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Abstract
This thesis presents a qualitative account of what affective polarisation looks 
like at the level of online user-generated discourse. It examines how users of 
the American right-wing news and opinion website TheBlaze.com articulated 
partisan oppositions in the site’s below-the-line comment field during and after 
the 2016 US presidential election. To date, affective polarisation has been stud-
ied from a predominantly quantitative perspective that has focused largely on 
partisanship as a powerful form of social identity. This contributes to a growing 
recognition of the central role of partisan identity in the evaluation of politics by 
publics within the American two-party system. However, analyses of partisan 
identification in the US have also shown how negative affect towards opposing 
partisans has led some people to dislike the other party more than they like the 
one with which they identify. This establishes a pivotal relation between affec-
tive polarisation and so-called negative partisanship. At the same time, the elec-
tion of Donald Trump as US president has led to a new interest in the content 
and articulation of American conservative identity, particularly as this relates to 
the role of hybrid partisan media in the production and negotiation of group 
boundaries. Against this backdrop, my thesis concentrates on the construction 
of self/other distinctions in partisan news commentary. It employs a conceptual 
framework which integrates constructionist thematic analysis with an articulation 
approach grounded in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. Articulation is here 
viewed as the ongoing struggle to “fix” meaning – including the meaning of so-
ciety and identity – in ways that exclude other meanings. This highlights the es-
sentially political dimensions of articulation as the mechanism via which the so-
cial is produced through discursive acts of opposition and exclusion. My analy-
sis reveals how the boundaries of American conservatism are contested 
through the public performance of antagonism; how characterisations of political 
difference are performed with reference to the political and economic signifi-
cance of hybrid partisan media; and how the use of partisan media is rhetorical-
ly related to broader historical processes of social, cultural, and political trans-
formation via antagonistic imaginaries of American past, present, and future – 
processes which are claimed to threaten America’s survival as a manifestation 
of divine providence encoded in the US Constitution. 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Chapter 1: Introduction – contextualising 
American conservative outrage online
Since every search for identity includes differentiating oneself from what 
one is not, identity politics is always and necessarily a politics of the cre-
ation of difference. One is a Bosnian Serb to the degree to which one is 
not a Bosnian Moslem or a Croat; one is a Gush Emmunim settler in the 
West Bank to the extent that one is not a secular Zionist; one belongs to 
the “European anthropological-cultural community” to the degree that one 
is not from the Maghreb, the Middle East, or Asia. What is shocking about 
these developments is not the inevitable dialectic of identity/difference that 
they display but rather the atavistic belief that identities can be maintained 
and secured only by eliminating difference and otherness. 
Seyla Benhabib, Democracy and Difference, 1996
Political life concerns collective, public action; it aims at the construction of 
a ‘we’ in a context of diversity and conflict. But to construct a ‘we’ it must 
be distinguished from the ‘them,’ and that means establishing a frontier, 
defining an ‘enemy’.
Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political, 1993
1.1 Introduction
This is a thesis on the subject of affective polarisation in the United States. 
Through a focus on how users of the American right-wing news and opinion 
website TheBlaze.com articulated partisan oppositions in a below-the-line 
comment field in the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the 2016 US presi-
dential election, I seek to offer a qualitative account of what affective polarisa-
tion looks like at the level of online user-generated discourse. In so doing, I 
present an analysis that focuses on one side of the polarised political culture in 
the US. Concentrating on the construction of self/other distinctions in right-wing 
partisan news commentary, my conceptual framework integrates constructionist 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) with an articulation approach ground-
ed in the work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (e.g., Laclau, 1990; Laclau 
& Mouffe, 2001). Articulation is here viewed as the ongoing struggle to “fix” 
meaning – including the meaning of society and identity – in ways that exclude 
other meanings (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), highlighting the essentially politi-
cal dimensions of articulation as the mechanism via which the social is pro-
duced through discursive acts of opposition and exclusion. Normatively speak-
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ing, affective polarisation is for the most part viewed as problematic (Reiljan, 
2020). Seen by some as a major impediment to idealised models of democratic 
engagement, e.g., rational deliberation (see Sunstein, 2009), there is neverthe-
less a significant ongoing debate regarding the social, cultural, and political im-
plications of affective polarisation. My research speaks to this debate by focus-
ing on how partisan media users actively contest categories of political opposi-
tion in a below-the-line comment field.
Affective polarisation has heretofore been studied from a predominantly quanti-
tative perspective, one which has employed a social identity approach to con-
ceptualising the power of partisanship (Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, 
& Westwood, 2019). Affective polarisation differs from ideological polarisation 
insofar as it refers to the propagation of negative affect towards the opposition – 
i.e., political parties, politicians, and partisans – as opposed to the entrench-
ment of disagreement over policy preferences. This reflects a growing recogni-
tion of the central role of partisan identity in the moral evaluation of politics by 
publics, particularly in the context of the American two-party system (Kreiss, 
2017). However, analyses of partisanship in the US have shown how negative 
affect towards opposing partisans has led some people to dislike the other party 
more than they like the one with which they identify (Abramowitz & McCoy, 
2019). This so-called “negative partisanship” is defined as “the phenomenon 
whereby Americans largely align against one party instead of affiliating with the 
other” (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018, p. 119). The rise in negative partisanship 
coincides with an entrenchment of other forms of social divisions, including 
racial, geographical, and ideological distinctions, that Abramowitz (2018) terms 
“the great alignment.” This concept describes a “growing alignment of partisan 
identities with deeper divisions in American society and culture” (Abramowitz, 
2018, p. x).
At the same time, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United 
States in 2016 has prompted a significant interest in contemporary American 
conservatism. Trump’s election has been portrayed as the outcome of economic 
hardship as well as “status threat felt by the dwindling proportion of traditionally 
high-status Americans (i.e., whites, Christians, and men)” (Mutz, 2018, p. 
E4330). Trump’s election has therefore created a new impetus to study the ar-
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ticulation of conservative identity (Kreiss, Barker, & Zenner, 2017), particularly 
among the American white working class, as well as the qualitative “identity 
content” of both liberalism and conservatism (K. Hanson, O'Dwyer, & Lyons, 
2019). Identity content is an important element of self-categorisation theory that 
has been under-explored. This is important because it has been shown that be-
liefs around what people think it means to be a member of a group have been 
demonstrated to have an impact on attitudes towards the other (K. Hanson et 
al., 2019), reflecting a more discursively oriented concept of identity as a rela-
tional construct (Benhabib, 1996; Hastings & Manning, 2004b; Mouffe, 1993). In 
that regard, a significant challenge for future research, according to Chadwick 
(2019, p. 7), is the fact that digital politics scholarship has gravitated towards 
"cases that are progressive or pro-liberal democratic.” Indeed, anthropologist 
Hugh Gusterson (2017) likewise highlights the manner in which analyses of 
Trump require engaging with communities that have heretofore largely been 
shunned by academics.
Studying the articulation of American conservative identity in the aftermath of 
the rise of Donald Trump raises a number of central concerns relating to dis-
courses of race and, specifically, whiteness. Alongside a growth in affective po-
larisation and negative partisanship, there has also been a marked increase in 
levels of racial resentment among white Republican voters (Abramowitz & 
Webster, 2018). Numerous scholars have already demonstrated the relation be-
tween Trump support and racial resentment (e.g., Austermuehl, 2020; Drakulich 
et al., 2020). This racial resentment is linked in important ways to colour blind 
approaches to racial inequalities, which promote a “business as usual” attitude 
to racial inequalities (Mueller, 2017, p. 220). Such approaches have been de-
scribed by King and Smith (2014) as a “critical ideational development” that ma-
terially benefited Republican and conservative political agendas whilst indirectly 
contributing to polarisation and gridlock in the decades that followed the elec-
tion of Ronald Reagan. Whilst overt commentary on race has become largely 
implicit, it has nonetheless been seen as rooted in attempts to maintain white 
hegemony (Drakulich et al., 2020).
Whiteness is itself a construction that emerges from historically situated dis-
courses of power and domination, with shifting and contingent boundaries of 
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inclusion and exclusion that bridge class and capital (Olson, 2008). In that re-
gard, it has been argued that colour blind approaches facilitate white ignorance 
and, in so doing, reproduce mechanisms by which established power structures 
are rendered invisible and persistent (Mueller, 2017) – processes by which 
whiteness is “masked as a category” that is social constituted through discur-
sive strategies that enable the dominance of the “colourless multi-colouredness 
of whiteness” (Dyer, 1988, p. 46). Constructions of whiteness in this sense func-
tion metonymically via what Dyer (2005, p. 10) calls “white racial imagery” – i.e., 
the racial imagery of white people themselves.  
In this regard, Hochschild (2016) offered a view on the feeling among white 
conservatives that racial minorities are receiving preferential treatment in the 
US – that they are cutting in line on the path to the American dream – shading 
the formative imaginaries of American nationhood with racial connotations. Re-
latedly, Lakoff (1995) proposed an interpretation of the functioning of discourses 
of morality, authority, and self-reliance through the metaphorical deployment of 
images of the strict father, a strategy that has been shown to be more prevalent 
among Republicans (Ohl et al., 2013). Lakoff (2016) has more recently returned 
to this theme to argue that the moral framework of the strict father provides a 
perfect mechanism for understanding support for Trump, particularly among 
while Evangelicals. In the contemporary US, discursive constructs align ideas 
about governance with antagonistic understandings of racial and political identi-
ties, linking images of crime, irresponsibility, and danger with non-whites and 
non-conservatives (King & Smith, 2014; Abramowitz & Webster, 2018), labelling 
"white" and “male” as "good" through discursive acts of opposition (Applebaum, 
2016; Lakoff, 2016). These metaphors at once saturate and animate the distinc-
tions between conservatives and their opponents, populating the characterolog-
ical frameworks of partisanship with moralistic images of race, religion, class, 
and gender.
In the context of a growing interest in the social, cultural, and political position-
ing of white Christian conservatism, Kreiss, Barker, and Zenner (2017, p. 475) 
argue that more studies are required in order to address the question of how 
these religious, class, and gender identities are “articulated, made salient, main-
tained, and linked to partisanship and political issues, through media and inter-
	 	 14
personally.” They argue that, whilst the current focus on partisanship and parti-
san identity is welcome, we still know little about the ways in which “partisan 
identity is constructed, communicated, and maintained, and how it is linked to 
race, perceptions of moral worth, and social status” (Kreiss et al., 2017, p. 475). 
Providing an account of how this process of the discursive production of differ-
ence operates in user-generated online political talk is one of the key goals of 
my research.
At the same time, a research agenda that seeks to examine the discursive pro-
duction of partisan distinctions can be situated within the context of a broader 
push towards a more qualitative approach to political communication (Karpf, 
Kreiss, Nielsen, & Powers, 2015). This is a key motivation for my own work, 
which examines the discursive production of partisan oppositions within a right-
wing media ecosystem that is characterised, it has been argued, by misinforma-
tion, radicalisation, and social division (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018). A quali-
tative analysis of these phenomena may help to reveal their dynamic and con-
tested character (C. Jackson & Sherriff, 2013). 
Rather than seek to offer a measure of affective polarisation in the US context, 
or to trace its causes or effects, then, my thesis aims to provide a qualitative ac-
count of how affective polarisation is performed in the online political talk of a 
right-wing partisan media audience. I do so by examining how the users of the 
conservative news and opinion website TheBlaze.com employ the public per-
formance of antagonism to articulate the boundaries of American conservatism 
in “below-the-line” (Graham & Wright, 2015) news commentary. As will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in section 1.2.2 (see also Chapters 5 and 6), The-
Blaze.com was a notable outlier in a conservative media ecosystem that was 
predominantly characterised by support for Donald Trump’s candidacy during 
the 2016 US presidential election cycle. Audience response to this stance ani-
mates my data sample. Insofar as my analysis centres on how users contest 
the meaning of political opposition as well as oppositional media in responses 
posted to TheBlaze.com, the embeddedness of partisan media in the contem-
porary struggle to define the meaning of American conservatism is the primary 
focus of my research.
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To the extent that my research focuses on the discursive production of antago-
nistic frontiers (Laclau, 2000) – i.e., self/other distinctions – in a partisan media 
environment, my analysis also considers how users draw on a variety of discur-
sive “resources” (Chadwick, Vaccari, & O’Loughlin, 2018a) in giving voice to 
outrage on political platforms. As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, 
these heterogeneous elements may include rhetorical genres and contentious 
media content, amongst other resources. In so doing, I will examine the ways in 
which outrageous representations of political opposition are woven together 
with other forms of political talk in user-generated below-the-line commentary. 
Insofar as the concept of a “hybrid media system” (Chadwick, 2013) also high-
lights the manner in which discursive authority is contested in contemporary 
media, articulation theory will provide a framework for thinking about the oppor-
tunities users have not only to reproduce but also to resist dominant or hege-
monic significations.
By drawing on the work of Mouffe and Laclau, my thesis orients towards the es-
sentially political dimensions of articulation as the mechanism via which the so-
cial is produced through discursive acts of opposition and exclusion. In so do-
ing, I propose antagonism as a key concept with which to grasp the dynamism 
of the categories of distinction on which affective polarisation operates. Whilst 
Reiljan (2020) argues that levels of affective polarisation in the US are in fact 
exceeded by those found in a number of European democracies, a significant 
body of research now exists which focuses on affective polarisation among 
American partisans. Given the extensive public and scholarly interest in affec-
tive polarisation in the US, I argue it is reasonable to focus on the US for the 
purposes of a qualitative case study. In focusing on processes of affective polar-
isation as discursive phenomena, however, my specific interest lies in exploring 
the role of contemporary media in the production of identity/difference distinc-
tions.
My empirical analysis of user-generated below-the-line comments at The-
Blaze.com demonstrates the ways in which the boundaries of American conser-
vatism are contested through the public performance of antagonism. It shows 
that the characterisations of self and other on which the contested meanings of 
conservatism rest are articulated not only with reference to political parties, 
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politicians, and partisans. Rather, through the classification of congruence and 
oppositionality, they are also mapped onto representations of media outlets, fig-
ures, and content. In addition, my analysis reveals how characterisations of po-
litical opposition are performed with reference to the political economy of hybrid 
partisan media, presenting media choice as something that has both political 
and economic significance. Lastly, my analysis establishes how the use of parti-
san media is rhetorically related in user-generated content to broader historical 
processes of social, cultural, and political transformation via antagonistic imagi-
naries of American past, present, and future. Media choice is in this sense dis-
cursively linked to actions that are claimed to threaten the survival of America 
and American nationhood, each viewed as manifestations of divine providence 
encoded in the US Constitution.
This first chapter, however, serves as an introduction to my thesis. First, I de-
scribe the context of my research – focusing first on the broader background 
before outlining my particular case study. Here, I offer an account of a number 
of relevant transformations in the US media environment over the past several 
decades that have seen the emergence of forms of media that are at once more 
participatory and more partisan. This is followed by an introduction to the work 
of the American conservative media figure Glenn Beck, including an overview of 
TheBlaze.com, the empirical focus of my research, which was founded by Beck 
in 2012. I conclude this contextual overview by outlining how focusing on The-
Blaze.com as a contested space in the context of the 2016 US presidential 
election will help to reveal not only important insights into the fractures and fis-
sures that typify American conservatism but also how those schisms are negoti-
ated discursively. Second, I offer a general overview of my doctoral research 
project. This includes outlining some of my primary aims, objectives, concepts, 
and methods. Here, I also briefly sketch out some of the main gaps in the litera-
ture to which I address my arguments. Third, I present a chapter-by-chapter 
outline of my thesis, which briefly sketches out my conceptual framework as 
well as some of my main findings.
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1.2 Context
In a general sense, this thesis examines the role of partisan media in American 
political life. As argued by Bateman (2017), when one is seeking to produce an 
analysis of the changing role of media in society, it is imperative that one devel-
ops a solid conceptual account of what one means by the term “media.” In what 
follows, I provide some contextual information that highlights and disambiguates 
two distinct models of “media” that will appear throughout this thesis. First, fo-
cusing on transformations in the American political media environment, I will of-
fer an overview of how communications scholars conceptualise contemporary 
media. In particular, in consideration of the participatory dimensions of media, I 
will focus on Chadwick’s (2013) concept of media hybridity, which foregrounds 
the uneven interaction between older and newer media in the redistribution of 
power that characterises contemporary media in the US. Second, focusing on 
the specific case of TheBlaze.com, which I relate to the broader partisan media 
operations of the site’s initial owner, conservative media figure Glenn Beck, I will 
describe the emergence of a populist concept of media-as-antagonists. In de-
scribing these phenomena, I will introduce some of the fears that have been 
expressed regarding the implications of media that are at once increasingly par-
ticipatory and partisan. Third, I will describe how taking TheBlaze provides an 
opportunity to reveal the fractures and fissures that characterise the contempo-
rary American right.
1.2.1 Transformations in the political media environment in the US
A discussion of the social role of media is fundamentally a discussion of power. 
Media power has been theorised in a variety of ways. Chouliaraki (2008), for 
example, argues that the ability to produce and perform the categories of ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ as well as to orient the audience towards these categories defines 
the power of mediation. Couldry and Curran (2003, p. 4), on the other hand, de-
fine media power as “an emergent form of social power in complex societies 
whose basic infrastructure depends increasingly on the fast circulation of infor-
mation and images” [emphasis in original]. They argue that struggle over control 
of representational resources figures centrally in many conflicts, even when not 
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explicitly centred, calling to mind Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic power, i.e., the 
“power to construct reality” (1979, p. 79).
This notion of contestation constitutes a fundamental characteristic of Chad-
wick’s (2013) concept of a hybrid media system, which conceptualises a media 
environment that is “far more diverse, fragmented, polycentric” than conceived 
of in older models of the relation between media and their publics. Moving on 
from a model of the audience as passive consumers beholden to powerful mass 
media, Chadwick sets out an image of porous boundaries between newer and 
older media constituted through the productive forces of audiences and institu-
tions. He argues:
Power in a hybrid media system is exercised by those who are successful-
ly able to create, tap, or steer information flows in ways that suit their goals 
and in ways that modify, enable or disable others’ agency, across and be-
tween a range of older and newer media settings. (Chadwick, 2013, p. 
207)
This model goes some way to addressing Bennett and Iyengar’s (2010, p. 38) 
exhortation that “communication theory needs to adjust to the new conditions in 
the sender–receiver–audience paradigm” that characterise current media. 
The contemporary proliferation of digital communication technologies has seen 
media institutions and publics assume competing roles as producers and “pro-
dusers” (Bruns, 2006) of mediated political discourse, challenging traditional 
regimes of political and media power. This introduces some important chal-
lenges to established concepts of not only the audience-media interface, but 
also the ontology of the media text. Afforded expanded abilities to produce me-
dia texts themselves, users of newer media can not only avoid anxieties around 
engaging in political conversations in face-to-face contexts, as described by 
Sobieraj et al. (2013, pp. 414-415); so, too, can some motivated participants ac-
tively challenge traditional media agendas through participatory practices of citi-
zen journalism and other modes of content production (Chadwick, 2013, p. 21).
Insofar as in a hybrid media system the power of publics comes up against the 
continuing power of political and media elites, Chadwick (2013, p. 210) argues, 
there are important constraints on the power of audiences to produce media 
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discourse. Competition and contestation are thus central features of Chadwick’s 
model. He writes:
If media are best seen throughout history as bundles of cultural, social, 
economic, and political practices, these practices are shaped by competi-
tive yet interdependent processes of hybridization involving multiple actors 
operating in and across diverse settings. (Chadwick, 2013, p. 26)
An important distinction to consider here is that which is theorised to obtain be-
tween alternative and mainstream media. 
Alternative media are defined by Couldry and Curran (2003, p. 7) as “media 
production that challenges, at least implicitly, actual concentrations of media 
power, whatever form those concentrations may take in different locations.” 
Fuchs (2010) supports a similar contention with his proposal that alternative 
media constitute critical media. In that regard, alternative media have been 
shown to play a role in cultivating political activism and counterpublics (Leung & 
Lee, 2014). This has traditionally been deemed to entail both collective rituals 
and the collective production of political messages (Fenton & Barassi, 2011). 
However, hybrid media are characterised by varying levels of user participation 
that have different degrees of political import, whilst also drawing on collective 
engagement in ways that differ significantly from more traditional forms of politi-
cal organisation. 
Television maintains a degree of dominance, even in the context of media that 
are seen as increasingly participatory. In that sense, Chadwick argues, “[t]elevi-
sion retains its primacy in the mediation of politics, though it is now accompa-
nied by a panoply of online media activity, some of which is facilitated by broad-
casters themselves” (2013, p. 59). Television’s “remarkable endurance,” he pro-
poses, is “reinforced by emerging patterns of online news consumption” that 
employ remediated television content as a focal point (Chadwick, 2013, p. 52). 
The relationship between older and newer forms of media is thus foregrounded, 
thus highlighting the relationship between television and newer forms of partici-
patory media.
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A focus on the role of social media platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and Face-
book is central to recent work on political activism in an international context, 
particularly left-wing political activism (Poell, 2014; Postill, 2013). Poell’s analy-
sis reveals “a media world that places the mass media at the margins and ele-
vates purveyors of social technology from NGOs to Flickr to prominent 
roles” (2014, p. 718). This line of inquiry fits with a model of “connective 
action” (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013), which is contrasted with older forms of 
collective organising, identification, and mobilisation. In this model, connective 
action is thought to no longer necessarily revolve around the “formation of col-
lective identities,” but is rather “based on the sharing of easily personalized 
ideas, such as ‘we are the 99%,’ through social media technologies” (Poell, 
2014, p. 718) – public words (Vidali, 1996) that circulate through so-called small 
media to potentially mass audiences. 
For Poell, it is “clear that activist communication is undergoing a profound trans-
formation” (2014, p. 728). Nevertheless, the notion of “politically significant be-
haviours” (Chadwick, Vaccari, & O’Loughlin, 2018b) encompasses a broad 
spectrum of participatory forms in a hybrid media system. This may entail the 
organisation of political engagement through horizontal communication net-
works, as in the case of protest movements such as Occupy and Indignados 
(Theocharis, Lowe, van Deth, & García-Albacete, 2015). However, political par-
ticipation in a hybrid media environment may also take the form of user-gener-
ated commentary. For example, Anstead and O’Loughlin (2011) show how syn-
chronous forms of commentary are becoming a prominent feature of participato-
ry politics, contributing to the development of what they term the “emerging 
viewertariat.” These practices are related to second or dual screening, which 
research has shown to be a notable predictor of online political participation (Gil 
de Zúñiga, Garcia-Perdomo, & McGregor, 2015). Indeed, the combination of 
political media consumption with participatory practices such as live-comment-
ing has been positively correlated with political engagement (Vaccari, Chadwick, 
& O'Loughlin, 2015).
In a hybrid media system, older distinctions between media production and 
consumption are variously being broken down and reformulated. Chadwick 
writes:
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When such large numbers of bloggers are now integrated into profession-
alized or semi-professionalized news production, when citizen activists are 
integrated into news-making assemblages through their participation as 
bloggers or Twitter or Facebook users, and when the vast majority of older 
media organisations have moved into the online environment, it is not al-
ways accurate to counterpose an online participatory culture against a 
centralized, top-down, broadcast media culture. (2013, p. 57)
Indeed, publics may sometimes occupy the same participatory environments as 
political and media elites (Chadwick, Dennis, & Smith, 2015). Nevertheless, 
some of these spaces serve to reproduce older distinctions between elites and 
publics, even whilst drawing on rhetorics of participation and user empower-
ment.
In that regard, the focus of my research is on user-generated below-the-line 
commentary on an American right-wing news and opinion website. So-called 
below-the-line comment fields refer to “comment and debate spaces opened up 
underneath news articles and blogs,” providing an opportunity for “audiences to 
discuss news content with each other and with journalists” (Graham & Wright, 
2015, p. 319). Thus, in the context of hybrid media, this framing of comment 
fields can be seen to demarcate a clear distinction between user-generated 
content and the formal outputs of journalists and other professional staff (Gra-
ham & Wright, 2015), with control of the news production process retained by 
media organisations (Jönsson & Örnebring, 2011). Nevertheless, below-the-line 
comment fields are an important and popular form of user-generated content in 
the context of news media (Hermida & Thurman, 2008).
Below-the-line comment fields provide a public mechanism for users to openly 
discuss their response(s) to the content of both above-the-line and below-the-
line media. However, they also increasingly constitute an important venue for 
internet-mediated political discussion (Reich, 2011; Walker et al., 2012). An in-
creasing level of attention is thus being paid to the democratic role and social 
impacts of participatory media, including the potential for below-the-line com-
ment fields to serve as a space for deliberation (Dahlberg, 2011), widely viewed 
as a normative ideal of democratic participation. This will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 2 (see section 2.3 pp. 60-75).
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At the same time, below-the-line comment fields are also the focus of growing 
concerns regarding the implications of incivility in American political talk (Ander-
son, Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, & Ladwig, 2013). The incidence of incivility in 
American political discourse is a theme that has been studied extensively 
(Brooks & Geer, 2007; Herbst, 2010; Mutz & Reeves, 2005; York, 2013). Forms 
of incivility in user-generated content have likewise received scholarly attention. 
For example, focusing on online discourse, Hardaker (2010, p. 238) defines 
trolling as attempts to “cause disruption and/or to trigger or exacerbate conflict 
for the purposes of [a user’s] own amusement,” a practice that may rely on sub-
terfuge and deception (Donath, 2002). Hmielowski et al. (2014, p. 1197), on the 
other hand, focus on flaming, which they define as the “use of aggressive lan-
guage in an online context.” These concepts share a number of discursive fea-
tures with the concept of outrage outlined by Berry and Sobieraj (2013), includ-
ing the prevalence of ad hominem attacks on opponents.
Whilst research has shown the use of aggressive language in online political 
discussions to be common (Papacharissi, 2004a), empirical studies of comment 
fields demonstrate contradictory findings. For example, research by Gardiner 
(2018) reveals ad hominem attacks to be a common feature of comments post-
ed to the below-the-line comment field at TheGuardian.com. In contrast, re-
search by Canter (2013) shows levels of incivility to be more limited than as-
sumed by many commenters, whilst for Halpern and Gibbs (2013), highly con-
tentious topics are more likely to produce uncivil responses. Likewise, levels of 
civility have been shown to differ depending on degrees of anonymity (Kiesler, 
Siegel, & McGuire, 1984), for example when users comment in response to 
Facebook posts versus in below-the-line comment fields on a news website, 
e.g., The Washington Post (Rowe, 2015). Existing research thus demonstrates 
variations in levels of incivility that are tied not just to the content of news items 
but also to the context within which comments are made. Following Chen 
(2017), then, it is not a simple either/or question of incivility or deliberation, but 
rather a matter of how they co-occur in online news comments.
Aside from concerns about the deliberative quality of user-generated below-the-
line commentary, the wide availability of partisan media in a high-choice media 
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environment is cited as a concern regarding the democratic function and delib-
erative quality of media discourse more broadly speaking (Mansbridge et al., 
2012). This was not always the case. In the US, for example, the professional 
ideal of objectivity became a defining characteristic of American journalistic 
practice from the early 20th century (Kperogi, 2013, pp. 51-52). For the past 
number of decades, however, significant structural transformations in the global 
media environment have laid the groundwork for a growing prevalence of parti-
san media outlets in the US (Levendusky, 2013a; Prior, 2013). Partisan media 
saliently privilege particular ideological perspectives and affective judgments 
about perceived opponents through a number of mechanisms, including the use 
of politically biased reporting (Groeling, 2013) and uncivil discourse (Gervais, 
2014), for example. Partisan media tend to frame the news as a struggle be-
tween two opposing camps, i.e., Republicans and Democrats in the US context 
(Levendusky, 2013a). In that regard, Levendusky argues, partisan media 
“shape how viewers see the “other side” because they powerfully invoke view-
ers’ partisan (social) identities” (2013a, p. 567)
The prevalence of uncivil discourse in partisan media is a matter of interest 
among scholars of political communication (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Gervais, 
2014; Mutz & Reeves, 2005). Yet incivility, Sobieraj and Berry argue (2011, p. 
20), no longer serves as an adequate model for the propensity towards conflict 
that is the mark of contemporary political media in the US. Instead, they note 
the rise of an “outrage industry” (J. M. Berry & Sobieraj, 2013) that spans media 
formats including cable television, talk radio, and political blogs. Outrage-based 
political opinion media, they argue, boast audiences that are both “impressive 
and unprecedented” (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011, p. 35). Most importantly, however, 
they are typified by a specific rhetorical form that they term “outrage discourse.” 
Whereas political incivility is characterised by “gratuitous asides that show a 
lack of respect and/or frustration with the opposition” (Mutz & Reeves, 2005, p. 
5), outrage discourse goes beyond incivility to encompass rhetorical efforts to 
provoke “visceral responses” of fear, moral righteousness, anger, and indigna-
tion from audiences through the use of “overgeneralizations, sensationalism, 
misleading or patently inaccurate information, ad hominem attacks, and partial 
truths about opponents” (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011, p. 19).
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However, it is seen not so much as a mode of affect as it is a commercially 
strategic deployment of antagonistic rhetoric. Although outrage discourse is to 
be found in both liberal and conservative media, it is argued to be notably more 
prevalent among right-leaning outlets (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011), constituting a 
potent force in contemporary American conservatism. 
Berry and Sobieraj (2013) look to a series of formative regulatory, political, and 
technological transformations that laid the foundations for the development of 
the outrage industry. Whilst some of these transformations have had global 
reach and impact, including technological changes of various kinds, it is impor-
tant to understand those dimensions that are specific to the US context. For ex-
ample, significant changes in US media regulations enabled newer forms of 
media ownership that facilitated the emergence of cable news in the 1990s and 
talk radio even earlier (Aufderheide, 1990, 1999). These changes have con-
tributed to a reshaping of the US media environment that has powerful implica-
tions for American politics in general (Levendusky, 2013a). The rise of the out-
rage industry should thus be understood in the context of the more generalised 
growth in partisan media outlets over the past several decades. 
Whilst the circulation of media formats more traditionally viewed as reliable 
sources of political information is declining (Deuze, Bruns, & Neuberger, 2007), 
audience figures for outrage-based content are steadily growing (J. M. Berry & 
Sobieraj, 2013). In order to explain this contrast, Sobieraj et al. (2013) suggest 
that outrage-based media may be bringing about new modes of political con-
versation, constituted through “parasocial" (D. C. Giles, 2002; Horton & Wohl, 
1956) interaction with media figures. By permitting audiences to avoid cross-
cutting political discussion, they argue, these new modes of political discussion 
may allow conservatives, in particular, to alleviate fears that their views will be 
perceived as intolerant (Sobieraj et al., 2013, p. 428). Such fear of stigmatisa-
tion in cross-cutting political talk has indeed been posited as central to the cul-
ture of avoidance that is seen to characterise American political talk (Eliasoph, 
1998; Mutz, 2006a). As discussed above, however, newer media have intro-
duced novel tools that can be utilised by audiences in order to engage in politi-
cal discussion.
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In that regard, a growing hybridisation in the production and circulation of media 
content introduces some important challenges to the notion that outrage can be 
viewed purely as a business strategy of commercial media, problematising the 
relationship between the outrage discourse of institutional media and the out-
rage voiced by those who engage with them. For example, the occurrence of 
incivility in below-the-line comments has been linked to contextual factors, such 
as article topic, article author, and sources cited in the article (Coe, Kenski, & 
Rains, 2014). This is an indicator that partisan cues are important for news au-
diences (N. J. Stroud, 2011). In that sense, it is important to consider not only 
the kinds of content with which audiences are engaging, but also how they are 
being utilised as resources.
A variety of distinctions define the intersection of professional and user-gener-
ated outputs in online news, speaking to enduring variations in terms of how in-
stitutional producers and audience “produsers” (Bruns, 2009) generate content. 
As noted above, below-the-line comment fields reproduce this distinction be-
tween elite and public discourse. However, news media also provide an array of 
resources for citizens to express political agency in the everyday spaces of so-
cial media (Chadwick et al., 2018b), speaking to Stroud’s (2011) argument that 
news audiences respond to partisan cues. Although their strategies may differ, 
outrage-based political opinion media and audience produsers can draw on 
similar discursive resources in their characterisation of both political opponents 
and oppositional media. However, those resources are not evenly distributed, 
both in terms of the uneven partisanship of the US media environment and in 
terms of the differential access to discursive authority enjoyed by elites and 
publics in a hybrid media system. 
1.2.2 Glenn Beck and TheBlaze
This thesis presents a case study of TheBlaze.com, the alternative media outlet 
developed by conservative media figure Glenn Beck and his production compa-
ny, Mercury Radio Arts. Glenn Beck came to prominence in the late 2000s as a 
conservative talk radio and television host and is now constituted as the focal 
figure in an expansive media production enterprise entailing internet, television, 
radio, books, magazines, and speaking tours. A message on the Mercury Radio 
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Arts homepage describes Beck as a “radio and TV personality, bestselling au-
thor, producer, filmmaker, clothier, entrepreneur, constitutionalist, curator, and 
humanitarian.” 
Beck styles himself as “the fusion of entertainment and enlightenment” — a 
claim that appears repeatedly throughout the years in interviews, press releas-
es, and even formerly as a motto on his website prior to the rebranding of his 
radio show and website as “Glenn” in 2017. This characterisation speaks openly 
to the increasingly “porous boundaries” between so-called hard news and enter-
tainment (Williams & Delli Carpini, 2011). At the same time, Beck’s style is 
recognised as confessional, catastrophic, and frequently paranoid. In that re-
gard, numerous commentators have situated Beck’s rhetoric in terms of Richard 
Hofstadter’s (1964) seminal essay ‘The Paranoid Style in American Politics’  – 
an analysis that has also frequently been applied to the Tea Party movement 
with which Beck has been associated (Courser, 2012). Above all, Beck’s style is 
framed as conservative, revelatory, and explicitly Christian. 
Glenn Beck’s outputs represent a particular mode of affective media production 
(Jutel, 2018). He narrates a universe in which apocalypses political, social, and 
economic are foretold as a matter of course (Kelly, 2012). However, revealing 
the threat posed to the American nation by those who would seek to destroy it 
from both within and without is portrayed as a dangerous act. The very act of 
discussing the threat to American sovereignty and nationhood is rhetorically 
posited as a threat to Beck as a speaker. This frames Beck’s outputs in terms of 
what Foucault (2001) referred to as “fearless speech” or parrhesia – i.e., 
“speaking truth to power despite danger” (Jutel, 2018, p. 377). Whilst parrhesia 
in Foucault’s model is presented as the very antithesis of demagogic rhetoric, 
Beck assumes the rhetorical form of parrhesia in his specific style of affective 
performance. Nevertheless, Beck’s truth-telling is frequently underscored by 
pedagogical and didactic metaphors, through these performing evidence of 
truths revealed to his audience (Kelly, 2012). However, the apocalyptic imagery 
which typifies Beck’s rhetoric is also frequently accompanied prominently by 
product advertising (e.g., survivalist tools, gold coins) that seeks to monetise 
fears engendered regarding the coming apocalypse (McNaught, 2013).
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Having joined Fox News Channel in 2009, Beck became a prominent figure in 
American conservatism. At the same time as Beck became a prominent figure 
at Fox News Channel, he likewise made a name as a figurehead within the 
outwardly leaderless Tea Party movement. Indeed, so embedded in Tea Party 
politics did Beck become that many local chapters even named themselves af-
ter his “9/12 Project,” whose stated aim was to rediscover Americans’ sense of 
national togetherness and purpose on the day after 9/11(The Blaze Staff, 2017). 
For example, in September 2009, Beck figured centrally in the “Taxpayer March 
on Washington,” which itself emerged from Beck’s 9/12 project and was nation-
ally coordinated by a number of organisations, including FreedomWorks, Tea 
Party Patriots, and the Patriot Action Network (Courser, 2010). 
As noted by Chadwick (2013, p. 55), Beck was also able to leverage the hori-
zontal online networks that had been established by the Tea Party movement 
when he organised the “Restoring Honor” rally on the National Mall in Washing-
ton DC in August 2010. These examples raise the question of how Beck can be 
seen to “reanimate” left-wing modes of protest and organisation from the post-
war era (Our Literal Speed, 2010, p. 387) at the same time as he draws on 
modes of rhetoric associated with the civil rights movement (C. A. Young, 
2019).  According to Jutel (2018), these rallies formed part of a broader affec1 -
tive media apparatus via which Beck’s media enterprise was enabled by the 
“free labour” (Terranova, 2000) of both his audience and Tea Party movement 
activists.
After comments claiming President Barack Obama was a “racist with a deep-
seated hatred of white people and white culture” (Kavanaugh, 2009), Beck’s 
Fox News Channel show was subjected to an advertising boycott orchestrated 
by left-wing activists (McNaught, 2013) – a successful example both of what 
McNaught (2013) refers to as “free-market censorship” or what Neilson (2010) 
terms “political consumerism.” Beck left Fox News Channel in 2011 and 
launched his eponymous internet television project, GBTV. It was only after a 
number of consolidations that in 2012 GBTV became TheBlaze, integrating with 
 Berlet and Lyons (2000, p. 2) argue that right-wing populist movements frequently 1
borrow “political slogans, tactics, and forms of organization from the Left, but harness 
them to rightist goals.”
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TheBlaze.com, which had been launched in 2010, to create a “single multi-plat-
form media company” (Weprin, 2012).
TheBlaze offers a mix of news and opinion pieces, with user-generated content 
following the model of TheGuardian.com's “Comment is Free” section. In fact, it 
has been claimed that TheBlaze is specifically designed in the model best ex-
emplified by the liberal-leaning alternative media outlet The Huffington Post 
(Rose, 2010). TheBlaze is particularly notable for its multi-platform, “transme-
dia” (Jansson & Lindell, 2015) characteristics. Whilst captures of Beck’s daily 
radio talk show are available in back catalogue on Soundcloud and via podcast 
through iTunes, shows can be reached not only via the website itself, but also 
via Facebook Live. 
At the time of its launch, Beck commented on his motivations in creating The-
Blaze. He wrote:
Too many important stories are overlooked. And too many times we see 
mainstream media outlets distorting facts to fit rigid agendas. Not that 
you’ve ever heard me complain about the media before. Okay, maybe 
once or twice. But there comes a time when you have to stop complaining 
and do something. And so we decided to hire some actual journalists to 
launch a new website — The Blaze. And we moved fast. We built the team 
and the site in just two months. We want this to be a place where you can 
find breaking news, original reporting, insightful opinions and engaging 
videos about the stories that matter most. The Blaze will be about current 
news — and more. It’s not just politics and policy. It’s looking for insight 
wherever we find it. We’ll examine our culture, deal with matters of faith 
and family, and we won’t be afraid of a history lesson. (G. Beck, 2010)
Whist in the previous section, I outlined a concept of media rooted in the out-
puts of communications scholarship, here I draw attention to a more antagonis-
tic model in which mainstream media are portrayed as agents of duplicity and 
deceit, which forms the basis of my analysis in Chapter 5 (see section 5.2 pp. 
155-165). 
Haller and Holt (2019a) note a prominent tendency among populist figures to 
characterise mainstream media in antagonistic terms, through the use of the 
term “Lügenpresse” – i.e., “lying press” – recontextualising a term notably asso-
ciated with Nazi rhetoric regarding press criticism (Prince, 2018). As Haller and 
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Holt highlight, however, with reference to the example of PEGIDA  in Germany 2
and Austria, this is a practice that continues today. As argued above, in the con-
text of partisan media, particularly outrage-based political opinion media, an-
tagonistic frontiers between mainstream and right-leaning alternative media are 
also produced discursively as a rhetorical strategy by media figures (Arceneaux, 
Johnson, & Murphy, 2012). 
Jutel (2013) identifies both Beck and Fox News Channel as major proponents 
of such antagonistic rhetoric, although Beck’s approach is presented as excep-
tional. Beck, Jutel remarks, “engaged in seeming revolutionary exposition in 
consecrating a populist community across media space, unified by a transgres-
sive dehumanization of its enemy” (2018, p. 376) – a mode of performance 
which had a profound impact on American political discourse in general. Indeed, 
Young (2019) contends that Beck’s specific brand of populist rhetoric laid the 
groundwork for the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States 
– a matter of some irony, considering Beck’s notable anti-Trump stance during 
the 2016 US presidential election cycle.
Insofar as audiences are likely to draw cues from trusted sources (Ladd, 
2010a), how audiences engage with this kind of content is important. Neverthe-
less, evidence indicates that audience engagement with Glenn Beck and his 
media enterprise is somewhat fraught. This speaks to Beck’s difficulties in terms 
of the “new political economy of the media field” (Jutel, 2013), in which move-
ment populism and media exist in a state of symbiosis. In spite of Beck’s erst-
while status as a media darling of populist conservatism (Rich, 2009), TheBlaze 
is widely discussed as a struggling endeavour. Beck has frequently spoken 
openly about the financial problems he has personally faced as a result. For a 
number of years, it has also been a topic of conversation amongst other right-
wing media figures. To give a sense of the transformation, TheBlaze laid off 20 
percent of its employees in August 2017 (Rothstein, 2017). Further layoffs in 
2018 reduced the company staff to less than 50, at a time when talks regarding 
 PEGIDA emerged as a populist street movement in 2014 (Dostal, 2015). PEGIDA is 2
the abbreviated form of “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlan-
des’ (Çakir, 2016), which translates as “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of 
the Occident” (Haller & Holt, 2019b).
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a sought-after bailout from the owners of conservative media figure Ben 
Shapiro’s website, The Daily Wire collapsed (Tani & Grove, 2018). 
It should be noted that since the period during which my data sample was pro-
duced, TheBlaze has undergone a merger with another conservative media out-
let, CRTV, led by Mark Levin (Concha, 2018). Both Levin and Beck were note-
worthy during the 2016 Republican primaries for their explicit NeverTrump  3
stance. Whilst Levin eventually came out in support of Trump, Beck maintained 
his position through the election and beyond. Declining viewership and financial 
conditions have been tied to Beck’s eventual support for President Donald 
Trump, which he expressed in May 2018, publicly stating he would support 
Trump’s 2020 re-election bid whilst donning a red “Make America Great Again” 
hat (Gallagher, 2018). Whilst Beck would later express his own support for 
President Trump, the way commenters discuss Beck’s attitude towards Trump 
as the Republican candidate and later President of the United States animates 
my data sample in ways that, I argue, demand significant scholarly attention.
1.2.3 TheBlaze as a site of contestation during the 2016 election
My position here is that selecting TheBlaze as a contested space during and 
after the 2016 US presidential election can offer some profound insights regard-
ing the fractures and fissures that define contemporary American conservatism. 
Whilst there are numerous examples of prominent right-wing media outlets that 
would provide more mainstream spaces within which to study the contemporary 
conservative media ecosystem (e.g., Breitbart, Fox News), the role played by 
TheBlaze was singular during 2016, as one of the only major right-wing partisan 
media outlets to refuse to support Trump’s candidacy.. Here, I outline this posi-
tion in greater detail, situating TheBlaze in terms of this ecosystem. 
Faris et al. (2017) show how the political media landscape in the US is not only 
asymmetrically characterised by higher levels of polarisation and partisanship 
on the right, but that it is also an ecosystem that is undergoing significant trans-
 For a detailed discussion of the NeverTrump phenomenon, see Johnson, McCray, 3
and Ragusa (2018a). The relation between Levin and Beck, including their status as 
prominent “NeverTrump” media figures, is discussed in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 
6.
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formations at the present time. This echoes the work of Berry and Sobieraj 
(2013), cited above, who demonstrate a greater prevalence of conservative out-
lets, with a noted dearth of liberal outrage media, particularly in terms of talk ra-
dio. Research on partisan media in the US has focused on the outsized role of 
Fox News Channel (J. M. Berry & Sobieraj, 2013; Hochschild, 2016). For 
Hochschild (2016, p. 126), Fox News exerts a “powerful influence” on its view-
ers; it “stands next to industry, state government, church, and the regular media 
as an extra pillar of political culture all its own…. To some, Fox is family.” In 
defining politics, it provides an affective framework for how people should emo-
tionally relate to politics. For Berry and Sobieraj (2013) and, later, Hochschild 
(2016), Fox News is seen as the dominant source of political information among 
conservatives. However, it is also seen to have “outsized importance in shaping 
political identity, attitudes about government, and beliefs” (Kreiss et al., 2017, p. 
474). 
More recently, research has focused on the significant role played by Breitbart 
(Benkler et al., 2018). Faris et al. (2017, p. 9) argue, for instance, that during the 
2016 US Presidential Election cycle, Breitbart emerged “as the nexus of con-
servative media,” a fact which represented a “significant reshaping of the con-
servative media landscape over the past several years.” In a New York Times 
profile of Breitbart and its elusive former editor Steve Bannon, Hylton (2017) 
wrote of Breitbart’s iconographic character, which has seen Breitbart constituted 
as dangerous media through media discourse. Nevertheless, such discourse 
constructions risk overplaying Breitbart’s importance. Republican politics 
throughout the 2016 election cycle were noteworthy for prominent resistance to 
Trump’s candidacy, even amongst Republican members of Congress (Johnson, 
McCray, & Ragusa, 2018b). In asserting Breitbart’s dominance in setting the 
tone of conservative media in 2016, media outlets, critics, and commentators 
risk downplaying or even erasing that factionalism. Likewise, many media or-
ganisations today are affected by large-scale economic pressures (M. T. 
Boykoff & Yulsman, 2013). By discussing Breitbart in terms of its precipitous 
success, the challenges facing both traditional and alternative media organisa-
tions as they attempt to navigate the vagaries of the US political media land-
scape are somewhat neglected. 
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The intense but also in many respects limited focus on the social role and status 
of Breitbart – and the Alt-Right as the social movement to which it has been re-
lated in public discourse (Heikkilä, 2017)(Heikkilä, 2017)(Heikkilä, 2017) – cre-
ates an image of uniformity within a right-wing media ecosystem. However, 
based on my articulation approach to the relation between media and affective 
polarisation in the US context, I argue this media environment is best under-
stood as characterised by struggles over the power and authority to define the 
nature, shape, and extent of contemporary American conservatism and other 
right-wing political ideologies and identities. The dearth of treatments of other 
right-wing media outlets that results from such a singular focus is a gap in the 
current crop of analyses. This is one of the key reasons why I have chosen not 
to focus on either Breitbart fo Fox News as my case study. 
Comparatively speaking, TheBlaze.com operates on a significantly smaller 
scale than Breitbart.com. For example, as of 27 December 2019, Breitbart.com 
was ranked #283 in global internet engagement by the web analytics platform 
Alexa  (based on certified data), whereas TheBlaze.com was ranked #6,477 4
during the same timeframe (based on estimated data). Similarly, whilst The-
Blaze.com had 7,334 sites linking in, Breitbart.com had 40,650. Although it may 
not receive the same visitor traffic or generate as much public interest, I argue 
TheBlaze.com nevertheless presents a challenging case study, insofar as it 
provides a rich empirical basis for exploring the dynamics of right-wing partisan 
media, as well as the factionalism of right-wing politics in the US.
A number of factors appear pertinent. First, how commenters respond to explicit 
and implicit partisan alignments can offer a perspective on how categories of 
oppositionality and likemindedness are constituted dynamically in user-generat-
ed discourse through the same articulatory processes as self/other distinctions 
and other forms of antagonism. Second, audience engagement also speaks to 
some of the pressures facing contemporary media, particularly in terms of the 
 Alexa is a subsidiary of Amazon. The site provides search engine optimisation and 4
web analytics data. Site ranking is based on certified or estimated data. According to 
Alexa.com, “global traffic rank is a measure of how a website is doing relative to all 
other sites on the web over the past 3 months. The rank is calculated using a propri-
etary methodology that combines a site's estimated average of daily unique visitors 
and its estimated number of pageviews over the past 3 months.”
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relationship between audience activity and advertising revenue in the produc-
tion of partisan news and opinion content. As advertising boycotts of right-wing 
media figures and outlets become a highly visible protest technique, TheBlaze.-
com offers a view not only on how media figures and the organisations with 
which they are associated respond to such tactics, but also how audiences 
conceptualise the significance of their own choice to tune in and tune out. Third, 
user-generated commentary posted to TheBlaze.com can also serve as a perti-
nent example of how a partisan media audience respond to a perceived shift in 
the partisan stance of their preferred media. This represents a challenging case 
study insofar as there is a dearth of literature dealing with audience responses 
to such dynamic transitions. The below-the-line comment field at TheBlaze.com 
thus presents a compelling space in which the boundaries of American conser-
vatism get contested in relation to publicly articulated feelings regarding the po-
litical and economic significance of partisan media.
My contention, as I have argued elsewhere (see Kelly, 2020), is that the public 
negotiation of Trump support in 2016 offers a compelling case study in how 
American conservative identities have been contested within a hybridised out-
rage media ecology. Whilst there are numerous prominent alternatives to Breit-
bart and Fox News, including Daily Caller, Infowars, and The Daily Wire,  none 
of these stood against Trump in 2016. The result is that nowhere was this par-
ticular form of contestation more prominent in 2016 than among the audience of 
TheBlaze. By offering a view on the kinds of oppositionality and outrage 
Trump’s 2016 candidacy engendered among a right-wing partisan media audi-
ence, this space can help to reveal a great deal about the articulation of con-
servative identity, but it also serves as a potent case study in the kinds struggles 
that define the market for conservative viewpoints. In 2016, all other prominent 
right-wing media eventually fell in line behind Trump as the representative of the 
Republican party and, by extension, of American conservatism. By refusing to 
voice his support for Trump, Beck became an outlier in a crowded field of con-
servative voices. He was joined in this controversial stance by only a subsection 
of his audience. The public contestation over the acceptance of Trump in 2016 
is a story that has thus far not been told in a way that rigorously depicts the af-
fective dynamics of these processes. That is the story that I tell in this thesis.
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1.3 Project overview
My analysis focuses on user-generated below-the-line commentary, which I 
conceptualise as a form of discursive performance through which meanings are 
publicly articulated. In particular, I am interested in how this pertains to the dis-
cursive construction of self/other distinctions in user-generated comments post-
ed to TheBlaze.com. This presents an opportunity to conduct a qualitative 
analysis of how affective polarisation manifests at the discursive level, with a 
particular focus on the role of right-wing partisan media in the production of an-
tagonistic oppositions.
With this thesis, I address four key objectives. First, I seek to explore how 
commenters use the public performance of antagonism to contest the bound-
aries of American conservatism in their online political talk. Second, I seek to 
examine how commenters perform their characterisation(s) of media in relation 
to publicly contested partisan antagonisms. Third, I seek to describe how com-
menters relate their use of partisan media to political and economic factors. 
Fourth, I seek to offer an account of how commenters relate their partisan me-
dia use to broader historical processes of social, cultural, and political transfor-
mation, particularly in terms of imaginaries of political past, present, and future. 
These main objectives are explicitly reflected in my four research questions, 
which I present at the end of Chapter 2.
My approach integrates constructionist thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 
2006) with an articulation paradigm grounded in the work of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe (2001). Empirically, my PhD data consist of a corpus of 5,288 
user-generated below-the-line comments posted to the conservative news and 
opinion website TheBlaze.com. These data are drawn from a sample of articles 
posted to the site during a six-month period around the 2016 US presidential 
election. My approach to sampling will be outlined in greater detail in Chapter 3 
(see section 3.3 pp. 98-110).
Importantly, through my focus on the performance of self/other distinctions, my 
conceptual framework distinguishes between attitudes and discourse. That is, I 
focus on the performance of partisan oppositions through user-generated con-
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tent without making claims as to the authenticity of the positions that may un-
derlie them. In so doing, I follow Hedrick, Karpf, & Kreiss (2018) in problematis-
ing the assumption of an “earnest internet,” orienting instead towards the poten-
tial “ambivalence” of online engagement (W. Phillips & Milner, 2018). My 
methodological approach is suited to this kind of ontology, insofar as my con-
structionist thematic analysis will not construe the words of users as a transpar-
ent window onto their views and attitudes. In the context of a growing preva-
lence of bots and other forms of automated content production, this is an ap-
proach that appears judicious. However, in this respect, my framework views 
the critical analysis of online political talk as a valuable endeavour in its own 
right.
This is a relatively limited data set drawn from a single website during a bound-
ed timeframe characterised by a presidential election and immediately following 
a contentious Republican Party primary. As such, any claims made herein must 
be understood in terms not only of their limited generalisability but also their po-
litically exceptional features. Whilst I will speak in more detailed terms about the 
limitations of my research in Chapter 8 (see section 8.4 pp. 268-272), I believe it 
is important to note from the outset these foundational limitations of my project. 
Nevertheless, even in its narrow focus on a single case study, my thesis seeks 
to make a series of contributions to scholarship in four principal areas. Some of 
these have been noted above, although I list them here explicitly for clarity. I will 
reflect on the extent to which my research achieves these contributions in 
Chapter 8 (see section 8.3 pp. 263-268).
First, affective polarisation has been conceptualised from a primarily quantita-
tive perspective through the lens of a social identity approach. As has been ar-
gued by Jackson and Sherriff (2013), however, the “messy" complexity of real-
world inter-group relations can usefully be revealed through qualitative analysis, 
including the production and significance of self/other distinctions. It should be 
noted that this is not an either/or proposition. A qualitative examination of affec-
tive polarisation should thus be seen as contributing to a more expansive, 
mixed-methods perspective on the development and expression of negative af-
fect towards the (perceived) opposition. 
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Second, and relatedly, a social identity approach has also been applied to the 
study of hostile media phenomena. As with processes of affective polarisation, 
an examination of hostile media perceptions and the expression of oppositional 
media hostility will likewise benefit, I argue, from a qualitative reappraisal. The 
relation between affective polarisation and hostile media perceptions is impor-
tant, insofar as in a partisan media environment that primes affective judgments 
about political opponents, attitudes towards political organisations and agents 
may become bound up in attitudes towards media.
Third, Berry and Sobieraj’s concept of the outrage industry views outrage as a 
business strategy. However, audiences can draw on similar generic frameworks 
in producing their responses to partisan media content (Kelly, 2020). It is there-
fore important to conceptualise outrage in a manner that can account for a mul-
tiplicity of audience voices. In that regard, my analysis focuses on the diversity 
of subject positions represented in a complex right-wing media ecology, con-
tributing to a body of research that seeks to apply Berry and Sobieraj’s concept 
of outrage to studies of incivility in user-generated content (e.g.`, Chen, 2017; 
Gervais, 2015b; Rao & Haina, 2017). 
Fourth, the site I have chosen serves as a case study that not only reveals ex-
treme competition within the right-wing partisan media market; it also speaks to 
the complex political economy of media ownership and participation in a hybrid 
media system.
My thesis examines how audiences respond to perceived shifts in alignment 
with media outlets, figures, and content. In a high-choice media environment in 
which partisan selection of media is thought to have important political and non-
political implications, this appears to be a phenomenon of some significance. 
However, as far as I have been able to establish, it has not as of yet been dealt 
with in the literature. My research examines how such reactions are articulated 
in user-generated below-the-line commentary, as well as how they are mapped 
onto affective judgments about politics and identity, thus contributing to an un-
derstanding of audience engagement with partisan media as a phenomenon 
that is both active and performative. At the same time, with this thesis, I seek to 
develop an approach to analysing the discursive dynamics of affective polarisa-
	 	 37
tion that has broader relevance beyond the context of my specific case study. 
This is a matter which I will discuss in greater depth in Chapter 8 (see section 
8.3 pp. 263-268)
1.4 Thesis outline
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This current chapter serves as an intro-
duction, providing important contextual information on my research area and 
case study, an overview of my research approach, and an outline of my thesis 
structure.
In Chapter 2, I outline my theoretical framework by focusing on three overarch-
ing concepts that are directly relevant to my analysis: polarisation, participation, 
and articulation. In each case, I contextualise each key concept in ways that 
highlight its relation to media and media-related practice. First, I outline argu-
ments pertaining to four specific forms of polarisation: elite, mass, ideological, 
and affective. Noting the quantitative basis of much work on affective polarisa-
tion, I propose a qualitative approach that recognises the dynamic, discursive 
character of self/other distinctions. Second, I examine a number of models of 
participation, particularly as this relates to normative debates about idealised 
forms of democratic engagement. Here, I examine some arguments regarding 
the democratic role of deliberation as well as some of the democratic implica-
tions of political consumerism in the context of hybrid media. Third, I outline my 
articulation approach, drawing on the work of Laclau and Mouffe (2001). Con-
ceptualising the production and performance of collective identities as an out-
come of the ongoing struggle to fix meaning, I expand on my argument that an-
tagonism serves as a useful conceptual tool for developing a qualitative account 
of affective polarisation.
Building on the outline of my articulation approach, in Chapter 3 I set out my 
methodological framework. First, following the model outlined by Braun and 
Clarke (2006), I offer a critical overview of my specific approach to construction-
ist thematic analysis, which focuses on the sociocultural conditions of discourse. 
Here, I also outline the “hybrid” (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006) character of 
my framework, insofar as my approach features the inductive and deductive 
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generation of both semantic and latent themes. Second, I give an overview of 
my approach to sampling, data gathering, and thematic coding. Here, I also re-
flect on some of the materials and methods that were discarded in the process 
of refining my methodological framework. Third, I reflect on some ethical con-
siderations, particularly as this pertains to working with online user-generated 
comments and issues surrounding the analysis of disagreeable content.
Having presented my theoretical and methodological approach, I discuss my 
main findings in four empirical chapters. Chapter 4 focuses on user-generated 
characterisations of US political parties, politicians, and partisans. Here, I start 
with a focus on some postulations of social identity theory regarding the kinds of 
content that should be present in my data sample. In particular, social identity 
theory proposes the presence of positive in-group characterisations and nega-
tive out-group characterisations. However, here I discuss a further form notable 
in my data: contestatory characterisations. This third form, I argue, helps to re-
veal the productive role of conflict and dissensus in the construction of identity/
difference distinctions. This chapter demonstrates how even in the context of 
deeply partisan media, dissenting voices persist.
Whereas Chapter 4 focuses on the antagonistic characterisation of political par-
ties, politicians, and partisans, Chapter 5 applies this approach to an analysis 
of media figures, outlets, and content. I first examine the emergence of the con-
cept of the “mainstream media” in right-wing political discourse before focusing 
on the occurrence of antagonistic claims of media bias in the online political talk 
of commenters. Lastly, I show how the construction of American conservative 
identity is bound up in contested notions of likeminded and counterattitudinal 
media. This chapter demonstrates the manner in which definitions of likeminded 
and counterattitudinal media are performed through online political talk.
Expanding on the analysis set out in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 examines audience 
commentary on media choice. I begin with an exploration of the shifting relation 
between TheBlaze and its audience before turning to a discussion of how com-
menters present a metacommentary on their media use, relating this to the buy-
cott/boycott distinction (M. Friedman, 1996). Lastly, I focus on how commenters 
depict the political economic impact of their practices of media use, highlighting 
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the utility of the concept of “political prosumption” (Hershkovitz, 2012) in the 
analysis of media selectivity. Here, I once again demonstrate how judgments 
about media are fundamentally intertwined with claims regarding politics and 
identity. This chapter also concentrates on how commenters actively constitute 
the target(s) of their antagonistic rhetoric.
Moving away from a more explicit focus on media, Chapter 7 considers how 
commenters deploy imaginaries of American past, present, and future for 
rhetorical purposes. First, I examine user-generated commentary on the theme 
of divine providence, which situates the authoring of the US Constitution and 
the emergence of the American nation in terms of metaphysical temporality. 
Second, I focus on the present political climate by examining user-generated 
commentary on the binary nature of the 2016 election. Lastly, I relate the dis-
cussion of past and present to visions of the future as expressed through an-
tagonistic and apocalyptic rhetorics of decay and degradation. In so doing, I of-
fer an account of a specifically polarised vision that foregrounds a perceived ex-
istential threat to the very existence of American nationhood.
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes my thesis. Here, I review the main claims I make 
in the foregoing chapters. However, I also outline some further conclusions that 
can be drawn from my analysis. I also highlight some of the contributions I be-
lieve my project makes to the literature on polarisation, political communication, 
and participatory media. In conclusion, I present some of the limitations to my 
approach, whilst offering an overview of some suggestions for potential av-
enues for further research, which I argue can make an important input into a tru-
ly mixed-methods framework for understanding affective polarisation, particular-
ly in its relation to broader processes of political differentiation.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced my doctoral research agenda. In so doing, I 
presented some background information on the context within which my re-
search is situated, an overview of the approach I have taken to completing my 
investigation, and an outline of my thesis. My interest lies not only in examining 
media that is increasingly participatory, but rather in exploring how this inter-
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sects with the kinds of transformations that have resulted in forms of media that 
are increasingly partisan. I see this is as the main context of my research.
Here, I have proposed that the concept of antagonism can usefully be em-
ployed as a conceptual tool in the qualitative analysis of affective polarisation, 
which includes attitudes towards opposing partisans and media. In so doing, I 
have taken the example of TheBlaze.com, the alternative media outlet devel-
oped by conservative media figure Glenn Beck and his production company, 
Mercury Radio Arts. Based on a qualitative analysis of online political talk in 
user-generated below-the-line commentary, in the following chapters I will ex-
amine how political antagonisms are articulated by commenters, as well as how 
those antagonisms are mobilised rhetorically. 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Chapter 2: Theory – polarisation, participation, 
articulation
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines my theoretical framework, which conceptualises the dis-
cursive production of self/other distinctions in user-generated online partisan 
news commentary through the lens of articulation theory. As argued in Chapter 
1, affective polarisation, defined as negative attitudes towards opposing parti-
sans, features increasingly prominently in analyses of political polarisation in the 
US (Iyengar et al., 2019). However, it has heretofore primarily been studied 
from a quantitative perspective. In order to produce a qualitative account of af-
fective polarisation that recognises the dynamic nature of categories of partisan 
opposition, I propose an articulation approach grounded primarily in the work of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001). Viewed as the ongoing struggle to 
“fix” meaning in ways that exclude other meanings (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002), 
articulation is here conceived as the mechanism via which the social is pro-
duced through discursive acts of opposition and exclusion – i.e., “antagonistic 
othering” (Herschinger, 2012). It is thus viewed as an inherently political 
process. Focusing on how affective polarisation manifests at the level of online 
user-generated discourse, I establish my theoretical framework through a focus 
on three key concepts: polarisation, participation, and articulation. 
First, I offer a conceptual definition of polarisation as it is employed in this the-
sis. In so doing, I focus primarily on three main themes. I begin with an exami-
nation of the various models of polarisation that figure prominently in scholarly 
debates in contemporary American political science. Here, I focus specifically 
on the concept of affective polarisation, which has come to the fore in recent 
years, arguing for a qualitative approach that can offer an account of the dy-
namic, discursive production of self/other distinctions. I then continue by outlin-
ing some contemporary understandings of partisanship and transformation in 
the bases for partisan alignments in the US context. Having established the 
concept of polarisation and its relation to partisan alignment, I then discuss 
some of the ongoing debates regarding the relationship between media and po-
larisation in the US context. Here, I expand on the related concepts of hostile 
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media perceptions and oppositional media bias, relating these to debates 
around the relation between political homophily and partisan selective expo-
sure.
Second, I outline the concept of participation as it pertains to my analysis. Here, 
I focus on three major dimensions of participation. I begin by discussing norma-
tive debates around idealised forms of political talk in democratic theory, intro-
ducing some important critiques of deliberation, which has become a dominant 
model of democratic legitimation. Here, I pay specific attention to issues relating 
to questions around rhetoric and voice, as well as how they pertain to social 
identity. Having introduced a concept of political talk that extends beyond ratio-
nal deliberation, I proceed to define the concept of online political talk, before 
proceeding to outline a further mode of politically significant behaviour that has 
relevance to my research: political consumerism. Here, I relate political con-
sumerism to contemporary practices of political communication and suggest the 
concept of “political prosumption” as a means of conceptualising the political 
and economic significance of user-generated content, including below-the-line 
comments.
Third, I define my articulation approach, which is grounded in the discourse 
theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. I begin by outlining the concept of 
articulation as employed by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), setting out its political 
dimensions. Here, I introduce the concept of hegemony and suggest the con-
cept of antagonism as a framework for conceptualising the ontology of opposi-
tional identities through the lens of articulation theory. I then move on to exam-
ine how articulation can be used to explore the production and performance of 
collective identities. Finally, insofar as my thesis conceptualises below-the-line 
commentary as a practice of political communication which occurs in a hybrid 
media environment (Chadwick, 2013), I here formulate an approach which 
views the articulation of meaning through the production and circulation of user-
generated content as a practice that is shaped by a variety of constraints oper-
ating at various levels.
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2.2 Polarisation
Political polarisation has become a matter of significant public and scholarly de-
bate in recent years, particularly in the US context. As remarked by Lelkes 
(2016), this debate is marked by confusion over what constitutes polarisation 
amongst media commentators as well as disagreements regarding how it 
should be defined amongst academics (Lelkes, 2016). In the US, political scien-
tists have argued at length about who exactly is polarised as well as to what ex-
tent (see Abramowitz, 2010; Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Baldassarri & 
Bearman, 2007; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Fiorina & Levendusky, 2006). Like-
wise, American media today talk more about polarisation than they did in the 
past (Levendusky & Malhotra, 2016). Some degree of polarisation is important 
in the context of party competition (Barber & McCarty, 2015). Nevertheless, 
normatively speaking, it is for the most part viewed as problematic (Reiljan, 
2020) – even dangerous – and is seen by some as a major impediment to ide-
alised models of democratic engagement, e.g., rational deliberation (see Sun-
stein, 2009). In that regard, polarisation and the heightened partisanship with 
which it is associated are implicated in significant fears regarding the stability of 
the very foundations of representative democracy (Iyengar et al., 2019). Polari-
sation, in short, is widely viewed as a matter of considerable import. Taking 
these conditions as a starting point, in this section I outline a definition of affec-
tive polarisation, relating it to analyses of forms of partisanship and the implica-
tions of media selectivity.
2.2.1 Forms of polarisation
Here, I focus on a number of key definitional issues that characterise the ongo-
ing debate regarding the nature and extent of political polarisation in American 
political life, primarily examining the distinction between elite and mass polarisa-
tion, on one hand, and the distinction between ideological and affective polari-
sation, on the other.
Political polarisation has been conceived in the academic literature as a primari-
ly ideological phenomenon (Reiljan, 2020), focusing predominantly on issue po-
sitions and perspectives on matters of policy amongst voters and political elites 
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(Knight, 2006). Although there is general agreement that some degree of ideo-
logical polarisation of political elites has taken place, there is notable disagree-
ment regarding the extent to which this applies at the mass level (Abramowitz & 
Saunders, 2008). Thus, for some authors, there is little evidence that the Ameri-
can electorate are polarising on moral, social, and economic policy issues (Bal-
dassarri & Bearman, 2007). For others, however, the sorts of divisions that 
characterise a polarising political elite are to be found among the general voting 
public, with the most profound divisions to be found among those who are most 
interested, informed, and active (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008). 
As noted by Lelkes (2016), the first argument – that polarisation in the US is lim-
ited to political elites – is typified by the work of Morris Fiorina, Jeremy Pope, 
and Matthew Levendusky (e.g.`, Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2006; Fiorina & Lev-
endusky, 2006), whilst the second argument – that polarisation exists at the 
mass level – is typified by the work of Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders 
(e.g.`, Abramowitz, 2010; Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Saunders & 
Abramowitz, 2004). Here, I outline the bases for both arguments before I intro-
duce Lelkes’ (2016) problematisation of the distinction.
First, the argument that polarisation is limited to political elites. Fiorina and 
Abrams (2008) argue there is little evidence to suggest that American citizens 
have grown more polarised, highlighting instead the role of a so-called “polari-
sation narrative” promulgated by media and political commentators on American 
politics since the early 1990s. In their analysis, they draw specific attention to 
the role of Pat Buchanan’s declaration of a “culture war for the soul of America” 
in a speech given at the 1992 Republican national convention  (Fiorina & 5
Abrams, 2008, p. 564). The elite polarisation argument is also supported by 
Baldassarri and Bearman (2007, p. 784), who assert that, generally speaking, 
“on moral, social, economic, and foreign-policy issues, there is little evidence of 
increasing polarization.” In the case of the elite polarisation argument, the public 
is viewed as essentially moderate with a thin layer of polarised activists and a 
growing “disconnect” palpable between the represented and those who purport 
to represent them (Fiorina & Abrams, 2012; Fiorina & Levendusky, 2006).
 See also analysis of comment 4.14, pp. 134-1355
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Furthermore, Fiorina and Levendusky (2006) argue that prominent qualitative 
and quantitative studies of polarisation in the late 1990s reveal little evidence 
that the American public is particularly polarised. Related to this position, Fiorina 
and Abrams (2008) propose that a reliance on indicators and analytical tools 
that are incapable of measuring polarisation has resulted in an academic dis-
course that to some extent mirrors the polarisation narrative propounded by the 
commentariat. A major explanatory factor in the putative misapprehension of the 
polarisation phenomenon, according to Fiorina and Levendusky (2006), is that 
“the media” have failed to sufficiently grasp the important distinction between 
the mass public and political elites. 
However, media are also seen to play another role in this process. Insofar as 
political elites constitute the public face of politics, their positions receive media 
attention and are thus portrayed as the norm (Fiorina & Levendusky, 2006). 
That tendency is made more prominent by a media predilection for “stories that 
stress conflict over agreement” (Fiorina & Levendusky, 2006, p. 52). This has 
potentially broad implications in terms of political engagement, insofar as it has 
been argued that “[a]ppeals  that emphasize threats and fear are more effective 
at motivating mass political activity than a positive agenda” (Kimball & Vorst, 
2013, p. 21).
Second, the argument that polarisation is taking place within the mass public. 
As noted above, there is widespread agreement that political elites have po-
larised in ideological terms. This contrasts with the proposition that “most ordi-
nary voters have less knowledge about politics, care less about it, and are 
largely non-ideological,” a claim which is further underlined by the assertion that 
those who are most active in politics tend towards more extreme positions (Fior-
ina & Levendusky, 2006, p. 52). Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) argue that 
Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006) present arguments that are in keeping with a 
seminal paper on public opinion and voting behaviour, ‘The Nature of Belief 
Systems in Mass Publics’ (Converse, 2006), originally published in 1964. Con-
vers’s paper argued that “the sort of ideological thinking common among politi-
cal elites was confined to a small minority of the American public” (Abramowitz 
& Saunders, 2008, p. 542). Converse’s view, reflected in Fiorina, Abrams, and 
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Pope (2006), contends that ordinary voters “showed little evidence of using an 
ideological framework to evaluate political parties or presidential candidates and 
very limited understanding of basic ideological concepts such as liberalism and 
conservatism” (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008, p. 542). 
Notwithstanding the fact that ideological thinking and sophistication are not 
necessarily coextensive with the capacity to categorise either according to spe-
cific camps or traditions, Abramowitz and Saunders contend that a series of 
dramatic shifts have taken place in American politics and the American elec-
torate since the 1950s that “might lead one to expect an increase in the preva-
lence of ideological thinking in the public” (2008, p. 542) – a fact they remark 
that Converse himself has acknowledged. Yet, Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 
(2006) depict a mass politics that looks much like the context originally de-
scribed by Converse. Abramowitz and Saunders (2008, p. 543) claim this argu-
ment is “contradicted by a large body of research by political scientists on re-
cent trends in American public opinion,” which shows that “political and cultural 
divisions within the American public have deepened considerably since the 
1970s. Contrary to the assertions of Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (2006), then, 
Abramowitz and Saunders (2008, p. 543) argue that the sorts of divisions that 
characterise elected officials and activists also typify the mass public, with “the 
deepest divisions … found among the most interested, informed, and active 
members of the public.”
However, alongside disagreement on who exactly is polarised, there is also sig-
nificant disagreement on how polarisation is to be defined. In that regard, 
Lelkes (2016) highlights how the distinction between elite and mass polarisation 
maps onto a further distinction in terms of how polarisation is conceptualised in 
the two bodies of research. His response is to identify four distinct manifesta-
tions of polarisation in the literature: “ideological consistency, ideological diver-
gence, perceived polarization, and affective polarization” (Lelkes, 2016, p. 393). 
These distinct conceptualisations of polarisation must be borne in mind when 
attempting to grasp the broader implications of the polarisation debate. 
For example, Lelkes (2016) proposes that Abramowitz and Saunders focus on 
consistency, whilst Fiorina and his colleagues focus on divergence, thus indicat-
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ing not only their focus on distinct manifestations of polarisation but also the fact 
that a more nuanced definition indicates support for both arguments. Lelkes 
thus argues that re-orienting the debate according to his revised categories 
leads to a number of important conclusions regarding the actual prevalence of 
polarisation in American political life. He surmises, “Americans at the mass level 
have not become more consistent ideologically, nor have they diverged, but par-
tisans have; perceptions of polarization have increased among partisans; and 
partisans increasingly dislike one another” (Lelkes, 2016, p. 393). This frame-
work explicitly foregrounds the important role that partisans play in processes of 
polarisation. Reflecting on this proposed centrality of partisans, it is to the fourth 
form of polarisation identified by Lelkes, i.e., affective polarisation, that I now 
turn.
Whilst ideological or issue polarisation has long been the primary focus of 
scholarship on the topic of political polarisation in the US context, the concept 
now has been expanded to include hostile feelings towards opposing partisans 
(Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012). This model of polarisation, which focuses on 
“partisan animosity” (Reiljan, 2020) or “attitudes toward the opposition” (Leven-
dusky, 2013a), has been termed affective polarisation. It has become a matter 
of some prominence in the literature on political polarisation, particularly in the 
US (see Garrett et al., 2014; Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Lelkes, 2019; Leven-
dusky, 2018; Rogowski & Sutherland, 2016). Whilst acknowledging the impor-
tance of existing research on ideological polarisation, this thesis draws specifi-
cally on the concept of affective polarisation.
The relationship between affective polarisation and other forms of polarisation is 
a matter of some disagreement (Lelkes, 2019). Research has shown affective 
polarisation to have its origins in the particular potency of partisanship as a so-
cial identity (Iyengar et al., 2019). Whilst some scholars (e.g.`, Iyengar et al., 
2012) maintain that a growth in affective polarisation is not necessarily linked to 
a rise in policy (or ideological) polarisation, Webster and Abramowitz (2017) ar-
gue that affective polarisation has a number of important ideological founda-
tions. Whatever its origins, affective polarisation has been shown to have a 
powerful impact on judgments and behaviours that go beyond the domain of the 
political (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015). Its potential implications are thus far-
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reaching, with demonstrated consequences that touch on social interaction, 
economic behaviour, and labour market distortion, in addition to political en-
gagement (Iyengar et al., 2019).
Affective polarisation heretofore primarily has been conceptualised according to 
a social identity approach, which entails social identity theory (Tajfel, 1974) and 
self-categorisation theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). 
This framework focuses on the distinction between in-group and out-group, 
highlighting positive feelings towards one’s own party that are accompanied by 
hostility towards the out-party (Billig & Tajfel, 1973). The maintenance of a posi-
tive social identity is one of the defining stipulations of the social identity ap-
proach. In that regard, group members must “differentiate their own groups pos-
itively from others to achieve a positive social identity” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 
42). However, according to Jackson and Sherriff, a number of strategies can be 
employed in order to achieve this goal. They argue: 
in intergroup settings when social identities are salient, individuals will 
adopt comparative strategies to enhance differences between groups in 
ways that favor the in-group over the out-group and which can have posi-
tive consequences for self-concept. Such socially competitive strategies 
may include in-group favoritism (e.g., in-group loyalty), out-group deroga-
tion (such as prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory behavior to out-group 
members), or a combination of both. (C. Jackson & Sherriff, 2013, pp. 
260-261)
Positive social identity, in other words, can be achieved both through positive 
reinformcent of in-group characteristics and denigration of out-groups.
Although the social identity framework extensively has been shown to be a reli-
able tool for quantifying and mapping patterns of intergroup tension and conflict 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979), Jackson and Sherriff (2013, p. 259) argue it is neverthe-
less limited by its primarily quantitative articulation in the context of post-posi-
tivist research methods and approaches – restricting its utility in terms of 
analysing the “messy" complexity and nuance of real-world intergroup relations. 
Thus, regarding existing applications of social identity theory, Huddy asserts, 
“social identity theorists’ disinclination to examine the sources of social identity 
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in a real world complicated by history and culture has placed serious limits on 
the theory’s application to political psychology” (2001, p. 129). In that regard, 
Jackson and Sherriff (2013, p. 260) argue that a qualitative approach to inter-
group relations can help to “tease out” the manner in which “intergroup relations 
are produced, experienced and understood.” In this thesis, I take that argument 
and apply it to the use of a social identity framework in the study of affective po-
larisation. However, my analysis focuses on the role of discursive articulations 
in the constitution and performance of partisan identities.
2.2.2 Party identification, negative partisanship, and ideological re-
alignment 
Partisanship and party identification are central factors in definitions and exami-
nations of affective polarisation. However, they assume specific forms in the 
context of the American two-party system. As with examinations of polarisation, 
discussed above, related analyses of partisanship and party identification also 
draw on the distinction between identity and policy preference. For example, 
early approaches to party identification focusing on a sense of personal attach-
ment (e.g.`, Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954) are contrasted with approaches 
focusing on electoral behaviour and voter choice (e.g.`, Fiorina, 1981). Howev-
er, Thomassen and Rosema (2009, p. 44) critique Fiorina’s (1981) definition of 
party identification as a “running tally of retrospective evaluations,” arguing that 
it is difficult “to see how this results in an enduring psychological identification 
between self and party.” It is, they argue, a concept that appears to be primarily 
rooted in cognition as opposed to affect (J. Thomassen & Rosema, 2009). For 
the purposes of this research, given my focus on the discursive production of 
partisan identity, I will work with a notion of party identification that foregrounds 
so-called “partisan self-image” (Butler & Stokes, 1969).
Party identification is important because research indicates not only that it is 
more stable than other political attitudes but also that it exerts a notable influ-
ence on those attitudes (Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998). Much work on the po-
larization of American politics and publics has focused on important transforma-
tions in the nature of party identification in the US. This research deals with the 
related concepts of ideological realignment (Abramowitz & Knotts, 2006; 
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Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998; Layman & Carsey, 2000; Putz, 2002; Saunders 
& Abramowitz, 2004; Schreckhise & Shields, 2003) and party sorting (Fiorina & 
Abrams, 2008). 
Party sorting refers to the process by which the political parties in the US have 
become more distinct, which is tied to an increasing correlation in terms of 
Americans’ policy positions (Fiorina & Abrams, 2008). This creates “a close rela-
tionship” between partisan and ideological identifications (Fiorina & Abrams, 
2008, p. 578). Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) similarly note a transformation 
in the racial, regional, and ideological bases of the two major parties since the 
1970s that have brought identity and ideology into increasing alignment. The 
two approaches introduced here differ in the role they attribute to the public in 
these changes. The result is that an expanding gulf is seen to be opening up 
between those who identify as Democratic and Republican voters, although in 
Abramowitz and Saunders’ approach this applies to more than an elite layer of 
activists.
It is important to note, however, that such realignments are not abnormal. On 
the contrary, research demonstrates that the period of relative consensus that 
followed the Second World War is the aberration. As noted by Firoina and 
Abrams (2008, p. 577):
Historical research in particular faces an insuperable problem. Scholars 
have pointed out that contemporary levels of elite polarization look unusu-
al compared to those of the mid-twentieth century but not compared to 
those of the late nineteenth century. 
This point is echoed in the work of McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006), 
whose data show a distinct pattern of congressional partisanship fitting this as-
sessment. This stance resonates with the elite polarisation argument introduced 
in the previous section.
Nevertheless, Abramowitz (2018, pp. 1-2) argues the particular forms of parti-
san conflict that are characteristic of American political life today indicate that 
the US has “entered a new age of partisanship” in which significant transforma-
tions in American society and culture have fostered major divisions at the level 
of the mass public. These transformations coincide with what he terms “the 
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great alignment,” which involves a “growing alignment of partisan identities with 
deeper divisions in American society and culture” (Abramowitz, 2018, p. x). It is 
claimed this so-called great alignment has transformed the American two-party 
system and is linked in important ways to a rise in negative affect towards op-
posing partisans. As already highlighted in Chapter 1, some authors have 
pointed to the important racial dimensions of these trends, particularly issues 
related to white resentment (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018) or ressentiment (Ol-
son, 2008), i.e., a deep anger at the loss of social status and white advantage. 
Indeed, Olson (2008, p. 706) has argued that, given the dominant voting prac-
tices of Black voters, who tend to overwhelmingly vote Democratic no matter 
their income level, polarisation can itself be seen as a largely white phe-
nomenon.
Abramowitz and Webster (2016) relate the increasing negative affect towards 
opposing partisans that is characteristic of affective polarisation to this growing 
alignment, identifying a tendency which they term negative partisanship. Nega-
tive partisanship is defined as “the phenomenon whereby Americans largely 
align against one party instead of affiliating with the other” (Abramowitz & Web-
ster, 2018, p. 119). Negative partisanship doesn’t merely lead some people to 
dislike the opposing party more than they like the one which they identify 
(Abramowitz & Webster, 2018); it also has the capacity to strongly influence 
voter decision-making (Abramowitz & Webster, 2016). For example, research 
on Canadian voter behaviour reveals dislike for opposing parties to be a motiva-
tor of political behaviours beyond simply casting a vote (Caruana, McGregor, & 
Stephenson, 2015). Taken together, negative partisanship and affective polari-
sation are seen to play a significant role in perpetuating a deepening partisan 
divide in the American electorate (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018). Importantly, 
such negative attitudes are thought to be further reinforced by exposure to 
likeminded partisan media (Levendusky, 2013b; Mutz, 2006b).
Thus, whilst there is disagreement over the historical patterning and specific 
origins of these trends in the ideological alignments of partisans, one thing that 
is certain is that media markets have emerged that capitalise on these political 
topographies as they exist today (Hopkins & Ladd, 2014; Iyengar & Hahn, 2009; 
Levendusky, 2011). In this thesis, I am interested in the discursive articulation of 
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these alignments of ideology and identity, particularly in the context of the be-
low-the-line commentary of partisan media users. These particular alignments 
of media and partisanship – and the relationship between media and polarisa-
tion – will be the focus of my discussion in the following section.
2.2.3 Media hostility, selective exposure, and political homophily
If the nature and extent of polarisation in American political life is still a matter of 
debate, the role played by media in this process is similarly the subject of con-
siderable disagreement. In discussing the role played by media in political polar-
isation, two key considerations are the related processes of media fragmenta-
tion and audience segmentation (Mancini, 2012). That is, as media choices pro-
liferate, “patterns of consumption become more widely distributed” (J. G. Web-
ster & Ksiazek, 2012, p. 39). Whilst Webster and Ksiazek (2012) focus on frag-
mentation in terms of the contemporary growth in digital media, authors such as 
Mutz (2006b) underline the fact that the phenomenon of fragmentation pertains 
to a much wider range of media forms.
Evidence increasingly indicates that selective exposure to likeminded media is 
associated with a growth in affective polarisation in the US (Garrett et al., 2014; 
Tsfati & Nir, 2017). Some authors have also demonstrated a link between a rise 
in extreme attitudes towards out-groups and exposure to the content of ideolog-
ical news and political opinion-media (Berry & Sobieraj, 2013; Jamieson & Cap-
pella, 2008). In the domain of internet-mediated communication, initially viewed 
optimistically as a potential site for deliberative collaboration (Dahlberg, 2001) 
and rational communication (Fuchs, 2014), these trends towards increasing par-
tisanship and polarisation of media choices are particularly pronounced, leading 
some to argue that partisan media are at the root of a growing “cyberbalkaniza-
tion” in a fragmented media environment (Brainard, 2010; Van Alstyne & Bryn-
jolfsson, 1996, 2005). These processes have been theorised to be at the root of 
hostile media perceptions (Arceneaux, Johnson, & Murphy, 2012), particularly 
among partisan identifiers (Dalton, Beck, & Huckfeldt, 1998). Here, I will first 
discuss fragmentation and selective exposure before moving on to explore their 
relation to hostile media perceptions and oppositional media hostility.
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Of particular relevance to the question of polarisation is the expansion of Ameri-
cans’ news choices. “Partisan news programs,” according to Levendusky, “are 
less about simply conveying information and more about helping viewers make 
sense of the world given particular dispositions” (2013a`, p. 566). Prior (2013) 
argues that the question of ideologically one-sided news exposure is most rele-
vant in terms of a small but highly involved and influential segment of the popu-
lation. 
For Hollander, the fragmentation of media audiences has produced a distinct 
patterning in the distribution of partisan media viewership, with less partisan 
viewers resorting to more “entertainment-based” media: “the rapid diffusion of 
cable television and the Internet in U.S. homes has drawn precious audiences 
away f rom news con ten t t o a huge bu f fe t o f en te r ta inmen t 
programming” (2008`, p. 23). This point echoes the work of Prior, who similarly 
draws attention to the ways in which this choice between centrist and partisan 
media is avoided entirely, arguing that a significant proportion of Americans 
“simply avoid news altogether” (2013, p. 120). Furthermore, for Sobieraj et al. 
(2013, p. 427), this distinction between news and entertainment is problematic, 
offering outrage-based media as an example of how “deeply the two can be in-
tertwined.”
Partisan selective exposure figures centrally in debates regarding the relation-
ship between media and political polarisation. Partisan media which favour one 
side over the opposition have become a prominent feature of what Prior (2005) 
terms a “high-choice media environment.” Insofar as the transition to a high-
choice media environment has significant implications in terms of the kinds of 
political information to which individuals have access (Van Aelst et al., 2017), 
media selectivity is viewed as an important factor to be considered (Hollander, 
2008; N. J. Stroud, 2010). 
That being said, the abundance of choice also presents opportunities to tune 
out political content. In that regard, media choice simultaneously has been im-
plicated in processes of political polarisation and political disengagement (Prior, 
2007). Thus, a fragmented media environment means audiences have “ample 
opportunities to tune out news outlets with which they disagree as well as the 
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news altogether” (Arceneaux et al., 2012, p. 174). Nevertheless, media choice 
has been correlated with the propensity to select likeminded media (N. J. 
Stroud, 2008), with the practice of partisan selective exposure most apparent 
among the most interested partisans (Hollander, 2008; Prior, 2013). This is a 
matter of significant import, insofar as the role of highly motivated partisans in 
primary elections has also been shown to shape the choices put to the elec-
torate in general elections, with the most interested partisans thus playing a ma-
jor role in promoting partisan change and polarisation (Charnock, 2018), even in 
the context of what Thomassen and Rosema (2009, p. 45) refer to as a “stable 
two-party system.”      6
Whilst the concept of selective exposure had for a time come to be viewed as 
“passé” in the study of political communication (Mutz & Martin, 2001), evidence 
now indicates that partisan selective exposure is widespread in the contempo-
rary fragmented media environment (Sobieraj et al., 2013). It has been sug-
gested that partisan selective exposure may have important political implica-
tions by contributing to more extreme positions on social and political issues 
(Hollander, 2008). It has likewise been argued that partisan media exposure 
has an impact on attitudes towards the opposition (Levendusky, 2013a). Thus, 
in spite of ongoing difficulties in demonstrating the impact of media choice on 
audience attitudes, there is growing concern regarding the outcomes of prac-
tices of “selective exposure” that put audiences in contact with fervently populist 
or ideological rhetoric (Prior, 2013). This concern is codified in a number of re-
lated concepts.
Whilst Pariser’s (2011) concept of algorithmically defined “filter bubbles” focuses 
on the manner in which data-driven processes of personalisation and au-
tomation isolate social media users from cross-cutting political talk, other schol-
 Drawing on the work of Mason (2018), Charnock (2018) argues that affective polari6 -
sation driven by the alignment of personal and partisan identities is fundamental to un-
derstanding Donald Trump’s popularity among Republicans. She argues that whilst 
Trump is far-removed from Republican orthodoxy in policy terms, he nevertheless ap-
peals to the personal and social identities of partisans (Charnock, 2018). With refer-
ence to Fiorina’s elite polarisation argument (see Fiorina et al., 2006), Charnock also 
highlights, however, that the involvement of highly motivated partisans in primary elec-
tions doesn’t necessarily indicate greater mass polarisation more generally speaking.   
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ars have focused on a more agentive model. For example, Jamieson and Cap-
pella (2008, p. 76) propose the metaphor of an “echo chamber” to describe the 
manner in which “messages are amplified and reverberate through the conser-
vative opinion media.” Sunstein (2002) argues that practices of selective expo-
sure will lead to “enclave deliberation” between groups of likeminded people 
and that has the capacity to drive group polarisation. This proposed process 
has otherwise been termed “cyberbalkanisation” (Van Alstyne & Brynjolfsson, 
1996), referring to the digitally-driven process via which virtual spaces are di-
vided to accommodate special interest groups. These concepts seek to account 
for the particular forms of partisanship in which media selectivity is enmeshed, 
highlighting a putative link between media and polarisation, with fears regarding 
the polarising effects of selective exposure in the digital domain being particu-
larly prominent.
The validity of such proposals has, however, been contested. For instance, 
Webster and Ksiazek (2012) present data that is at odds with Sunstein’s analy-
sis. Their results indicate “high levels of audience overlap” in the use of a di-
verse range of media and that the media repertoires of users are varied (J. G. 
Webster & Ksiazek, 2012, pp. 50-51). Likewise, Dubois and Blank (2018) argue 
that online echo chamber effects are overstated, with politically interested indi-
viduals tending towards diverse media diets in a high-choice media environ-
ment. Furthermore, Nelson and Webster (2017) find that the audiences for par-
tisan news sites tend to be ideologically diverse, whilst Farrell (2012) questions 
Sunstein’s proposition that cyberbalkanisation leads to opinion polarisation, ar-
guing there is insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis.
At the same time, Mansbridge (1994) has shown enclave deliberation to have 
several positive functions and outcomes, including in providing protected spa-
ces for the articulation of oppositional discourse. However, the import of en-
claves goes beyond the level of information, with protected enclaves providing a 
safe space for identity politics (V. Taylor, 1989), an argument supported by Sun-
stein (2002, p. 177). “Even the most just societies,” Mansbridge (1994, p. 63) 
argues, “need these enclaves of protected discourse and action.” In this sense, 
even if they do not produce echo chambers, studying the social implications of 
partisan media in terms of their relation to affective polarisation nevertheless 
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appears to be a potentially fruitful research topic in the context of contemporary 
changes in digitally mediated practices of political communication.
In that regard, insofar as they are associated with the avoidance of cross-cutting 
political conversation, outrage media have been implicated in processes of po-
litical polarisation (Sobieraj et al., 2013). Notably, as I will argue in Chapter 5, 
the self/other distinctions on which this business model operates apply not just 
directly to political parties, politicians, and partisans. Rather, the discursive con-
struction of “antagonistic frontiers” (Laclau, 2000) between mainstream and par-
tisan media is a rhetorical strategy utilised by media figures (Arceneaux et al., 
2012). Characterisations of political opposition thus may likewise refer to media 
figures, outlets, and content. 
A central issue is not only the manner in which partisan media attack the oppo-
sition (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008), but also how audiences respond to those 
attacks. In that regard, Domke et al. (1999, p. 36) refer to “the rising public per-
ception of a liberal news media.” Research suggests that this perception of lib-
eral bias can be explained in part by the hostile media phenomenon (P. A. Beck, 
1991; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985), which occurs “when opposing partisans 
perceive identical news coverage of a controversial issue as biased against 
their own side” (Feldman, 2012, p. 449). The hostile media phenomenon has 
been observed in response to both balanced and biased coverage and has ac-
tively contributed to what Lee (2005) terms the “liberal media myth.” 
However, perceptions of media bias are not evenly distributed. For instance, 
Republicans have been shown to be more likely than are Democrats to perceive 
a hostile media bias (Eveland Jr & Shah, 2003). Although the notion of a “liberal 
media” has now gained broad traction in the US context (Major, 2012), it has 
been argued that the emergence and development of this antagonistic vision of 
the US media environment has specific historical origins in right-wing media 
discourse (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008). As Major (2012) argues, the notion of a 
news media with a liberal bias is a populist concept solidified in what he calls 
the “conservative counter-sphere.” The concept of media hostility thus has an 
important role to play in the study of right-wing media.
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One suggested explanation is that criticism of institutional news media is central 
to the performances and personae of right-wing media figures such as Rush 
Limbaugh (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008). Arceneaux et al. (2012) have postulat-
ed that partisan media figures espouse views which are ideologically and affec-
tively coherent with their intended in-group target audience. At the same time, 
they also actively oppose the positions of their counterparts (Arceneaux et al., 
2012), whilst criticising so-called mainstream media for their supposed biases 
(Perloff, 2015). By serving as "sources of negative affect toward news 
media” (Arceneaux et al., 2012, p. 184), partisan media arguably contribute to 
what Arceneaux et al. term “oppositional media hostility.” This term refers to in-
creasing suspicion of news media among media users, “driven by reactions to 
media outlets that represent political viewpoints contradicting to their 
own” (Arceneaux et al., 2012, p. 175). Insofar as out-party media come to be 
associated with opposing parties and partisans, the reputations of media outlets 
are bound up in processes of affective polarisation (Peterson & Kagalwala, 
2019).
As with analyses of affective polarisation, however, research on the topic of 
both hostile media perceptions and oppositional media hostility has been pri-
marily quantitative – relying predominantly on experimental approaches – and 
oriented towards measuring media effects. For instance, the concept of opposi-
tional media hostility articulated by Arceneaux et al. (2012) is based on an ex-
perimental model. Likewise, a social identity approach has become paradigmat-
ic in studies of hostile media phenomena (Matheson & Dursun, 2001; Reid, 
2012; Tsfati, 2007). As noted earlier, the dominant concept of social identity has 
also been developed in the context of a post-positivist research framework (C. 
Jackson & Sherriff, 2013). My approach, by contrast, focuses on how media 
users dynamically construct categories of opposition in user-generated dis-
course.
Many of the arguments about the sources of hostile media perceptions were 
made at a time when politicians relied heavily on journalists and traditional news 
media as part of their communications strategies. However, this situation has 
changed dramatically since the concept was first introduced. Today’s media en-
vironment is characterised to a significant extent by the pervasive capacity of 
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audiences to interact in complex ways with political information (Perloff, 2015), 
enabling them to become active participants in what Chadwick (2011) has 
termed the “political information cycle.” As pointed out by Perloff (2015), along-
side the growth of partisan media and the proliferation of social media, the very 
character of perceptions of bias have also changed over the three-decade his-
tory of research on hostile media perceptions. 
More recent research has thus sought to understand how the phenomenon 
translates to the context of newer media, including participation in political blogs 
(Borah, Thorson, & Hwang, 2015) and discussion in homogeneous social net-
works (Hart, Feldman, Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2015). Thus, although audi-
ences may be growing more cynical regarding the trustworthiness of news 
(Ladd, 2010b), they are also afforded new possibilities to express those frustra-
tions in the context of a media environment that increasingly features tools for 
audience participation in the production and dissemination of media discourse 
(Deuze et al., 2007), notably in the form of below-the-line commentary (Gar-
diner, 2018; Graham & Wright, 2015; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015). 
Insofar as partisan media aiming at ideological persuasion have been shown to 
contribute to political behaviour and preferences (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018; 
Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017), partisan selective exposure is an important phe-
nomenon that requires scholarly attention. Partisan media messaging may em-
ploy the derogation of oppositional sources and opposing partisans as a discur-
sive strategy, as noted above. However, in a hybrid media system characterised 
by the contested and uneven distribution of media power between older and 
newer media (Chadwick, 2013), the messaging of media institutions and their 
audiences may be in conflict. 
In that regard, Ladd (2010a) argues that audiences are likely to take cues re-
garding media hostility from trusted media figures. Whilst a growing body of re-
search deals with the problems posed by increasing access to both likeminded 
and attitude-discrepant media (Garrett et al., 2014), as well as the potentially 
de-polarising role of counterattitudinal content in the repertoires of partisans 
(Arceneaux et al., 2012; Knobloch-Westerwick, 2012), I have been unable to 
identify any qualitative, quantitative, or mixed-methods accounts of how audi-
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ences respond to partisan media when they perceive those media to undergo a 
shift from an attitude-consistent to an attitude-discrepant stance. 
Likewise, although analyses of the ongoing transformation of political communi-
cation provide important insights into the political implications of selective expo-
sure to partisan media, they seldom offer an account of how media users inter-
pret and represent the relevance and outcomes of their own media use. This 
speaks to Prior’s (2013) assertion that examinations of the relationship between 
media and polarisation must move beyond questions of selective exposure to 
include, for example, selective processing and counter-arguing of attitude in-
consistent information. It is important, in that regard, to conceptualise the forms 
of participation in which media users are actually engaging. This is a topic which 
will be discussed in detail in the following section.
2.3 Participation
Selective exposure provides one of the dominant frameworks for talking about 
the relation between media selectivity and the wide availability of likeminded 
media. However, as a model of media use, selective exposure does not provide 
a comprehensive account of what people actually do with media, including what 
they do when dealing with counterattitudinal content. Numerous scholars writing 
on the theme of selective exposure articulate their fears with reference to a 
specific normative ideal of democratic participation: deliberation (e.g.`, 
Knobloch-Westerwick & Johnson, 2014; Niemeyer, 2014). However, as high-
lighted in Chapter 1, the prevalence of political discussion in online spaces de-
mands a specific re-conceptualisation of deliberation and political talk. Whereas 
in Chapter 1, I spoke in terms of fears expressed regarding the impact of incivili-
ty in online political talk (Anderson et al., 2013), in what follows I outline various 
characteristics of online political talk as well as how it is related to other partici-
patory practices, such as political consumerism. Following Chen’s (2017) con-
tention that it is not a simple either/or question of incivility or deliberation, but 
rather a matter of how they co-occur in online news comments, I situate these 
forms of participation within the context of a theoretical moment that privileges 
deliberation.
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2.3.1 Voice, rhetoric, and deliberation – conceptualising political talk
In recent decades, a deliberative model has come to dominate democratic theo-
ry, to the extent that deliberation “now inhabits a central position in normative 
accounts of political legitimacy” (Sass & Dryzek, 2013, p. 5). Gutmann and 
Thompson’s Democracy and Disagreement (1998), labelled by Iris Marion 
Young as “the most complete theory of deliberative democracy yet 
developed” (1999, p. 151), is one prominent example. In its most fundamental 
sense, Gutmann and Thompson argue elsewhere, “deliberative democracy af-
firms the need to justify decisions made by cit izens and their 
representatives” (2009, p. 3). Central to deliberative models of democracy is a 
focus on the constitutive role of specific modes of political talk. For example, to 
mention two examples cited in section 2.2.3 (above), Mansbridge (1994) focus-
es on the role of deliberation in resolving conflict between competing interests, 
whilst Sunstein (2001, 2002) recognises deliberative democracy as a traditional 
American aspiration, contrasting this ideal with the potentially polarising impact 
of discursive practices associated with digital media.
The deliberative view is often contrasted with interest-based conceptions of 
democracy, which “consider democracy primarily as a process of expressing 
one’s preferences and demands, and registering them in a vote” (I. M. Young, 
1996, p. 121). Critics of this model see it as irrational whilst promoting a “priva-
tized understanding of the political process” (I. M. Young, 1996, p. 121). In the 
deliberative model, by contrast, “through public deliberation citizens transform 
their preferences according to public-minded ends” (I. M. Young, 1996, p. 121), 
a task that is ideally achieved through reasoned debate targeted at the common 
good. This distinction in terms of the place of private interest versus the com-
mon good is, according to Young (2000), a false dichotomy. 
Nevertheless, dominant understandings of processes of justification within the 
deliberative model tend to privilege particular readings that focus on the central 
role of rational argument in the legitimation of democratic decision-making. 
Such readings draw to a large extent on the foundational work of Habermas 
(1991), particularly his focus on communicative rationality as a means of 
achieving consensus through deliberation. The public sphere is seen as funda-
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mental. It is both “a space constituted by critical communication” (Dahlberg, 
2004, p. 3) and the space within which such communication occurs. 
In Habermas’ (1991) model, the public sphere is conceived as open and acces-
sible to all, with private interests and identities bracketed for the purpose of de-
liberating on the definition of the common good through rational argument. This 
vision of the public sphere remained an ideal, with Fraser remarking Habermas’ 
own contention that “the full utopian ideal of the bourgeois public sphere was 
never realized in practice” (1992, p. 59). Further critiques were levelled at 
Habermas’ vision, in particular the notion that social inequalities could ever be 
bracketed in any practical sense (Fraser, 1992, p. 64), as well as the implicit 
opposition of reason and emotion in the model of communicative rationality as 
action oriented towards consensus (Lunt & Stenner, 2005).
For many deliberative theorists a focus on such rational forms of discourse 
serves as an insufficient framework for understanding the kinds of political talk 
in which people are actually engaging in contemporary democracies. One cen-
tral problem here is the gap obtaining between idealised models of participation, 
particularly those equating deliberation with rational argumentation, and actually 
existing practices of political communication. A central problem is the manner in 
which various theories set out universalizing claims about the rational character-
istics of the deliberative model of political communication. On the contrary, far 
from being a universal feature of democratic speech, Young (1996, p. 123) ar-
gues, this model “derives from specific institutional contexts of the modern 
West–scientific debate, modern parliaments, and courts.” As Dahlberg (2004, p. 
5) notes, Habermas himself now concedes that this model places “too much 
faith in historically contingent norms and value orientations manifested in specif-
ic institutions”. 
For Chantal Mouffe (1996), pluralism qua the acceptance of difference is both 
constitutive of modern liberal democracy and its defining characteristic. Never-
theless, she argues, various forms of violence are disguised through universal-
izing appeals to rationality and neutrality that define more critical-rationalist 
models of deliberation. Not only do such claims inflict violence through hege-
monic relations of power, such acts of erasure also constitute a significant risk 
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to democracy. “To negate the ineradicable character of antagonism and aim at a 
universal rational consensus” she writes, “this is the real threat to 
democracy” (Mouffe, 1996, p. 248).
For Sass and Dryzek, it is important for deliberative theorists to note that “com-
municative acts which are not deliberative in intention can be deliberative in ef-
fect” (2013, p. 8), and thus a more encompassing definition of deliberation is 
required. With this perspective in mind, a number of approaches to the limita-
tions of this model of deliberative argumentation are notable. 
On one hand, one can appreciate attempts to broaden the definition of what 
constitutes public reason. For example, Mansbridge remarks of Gutmann and 
Thompson’s argument that one of its primary aims was “to widen the scope of 
public reason” (1999, p. 212), although she maintains they do not go quite far 
enough. On the other hand, one can remark attempts to refute dominant claims 
that deliberation can or should be based solely or primarily on rational-critical 
argumentation. Themes of rhetoric and voice are important considerations in 
each case, both of which will be the focus of discussion for the remainder of this 
section.
“Rhetoric’s association with reason,” according to Dryzek, “is complex and con-
tested” (2010, p. 320). For Young (2000), for example, they are not set in oppo-
sition. Instead of a model of deliberation predicated primarily on the public de-
ployment of rational-critical discourse in search of the common good, she ar-
gues, deliberative talk has a number of dimensions. In particular, she argues for 
the need to recognise the role of public address/greeting, rhetoric, and narrative 
in deliberative talk. In this view, rhetoric isn’t merely something to be counter-
acted through discursive practices of public reason, but is rather a fundamental 
feature of effective argumentation. Rhetoric in Young’s model includes “the af-
fective dimensions of communication, its figurative aspects, and the diverse 
media of communication” (2000, p. 7).
Likewise, Dryzek (2010, p. 327) argues that rhetoric is in fact a necessary out-
come of the very existence of representative democracy and deliberative sys-
tems. For Dryzek, it is nevertheless important to distinguish between defensible 
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and undesirable uses of rhetoric. He posits that “Rawlsians and Habermasians 
can and do allow that rhetoric may be useful in stimulating reasoned reflection 
and interchange” (Dryzek, 2010, p. 322). Rather than a simple enemy of rea-
son, then, for Chambers, “deliberative rhetoric makes people think, it makes 
people see things in new ways, it conveys information and knowledge, and it 
makes people more reflective” (2009, p. 335). Dryzek’s position further states, 
however, that in spite of claims by Rawlsians and Habermasians that the non-
logos aspects of rhetoric can never substitute for reason, “such substitution can 
sometimes be fruitful” (2010, p. 322). 
Garsten (2009) similarly writes about the role of rhetoric in distinctly positive 
terms, arguing for a “politics of persuasion” by challenging the intellectual roots 
of suspicion of persuasive rhetoric, laying the groundwork for an understanding 
of deliberation in which rhetoric plays an integral role. In such a model, persua-
sive rhetoric need not be limited to political and media elites. On the contrary, 
research indicates important points of hybridisation of elite and public discourse. 
For example, Vaccari (2012) argues that indirect persuasion through interper-
sonal communication can have an impact on reception of campaign messaging. 
This is an important factor that should also be considered in the context of on-
line user engagement.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to the positive reading of the role of rhetoric 
in political talk. For instance, Dryzek’s notion of the engagement of discourses 
is seen as potentially susceptible to non-democratic forces. He argues: 
The engagement of discourses and its provisional outcomes are democra-
tic to the degree they are under dispersed influence of competent actors, 
as opposed to manipulation by propagandists, spin doctors, and corporate 
advertisers. (Dryzek, 2005, p. 224)
Insofar as it focuses on various forms of manipulation, this is a claim that has 
distinct implications for how one might understand outrage-based political opin-
ion media and other forms of partisan content oriented towards ideological and 
affective persuasion. This argument once more raises questions regarding the 
polarising impact of political homophily, discussed in section 2.2.3. However, in 
that regard, Bird (1998, p. 33) warns us against seeing audiences as overly 
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passive recipients of whatever journalists put in front of them, arguing instead 
that we should see audiences as actively engaging not just in terms of consum-
ing content but in actively shaping the media environment. 
Fears about the effects of political homophily in the context of media use should 
thus be measured against an actual understanding of how audiences use me-
dia as resources (Chadwick et al., 2018b). In that sense, this analysis also po-
tentially applies to below-the-line commentary, insofar as it has been argued 
that “user-generated comments can not only significantly impact readers’ per-
ceptions of public opinion, they can also change readers’ personal 
opinions” (Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015, p. 467). The relevance of rhetoric in the con-
text of partisan media must thus be properly explored with reference to a 
broader definition of deliberative practice. In particular, an account must be of-
fered of the rhetorical dimensions of user-produced content in the context of 
hybrid partisan media.
For Laclau, rhetoric is a central feature of politics. Whilst rhetoric did feature in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), the work to which I 
refer in setting out my articulation approach, Thomassen (2016) argues that La-
clau’s later work focused more explicitly on the political role of rhetoric. Remark-
ing on Laclau’s notion of rhetoric, he contends, “given that politics is about the 
construction of collective identities, politics has an inherently ‘rhetorical’ 
aspect” (L. Thomassen, 2016, p. 167). This builds on Laclau and Mouffe’s con-
tention that all language and thus all political discourse is inherently rhetorical 
(L. Thomassen, 2016) – a claim which links to their concept of hegemony, 
specifically as this pertains to the relation between hegemony and rhetoric in 
the formation of collective identities. In that regard, Laclau (2005, p. 19) argues, 
“far from being a mere adornment of a social reality which could be described in 
non-rhetorical terms, [rhetoric] can be seen as the very logic of constitution of 
political identities."
A variety of rhetorical frameworks have been theorised as playing a central role 
in American civic life and public discourse. For example, the notion of the out-
rage industry proposed Berry and Sobieraj (2013) presents “outrage discourse” 
as a mode of rhetoric that primes in-group/out-group thinking. Furthermore, je-
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remiad rhetoric has been identified as a key dimension of assertions of Ameri-
can identity over the course of several centuries.  Jeremiad rhetoric is rooted in 7
specific forms of “temporal narrative” (Brophy, 2016), projecting images of past 
greatness onto prophetic visions of future decline (Murphy, 2009). Indeed, Mar-
cus (2006) highlights this specific link between prophecy and the American 
voice in his examination of the manner in which acts of prognostication suffuse 
American popular culture.
These few examples briefly demonstrate the relevance of rhetoric to the analy-
sis of American political talk. However, each of the above examples centres on 
the role of rhetoric in various forms of elite discourse. For instance, Berry and 
Sobieraj’s model focuses on outrage discourse as a commercial strategy. By 
contrast, my analysis examines how outrage makes its way into the outputs of 
users. 
Whilst foregrounding the role of rhetoric, the above examples also demonstrate 
how research on user-generated content – particularly an approach that focus-
es on the discursive construction of identity/difference distinctions – might bene-
fit from conceptualising voice and its performative functions. In the domain of 
political talk, the relation between voice and rhetoric is an important dimension 
of the discursive mechanisms via which political viewpoints are encoded and 
embodied. Voice is thus conceived in ways that link it meaningfully to claims to 
political authority. For Couldry (2010), for example, voice is one mechanism via 
which power is rendered accountable. In that sense, voice (rather than simply 
deliberation) can be seen as fundamental to processes of democratic legitima-
tion. 
A conceptualisation of political talk which looks beyond deliberation to account 
for the role of rhetoric and the centrality of social identity is an important step 
towards providing an account of participation that focuses on the production 
and reproduction of difference. In that regard, media operate with respect to es-
tablished conventions around who and what is heard (Dreher, 2009). Within a 
 The reliance of partisan media users on established modes of rhetoric, e.g., jeremiad 7
rhetoric, that is evidenced in my data sample will be a topic of discussion in Chapter 7.
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hybrid media system, in which discursive authority is simultaneously more 
broadly distributed and more deeply contested, those conventions are some-
what upended, opening up new possibilities for speaking and being heard.
Engaging in “dialogue across difference” (Dryzek, 2005) is frequently seen in 
deliberative theory as fundamental to democratic engagement. However, re-
search on the topic of voice highlights the need not only for dialogue across dif-
ference, but also listening (Dreher, 2009). This draws attention to what gets 
spoken as well as to “who is heard, and to what end” (Burgess, 2006, p. 203). 
In that regard, as noted by Couldry (2009, p. 580), “a mere claim by particular 
individuals or groups to ‘voice’, without any practice of listening, is contradictory, 
or at best incomplete.” As such, a concept of voice is proposed which entails 
“practices of both speaking and listening, based in a practice of mutual recogni-
tion” (Couldry, 2009, p. 580). Nevertheless, a notion of voice underpinned by a 
principe of recognition is problematised by forms of antagonistic opposition that 
deny the legitimacy of opponents (Mouffe, 2005), contrasting partisan antago-
nism with an agonistc pluralism that moves beyond the Schmittian friend/enemy 
distinction.
However, voice is accorded a variety of meanings throughout the literature. 
Thus, treatments of voice in linguistic anthropology and sociolinguistics, for ex-
ample, also focus on its role in the performance of social personae (Agha, 
2005) as well as how the voices of others are represented through various 
forms of imitation and discursive recycling across participation frameworks 
(Agha, 2010; Steve Coleman, 2004; Shoaps, 1999). Such analyses consider 
how identity is represented through a variety of voices and discourses (Pietikäi-
nen & Dufva, 2006). The notion of voice in this sense has a great deal to do 
with social identity and its socially and historically situated production and per-
formance. 
Furthermore, dominant theories of voice in sociolinguistics and discourse analy-
sis also integrate Bakhtin’s (1981) concept of heteroglossia, i.e., the manner in 
which individual speakers speak with multiple voices. Speakers thus position 
themselves within the social world by engaging not only in acts of identity (Le 
Page & Tabouret-Keller, 1985), but also acts of alterity – i.e., by drawing on and 
performing the voices of both self and other (Hastings & Manning, 2004b). Hast-
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ings and Manning (2004a, p. 300) are explicit on this point, noting “voice is pre-
cisely an area where anthropological linguistics has shown clearly that a cate-
gory seemingly transparently related to expressive identity is instead shot 
through with alterity.” This concept of multivocality creates an image of a plurali-
ty of voices engaging an array of rhetorical and discursive resources in the as-
sertion of political identities. 
Indeed, such "polyphony of voices” is central to the vision of radical democratic 
struggle envisioned by Laclau and Mouffe (2001), with a particular focus in the 
work of both Mouffe (1993, p. 5) and Laclau (1990, p. 172) on the repression 
and elimination of voices against consensus. Likewise, Hall’s definition of articu-
lation entails both the sense of “to give voice to” and “to connect” (J. Clarke, 
2015), highlighting the relation between voice as utterance and social forma-
tions as complex unities (J. Clarke, 2015; Grossberg, 1996). The approaches to 
articulation of Laclau, Mouffe, and Hall will be discussed in greater detail in sec-
tion 2.4, below.
Integrating a notion of voice and rhetoric into the conceptualisation of political 
talk problematises the kinds of perspectives and worldviews that get voiced by 
users in the production of below-the-line commentary. Analysing such contribu-
tions requires examining forms of political talk and participation that extend be-
yond the domain of formal deliberation.
2.3.2 Participation through online political talk
“An extraordinary feature of the literature on deliberative democracy,” argues 
Saward, “has been its unwillingness to take an encompassing view of democra-
tic sites, institutions and procedures” (2003, p. 166). However, numerous theo-
rists do indeed propose a broader definition of deliberation than that suggested 
by Habermas. For example, in her exploration of the function of rhetoric in pub-
lic discourse, Chambers (2009) draws on the important distinction between de-
mocratic deliberation and deliberative democracy, whilst Fraser (1992) sets out 
a distinction between strong and weak publics in order to offer an account of the 
gap between decision-making, in the sense of parliamentary sovereignty, and 
opinion-formation, more generally speaking. Similarly, a number of authors ar-
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gue for a conception not of deliberative democracy per se but of deliberative 
systems within societies (Dryzek, 2009; Mansbridge, 1999). This approach 
"opens up the permissible space for deliberation by arguing that political talk 
emerges in a variety of forms and spaces across society” (Edwards, 2017, p. 
318).
Introducing the notion of a “full” deliberative system in order to counteract more 
restricted conceptualisations of politically significant speech practices, Mans-
bridge (1999, p. 211) argues:
Through talk among formal and informal representatives in designated 
public forums, talk back and forth between constituents and elected repre-
sentatives or other representatives in politically oriented organisations, talk 
in the media, talk among political activists, and everyday talk in formally 
private spaces about things the public ought to discuss – all adding up to 
what I call the deliberative system – people come to understand better 
what they want and need, individually as well as collectively. The full delib-
erative system encompasses all these strands.
Here, it is possible to appreciate echoes of Fraser’s distinction between strong 
and weak publics, but one is also reminded that it is only through such “weak” 
deliberations and discussions that strong publics can be held to be legitimate.
Drawing on this distinction between formal deliberation and other modes of po-
litically significant speech, Mansbridge (1999, p. 210) presents everyday politi-
cal talk as a fundamental underpinning of deliberative democracy:
One can trust formal governmental decisions to reflect the considered will 
of the citizenry only insofar as that will has gone through a process of ef-
fective citizen deliberation–in the everyday talk of homes, workplaces, and 
places where a few friends meet, as well as more formal talk in designated 
public assemblies. 
Through it “citizens construct their identities, achieve mutual understanding, 
produce public reason, form considered opinions, and produce rules and re-
sources for deliberative democracy” (Kim & Kim, 2008, p. 51). In that regard, 
casual conversation is classed as an important form of political participation 
(Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999).
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However, the model of everyday political talk has now been extended to include 
online contexts of communication, a shift that challenges Mansbridge’s framing 
of everyday talk as something taking place in formally private spaces. Building 
on Mansbridge’s (1999) focus on the political function of everyday talk in delib-
erative systems, the concept of “everyday political talk online” has been used in 
the examination of the “below-the-line” comments that are the empirical focus of 
my research (see Graham & Wright, 2015). In that regard, in Chapter 1 I estab-
lished that below-the-line comment fields are increasingly seen to constitute an 
important venue for internet-mediated political discussion (Graham & Wright, 
2015; Reich, 2011; Walker et al., 2012). 
Political discussion and deliberation in online environments have been concep-
tualised using a variety of approaches, many of which have focused on the de-
liberative potential of online political discussion (Stephen Coleman & Moss, 
2012; Dahlberg, 2001; Papacharissi, 2004b; Wilhelm, 1998a). For example, 
Graham (2015, p. 248) examines everyday political talk in the internet-based 
public sphere, based on the premise that informal political talk is a process 
through which citizens "become aware of other opinions, discover the important 
issues of the day, test new ideas, and develop and clarify their preferences.” 
Importantly, this work draws attention to an inclusive definition not only of the 
kinds of spaces in which political discussion can take place, but also the various 
forms political discussion can take.
Whilst the notion of everyday political talk online plays an important role in 
speaking to a more inclusive and informal form of political discussion, many au-
thors choose to avoid referring to the everyday dimensions of this mode of polit-
ical communication, focusing instead on “online political talk" (Stromer-Galley, 
2002). For example, Graham and Wright frequently draw on this phrase in their 
discussions, referring to the shifting contexts of online political talk (S. Wright, 
2012) and highlighting the propensity of studies of online political talk to focus 
on a Habermasian model of rational deliberation (S. Wright, Graham, & Jack-
son, 2016). Stromer-Galley’s (2002) use of the phrase is oriented specifically 
towards examining the US context, where political conversation is viewed by 
many as taboo in a majority of social settings (Eliasoph, 1998). It is also a term 
employed by Gervais (2015a) in his examination of incivility in online political 
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discussions. In sum, online political talk is widely used terminology for analysing 
political discussion in online environments. In this thesis, for the purposes of 
clarity, I thus refer primarily to online political talk, which is seen as an increas-
ingly important form of participation in the context of liberal democratic systems.
2.3.3 Online political talk and political consumerism
Whilst participation is a topic that is central to understanding the functioning of 
contemporary representative democracy (Teorell, Torcal, & Montero, 2007), a 
variety of modes of participation have targets that extend beyond traditional po-
litical actors and institutions. A key example is political consumption or political 
consumerism, a practice which intersects in important ways with online political 
talk in my data set.
Baek (2010, p. 1066) defines political consumption as a “consumer’s decision 
either to punish (i.e. boycott) or reward (i.e. buycott) private companies by mak-
ing selective choices of products or brands, based on social, political or ethical 
considerations.” The growth in political consumerism has been correlated with 
diminishing public engagement with formal electoral politics, with so-called “citi-
zen-consumers” increasingly drawn towards consumerist methods of political 
participation (Kyroglou & Henn, 2017). Political consumerism has been pre-
sented as a practice that is motivated by the perceived failure of political sys-
tems to respond to the individualised claims of citizen consumers with respect 
to the forces of neoliberalism (Kyroglou & Henn, 2017). This is related to a crisis 
of voice that Couldry (2008) attributes to some neoliberal democracies. Howev-
er, research also indicates that people are motivated to engage in acts of politi-
cal consumerism in order to engage in both individually-oriented value expres-
sion and group oriented social identification (Gotlieb & Cheema, 2017). 
Mirroring a broader focus on progressive issues noted in Chapter 1, there is a 
propensity in the literature on political consumerism to present it as an essen-
tially progressive practice, or one oriented towards progressive social and politi-
cal outcomes. In that regard, some definitions of political consumerism equate it 
with progressive political concerns. For example, Micheletti (2010, p. 182) de-
fines political consumerism as directed towards the “issues and values associ-
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ated with the politics, ethics, and environmentalism of products.” Others 
demonstrate an empirical focus on progressive political advocacy and action. 
For example, Becker and Copeland (2016a) examine LGBT Americans' re-
sponse to the conservative politics of a popular fast-food chain. And yet, con-
servative objectives can also be the target of political consumerist actions and 
advocacy. In the context of my research, this includes the ways in which parti-
san media audiences attribute significance to the use of right-wing partisan me-
dia.
If political consumerism can be thought of as a politics of products (Micheletti & 
Stolle, 2012), then it is a practice that also encompasses news and opinion me-
dia, particularly in the case of subscription services, given their status as media 
products (Chyi, 2005). However, political consumerism is linked to media and 
media-related practices in other ways that are pertinent to the current analysis. 
For example, Micheletti (2010) examines discursive forms of political con-
sumerism, which can entail various forms of politically-oriented content produc-
tion. Furthermore, Becker and Copeland (2016a) relate political consumerism to 
political communication, proposing that “political consumerism may be a func-
tion of the ability of social media use to create networked publics, or groups of 
individuals who come together online to connect across areas of shared inter-
est” (Becker & Copeland, 2016b, p. 23).
The proliferation of digital media technologies thus broadens the communicative 
repertoires of political consumers (de Zúñiga, Copeland, & Bimber, 2013a) at a 
time of increasingly widespread distrust of political institutions (Stolle, Hooghe, 
& Micheletti, 2005). In this sense, political consumerism can be understood as 
existing in the same domain as other participatory responses to fragmentation 
and individualisation, such as emerging forms of so-called “connective action” 
identified by Bennett and Segerberg (2013). An important factor to be consid-
ered is thus the manner in which online political talk can be conceptualised in 
terms of the production of user-generated content within the framework of politi-
cal consumerism. 
In that regard, the concept of “prosumption” (Fuchs, 2013a; Ritzer & Jurgenson, 
2010), drawing on Toffler’s (1981) image of the “prosumer,” was coined to ac-
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count for the distinctive coming together of practices of consumption and pro-
duction that characterises the increasingly blurred boundaries between con-
sumers and producers in the creation and dissemination of consumer goods. In 
a participatory media environment, however, this also applies to the commu-
nicative repertoires of political consumers, who can both contribute and con-
sume various forms of content. This broadening of possibilities is accounted for 
in Hershkovitz’s concept of “political prosumption,” which seeks to “export” the 
concept of prosumption to the political sphere (2012, p. 512). A growing use of 
the term has seen its meaning shift from the more specific uses of Toffler, which 
foregrounds (corporate) producer and (private) consumer, to refer more broadly 
to “user-led content creation” (Bruns, 2016). Bruns’ (2006) notion of produsage 
is designed as an alternative to prosumption (Bruns, 2016), counteracting asso-
ciations between prosumption and exploitative modes of “digital labour” (Fuchs, 
2013b). Although my analysis draws on the notion of prosumption in order to 
highlight the relation between corporate media institutions and an active audi-
ence, I do so whilst recognising these limitations. At the same time, highlighting 
their role in content creation, I refer in this thesis to commenting users as pro-
dusers, as opposed to prosumers.
In a hybrid media environment, in which media users increasingly have oppor-
tunities to publicly and reflexively comment on their own use of media, the pro-
duction and consumption of media content can be attributed political signifi-
cance by audiences. However, it has been suggested that the production of 
user-generated content may also serve as a gateway to more conventional 
forms of participation (Gotlieb & Cheema, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the political-civic potential of political consumption has been chal-
lenged by a number of leading social theorists. For example, based on the con-
tention that consumption practices are driven by largely individual rather than 
democratic interests (Gitlin, 1995), the critical view posits that acts of consump-
tion are motivated by private concerns that lack democratic potential, insofar as 
consumerism entails the “privatisation of human problems and of the responsi-
bility for their resolution” (Z. Bauman, 1991, p. 261). Further critiques have ad-
dressed the possibility that acts of political or ethical consumption may “crowd 
out” more meaningful or impactful political activity (Rössel & Schenk, 2017). For 
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instance, Szasz (2012, p. 79) proposes that, “rather than inspiring additional ac-
tion, ethical consumption is more likely to silence the internal voice that urges 
us to do more.”
In spite of these critiques, research does indicate political consumerism to be 
both a meaningful mode of political-civic engagement and, contrary to the 
“crowding out” thesis, positively correlated with other forms of political participa-
tion (Rössel & Schenk, 2017). In that regard, political consumerism and, specifi-
cally, acts of political prosumption can be considered alongside other “politically 
significant behaviors” (Chadwick et al., 2018b) that connect politically significant 
speech with other forms of meaningful action. This resonates with research, in-
troduced above, that explores the correlation between the contributions of users 
engaging in dual or second screening practices and other modes of political-
civic engagement (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2015; see Vaccari et al., 2015).
 
Reflecting on these matters raises the question of the implications for political 
participation if, beyond the realm of academic debate, people nonetheless view 
their media choice as politically significant behaviour in addition to its economic 
implications. In that regard, my interest in this thesis is targeted at exploring 
how partisan media users articulate meanings in below-the-line commentary. 
This includes the significance users attribute to their chosen forms of participa-
tion. Participation, then, provides a means of thinking about politically significant 
and otherwise meaningful action. Whilst contemporary theories of democracy 
prioritise certain forms of participation over others – i.e., deliberation – an 
analysis of actual practices can help to reveal both the variety of approaches to 
political-civic engagement and participation that exist and the meanings they 
are attributed by those who engage in them.
In sum, when one looks more closely at what people are actually doing and 
saying regarding politics and how they talk about political-civic engagement, it 
becomes clear that a lot of the work of participation is also about the production 
and performance of identities – the same identities that are operationalised in 
affective polarisation and foregrounded by partisan media. In the following sec-
tion, I will propose the concept of articulation as a framework for thinking about 
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how meanings and identities emerge through discursive acts of contestation 
and conflict, relating these processes to affective polarisation.
2.4 Articulation
My approach in this thesis progresses from the stipulation that the production of 
meaning is not only the site of political struggle, but that it is also constitutive of 
the social world. In that regard, I draw on the concept of articulation to examine 
how meanings are created and contested. Articulation is a performative concept 
about the ordering of matter and meaning (Stormer, 2004, p. 257), one which 
entails the privileging of some meanings over others (Kumar, 2014), whilst also 
creating linkages between those meanings (Slack, 1996). The concept of articu-
lation has also been used to describe the manner in which imaginaries are con-
structed (Lawson, 2011), as well as accounting for the creation of publics and 
counterpublics (Richards, 2016). In the context of my thesis, I am interested in 
the manner in which articulation has been used as a way of explaining the for-
mation of collective identities (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001). Two dominant ap-
proaches to articulation are notable in the field of cultural studies: the approach 
of Laclau and Mouffe and the approach of Hall. Here, I outline how I conceptu-
alise articulation based on the existing literature, noting that I will draw primarily 
on Laclau and Mouffe’s approach in this thesis.
2.4.1 Antagonism, hegemony, and the political – aspects of articulation
Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, specifically as formulated in Hegemony 
and Socialist Strategy (2001[1985]) integrates a number of important concepts 
from the work of Foucault, Derrida, Althusser, Lacan, and Gramsci – amongst 
others. I draw on their work whilst recognising the manner in which it has pro-
duced a perception of a single authorial identity – Laclau and Mouffe. As high-
lighted by Wenman (2003, p. 582), this has led to the tendency to view the work 
of both Mouffe and Laclau as a “coherent unity, obscuring the distinctions which 
characterise their individual contributions, both prior to and following the publi-
cation of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.” In outlining the concept of articula-
tion as it pertains to the work of Mouffe and Laclau, I will thus refer to their co-
authored work as well as their individual contributions. 
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In the work of Mouffe and Laclau, the concept of articulation is itself articulated 
in the context of a particular normative vision of democratic life in the form of 
radical pluralism. In Hegemony and Socialist strategy, articulation is defined as 
“any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is 
modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 105). 
Articulation, in this sense, “positions signs in relation to other signs in order to 
give meaning” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 28). As a practice, articulation 
thus entails: 
enunciating elements (e.g. beliefs, values, individuals, organizations, 
technologies, practices, discourses, etc.) and then linking those elements 
into a ‘unity’, which often has the effect of empowering certain ways of 
seeing, being, and acting while disempowering or constraining others. 
(Lawson, 2011, p. 43). 
The principle of unity or totality is important. Insofar as articulation is both the 
outcome and the process of political and historical struggle, DeLuca (1999) dis-
tinguishes between articulation as the process and discourse as its outcome. 
For Laclau and Mouffe (2001, p. 105), however, discourse refers to the “struc-
tured totality” that is the outcome of articulatory practice.
A fundamental dimension of Laclau and Mouffe’s approach is that articulations 
are contingent, i.e., “possible but not necessary” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 
25). The goal of discourse analysis, in this sense, is to “map out the processes 
in which we struggle about the way in which the meaning of signs is to be 
fixed” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 25). However, it is also oriented towards 
the manner in which certain concrete fixations of meaning come to be natu-
ralised through convention (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). For Laclau (1990, p. 
100), “every social configuration is meaningful,” and articulation is the mecha-
nism via which that meaning is produced. These are the basic principles of La-
clau and Mouffe’s approach to articulation, although there are a number of key 
elements that they propose. Here I discuss antagonism, hegemony, and Laclau 
and Mouffe’s concept of the political.
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Notably, Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) account of articulation employs the con-
cept of “antagonism” to explain the role of conflict in producing categories of 
identity and difference. They employ a concept of antagonism that is animated 
by the notion of friend/enemy distinction they derive from Schmitt (1976). The 
concept of articulation thus speaks to the production of antagonisms that differ-
entiate self and other. It is the process through which identity/alterity distinctions 
are performed. Insofar as analysing the construction of these distinctions is my 
stated aim in producing a qualitative account of affective polarisation, I propose 
that antagonism can serve as a useful analytical tool for this purpose. Whilst 
Laclau (1990) posits that antagonism is not a teleological end of identity con-
struction, certain rhetorical frameworks do serve to produce this outcome.
For example, in Laclau’s (2000) analysis of populist rhetoric, he presents the 
concept of "antagonistic frontiers,” which divide “us” from “them.” Through dis-
cursive acts of "antagonistic othering” (Herschinger, 2012), categories of self 
and other are constructed, and these form the basis of assertions of identity. 
However, antagonistic frontiers are not objective phenomena but are rather dis-
cursively contested formations, which are articulated from different perspectives 
within the context of rival hegemonic projects (Farkas & Schou, 2018; Laclau, 
2005, p. 131; Wullweber, 2019). In that sense, antagonisms only exist as dis-
cursive effects (L. Thomassen, 2005) – as the outcome of hegemonic struggles. 
Articulation and hegemony are thus seen to be fundamentally entwined in La-
clau and Mouffe’s account. 
Second, hegemony. Insofar as certain articulations, and the discursive unities 
that result from their linkage, either empower or constrain by fixing meanings in 
particular ways, they can be said to have a hegemonic character. In the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe, the concept of hegemony is drawn from Gramsci. Hegemo-
ny entails the articulation of contingent relationships and is the mechanism 
through which both politics and economy are constituted (L. Thomassen, 2016). 
However, hegemony is also fundamentally implicated in the production and per-
formance of identities. In that regard, Wenman (2003, p. 589) writes, hegemonic 
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practices are “understood as the strategic means by which competing social 
sectors…seek to construct new collective social identities.” 
For Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony can be defined as “the articulation of identi-
ties in the context of antagonistic social relations” (Leggett, 2013, p. 302). In this 
view, according to Leggett, “all social relations and identities are the outcomes 
of acts of power” (2013, p. 302). This comes to the fore when considering the 
relations obtaining between classes. For example, Laclau (1977, p. 161) writes:
A class is hegemonic not so much to the extent that it is able to impose a 
uniform conception of the world on the rest of society, but to the extent that 
it can articulate different visions of the world in such a way that their poten-
tial antagonism is neutralized. 
Whilst antagonism may be an unavoidable dimension of social life, it is the func-
tion of hegemony to seek to erase the tensions that antagonism presupposes. 
Thus, whilst articulation is a process of creating connections, it does so by al-
lowing certain meanings to prevail over others. Nevertheless, insofar as the 
forms of totality which hegemony seeks to create are in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
model impossible, Wenman (2003, p. 589) argues, “each hegemonic formation 
necessarily encounters ‘frontier effects’ with other articulatory practices.”
In that sense, Slack (1996, p. 115) reflects on hegemony not as domination per 
se, but rather “the process of creating and maintaining consensus or of co-ordi-
nating interests.” She continues: “The process of hegemony as ideological 
struggle is used to draw attention to the relations of domination and subordina-
tion that articulation always entails” (Slack, 1996, p. 119). Hegemonic struggle 
as a process aims at fixing meanings in order to produce society as a “determi-
nate object” (Laclau, 1990) – what Wenman (2003) refers to as “society-as-to-
tality” – but it can only ever do so temporarily. Thus, what is viewed as objective 
is in fact a political outcome – a temporary sedimentation of contingent mean-
ings, which have been conventionalised so as to appear natural (Jørgensen & 
Phillips, 2002). These temporary sedimentations can be conceived of as “partial 
fixations” which “bind the flow of differences temporally and allow for orientation 
of action” (Herschinger, 2013, p. 188). Viewing hegemony as a process of ideo-
logical struggle highlights “the relations of domination and subordination that 
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articulation always entails” (Slack, 1996, p. 119). In this regard, the notion of 
conflict and the political are further dimensions of Laclau and Mouffe’s model.
Laclau and Mouffe’s approach in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is termed 
post-Marxist in the sense that it addresses the privileging of class in Marxist 
analyses. Instead, they draw on Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as a means of 
opening up the domain of political analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). How-
ever, in contrast with Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe seek to conceptualise the po-
litical constitution of the economy. In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, politics 
is defined as “a practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of social 
relations” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 153), although this disguises the fact that 
Mouffe and Laclau each takes a distinct approach to the political articulation of 
social relations (Wenman, 2003). 
For Slack (1996, p. 122), the anti-reductionist turn in cultural studies, of which 
Laclau is an exemplar, "rendered it possible and necessary to re-theorize social 
forces such as gender, race and subculture as existing in complex — articulated 
— relations with one another as well as with class.” Laclau and Mouffe’s notion 
of class is here pertinent: rather than essential, objective groups, economic 
classes are viewed instead as the product of "political, discursive 
processes” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002) – i.e., articulations. Articulation, in this 
sense, provides a mechanism for thinking about the ways in which social cate-
gories are linked together in order to produce transient formations that are open 
to contestation.
One of the primary critiques of Laclau and Mouffe’s approach is the manner in 
which it centres on an open field of discursivity. This model of a field of discur-
sivity that is inherently open is drawn from Derrida’s conceptualisation of semio-
sis as “an infinite play of signification which precludes the fixing of 
meaning” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 125). The notion of radical open-
ness raises a further critique of Laclau and Mouffe’s approach, raised by Slack. 
She argues that Laclau and Mouffe do not “intend to leave behind 
politics” (Slack, 1996, p. 121), yet this is a possible outcome of their theorisation 
of radical openness of the social, which renders society a "totally open discur-
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sive field” (Grossberg, 1996, p. 146). This is a point to which I will return in sec-
tion 2.4.3, below.
However, a further dimension to be noted is the manner in which all social prac-
tices are conceived as articulations. Thus, unlike Fairclough’s approach to dis-
course, which theorises the dialectical relation between the discursive and the 
material (e.g.`, Fairclough, 2013), Laclau and Mouffe’s approach instead con-
ceptualises all social practices as fully discursive (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). 
Insofar as all social practices are viewed in this model as articulations, it is pos-
sible to analyse a variety of modes of participation through the lens of articula-
tion theory. This includes, for example, not only acts of political consumerism, 
but also discussions about their significance.
Central to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory is the notion that certain key 
signs function as “nodal points” around which meanings are partially fixed – or 
around which collective identities “coalesce” (L. Thomassen, 2016). Examples 
include definitions of “democracy” in political discourses (Jørgensen & Phillips, 
2002, p. 26). In addition, Laclau and Mouffe use the term “floating signifiers” to 
refer to signs that are the object of struggle across competing discourses, 
proposing that discourse analysis is the practice of examining how competing 
ascriptions seek to fix the meaning of certain signs in various ways. My analysis 
in this thesis centres on the struggle to fix the meanings of relevant categories 
of identity and alterity – e.g., progressive, liberal, Democrat, Republican – al-
though I focus in particular on how these contribute to the contested definition 
of contemporary American conservatism.
In sum, articulation is here viewed as the ongoing struggle to “fix” meaning – 
including the meaning of society and identity – in ways that exclude other 
meanings (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). This highlights the essentially political 
dimensions of articulation as the mechanism via which the social is produced 
through discursive acts of opposition and exclusion. It is this sense of contesta-
tion that will play a fundamental role in how I seek to examine the production of 
conservative identity, focusing of contestatory performance (Fuoss, 1993) as a 
means of challenging dominant power relations and foregrounding the produc-
tive role of acts of “antagonistic othering” (Herschinger, 2012) in the articulation 
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of contemporary American conservatism. This will require outlining the process 
of identification and its role in the articulation of collective identities, a topic 
which is dealt with in the next section.
2.4.2 Identification and the articulation of identity/alterity distinctions
Qualitative approaches to the construction of identity/alterity distinctions have 
demonstrated that in-group/out-group boundaries do not necessarily function 
purely as predefined categories but are rather produced dynamically through 
discursive interaction and performance (Benhabib, 1996; Mouffe, 1993). For 
both Mouffe and Benhabib, identity is a relational concept, defined against 
some external other. Benhabib (1996), for example, describes not only the pro-
cesses of exclusion via which identities are constituted, but also the elimination 
of difference via which they are secured. Likewise, speaking of the “constitutive 
outside” that she sees as fundamental to the articulation of each collective iden-
tity, Mouffe (2005, p. 19) argues the “constitution of a specific ‘we’ always de-
pends on the type of ‘they’ from which it is differentiated.” Insofar as all social 
identities – or ‘subject positions’ – are articulated in terms of this constitutive 
outside, which exists as an enduring threat to any attempt to fix meaning, social 
identities can be said to be intrinsically relational (Wenman, 2003).
Whilst Bennett and Segerberg (2013) note that emerging forms of individualised 
“connective” action are being facilitated by digital technologies, Laclau and 
Mouffe’s model proposes that all politics is about collective identities  (L. 
Thomassen, 2016). As with all articulations, identities are the product of contin-
gent processes, thus forming part of the discursive struggle that characterises 
articulation (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). As argued above in section 2.4.1, 
whereas earlier works in the Marxist tradition, including Gramsci, had centred 
on class as the organising logic for the production of collective identities, Laclau 
and Mouffe’s analysis focuses on hegemony in order to explain the relations be-
tween social elements (L. Thomassen, 2016). Unlike essential economic class 
identities, this model posits that group identities “are always created in political, 
discursive processes” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 33). Underlying this con-
cept of identity is a performative notion of articulation as hegemonic interven-
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tion, which is seen at once as contingent and realising social relations (Laclau, 
1996). This thesis likewise conceptualises identity in terms of such hegemonic 
acts of exclusion, understood as performative attempts to override and dissolve 
antagonisms.
Laclau and Mouffe’s model proposes that both collective identities and subjects 
emerge from the process of articulation. As DeLuca (1999, p. 339) writes:
Far from being the fully conscious source and sovereign of discourse, 
then, the subject is the ongoing effect of social discourses, a product con-
stituted within the matrix of linguistic and material social practices. In this 
sense, the subject is not a content, but a performance, a happening born, 
existing, and transformed in social discourses.
Although Laclau and Mouffe draw on Gramsci in order to produce a revised 
concept of hegemony as a means of explaining the processes via which collec-
tive identities are produced, their approach to collective identity also draws on 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. That is, they focus on processes of identification 
rather than stable, objective identities, where identification is conceptualised as 
“an ongoing and always incomplete process” (L. Thomassen, 2016, p. 166). 
This approach fits with a constructivist model of identity, which sees identity as 
something one does rather than something that one has (Hastings & Manning, 
2004b). This position is also reflected in Bucholtz and Hall, who propose “a 
framework for the analysis of identity as constituted in linguistic 
interaction” (2005, p. 586). Those authors arrive at a definition of identity which 
sees it as “the social positioning of self and other” (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, p. 
586). 
In that regard, Hastings and Manning (2004a, p. 293) write, “it is remarkable 
how often we talk of identity as if it were absolute and not relational”. Yet, there 
is no identity without alterity. As argued by Benhabib, “every search for identity 
includes differentiating oneself from what one is not” (1996, p. 3). The only way 
an individual’s sense of self enters the social world might be “via some form of 
discourse” (Bucholtz & Hall, 2005, p. 587), yet “even those linguistic resources 
that people may eventually employ in marking ‘acts of identity’ have their origins 
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in the mouths of others” (Hastings & Manning, 2004b, p. 300), highlighting the 
relation between the performance of alterity and the notion of voice. 
On this matter, reflecting on constructivist approaches to identity, Hastings and 
Manning draw attention to what they portray as a key oversight. They argue: 
identity performances are relational with respect to different dimensions of 
alterity, involving objectification of subjectivity, delineating stances both 
with respect to others against whom one defines oneself, the audiences 
before which performance occurs, as well as the relationship between this 
performance and others one might engage in. (Hastings & Manning, 
2004b, p. 294)
Indeed, the concept of negative partisanship discussed in section 2.2.2 (see pp. 
50-53) effectively highlights the power of a focus on otherness as an organising 
logic. Whilst negative partisanship and affective polarisation alike both rest on 
negative affect towards opposing partisans, the concept of negative partisan-
ship in particular foregrounds the strength of such a relational focus on the so-
called “constitutive outside” (Derrida, 1974) – i.e., an opposed “them.” My theo-
retical framework proposes antagonism as a way of conceptualising this kind of 
negative affect. 
In Laclau and Mouffe’s approach, antagonism is viewed as a fundamental as-
pect of politics, one which must therefore be accounted for in democratic theory 
(L. Thomassen, 2016). However, according to Laclau (2005, p. 81), populism 
and populist rhetoric rest on a particular form of antagonism in which a “frontier 
of exclusion” divides the social into two opposing camps. In this model, whilst 
“the people” are composed of something less than the totality, “it is a partial 
component which nevertheless aspires to be conceived as the only legitimate 
totality” (Laclau, 2005, p. 81). Populism is thus distinguished from liberal con-
ceptions of society, insofar as it contrasts a homogenous social whole with a 
pluralism of individual citizens protected by individual rights (L. Thomassen, 
2016). With reference to populist constructions of difference, identities are seen 
as contingent and as such can be articulated around the figure of “the people” 
rather than necessarily around class. This opens up a space for the articulation 
of collective identities around other factors, including race and gender.
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Wenman (2003, p. 589) argues that hegemonic practices are those in which dif-
ferent social sectors seek to construct collective social identities in such a way 
that the specific “concrete demands” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 120) of one so-
cial sector are articulated so as to be seen as contiguous with the “object soci-
ety-as-totality.” This is a goal which is itself unachievable, given the impossibility 
of fixing or closing society in this manner. That is to say, as with all articulations, 
the meaning of society can only ever be but a temporary fixation.
In terms of Laclau and Mouffe’s normative claims regarding radical political 
agendas, Thomassen (2016, p. 165) writes, “the task for the Left is to articulate 
identities together in a way so as to create a collective subject of change.” Here, 
the social sectors envisaged include "feminism, anti-racism, the gay movement, 
etc.” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 132). However, there is a dearth of treatments 
of right-wing movements in the literature. I argue that this conception of pop-
ulism can equally contribute to an examination of how conservatives discursive-
ly constitute a partisan image of the people whilst articulating antagonisms be-
tween conservatives and perceived opponents.
In a divided society, Dryzek (2005) argues, assertions of identity tend towards 
mutual contradiction. As this thesis seeks to demonstrate, however, they also 
rely fundamentally on acts of "antagonistic othering” (Herschinger, 2012). By 
examining the contested definition of conservatism within the below-the-line 
comment field of an American conservative news and opinion website, I focus in 
this thesis on particular competing claims to fix its meaning in antagonistic 
terms. Insofar as the articulation of collective identities can be viewed in the 
context of hegemonic struggle, these competing claims can be seen to have a 
political character that is of fundamental relevance to the study not only of affec-
tive polarisation but also American politics more broadly speaking. 
Focusing on the struggle to define the character of conservatism will allow my 
analysis to highlight what Herschinger (2013, p. 186) terms the “contingency of 
collective identity-building processes.” In that regard, Jørgensen and Phillips 
(2002, p. 37) argue, “knowledge, identity and social relations are all contingent: 
at a given time, they all take a particular form, but they could have been – and 
can become – different.” Focusing on this dimension of contingency and possi-
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bility will foreground the dynamic and contested character of partisan opposi-
tions. In the context of my thesis, this will be used as a means of broadening 
the existing approach to affective polarisation. Nevertheless, conceptualising 
articulation as a process that is simultaneously open and constrained by struc-
tural conditions serves as a reminder that there are factors that must be consid-
ered in terms of how discursive acts of articulation occur in the context of a hy-
brid media system. This is a topic to which I will now turn.
2.4.3 Articulation in a hybrid media environment
As noted by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p. 38), “[m]eanings are never com-
pletely fixed, but nor are they ever completely fluid and open.” Struggle and 
constraint are thus two concepts that are fundamental to an understanding of 
articulation. As noted earlier, theories of articulation are typified by two dominant 
approaches. On one hand, there is the framework set out by Laclau and Mouffe 
(2001). On the other hand, there is the model set out by Hall (see Grossberg, 
1996). Here, I briefly compare the two approaches in terms of their treatments 
of constraint, before moving on to relate Laclau and Mouffe’s model of articula-
tion to Chadwick’s (2013) model of media hybridity through a discussion of 
struggle and constraint.
For Hall, articulation is “the form of the connection that can make a unity of two 
different elements, under certain conditions” [emphasis in original] (Grossberg, 
1996, p. 141). As with Laclau and Mouffe’s approach, Hall’s model recognises 
the contingent and temporary character of articulations, insofar as “the so‐called 
‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of distinct, different elements, 
which can be re‐articulated in different ways because they have no necessary 
‘belongingness’” (Grossberg, 1996, p. 141). The two approaches thus share 
some important features. According to Featherstone (2011, p. 140), however, 
Hall’s account of articulation is “emphatically more situated than either Althuss-
er's interventions or Laclau and Mouffe's account of articulation as constituted 
through the formation of discursive frontiers.” Hall’s model, that is, provides a 
greater prominence to the role of context and history. Articulation is in this sense 
viewed as a situated practice that is fundamentally shaped by the fact of its sit-
uatedness.
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Contingency refers to the non-determinism and openness of articulations. 
Whilst Chouliaraki and Fairclough integrate Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of ar-
ticulation into their own analysis, they nevertheless critique Laclau and Mouffe 
by highlighting that there are certain structural constraints on what meanings 
can be articulated and by whom. In that regard, they argue, “the degree and the 
form of the contingency of the social depends upon how persons and practices 
are positioned within social structures,” with class, gender, race, and age rela-
tions affecting the contingency of the semiotic in particular (Chouliaraki & Fair-
clough, 1999, p. 125). Contingency, in other words, is “structurally 
constrained” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 126). Here, “structure” is un-
derstood as some form of “relative permanence – open to change but with rela-
tive stability” (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999, p. 125). Jørgensen and Phillips 
(2002, p. 56) echo Chouliaraki and Fairclough when they stress that, “in a given 
situation, not all possibilities are equally likely and not all aspects of the social 
are equally open.” In this thesis, I orient towards this question of constraint on 
speaker agency. However, I do so in the specific context of user-generated con-
tent production.
In that regard, as with Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of articulation, struggle is 
central to the concept of hybrid media put forward by Chadwick (2013). In a hy-
brid media environment the struggle over meaning is mirrored in a struggle over 
control of the resources through which meaning is produced. As Chadwick 
(2013, p. 208) argues, “hybridity empowers and it disempowers.” Contrary to 
normative ideals of deliberation, the struggles that underlie the hybridity de-
scribed by Chadwick also introduce a fundamental dissonance to public sphere 
discourse (Pfetsch, 2018). For example, in Chadwick’s 2017 edition of his book 
The Hybrid Media System, he looks to the polarised struggle between Trump 
supporters and Clinton supporters in the context of the 2016 US presidential 
election. This empirical example leads Chadwick to ask: who has the right to 
assert conclusions regarding matters of contestation in a hybrid media system? 
Indeed, this is something which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7 (see 
section 7.3 pp. 233-241). However, as shall be seen in later chapters, this 
struggle also played out between conservatives who were supportive of Trump’s 
candidacy and those not. This tension points to the need for a model of partisan 
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opposition which takes into account forms of antagonism that occur both within 
and between groups.
Chadwick’s (2013) model of media hybridity also focuses attention on the con-
straints that shape forms of participation in the struggle for discursive authority 
that characterises contemporary media. Drawing on Chadwick’s writings, Lü-
nenborg (2019, p. 34) argues, "the coexistence of traditional media institutions 
and personalized networked media establishes conflicting settings of articula-
tion.” An analytical framework based on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory 
and Chadwick’s concept of media hybridity has recently been applied by Hatak-
ka (2019) in his doctoral research on populist radical right counterpublics. 
Hatakka’s research focuses on struggle, which is also central to my own ap-
proach. However, I also seek to situate articulations in a hybrid media environ-
ment in terms of structural constraint. 
Whilst drawing on the work of Mouffe and Laclau in formulating my approach to 
articulation, my framework thus orients towards criticisms that have seen this 
model as insufficiently heeding of the structural conditions that help to shape 
the production of meanings in the context of the ineradicable dissonance of 
real-world publics. It is towards this dissonance and disagreement that I will turn 
in my empirical analysis. This notion of constraint will thus serve as an impor-
tant facet of my analysis of how users talk about politics in user-generated be-
low-the-line commentary at TheBlaze.com. 
2.5 Conclusion: giving voice to self and other online
In this chapter, I have set out my theoretical framework through a review of key 
literature. I did so by examining and defining three key concepts: polarisation, 
participation, and articulation.
First, I outlined how I will conceptualise polarisation for the purposes of this the-
sis. I began by outlining two distinctions in the literature on polarisation, namely 
elite versus mass polarisation and ideological versus affective polarisation. Af-
fective polarisation, which refers to negative affect towards opposing partisans, 
was outlined as the focus of my research. I identified the primarily quantitative 
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treatments of affective polarisation as a gap in the literature, arguing instead for 
a qualitative account that captures the dynamic nature of partisan oppositions. 
Affective polarisation was then related to various trends in the conceptualisation 
of partisanship, including the notion of negative partisanship. Having estab-
lished the relation between negative partisanship and affective polarisation, I 
then moved on to consider their relation to media hostility and selective expo-
sure. Here I argued that a rigorous examination of the relationship between 
media and affective polarisation must focus on actually existing practices of po-
litical talk and their relation to patterns of media use. In the context of contem-
porary media, I contend, this necessarily demands a more detailed focus not 
only on partisanship, but also participation.
Second, I defined the notion of participation as it pertains to my research agen-
da. I began by discussing and critiquing the deliberative model of participation 
and legitimation that has come to dominate democratic theory. Rather than a 
model of rational critique, I instead looked to models of political talk that account 
for the role of voice and rhetoric in political communication. The role of social 
identity was thus foregrounded. I then moved to outline the concept of online 
political talk, before discussing the relation between online political talk and po-
litical consumerism, demonstrating how forms of participation extend beyond 
deliberative modes of political-civic engagement. In sum, it was shown that de-
liberation serves as an insufficient model for describing how people actually talk 
about politics. Instead, a space was opened up for thinking about the kinds of 
society that people imagine and how they do so through their political talk. With 
reference to my discussion of affective polarisation, a central question becomes 
how those imagined social formations are attributed a specifically partisan char-
acter.
Third, I proposed an articulation approach as a framework for conceptualising 
how the boundaries of American conservative identity get contested. I intro-
duced the work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, particularly their joint 
work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), on which I 
draw in devising my approach. Focusing on their definition of articulation, which 
is a fundamentally relational concept, I defined other key concepts, including 
antagonism, hegemony, and politics. Antagonism, I suggested, provides a 
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framework for thinking about the ontology of partisan oppositions as contingent 
and shifting significations, with articulation providing a means of describing the 
struggle over the meaning of conservatism as well as how partisan oppositions 
are discursively produced and populated with content. Articulation was thus re-
lated to the performance of identity/alterity distinctions, with a focus on opposi-
tion providing a means of revealing how polarised imaginaries are articulated. 
Here, I drew on Laclau’s concept of populism as a way of conceptualising 
hegemonic attempts to assert certain kinds of partisan interests. Lastly, consid-
ering some key critiques of Laclau and Mouffe’s approach, I examined the no-
tions of struggle and constraint, situating these concepts in terms of Chadwick’s 
(2013) model of a hybrid media system. Here, hybridity was proposed as a 
mechanism for conceptualising the hegemonic struggle to define American con-
servatism in the context of participatory media.
Insofar as they provide a space within which polarised attitudes towards media 
and politics can be articulated publicly, hybrid media are empirically and theoret-
ically consequential. My research proceeds on the premise that hybrid media 
provide spaces within which media users can themselves voice hostile attitudes 
towards their perceived opponents. In a media environment in which media out-
lets, figures, and content are habitually attributed partisan leanings by both me-
dia and their audiences, this potentially includes both opposing partisans and 
media (i.e., media perceived as opposing partisans). If, as Matthews (2013) ar-
gues, partisanship has an impact on how people respond to political messages, 
including partisan attacks, it is a matter of some interest when perceived parti-
san attacks occur in media that heretofore have been seen as proattitudinal.
In summary, viewed through the lens of articulation theory, affective polarisation 
is seen to rest on the articulation of antagonisms in the form of partisan opposi-
tions. This thesis aims to contribute to an understanding of affective polarisation 
by describing it as a discursive outcome of the social production – i.e., articula-
tion – of meaning. As noted in Chapter 1, the election of President Donald 
Trump in 2016 created a new interest in the articulation and content of Ameri-
can conservative identity. In this chapter, I have outlined an ontology of antago-
nism in the context of a hybrid media system which draws on the concept of ar-
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ticulation in order to examine the contested boundaries of contemporary Ameri-
can conservatism. 
Insofar as articulation can be seen as part of a move towards a theory of con-
texts (Grossberg, 1993), in the following chapter I set out a methodological 
framework rooted in the method of constructionist thematic analysis, which 
seeks to describe and analyse the sociocultural contexts of discourse (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006).
2.6 Research questions
The following research questions for the most part map onto the breakdown of 
my four empirical chapters. Starting from an initial interest in the ways in which 
partisan media users characterise partisan opposition in their online political 
talk, these questions were devised iteratively in the process of familiarising my-
self with my data sample and developing a coding framework for my construc-
tionist thematic analysis. The process via which the sample was produced is 
dealt with in detail in the following chapter. My research questions address four 
specific themes, each linked in various ways to my objective of presenting a 
qualitative account of affective polarisation through the lens of articulation theo-
ry:
RQ1: How do commenters articulate partisan oppositions in their online political 
talk?
RQ2: How do commenters articulate partisan oppositions in their characterisa-
tion(s) of media? 
RQ3: How do commenters situate their media choice discursively in terms of 
the political and economic significance of partisan media?
RQ4: How do commenters relate their partisan media use to broader historical 
processes of social, cultural, and political transformation?
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Chapter 3: Methodology –– constructionist 
thematic analysis
3.1 Introduction
This chapter outlines my methodological framework, which integrates construc-
tionist thematic analysis with an articulation approach grounded in the work of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001). In the previous chapter, I argued 
that antagonism constitutes an important analytical tool for developing a qualita-
tive account of affective polarisation. In that regard, my thesis employs the con-
cept of antagonism as a framework for conceptualising the ontology of opposi-
tional identities through the lens of articulation theory. Taking the discursive 
construction of contemporary American conservatism in online partisan media 
as a case study, I seek to demonstrate how identity/alterity distinctions are per-
formed dynamically through user-generated online discourse. In order to do so, 
however, it is important to identify and analyse patterns (i.e., themes) in how 
commenters articulate those distinctions, particularly how they do so by drawing 
on an array of discursive resources, some of which are made available through 
media. The aim of this chapter is thus to establish how I operationalised my 
conceptual framework, outlined in Chapter 2, in the form of a specific process 
for generating, collating, and analysing data. In what follows, I will therefore 
demonstrate the value of taking a constructionist thematic analysis approach to 
the question of how commenters articulate partisan oppositions in their online 
political talk.
First, I will provide an overview of thematic analysis, paying specific attention to 
its application as a constructionist method that focuses on the relation between 
discourses and social reality. In so doing, I will assert the relevance of construc-
tionist thematic analysis to the study of discursive articulations. Here, I will also 
discuss the important distinction between inductive and deductive (i.e., theoreti-
cal) thematic analysis, the difference between manifest and latent themes, and 
the proven deployment of thematic analysis in the study of online user-generat-
ed content. Second, I will describe the specific approach taken in generating 
and analysing my data sample, including my “hybrid” (Fereday & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006) process of establishing a coding frame using deductive and 
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inductive reasoning, one which was furthermore based on the analysis of mani-
fest and latent themes. Whilst I will here focus on the steps taken in selecting 
and gathering my data, I will also briefly outline some of the methods and ap-
proaches that were considered but eventually excluded for various reasons in 
the elaboration of my research design. Third, I will outline some of the ethical 
factors I considered in developing my particular methodological framework. 
Here, I will pay particular attention to the ethical implications of using so-called 
“public” user-generated content as research data. However, I will also argue for 
the value of a reflexive approach to research ethics that centres both research 
subject and researcher.
3.2 Thematic analysis as a qualitative research method
My thesis utilises the definition of constructionist thematic analysis set out by 
Braun and Clarke (2006). Thematic analysis, broadly defined, is a qualitative 
research method for “identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) 
within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79). This is achieved through a process 
of “careful reading and re-reading” (Rice & Ezzy, 1999, p. 258), which allows the 
researcher to get close to the data in order to become sensitive to emergent 
patterns (Sullivan, 2003, p. 88). As argued by Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 78), 
thematic analysis offers a flexible approach to conducting qualitative research, 
one which can be applied in conjunction with a range of theoretical and episte-
mological frameworks. This is because, unlike other qualitative methods, it is 
not tied to any one particular theoretical or epistemological position (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, p. 78). In that sense, thematic analysis can be viewed as a 
method, as opposed to a methodology. The openness and flexibility of thematic 
analysis, whilst recognised as advantages, are at the root of Braun and Clarke’s 
definitional project. Here, I provide an overview of my conceptualisation of con-
structionist thematic analysis, which I argue is an appropriate tool for exploring 
the struggle over the creation of meaning in online user-generated content.
3.2.1 Constructionist thematic analysis –– defining my approach 
Insofar as it provides an array of core skills, and given its capacity to structure 
and organise rich data, Braun and Clarke argue thematic analysis “should be 
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seen as a foundational method for qualitative analysis” (2006, p. 78). Neverthe-
less, their paper represents an attempt to clearly demarcate thematic analysis in 
order to provide the kind of conceptual tools that will enable those who employ 
it as a method to make theoretically and methodologically sound choices (Braun 
& Clarke, 2006, p. 78). In so doing, they set out a six-phase process that I ap-
plied in a slightly modified form. The six phases are: 1) familiarising oneself with 
the data, 2) generating initial codes, 3) searching for themes, 4) reviewing 
themes, 5) defining and naming themes, and 6) producing the report (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, p. 87). For the purposes of this project, the sixth phase will entail 
the production of a set of 4 empirical chapters, with the six phases themselves 
set within the broader framework of the doctoral research process. Having out-
lined the meaning of constructionist thematic analysis here, my specific ap-
proach will be described in greater detail in the following section.
One of Braun and Clarke’s main contributions is a clearly delineated six-phase 
process that ideally can be reproduced by any qualitative researcher wishing to 
conduct a rigorous and empirically valid thematic analysis. However, in so do-
ing, they also distinguish between an array of approaches that can be taken. 
Given that thematic analysis comes in a variety of forms, it is therefore impor-
tant to distinguish between these various iterations of the method in order to 
choose the most appropriate approach in the context of a given set of research 
questions. Based on Braun and Clarke’s formulation and the research questions 
I outlined at the end of Chapter 2, three particular distinctions appear to be most 
relevant here: essentialist versus constructionist, inductive versus deductive, 
and semantic versus latent.
First, the distinction between essentialist and constructionist thematic analysis. 
The capacity for thematic analysis to take either form is tied to its flexibility and 
openness as a method. Whereas the pairing of thematic analysis with an essen-
tialist (or realist) paradigm is suited to reporting “the experiences, meaning, and 
the reality of participants,” its deployment as a constructionist method allows the 
researcher to examine “the ways in which events, realities, meanings, experi-
ences and so on are the effects of a range of discourses operating within soci-
ety” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 81). Constructionist thematic analysis is oriented 
more towards theorising the sociocultural conditions of discourse, including the 
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social production and reproduction of meaning, than offering an account of indi-
vidual psychological motivations (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 85). Relatedly, this 
mode of thematic analysis does not “treat people’s talk of experience as a 
transparent window on their world” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 95). In that regard, 
constructionist thematic analysis is primarily geared towards the search for im-
plicit or latent themes. This will be discussed below.
Second, the distinction between inductive and deductive thematic analysis. This 
distinction refers to the manner in which themes are identified or generated by 
the researcher. DeSantis and Ugazirra (2000, p. 362) define a theme as “an ab-
stract entity that brings meaning and identity to a recurrent experience and its 
variant manifestations.” In their view, a theme “captures and unifies the nature 
or basis of the experience into a meaningful whole” (DeSantis & Ugarriza, 2000, 
p. 362). In that regard, Boyatzis (1998) distinguishes between the inductive and 
deductive generation of themes. Inductive themes are generated from raw data, 
whereas deductive themes are produced with reference to theory and/or prior 
research (Nowell, Norris, White, & Moules, 2017, p. 8). Importantly, a successful 
theme must capture "something important in relation to the overall research 
question” (Nowell et al., 2017, p. 8). This centring of specific research questions 
in the design and conduct of thematic analysis indicates that the selection of an 
individual case study is supported (Graham & Wright, 2015, p. 321).
Third, the distinction between semantic and latent themes. This distinction aris-
es in the work of Boyatzis (1998), although Boyatzis refers rather to the distinc-
tion between manifest and latent themes. The analysis of manifest themes 
refers to that content which is explicitly expressed (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 16). It can 
therefore be viewed as the study of explicit semantic form (Braun & Clarke, 
2006, p. 84). This mode of analysis involves a primarily descriptive approach. 
However, Braun and Clarke argue that an ideal research process entails a pro-
gression from description of patterns to interpretation. With interpretation comes 
“an attempt to theorize the significance of the patterns and their broader mean-
ings and implications” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84). Whilst a focus on manifest 
themes is important, therefore, it is through the exploration of both manifest and 
latent (i.e., implicit) themes that relations with the broader context can best be 
understood (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 166).
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Yet, the definitional work required in demarcating an approach to thematic 
analysis must go beyond a focus on these distinctions. Insofar as the flexibility 
inherent in thematic analysis can lead to “inconsistency and a lack of coherence 
when developing themes derived from the research data” (Nowell et al., 2017, 
p. 2), it is imperative to explicitly apply a coherent epistemological framework to 
support one’s empirical claims (Holloway & Todres, 2003). 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the conceptual focus of my research is what 
Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p. 47) term the “struggle over the creation of 
meaning” [emphasis in original], with an empirical focus on how a partisan me-
dia audience use online political talk to contest the meaning of American con-
servatism in user-generated below-the-line commentary. In Chapter 2, I argued 
that a qualitative approach focused on the way people talk about identity and 
alterity can help to reveal some of the messy complexity and nuance of real-
world intergroup relations (C. Jackson & Sherriff, 2013), thus contributing to a 
qualitative account of affective polarisation. In so doing, I proposed an articula-
tion framework as a means of evaluating and mapping how commenters strug-
gle to fix the meaning of conservatism in their online political talk. 
Articulation is both “a process of production of reality and an analytical 
practice” (Drzewiecka & Steyn, 2012, p. 6). It is a concept which facilitates a 
conceptual focus on the manner in which the symbolic and material are inter-
woven. In that regard, articulation can be viewed as a constructionist concept, 
e.g., in the case of Laclau and Mouffe’s orientation towards the construction of 
objectivity through discourse. Considering Jørgensen and Phillips’ assertion that 
it can be fruitful to supplement Laclau and Mouffe’s approach with other meth-
ods (2002, p. 24), I contend that constructionist thematic analysis presents an 
appropriate means of exploring the constitutive power of discursive articulations 
and the various struggles over meaning by which they are characterised.
Braun and Clarke’s definitive overview of thematic analysis serves to solidify the 
method and fix some of its boundaries. By creating an image of a six-phase 
process, they establish a model that can be followed by researchers in order to 
ensure rigour and validity of findings. Nevertheless, although it is presented as 
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a linear process, it is in fact “an iterative and reflective process that develops 
over time and involves a constant moving back and forward between 
phases” (Nowell et al., 2017, p. 4). This iterative character permits what Fere-
day and Muir-Cochrane (2006) term a "hybrid approach” to thematic analysis 
that deploys inductive and deductive reasoning at various stages, based on the 
analysis of both manifest and latent themes. This allows for the development of 
both the theory-driven codes described Crabtree and Miller (1999) and the 
data-driven codes described by Boyatzis (1998). Taken together, the approach I 
employ is thus a hybrid constructionist model. Such a hybrid model is well suit-
ed to the analysis of social constructions that are manifest explicitly in discourse 
as well as those that are encoded implicitly, e.g., public articulations of race and 
gender, particularly in the case of so-called “colourblind” approaches to racial 
inequalities (King & Smith, 2014).
3.2.2 Constructionist thematic analysis of below-the-line commentary
In the previous two chapters, I established the conceptual relevance of below-
the-line commentary in the context of increasingly hybrid forms of “participatory” 
media and emerging modes of political-civic engagement. In so doing, I outlined 
some of the main approaches that scholars of media and communications have 
taken to conceptualising how people talk about politics in online spaces, e.g., 
online political talk (Stromer-Galley, 2002; Toepfl & Piwoni, 2015), online politi-
cal discussion (Papacharissi, 2004a; Wilhelm, 1998b), and everyday political 
talk online (S. Wright et al., 2016). My conceptual framework foregrounds the 
concept of online political talk, whilst my empirical focus is oriented towards how 
such talk occurs in the context of a below-the-line comment field of an American 
right-wing partisan news website, TheBlaze.com.
A number of other methodological approaches, both quantitative and qualitative, 
have been taken to the analysis of below-the-line comments. For example, 
some large-scale analyses of below-the-line comments, such as Gardiner et al’s 
(2016) study of 70 million user-generated comments posted to The Guardian’s 
website, have used a quantitative approach. Similarly, Wahl-Jorgensen, Bennett 
and Taylor (2017) employed a quantitative content analysis in their study of 
newspaper and blog coverage of the Snowden revelations, which included a 
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selection of user comments posted in response to blog posts. Although quanti-
tative methods have been demonstrated in this field of research, a number of 
other approaches to qualitative analysis have been shown to be appropriate to 
the study of online discourse. For example, critical discourse analysis (CDA) 
has been applied to the occurrence of hate speech in online news comments 
(Erjavec & Kovačič, 2012). Cammaerts (2009) also examines racist discourse in 
online news commentary from a critical qualitative perspective.
Thematic analysis is an established method in the qualitative study of user-
generated content. It is a method which is particularly well-represented in the 
study of user contributions to online support groups. For example, Sullivan 
(2003) discussed the concept of gendered cybersupport through a thematic 
analysis of online cancer support groups. Similarly, Elwell, Grogan and Coulson 
(2010) employed thematic analysis in their examination of the use of online 
support groups among adolescents living with cancer. Malik and Coulson 
(2008) employed thematic analysis in their study of an online fertility support 
group focusing on the male experience of infertility, whilst Hanna and Gough 
(2017) did so in their examination of men’s experience of infertility in intimate 
partner relationships. Rodham et al (2013) conducted a thematic analysis of on-
line representations of self injury. Finally, Gibson and Trnka (2020) use thematic 
analysis to identify young people’s motivations for engaging support through 
social media. This non-exhaustive list of examples demonstrates the viability of 
the method in the analysis of user-generated content. However, it should be 
noted that many of the examples presented here are based on an array of ap-
proaches, including some which adhere to a purely deductive and essentialist 
paradigm.
Whilst thematic analysis has a proven track record in the study of some forms of 
online user-generated content, as evidenced above, it has had a more limited 
deployment in the study of both below-the-line commentary and user judgments 
about media. In that regard, Dochterman and Stamp (2010) have used thematic 
analysis to explore web users’ judgments about websites, although their ap-
proach entailed the transcription and analysis of focus group conversations. 
Giles et al (2015) employed thematic analysis in their exploration of reader re-
sponses regarding the acceptability of financial incentives for breast feeding. 
	 	 97
Furthermore, Graham and Wright’s (2015) methodological approach to 
analysing below-the-line comments mirrors the approach I outline here in a 
number of important ways. Whilst theirs is described as a qualitative content 
analysis of below-the-line comments, it follows Mayring (2000) in using both de-
ductive and inductive techniques to develop a coding scheme. 
Although constructionist thematic analysis has been infrequently utilised in the 
study of partisan news commentary, the particular demands of my research 
agenda indicate its relevance here. Constructionist epistemologies foreground 
the relational character of knowledge (Kikooma, 2010, p. 41), i.e., its social con-
struction. As argued both above and in Chapter 2, Laclau and Mouffe’s model of 
articulation focuses on the political dimensions of this process, insofar as it fo-
cuses on the struggle inherent in the production of meaning. However, insofar 
as “articulation necessarily materializes,” it is also a fundamentally performative 
concept (Stormer, 2004, p. 265). Thus, whilst constructionist thematic analysis 
targets potentially obscure processes of meaning production, integrating this 
approach with an articulation paradigm emphasises both its contestatory and 
performative dimensions. 
In addition to the conceptual factors outlined in section 3.2.1, these examples 
support the practical suitability of thematic analysis in the study of below-the-
line commentary, particularly in the context of a set of research questions which 
focus on the emergence of social understandings through processes of discur-
sive conflict. Drawing on the framework so established, in the following section I 
describe my specific approach to sampling, data collection, and thematic cod-
ing.
3.3 Sampling, data collection, and thematic coding
My project data consist of user-generated “below-the-line” comments posted in 
response to web articles at TheBlaze.com. In Chapter 1, I outlined my reasons 
for choosing this site as the basis for a case study: briefly, a right-wing partisan 
media outlet in a state of transition, one which is notable both for its anti-Trump 
stance during the 2016 election and for public expressions of alignment and 
misalignment with its perceived message. On a methodological level, a re-
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search design focused on an individual case study can help to ensure a re-
searcher has the time to undertake a rich analysis that is refined in terms of a 
specific set of research questions (Graham & Wright, 2015, p. 321). Similarly, 
the rich, detailed analysis that is characteristic of qualitative case studies can 
help to produce important insights about how media function (Faris et al., 2017).
To begin the sampling process, a preliminary set of site searches was conduct-
ed using an array of key terms via Google’s search engine. The most numerous 
results were returned for parameters based on named political and media fig-
ures. It was thus decided that three case sets grounded in US presidential poli-
tics would be chosen to serve as guides for the data sampling process. For the 
purposes of manageability, I produced a time-limited set of results covering sto-
ries focusing on Donald  Trump, Hillary  Clinton, and Barack  Obama from 
20/07/2016 to 21/01/2017. This placed the empirical focus of my analysis on 
presidential politics, centring on a roughly six-month period leading up to and 
including President Donald Trump's inauguration in January 2017. This period 
notably encompassed the 2016 US presidential election. Data gathering was 
completed in November 2017.
3.3.1 Creating a corpus of user-generated below-the-line comments
In order to avoid the algorithmic limitations of using a single search engine to 
gather results, time-limited site searches of TheBlaze.com were conducted for 
each month within the sample timeframe using both Bing and Google. The 
terms used were: “Trump,” “Clinton,” and “Obama.” Seven searches (i.e., July 
through January) were conducted for each search term via each search engine 
and results were exported directly to a comma-separated values (CSV) file us-
ing Scraper, a simple web-scraping extension for Google Chrome. In the first 
instance, an Excel workbook was produced for each set of search results (i.e., 
each case set) using the CSV output files from Scraper. Each of these three 
workbooks consisted of three worksheets: Bing results output, Google results 
output, and a combined results output produced from collating and cleaning the 
results lists (i.e., removing duplicates and results referring solely to family mem-
bers). 
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Although Google produced consistently fewer results per search, it was  found 
that the smaller number of  results found for each search via Google was not 
simply a subset of the larger number found via Bing. As such, I have 
combined  the two sets, deleting duplicates from the Google results in the first 
instance. After filtering out results that focused solely on family members 
(i.e.,  Michelle Obama, Bill Clinton, Chelsea Clinton, Melania Trump, Ivanka 
Trump, Donald Trump Jr, Eric Trump, Barron Trump), this  left me with  the fol-
lowing sets of search results: Obama (n = 322), Clinton (n = 578), Trump (n = 
1492). 
Those numbers in themselves are quite interesting, but they also raised a num-
ber of questions in terms of how I would distribute my focus. For example, 
should I focus equally on all three, or should there be a weighted distribution 
based on relatively how frequently a term appears (e.g., 1:2:5)? As a qualitative 
study, my aim in this thesis is to present an analysis of the ways in which users 
talk about political opponents, rather than providing a comparison of how the 
appearances of different actors in the sample are weighted relative to each oth-
er. As such, it was decided that each case set would be given equal weighting, 
with 10 items to be randomly selected from each set in order to produce a total 
of 30 web articles to be included in the dataset.
Each of the cleaned results lists was then added as a separate worksheet to a 
final results workbook. Each entry in this final spreadsheet was given two indi-
vidual identifiers: Rank ID, based on where an item appeared in the search re-
sults, with Bing results first and Google later; and Rand ID, which is the =rand() 
value produced by Excel. After assigning each entry a Rand ID, these were or-
dered in ascending value to randomise the sample. This dual identification en-
sures the results sets are reversible, although the original listings themselves 
are not chronological, but rather ranked according to the algorithms of each par-
ticular search engine. 
In terms of building the actual dataset from the sample selection, I highlighted 
the first 10 results under each case set based on ascending Rand ID. Opting for 
an even distribution across case sets (i.e., n=30 web articles) produced a cor-
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pus consisting of 5,288 user-generated comments: 1348 from the Clinton case 
set, 1819 from the Obama case set, and 2121 from the Trump case set.
Data analysis was conducted using the qualitative data analysis software NVi-
vo. Data files were produced within Google's Chrome browser using the NCap-
ture browser extension, which was developed by the developer of NVivo, QSR 
as a means of capturing web data for analysis using NVivo. NCapture creates a 
copy of target web pages and outputs them as NVivo NCapture data files, with 
file extension .nvcx. Complete filenames feature the webpage title and website 
name, as well as capture date and time.  These data files were then imported, 8
uncompressed, directly to the NVivo project, where they are archived in PDF 
format. 
Although there are some minor issues with the output files when using NCap-
ture (e.g., visual artefacts of the PDF transposition), it is a tool that greatly facili-
tates the collection of digital web page data. A “print to PDF” function would not 
have worked in this case due to display issues with the website. As such, it is a 
valuable means of avoiding what would otherwise have been an extremely 
time-consuming data collection process involving the programming languages 
JavaScript and Python. This would also have produced highly decontextualised 
textual data and metadata featuring none of the visual richness or structure of 
the actual website. Nevertheless, PDF is an open standard that will ensure data 
files can be read and transferred reliably when necessary. It will also ensure 
long-term access to data. However, I worked with the files within NVivo for the 
duration of the project in order to ensure version control. The PDFs can be ex-
ported as and when required now that analysis via NVivo is complete. The UK 
Data Service’s online repository, ReShare will be used for the long-term preser-
vation and sharing of the dataset. Project data will be retained and preserved 
for a minimum of seven years, as stipulated by the LSE Research Data Policy. I 
will also keep a password protected copy of project data indefinitely.
 For example: “Federal judge orders unsealing of search warrant at center of Clinton 8
email probe – TheBlaze 2017-11-09 11-27-55Z.nvcx”
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Each data file constitutes both a case and a source, and all are organised within 
NVivo according to the three specific case sets which served as the basis of the 
sample selection: Clinton (n= 10), Obama (n= 10), and Trump (n= 10). I have 
produced a source classification sheet featuring the following attributes: Refer-
ence Type, Title, Set Description, URL, Reporter, Period, Source, Rank ID, 
Rand ID, Comment Count, Publication Date.  In the context of this particular 9
study, the unit of analysis is individual user-generated comments, whilst each 
web article constitutes a case.
3.3.2 Developing a “hybrid” coding framework 
Once the sample was created, I began the iterative process of creating a hybrid 
coding framework that combines inductive and deductive approaches to the ex-
traction and generation of both semantic and latent themes. In so doing, I aimed 
to follow Braun and Clarke’s six phase process for conducting a thematic analy-
sis (2006, p. 87).
In the first phase, I conducted a close reading and re-reading of the data. This 
entailed reading user-generated comments, both in NVivo and via physical 
printouts of each “case.” The question of transposition is fundamental to the first 
phase. This is especially true in the case of research designs that involve the 
transcription of verbal data. As argued by Braun and Clarke, the central concern 
is that “the transcript retains the information you need, from the verbal account, 
and in a way which is ‘true’ to its original nature” (2006, p. 88). Insofar as my 
analysis is conducted on digital exports of the website itself, including its visual 
structure, I work with material that already achieves this aim.
When it comes to the examples I present in this thesis, I follow the approach 
taken by Rodham et al. (2013) and Gibson and Trnka (2020). That is, com-
ments are included verbatim, with no correction for spelling or grammar, in order 
to “retain the specificity of textual communication” (Gibson & Trnka, 2020, p. 
240). Thus, whilst I do not employ screen grabs for ethical reasons (i.e., 
anonymisation), the textual transposition of content adheres as closely as pos-
 The classification metadata for all sources is to be found in the Appendix (see p. 277).9
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sible to the manner in which comments were composed and posted by users. 
One downside of textual data is that one misses out to a certain extent on the 
close reading that comes with the process of transcription, thus more time is re-
quired familiarising oneself with the data in the first phase in the case of textual 
content (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 88).
In the second phase, I generated an array of initial codes although, as expect-
ed, this step produced a set of codes that was unwieldy both in terms of the 
number of “nodes” I produced and the depth of parent and child nodes that this 
number entailed. Given that I wanted to ground my analysis primarily in the 
data, I entered this phase with an underdeveloped theoretical framework. In this 
sense, my approach shares some important features with the method of 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2007). Coding in this phase was thus primarily in-
ductive, i.e., data-driven. Nevertheless, my analysis was guided by my broad 
interest in the way in which political identities were represented in the corpus. In 
this phase, I also coded in a more granular manner than in later phases, focus-
ing on coding words and phrases rather than entire comments. Nevertheless, 
following Braun and Clarke (2006, p. 89), I coded data inclusively in order to 
maintain a sense of the context. This means that phrases within comments 
were coded in order to give an impression of how coded terms appeared in the 
data.
Having established an initial framework, in the third phase I used these initial 
codes to identify a preliminary set of themes, based on both semantic and latent 
patterns. Themes identified in this phase are usually broader than the codes 
identified in the second phase (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 88). I thus produced a 
coding frame that was scaled back to three broad parent themes: 1) Characteri-
sation, 2) Media, and 3) Politics. Each of these parent themes was one child-
node deep. As with the phase two process, the phase three process was in-
formed by my interest in how people talk about political identity and difference. 
The “Characterisation” theme was broken down into a set of three relevant op-
positions: self/other, left/right, and implicit/explicit. This third opposition was de-
signed to account for the inclusion of semantic and latent elements. From my 
emerging sense of the data, in this phase I included a code to account for rep-
resentations of political and media agency as sub-themes (see Figs. 3.1 - 3.3). 
	 	 103
Fig 3.1 “Characterisation” thematic coding map (Phase 3)
Fig 3.2 “Media” thematic coding map (Phase 3)
Fig 3.3 “Politics” thematic coding map (Phase 3)
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Fig 3.4 Final thematic coding map (Phases 4-6)
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It was in the final three phases (Phases 4-6) that the “iterative” (Nowell et al., 
2017) character of the coding process came to the fore. In the fourth phase, I 
began to review the themes I had produced in the third phase. This was done in 
conjunction with developing and refining my theoretical framework. During this 
recoding process, my theoretical framework was established through an itera-
tive and largely inductive approach. As I developed my theoretical focus on the 
articulation of antagonisms based on the constructions of opposition that char-
acterised my data, key ideas fed into my thematic analysis, constituting it as a 
hybrid process. Thus, although the coding process was largely data-driven, it 
was inflected at a number of points with theoretical insights external to the data. 
This was particularly true of the fourth phase. 
Braun and Clarke identify the fifth phase as the point at which themes are de-
fined and named. In my approach, I draw on the thematic codes produced dur-
ing Phase 4, which are then mapped onto the chapter breakdown of my thesis 
(Phase 6, described below). In order to formalise relationships between themes, 
which then served as the basis for a set of four empirical chapters, I created a 
set of node matrices in NVivo. These node matrices were used to identify par-
ticular concentrations in the data that spoke to my theoretical interests, although 
relying on codes that were for the most part themselves inductively drawn from 
the data. 
Whereas coding was more granular in earlier phases, in this phase I estab-
lished individual comments as the unit of analysis. Thus, from this point forward, 
all codes were applied at the comment level, rather than to words or phrases. 
Whilst the formulation of intermediary themes during Phase 3 produced a limit-
ed set of broad categories, the final thematic map I produced was more com-
prehensive, encompassing a greater array of thematic nodes, including an extra 
sub-theme layer in a number of cases. Please see Fig 3.4, above, for a visual 
representation of my final thematic coding. This final thematic coding map en-
compasses Phases 4-6.
According to Braun and Clarke’s framework, the sixth and final phase entails 
presenting a research report. The current act of outlining the coding process 
and of presenting my data analysis in later chapters constitutes the sixth phase 
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in the process. In my case, Phase 6 is thus shaped by the particular demands 
of the PhD examination, including the structural conventions of the thesis. In 
that sense, Phases 4-6 in particular, but also the entire analytical process more 
broadly speaking, took shape according to those requirements.  Indeed, some 10
of the final themes were identified during the writing process and have been it-
erated over and alongside foregoing coding. The final three phases were thus 
characterised by what Nowell (2017, p. 4) calls a “constant moving back and 
forward between phases,” rather than a simple linear progression from one 
phase to the next.
Having outlined the coding process in detail, I now turn to two final points re-
garding the selection of themes for inclusion and the presentation of data in the 
thesis before moving on in the next section to a discussion of the materials and 
methods discarded in refining my approach.
Drawing on the work of Chadwick, Vaccari, and O’Loughlin (2018b), one of the 
central arguments in my thesis is that media users draw on media as discursive 
resources in a variety of ways. In that regard, it is essential to note that my 
sampling choices certainly had an impact on the kinds of themes that were 
identified in the research and therefore which examples made their way into my 
thesis. For example, the fact that an article focusing on Hillary Clinton’s stance 
regarding gun control (Schallhorn, 2016) featured amongst the 30 news items 
randomly selected for inclusion in the corpus, as well as the fact that this piece 
had 158 user comments posted in response, had an important influence on the 
fact that gun control appears as a theme, as opposed to another culturally con-
tested issue, such as reproductive rights. At the same time, I sought to maintain 
a sense of how “personal biases could impact the analysis” (Sullivan, 2003, p. 
88). This is an important matter that I will return to in section 3.4.2, below. The 
coding framework I developed, and the analysis to which it contributed, should 
be considered according to these caveats.
 In my view, this differs somewhat from the production of an individual report, as out10 -
lined by Braun and Clarke (2006), insofar as decisions I made about how to structure a 
multi-chapter thesis were affected by and simultaneously fed into the process of the-
matic analysis. This is a minor point, to be sure, but it is nevertheless noted.
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Finally, a brief practical note on how I integrate the data into my thesis. The be-
low-the-line comment field at TheBlaze.com features a “reply” function that 
structurally produces nested subthreads within the main comment field. This 
function visually signals that certain responses or groups of responses consti-
tute sets of comments and replies. Through this functionality, users can explicit-
ly address themselves towards other commenters in the content of their com-
ments. Although many of the comments presented as part of my analysis are 
individual comments, I also draw in a number of instances on such replies and 
nested sub-threads. As discussed below (see section 3.4.1, below), I do not in-
clude screen grabs for ethical reasons. I opt instead for verbatim quotations, for 
reasons discussed at the beginning of this section. However, in my empirical 
chapters, I have sought to recreate to a certain extent the structure of com-
ments and responses through the use of indentation to mimic the three levels of 
reply capability permitted by the website. I also use an approach to labelling 
comments that likewise reflects these levels. My aim in so doing is to reproduce 
some of the contextual features of the below-the-line comment field.
The discussion featured in the four empirical chapters of this thesis is based on 
the analysis of 110 individual contributions from 97 distinct users across 16 
source articles. Of the 97 distinct users whose contributions are featured, 3 user 
accounts posted 3 comments (sometimes in response to replies to their own 
comments) and 8 user accounts posted 2 comments, whilst 86 user accounts 
posted no more than 1 comment. This indicates there is little overlap in terms of 
the user accounts represented in the discussion. However, it is important to 
note two matters. First, taking into account contemporary discussions of so-
called “dark participation” online (Frischlich, Boberg, & Quandt, 2019), it is not 
necessarily clear from this sampling process who or what is behind any given 
user account. Second, as discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.3 pp. 35-38) 
the aim of this thesis is not to reveal the experience or attitudes of individual 
users but rather to highlight and examine practices of discursive articulation.
3.3.3 Materials and methods discarded – refining my approach
The approach here described represents the culmination of a lengthy process 
of refinement and reappraisal in which numerous key decisions were made to 
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limit the scope and focus of my research. For example, my original plans when I 
began this project entailed a period of embedded ethnography with Tea Party 
movement adherents in the US. My aim would have been to examine the social 
circulation of media discourse (Vidali, 1996) by looking at the way informants 
use and, specifically, talk about partisan media. As my project progressed, how-
ever, a number of factors led me to reconsider this focus. In particular, I became 
increasingly interested in the question of how audiences use and engage with 
online partisan media. However, the decision to adjust my focus was also af-
fected by the dwindling visibility of the Tea Party movement as a political force 
in the US, as well as how it was arguably superseded by a successor move-
ment under the guise of Trumpism, at least to a certain extent (Rohlinger & 
Bunnage, 2017). 
The American political landscape has undergone significant transformations 
since I began my project in 2013. My revised research agenda seeks to offer a 
snapshot of this moving target. Having taken TheBlaze.com as the object of my 
research, yet more decisions needed to be made. At first, I intended to create a 
data sample that included comments posted to TheBlaze.com and to The-
Blaze’s Facebook page. I spent a number of weeks developing a complex set of 
strategies for extracting data from each source. This entailed working towards 
creating two specific coding processes: one for the website and one for Face-
book. 
The website-specific process would utilise JavaScript as a means of accessing 
the full set of below-the-line comments attached to each news item included in 
the random sample. Python would then be used to “clean” the data and order 
them in a CSV file according to a set of predefined categories. The Facebook 
process would entail exporting comments via the Facebook Graph API Explorer, 
use of which requires the creation of a Facebook developer account. In order to 
extract comments from a post, both the post ID and page ID are required. This 
outputs in JSON format. The resulting code would be copied to a text editor 
(e.g., TextWrangler), where it can be saved as a self-contained file. This file 
would then be imported as a TXT file into a converter. Finally, those textual data 
would be parsed as a JSON file and output to a CSV under a set of predefined 
categories.
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This proposed process of data gathering was highly complex and technically 
demanding. Aside from its technical difficulty, it would also have produced a 
massive data set of highly decontextualised textual data and metadata. This 
would have worked against my aim of producing an account of the context of 
right-wing political talk. Furthermore, the creation of a dual dataset of website 
comments and Facebook comments would also have introduced a comparative 
element to the analysis that would have rendered the process even more diffi-
cult. Furthermore, working with Facebook data raised a number of significant 
ethical issues tied to LSE’s emerging stance on conducting research using so-
cial media data, particularly in terms of dealing with the terms of service of on-
line platforms.  In consideration of these factors, it was decided that the simpli11 -
fied process using NCapture (outlined above) represented a more amenable 
and workable approach. Nevertheless, it is clear that these decisions imposed a 
number of limitations on my research and my findings. Those limitations will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8 (see section 8.4 pp. 268-272). 
3.4 Ethical considerations
The decision to limit my empirical focus to user-generated content also raised 
an array of ethical concerns in terms of studying online media. The user-gener-
ated content that is so characteristic of contemporary online participation takes 
many forms and does so in a variety of digital contexts. Here, I discuss my ap-
proach to research ethics, which draws primarily on a series of recommenda-
tions presented by the Association of Internet Researchers (AoIR) Ethics Work-
ing Committee (Markham & Buchanan, 2012), as well as other discussions of 
ethical issues related to the study of online user-generated content. Ethical 
practices regarding the use of user-generated data diverge. The discussion that 
follows in section 3.4.1 constitutes a reflection on this significant, ongoing de-
bate. Following on from this, in section 3.4.2, I also discuss the central role of 
reflexivity in conducting ethical research.
3.4.1 An ethics of care in the study of online user-generated comments 
 This stance has not yet been codified in official documentation but is rather present11 -
ed as ethical guidelines to researchers by LSE’s Research Ethics Committee.
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Following Markham and Buchanan (2012) and McKee and Porter (2009), in par-
ticular, I applied a processual, case-based approach to research ethics for the 
purposes of this project. Two of the central considerations for my research 
raised by Markham and Buchanan (2012) are the tensions between text and 
personhood that manifest in user-generated content online and the relevance of 
the “human subject” concept in internet-related research. Another central prob-
lematic dealt with in their AoIR guidelines is the public/private distinction. I will 
briefly address all three here.
On the matter of the relation between text and personhood in online 
content, Kantanen and Manninen (2016, p. 91) argue, "research use of sponta-
neous conversations, gathered in a publicly accessible venue is not human sub-
jects research." This argument draws directly from the work of Kozinets (2010). 
It likewise mirrors the arguments of Walther (2002, p. 207), who states:
the analysis of Internet archives does not constitute an interaction with a 
human subject, and since it avails itself of existing records, then for IRB 
purposes, it may be no different than research using old newspaper sto-
ries, broadcasts, the Congressional Record, or other archival data. 
Such claims have been shown to be problematic by a number of scholars of in-
ternet-mediated communication.
In contrast, for example, the AoIR Ethics Working Committee guidelines argue 
that because “all digital information at some point involves individual persons, 
consideration of principles related to research on human subjects may be nec-
essary even if it is not immediately apparent how and where persons are in-
volved in the data” (Markham & Buchanan, 2012, p. 4). Likewise, Sormanen 
and Lauk (2016, p. 64) state that public data “available on any social media site, 
does not automatically mean it has an unproblematic availability for research.” 
These competing claims have a number of implications in terms of data collec-
tion and management, as well as ethics.
Social network profiles can in certain respects be seen as an extension of the 
self. In my earlier research exploring an online social network targeted at gay 
users (Kelly, 2013), I deployed the concept of “semiotic prosthesis” to provide a 
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metaphor for the relationship between text and personhood. Such relations are 
rendered explicit in specific social network site settings. Facebook, for instance, 
goes to great lengths to ensure profiles are seen as bound to users’ “real” iden-
tities. The economic imperatives for doing so are substantial.
But TheBlaze.com is not Facebook. It does not feature any direct link to a user 
profile or the putative “real” identity of users. Providing contact information is in 
fact disallowed by the site’s Terms of Use.  I believe the likelihood of sharing 12
personal information is therefore significantly lower than on Facebook. Consid-
ering this distinction between TheBlaze.com and online social networking prac-
tices more broadly defined, I shall avoid thinking about user comments in this 
data context as simply semiotic prostheses. I will rather conceive of them as 
complex cultural artefacts that are primarily public in nature.
Thinking specifically about the distinction between public and private, comments 
posted to TheBlaze.com form a part of texts that are situated within a clearly 
defined “Public Area” of the website. In fact, users agree to the public character 
of their comments in the site’s Terms of Use. LSE’s stated position on the rele-
vance of user agreements seems to indicate that informed consent is not nec-
essarily required here. And yet the focus placed on Terms of Service in LSE’s 
position on researching social media is also ethically problematic, insofar as 
empirical evidence clearly demonstrates that users do not particularly engage 
with such agreements (Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsch, 2020; Steinfeld, 2016). A further 
factor to consider is that all project data will be secondary, given that articles 
and comments are already published and publicly available online (i.e., no sign-
in is required to view user comments).
One might even ask if the public/private distinction applies at all. In defining 
what is public and what is private, for example, Berry (2004, pp. 323-324) posits 
that privacy is “a misleading and confusing concept to apply to the Internet,” ar-
guing instead for an “open source” approach animated by an ethics of care. As 
noted by McKee and Porter (2009, pp. 90-91), another approach is that taken 
by Cubbison, who distinguishes between “posts intended for personal conver-
 See https://www.theblaze.com/terms.12
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sation and posts intended for broad publication.” I argue this is a model that is 
suitable here, as it fits with a conceptualisation of my sources as hybrid arte-
facts synthesising more institutional media outputs with content produced by 
users. In their thematic analysis of online representations of self-injury, Rodham 
et al (2013, p. 175) arrive at a similar ethical conclusion, arguing that observa-
tional research featuring public domain data does not raise contentious ethical 
considerations. Nevertheless, in considering these texts as hybrid cultural prod-
ucts that are produced through digitally mediated social interaction, I have en-
deavoured to adhere to ethical principles of avoiding harm and protecting  the 
privacy of authors of all user-generated content included in my dataset.
At the same time, there remains the question of ownership and copyright, as 
well as the need to provide credit to content producers for their work. For exam-
ple, blogs can be seen as officially in the public domain (McCullagh, 2008) or 
one’s focus could instead be directed towards protecting copyright of authors 
(Pitts, 2004). In formulating ethical approaches to social media data, it is impor-
tant to be careful not to erase the authors’ own judgments, which can be 
achieved through both anonymisation and more concerted forms of disguise, 
such as paraphrasing. According to Bruckman, anonymisation is one of the 
most difficult issues when it comes to online data. She argues, “one of the 
thorniest problems concerns how to disguise names of people and sites” (2006, 
p. 91). For this purpose, Bruckman (2002) proposes a continuum from no dis-
guise, through light disguise and moderate disguise, to heavy disguise.
For the purposes of maintaining confidentiality, Moreno et al. (2013) argue that 
direct quotations should not be used. However, my research could be seen as 
being of minimal risk. That is: 
the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the re-
search are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encoun-
tered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical examina-
tions or tests. (45 CFR §46.102, 2009)
Nevertheless, one must maintain a sense of the fact that unseen risk may 
emerge from the nature of digital content. For example, the fact that digital con-
tent is interconnected in complex ways poses some problems. As such, identi-
fiers such as usernames can appear across multiple contexts, and researchers 
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can follow content producers’ movements across the web (Kurtz, Trainer, 
Beresford, Wutich, & Brewis, 2017). Likewise, a motivated reader of research 
outputs can do the same. 
In consideration of these concerns, following Bruckman’s (2002) model, I will 
use light disguise, knowing that whilst usernames and other clearly identifiable 
information will be cleaned from the data, it would still be possible for a keen 
reader to locate the original public posts. Yet this choice speaks to just one 
phase in the research process. Through a process approach to research ethics, 
however, further ethical concerns raised by the research had to be dealt with as 
the project progressed. For example, I had to decide what is and is not included 
when it comes to publication of the thesis. I will have to replicate this process 
when it comes to the dissemination of research findings. This provides many 
opportunities to further anonymise content as appropriate.
For these reasons listed, I concluded that it was not an ethical requirement to 
seek informed consent from authors. Besides, gaining informed consent from 
users for their user content to be included in my dataset is not technically possi-
ble within the iteration of the site architecture that existed at the time of data col-
lection – that is, without a disruptive and intrusive approach that would require 
public exchanges with users. Whilst in the research design phase, it was possi-
ble to message any user directly in response to a comment on the site, at the 
time of data collection this was no longer possible.  In that regard, a further re13 -
lated fact to consider is that whilst Madge (2007) argues that ethical research 
should be shared with the community studied in order to correct any errors or 
address any other issues, this will not be possible in this case.
3.4.2 Reflexivity and the analysis of disagreeable content
 Indeed, soon after I compiled my dataset, the below-the-line comment feature at 13
TheBlaze.com was entirely disabled in favour of comment facilities provided via The-
Blaze’s Facebook page. Whilst the site’s terms of use have yet to be modified to ac-
count for this major structural transition, the action itself highlights the enduring power 
of media institutions in a hybrid media system, as well as the potential ephemerality of 
user contributions in a system characterised by the struggle over discursive resources.
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If it can be considered best practice, following Berry (2004), for a researcher to 
apply an ethics of care when dealing with research subjects, then the same 
could be said to hold true for how such a principle might best be applied to the 
researcher themselves. In that regard, it is imperative that qualitative re-
searchers "develop a practical and visible process of reflexivity” (Malacrida, 
2007, p. 1329). Whilst such an approach has important epistemological implica-
tions in terms of offering an account of how a researcher’s positions can shape 
their research agenda and outputs (Mauthner & Doucet, 2003), it also provides 
an opportunity to protect the emotional safety of the researcher (Malacrida, 
2007, p. 1330). Reflexivity, in other words, “is closely connected with the ethical 
practice of research” (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004, pp. 273-274).
The notion that research can have an emotional impact on the researcher is 
well established. An edited volume by Stamm (1995), for instance, discusses 
the issue of secondary traumatic stress. The principle of transference raised in 
these discussions indicates how research content can impact a researcher’s 
affective experience, both in the research context and beyond. Whilst I do not 
wish to claim that my experience conducting this research counts as trauma in 
any grand sense, engaging with the content of my data was a difficult and emo-
tional undertaking. As I engage reflexively with the research process, I do so in 
recognition of the potential impacts this research might have on me as a re-
searcher, as well as the possible implications of my response to my data on the 
quality of my work.
For Myerhoff and Ruby, reflexivity is a practice which pervades the research 
process. They write:
Being reflexive means the producer deliberately, intentionally, reveals to 
an audience the underlying epistemological assumptions that caused the 
formulation of a set of questions in a particular way, the seeking of an-
swers to those questions in a particular way, and finally the presentation of 
the findings in a particular way. (Myerhoff & Ruby, 1982, p. 5)
In that regard, the broader approach taken in this chapter constitutes an impor-
tant form of reflexivity in which an account has been offered of the mechanisms 
and frameworks via which my thesis data have been gathered and analysed. 
However, Georgakopoulou argues that there is also a specific value in the re-
	 	 115
searcher “being reflexive about their own ideological and political stance” (2017, 
p. 3). It is through practices of self-reflexivity that a researcher can reveal those 
political and ideological agendas that can be “hidden” in one’s writing (Hertz, 
1996, p. 7). This kind of reflexive practice is demonstrated by Back (2002a) in 
his account of interviewing Nick Griffin, the former leader of the British National 
Party – a party that is associated with white nationalism and right-wing populism 
in the UK. Insofar as my aim in conducting this research is to provide an ac-
count that is rigorous, theoretically rich and, above all, fair, it is therefore impor-
tant for me to highlight my own ambivalent relation with the material I present. It 
should be noted that I found the material in many cases to be disagreeable and 
distasteful. Nevertheless, I was guided in the research and writing process by 
my aim to produce a factual and scrupulous account of right-wing online political 
talk. 
In the context of these ethical considerations, particular attention was paid 
therefore to the potential benefits of the research. I see this project and its out-
puts contributing to a significant ongoing debate about the nature and extent of 
polarisation in American political life. However, in the context of contemporary 
transformations in practices of political communication that are afforded a global 
reach through platform technologies (Kreiss & McGregor, 2018), this is a debate 
that has broad implications, both in the US context and elsewhere. As such, the 
need to engage critically and reflexively with my data was paramount in order to 
ensure the production of a rigorous account of how American conservatives de-
fine themselves through online partisan media. For this reason, I believe it is of 
the utmost importance that I maintain a reflexive awareness of how I am im-
pacted and affected by the material with which I am working throughout the re-
search process. By offering this account, I aim to make explicit my recognition 
of the way in which my own attitudes and sentiments might have shaped not 
only the conduct of this research but also its outcomes.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have outlined and critically assessed my methodological ap-
proach. By demonstrating the benefits of integrating my articulationist concep-
tual framework with an open and flexible methodology, I argued that construc-
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tionist thematic analysis serves as an appropriate method with which to address 
my research questions, in particular the central question of how commenters 
articulate partisan oppositions in their online political talk. As a reflexive ap-
praisal of my approach, this chapter has focused on three key dimensions of 
methodological reflection.
First, I introduced thematic analysis as a qualitative research method, based 
primarily on the widely-cited definition set out by Braun and Clarke (2006). In 
defining my specific approach to thematic analysis, I drew on a set of three key 
distinctions discussed by Braun and Clarke: essentialist versus constructionist, 
inductive versus deductive, and semantic versus latent. I highlighted how con-
structionist thematic analysis entails an orientation towards theorising the socio-
cultural conditions of discourse, including the social (co-)production of meaning. 
I also examined the distinction between inductive and deductive reasoning as it 
applies to conducting thematic analysis. Here, it was shown that a deductive 
approach to thematic analysis draws more heavily on literature and theory, 
whereas an inductive approach is more data-driven in establishing categories of 
analysis. The distinction between latent and semantic themes was also dis-
cussed. Drawing on Boyatizs (1998), I argued that a mix of semantic and latent 
themes is required in order to relate online political talk to the broader social 
context. 
In my discussion, I established that my approach would draw on a construction-
ist paradigm whilst taking a hybrid approach that employs both inductive and 
deductive reasoning, as well as the generation and extraction of both semantic 
and latent themes. However, I also noted the need for a researcher to outline a 
clear epistemological framework, given the flexibility and openness of thematic 
analysis as a method. Here, I underlined the centrality of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(2001) concept of articulation to my research and asserted the affinity between 
the concept and my constructionist approach to thematic analysis.
Drawing on a brief overview of various methods and methodologies that have 
been used in the study of user-generated content, I also argued that construc-
tionist thematic analysis represents an appropriate approach to the study of be-
low-the-line commentary.
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Second, I outlined in detail my approach to sample selection, data gathering, 
and thematic coding. In the first instance, I gave an overview of the process of 
limiting my sample of user-generated news comments posted to TheBlaze.com, 
which entailed opting for a specific focus on the 2016 US presidential election. 
Narrowing my focus to American electoral politics allowed me to limit my sample 
to news items discussing Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. 
Here, I gave a detailed account of the process via which I produced the corpus 
of user-generated comments. However, I also outlined how I deployed Braun 
and Clarke’s six-phase approach to thematic analysis to produce a hybrid cod-
ing frame that relied on inductive and deductive reasoning and focused on gen-
erating and extrapolating both semantic and latent themes. 
In this section, I also presented some of the materials and methods that were 
discarded in the process of establishing my eventual research design. In partic-
ular, I discussed having to reassess the empirical focus of my PhD due to the 
changing political environment in the US, as well as the choices I made in refin-
ing my sampling process, which for various reasons included opting against in-
cluding comments posted to Facebook in my sample.
Third, I set out an ethical approach based on a principle of care and assessed 
some further ethical concerns regarding researcher reflexivity. In the first in-
stance, I examined some of the ethical implications of conducting research on 
user-generated content online. In so doing, I drew specifically on a set of AoIR 
recommendations regarding the conduct of ethical online research. Here, I 
briefly discussed a number of key issues, including the tension between text 
and personhood, the concept of the “human subject” in internet research, and 
the central problematic of the public/private distinction, specifically as these 
matters pertain to the question of informed consent. In my discussion, I estab-
lished that the status of my data meant it was neither necessary nor possible to 
seek informed consent from users at TheBlaze.com. Nevertheless, I confirmed 
that I have anonymised all data in order to protect the identities of participants, 
due to the demands of an “ethics of care” approach to research ethics. In that 
regard, usernames are scrubbed from all materials excerpted from the corpus. 
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I also discussed the matter of reflexivity, which I approached from two angles. 
On one hand, I argued an ethics of care approach also necessitates a reflexive 
focus on the wellbeing of the researcher, particularly when working with difficult 
or disagreeable content. On the other hand, reflexivity also entails taking into 
account the potential impact of a researcher’s own political and ideological 
stances on the research process. Here, I asserted my aim of engaging in a rig-
orous, theoretically rich, and fair analysis of below-the-line commentary in order 
to produce a factual and scrupulous account of American right-wing online polit-
ical talk
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Laclau and Mouffe have been criti-
cised by Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 125) for their failure to account for 
the structural limitations on what meanings can be (re)articulated and by whom. 
As newer forms of media emerge, relations of media power are shifting, becom-
ing more hybrid (Chadwick, 2013). This has a transformative impact on who can 
say what and where. My thesis seeks to offer an account of how these trans-
formations are operationalised by partisan media users in the process of devel-
oping new forms of political-civic engagement and participation. It also reflects 
on how this reorganisation of practices of political communication is related to 
affective polarisation and negative partisanship. 
Considering this background, this chapter has focused on how I implement La-
clau and Mouffe’s concept of articulation via a constructionist thematic analysis. 
In the chapters that follow, I will employ this framework to explore how the 
boundaries of American conservatism are contested through the public perfor-
mance of antagonism, how characterisations of political difference are per-
formed with reference to the political and economic significance of partisan me-
dia, and how the use of partisan media is rhetorically related to broader histori-
cal processes of social, cultural, and political transformation via the public pro-
duction of imaginaries of American past, present, and future – processes which 
are claimed to threaten the very survival of America and American nationhood. 
	 	 119
Chapter 4: Characterising political parties, 
politicians, and partisans
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on characterisations of US political parties, politicians, and 
partisans in order to explore the discursive construction of identity/difference 
distinctions in below-the-line commentary at TheBlaze.com. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, recent research shows both instrumental and expressive bases for 
affective polarisation and partisan affiliation in the United States, revealing a 
role for orientations towards protecting party status and advancing ideology 
(Huddy, Mason, & Aarøe, 2015; S. Webster & Abramowitz, 2017). In that re-
gard, my data feature prominent commentary not only on the policy positions 
and ideologies of political actors from across the political spectrum. Rather, the 
user-generated commentary in my data sample also explicitly focuses on their 
personal moral character. In this first empirical chapter, I focus on how such 
characterisations draw on and contribute to the discursive articulation of “an-
tagonistic frontiers” (Laclau, 2000) between conservatives and their opponents. 
In what follows, I argue that antagonistic characterisations of political difference 
are important stylistic features of the contemporary performance of partisanship 
in “online political talk” (Stromer-Galley, 2002). The performance of antagonism 
is here seen as integral to technologically mediated processes of affective po-
larisation, specifically as this applies to the US context.
In this chapter, I will focus on empirical examples that help to animate an under-
standing of public discourse which sees it as constitutive of categories of politi-
cal opposition, thereby contributing to a qualitative account of affective polarisa-
tion. In the process, I will draw on examples that I class under three primary 
headings: 1) positive in-group characterisations, 2) negative out-group charac-
terisations, and 3) contestatory characterisations. I argue that although each 
mode serves to actively constitute distinctions between self and other, it is 
through acts of “contestatory performance” (Fuoss, 1993) that the productive 
role of “antagonistic othering” (Herschinger, 2012) is best revealed. Insofar as 
my approach to constructionist thematic analysis focuses on both semantic and 
latent themes, as outlined in the previous chapter, I will here draw on examples 
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of oppositional rhetoric that feature both implicit and explicit forms of characteri-
sation. The themes I identify are rarely discrete elements but rather frequently 
intersect in a variety of ways. They are also sometimes contradictory, a fact 
which can be revealed not only by the presence of dissenting voices in the data, 
but also by the presence of conflicting “antagonistic strategies” (Laclau, 1999) 
used to articulate the boundaries between conservatives and their perceived 
opponents.
4.2 Positive in-group characterisations
As outlined above, one of the core propositions of the social identity approach is 
the drive to define one’s identity in positive terms vis-à-vis some out-group (C. 
Jackson & Sherriff, 2013, p. 260). As such, it can be expected that characterisa-
tions of one’s in-group will be primarily positive, due to the desire for positive 
self-evaluation (Abrams & Hogg, 1990). It is not surprising therefore to find that 
in-group characterisations of Republican voters and conservatives largely follow 
this model. In this section, I will outline some features and key themes that 
emerge from the data in terms of positive in-group characterisations. What is 
notable, however, is the fact that explicit characterisations of this kind are no-
tably infrequent when compared with the number of negative out-group charac-
terisations, a theme that will be dealt with in section 4.3. Likewise, the relation 
between the Republican Party and conservatives is problematised in the con-
testatory performances described in section 4.4
Whilst the boundaries between in-group and out-group are complex, particularly 
in the context of shifting alignments of partisan identity and ideology, certain 
positive images are nonetheless palpable. Here, I introduce the core claim that 
Trump supporters and conservatives are primarily if not solely responsible for 
economic productivity. One of the clearest examples of this is visible in com-
ment 4.1, which was posted in response to a story discussing the fact that three 
times as many bus permits had been issued for the Women’s March on Wash-
ington  than for the inauguration of President Donald Trump in January 2017 14
(Garcia, 2017). The comment reads:
 The Women’s March on Washington took place on 18 January, 2017 – the day fol14 -
lowing the inauguration of President Donald Trump.
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Most trump supporters have jobs they have to go to. [sic]
Comment 4.1 15 January, 2017
Here, it is proposed that getting out and protesting would be difficult for most 
Trump supporters, as they have jobs to go to. This was a recurring theme in 
comments on that story, highlighting the manner in which news media serve as 
cues (N. J. Stroud, 2011) or resources (Chadwick et al., 2018b) for their audi-
ences, a topic to which I will return  in Chapter 6. In terms of the formal content 
of such claims, this mode of commentary serves as a pertinent example of the 
strict father metaphor discussed by Lakoff (1995, pp. 191-192), which sees the 
strict father as head of the nuclear family providing support and sustenance 
whilst embodying the kind of moral leadership that demonstrates how to be 
“self-disciplined, industrious, polite, trustworthy,  and respectful of authority.”
A variant form is seen in comment 4.2, posted in response to the same story. 
The comment reads:
We don’t need buses we’re grown adults who can afford a car or taxi. [sic]
Comment 4.2 14 January, 2017
Already it is possible to appreciate an important set of oppositional claims: con-
servatives are economically productive and grown adults who don’t require bus 
permits in order to travel. Implicit in these claims is the notion that political op-
ponents are neither economically productive nor mature enough to afford their 
own mode of transport, two themes that will be discussed in more explicit terms 
in the next section. As argued by Edge (2009), such conservative discourses of 
productivity have distinct racial connotations – an argument which will also be 
discussed further in the following section.
If these examples appear glib, comment 4.3B offers a more thorough typology 
that sets out a complex set of relations between “4 Americas.” Comments 4.3A 
and 4.3B were posted in response to a story outlining then-FBI Director James 
Comey’s reasoning for reopening the Clinton email investigation in advance of 
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the November 2016 election date (Goins-Phillips, 2016a). Posted as replies to 
an earlier user comment, the contributions read:
Despite all of the evidence, all of the testimony, and everything incriminat-
ing she herself has said, in just over a week, millions of Americans will still 
vote for one of the most, if not THE most, corrupt politicians in our nation's 
history to be the president. A tyrannical government couldn't be more 
pleased with how quickly the sheep have fallen in line. They were playing 
the long game, they had decades to make this happen, but it's almost 
complete. Tyranny is returning to America thanks to the mindless blind 
who would rather be lead with a choke collar than be free. [sic]
Comment 4.3A 29 October, 2016
If I thought I was going to get everything free while I sat on my couch, I 
might vote for Mrs. Claus too. There are now 4 Americas: 1. Citizens 
who work, 2. citizens who take from the people who work, 3. illegals 
who break the law and get everything free from the people who work, 
and 4 the elite who have cushy jobs, do nothing, and promise the last 2 
they will get goodies they take from THE CITIZENS WHO WORK.(#1) ? 
#5 ( dead people who rise up like the walking dead during elections and 
vote for # 4) [sic]
Comment 4.3B 29 October, 2016
Comment 4.3A puts forward the notion that Americans were about to vote for 
“one of the most, if not THE most, corrupt politicians in our nation’s history” and 
that tyranny “is returning to America thanks to the mindless blind who would 
rather be lead with a choke collar than be free.” Reflecting on the choice to vote 
for Hillary Clinton, user 4.3B outlines in response an imagined model of the 
makeup of American society that categorises economic participation according 
to four distinct categories. Relating economic activity to voter behaviour, a fifth 
category is added, i.e., “dead people who rise up like the walking dead during 
elections” in order to vote for political elites. This raises the spectre of electoral 
fraud, discussion of which entails a form of conspiratorial thinking that figures 
prominently in American right-wing media discourse linking Democratic electoral 
successes with illegal voting behaviours, especially those involving “illegal” im-
migrants (see Musgrove, 2018). Claims of voter fraud were repeated by Presi-
dent Donald Trump after the 2016 election and were broadly recirculated by an 
array of right-wing and conservative media outlets (Phillip & DeBonis, 2017).
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Orthographic modifications to the shape of text perform important signifying 
functions, contributing to the emergence of what Androutsopoulos (2011, p. 
155) calls a “‘new’ digital vernacular” in computer-mediated communication. For 
example, as Sobieraj and Berry (2011, p. 40) note of text-based communication, 
“the deliberate use of uppercase letters, multiple exclamation points, enlarged 
text, and so on” constitutes “shouting.” This highlights the manner in which 
stress can be performed by speakers in computer-mediated environments. In 
this case, the phrase “THE CITIZENS WHO WORK” is foregrounded in a strik-
ing manner. Here, it is asserted that the “citizens who work” are a partisan in-
group, linking themes of personal responsibility with conservative social identity. 
This is a theme that I will raise in more detail in the following section as an im-
portant factor related to the negative characterisations of political opponents.
Claims within this partisan media space which reflect positively on the partisan 
in-group do not necessarily go unchallenged. On the contrary, whilst dissenting 
voices are relatively rare, they are nevertheless a visible feature of the user 
commentary. In some cases, such dissent emerges through contestation be-
tween rival conservative stances (to be discussed in section 4.4, below). Other 
times, however, the dissenting voices are clearly those of opposing partisans, 
as is the case in the following examples. In particular, a few prominent users are 
notable in the data sample, comments from two of whom are present in the 
comments seen in the following exchange (i.e., 4.4B.1 and 4.4B.2). These 
comments are once again drawn from Carlos Garcia’s (2017) article discussing 
the Women’s March on Washington:
Could be most Trump supporters have a job and don’t have time for this 
sort of nonsense. [sic]
Comment 4.4A 13 January, 2017
I thought they voted for Trump because they didn’t have jobs. [sic]
Comment 4.4B.1 14 January, 2017
All that matters is they didn’t vote for Hillary!! [sic]
Comment 4.4C.1 14 January, 2017
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Ha! And all those rubes that went to his rallies were hard working peo-
ple who called in sick? It cuts both ways. Are you ditching work to go to 
a rally or to protest? [sic]
Comment 4.4B.2 13 January, 2017
The protest is on Saturday, not a weekday. [sic]
Comment 4.4B.3 13 January, 2017
In response to another claim that Trump supporters simply don’t have time for 
protest because they have jobs to go to, user 4.4B.1 asks, “I thought they voted 
for Trump because they didn’t have jobs,” drawing attention to the contradiction 
between the economic logic frequently cited for Trump support and attendance 
numbers at Trump rallies. Similarly, user 4.4B.2 highlights the contradiction be-
tween claims that attendance at the Women’s March on Washington is an indi-
cator of economic indolence whilst attendance at Trump rallies is viewed as po-
litically legitimate. 
Whilst the first several examples focus on economic and political participation, 
comment 4.5 raises two further key themes in positive in-group characterisa-
tions: Christianity and the US Constitution. The user in this case was respond-
ing to a comment on a story about Jimmy Fallon “wrecking” Donald Trump’s hair 
in a 2016 interview (Goins-Phillips, 2016e). The comment reads:
....although widely trashed on theBlaze site for switching from my primary 
candidate to a Trump supporter and attempting to show the hypocrisy of 
Glenn (Alinsky on parade), I have never wavered in my foundational love 
and concern for Glenn...I pray that he may right his ship, learn from his 
mistakes, review the lessons taught and grow... I AM a "2" Corinthians 
Christian and "Constitutional" Conservatives will need ALL the Christians 
that they can muster in the future to save America, her sovereignty and 
preserve her founding documents to save Humanity during the perilous 
near future that we face... [sic]
Comment 4.5 16 September, 2016
The original off-topic post remarks, “Ironic that Glenn Beck Wrecked his media 
empire trashing Trump,” before linking to a Politico article titled “Glenn Beck’s 
‘Bad Bet on Ted Cruz’” (Vogel & Gold, 2016). A number of themes highlighted in 
this comment will be dealt with in greater detail later in this thesis. For instance, 
the topic of audience alignments with Beck will be dealt with in Chapters 5 and 
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6, whilst both the religious dimensions of this comment and the relevance of the 
US Constitution will be analysed at greater length in Chapter 7 (see section 7.4 
pp. 241-252). 
In the context of the current discussion of positive claims to group identity, how-
ever, one can remark the assertion of Christian identity as well as the important 
role that is being foretold for Christians in their future alignments with constitu-
tional conservatives to “save America.” By distinguishing between constitutional 
conservatism and other forms of conservatism, as well as between “‘2’ Corinthi-
ans” Christianity and other forms of Christianity, this comment thus highlights 
the multiple levels on which distinctions between self and other get produced.  15
This is a theme I will return to in my discussion of the contested boundaries of 
group identities in section 4.4, below. Before I turn to that topic, I will first outline 
some notable characteristics of negative out-group characterisations in the be-
low-the-line commentary of users.
4.3 Negative out-group characterisations
As earlier discussed, alongside the occurrence of positive in-group characteri-
sations, maintaining positive social identity also entails negative out-group 
characterisations, i.e., “out-group derogation" (Brewer & Brown, 1998), defined 
as “exaggeration of the negative characteristics of relevant out‐groups, thereby 
also making one's in‐group seem superior” (Greene, 2004, p. 138). Such nega-
tive characterisations are pervasive in my data. In fact, I would argue that nega-
tive characterisations of opponents is one of the defining features of the online 
 The meaning of “constitutional conservatism” is a matter of debate. From the per15 -
spective of academic scholarship, constitutional conservatism “puts liberty first and 
teaches the indispensableness of moderation in securing, preserving, and extending its 
blessings" (Berkowitz, 2013, p. 1). In so doing constitutional conservatism actively 
seeks to conserve the US Constitution. Berkowitz (2013) furthermore sees constitu-
tional conservatism both as a means of uniting social and limited government conserv-
atives and counteracting the two greatest challenges that conservatives face today: the 
rise of so-called “big government” and the sexual revolution. For Kersch (2011), consti-
tutional discourse in conservative political thought began to assume populist, elitist, 
and anti-judicial qualities from the mid-1950s and a commitment to “originalism,” evi-
denced in the founding of such institutions as the Federalist Society in 1982, only from 
the late 1970s. After 1980, Edelman (1988, p. 37) argues, originalism became a “term 
that excites the imagination of large numbers of people and also helps to organise and 
discipline them as a potent political instrument.”
	 	 126
political talk in my sample. These characterisations are often uncivil and in 
many cases share important features with characterisations of political oppo-
nents that typify outrage discourse, as defined by Berry and Sobieraj (2011). 
One of the most important ways in which speakers display an outrageous 
rhetorical style is through the use of name-calling, targeted at political parties, 
politicians, and partisans alike. The data are marked by partisan name-calling 
through the creative use of portmanteau terms and other forms of slang. Hos-
sain, Tran, and Kautz (2018, p. 612) refer to this phenomenon as “creative polit-
ical slang,” defined as “a recently-coined, non-standard word that conveys a 
positive or negative attitude towards a person, a group of people, an institution, 
or an issue that is the subject of discussion in political discourse.” Comments, 
drawn from responses to a number of articles, are presented in comments 
4.6-4.9:
Obummer is too narcicistic to blame himself so he blames Russia even 
with absolutely no proof. Obummer said his legacy was on the ballot and 
one candidate would advance his failed policies and another apposed it 
and the one that apposed him won by a landslide. He said, ”If you care 
about our legacy … my name may not be on the ballot but our progress is 
on the ballot … there is one candidate on the ballot that will advance those 
things and there is another candidate whose defining principle, the central 
theme of his candidacy is oppposition to all that we have done…. I will 
consider it a personal insult, an insult to my legacy if this community lets 
down its guard.” [sic]
Comment 4.6 16 December, 2016
Get off the Russian hacker story, already. Find a Dimocrat official, or a 
Hitlery campaign spokesman, who will state for the record that they prob-
ably shouldn’t have been lying, covering up, insulting, and plotting to usurp 
the election process themselves. Had they not, Russian or (you name it) 
hackers would have had nothing to hack!! [sic]
Comment 4.7 16 December, 2016
barry obamaRamaLamaDingDongCornholio is nothing more than a piece 
of dog Shi-t. He wanted to leave a parting shot at Israel & that’s just what 
he did. Bath House barry will go down as the worst president or should I 
say community organizer in the history of our great nation. I pray that the 
Good Lord will guide President-Elect Trump in his quest to Make America 
Great Again. Our mooselem president & his democraps are still in shock 
over the election. How sweet it is. God Bless America. [sic]
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Comment 4.8 27 December, 2016
People are energized to reclaim their country from the barbarians that 
have controlled it. The carrier politicians who think they, and they alone run 
the country, along with then libtards who assumed they could simply 
change this country into just another third world socialist crap heap, with-
out the people having anything to say about it [sic]
Comment 4.9 2 December, 2016  
Firstly, comment 4.6 features the claim that “Obummer is too narcissistic to 
blame himself [for the election loss] so he blames Russia.” The user in this case 
draws attention to the idea that the 2016 election had been a referendum on 
Obama’s legacy, citing Obama himself. Comment 4.7, features the terms “Di-
mocrat” and “Hitlery” as well as the conspiratorial claim that the purported Russ-
ian hacking of the 2016 US presidential election was merely continuing work 
already being carried out by the Clintons and the Democratic Party.  Comment 16
4.8 features an array of portmanteau terms as well as other forms of name-call-
ing. Alongside the portmanteau “democraps” are a number of other examples, 
including “barry obamaRamaLamaDingDongCornholio” and “Bath House 
barry.”  This comment also features the claim that Barack Obama is secretly a 17
muslim. Finally, comment 4.9 features one of the more prominent portmanteau 
insults directed at the liberal left: “libtards.” This is a term that has a vibrant so-
cial life beyond the context of this particular data sample. 
 Reports indicate wide agreement among US security services that Russian opera16 -
tives interfered in the 2016 US presidential election (Sanger & Schmitt, 2016). In con-
trast with the claim made in comment 4.8, a leaked NSA report “concluded with high 
confidence that the Kremlin ordered an extensive, multi-pronged propaganda effort to 
undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and 
harm her electability and potential presidency” (Cole, Esposito, Biddle, & Grim, 2017). 
However, this consensus would later be disparaged by President Donald Trump (Fidler, 
2016).
 The phrase “bath house barry” refers to the right-wing conspiracy that Barack Oba17 -
ma is gay and that he secretly “frequented gay bath houses in Chicago along with his 
former chief of staff and current Chicago mayor, Rahm Emanuel,” propounded in par-
ticular by journalist Wayne Madsen in his eponymous newsletter (Gabler, 2012). When 
Obama would later come out in support of marriage equality in the US – a topic that I 
discuss in Chapter 7 (see section 7.4 pp. 241-252) – this was taken as evidence that 
he was now “out of the closet,” with Fox News Channel host Greg Gutfeld remarking of 
Obama: “He’s officially gay for class warfare” (Frum, 2012).
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As noted by Ebner, in the US context, libtard is a “derogatory term used by the 
Alt-Right – combining the words liberal and retard – to describe left leaning lib-
erals” (2019, p. 169). Whilst Hossain, Tran, and Kautz (2018, p. 612) refer to the 
term as a form of creative political slang, Gao, Kuppersmith, and Huang (2017) 
classify it as a hate slur term in their analysis of hate speech on Twitter following 
the 2016 US presidential election. Shin and Doyle (2018) have related the use 
of the term to judgments regarding group identities in online political discourse. 
Although certainly used by the Alt-Right in the manner by Ebner, the term has a 
broader usage. For example, the page dedicated to explaining the term on the 
science, criticism, and skepticism community site RationalWiki (n.d.) posits that 
it is used more generally to describe “anyone not sufficiently conservative.” 
Whilst the RationalWiki entry must be understood in terms of its critical stance 
regarding use of libtard, in this sense of its usage the term can be seen to con-
struct an antagonistic frontier between conservatives and those judged not to 
live up to certain tacit standards against which the moral standing of conserva-
tives is to be measured. That is to say, the term libtard, as well as other such 
terms, can be used to articulate self/other distinctions by allowing speakers to 
perform various forms of alignment with specific in-groups and out-groups.
Whilst portmanteaus and other forms of slang present a relatively open frame-
work for producing partisan insults, other articulations are more thematically 
constrained. For example, the relation between Hollywood figures and liberals is 
a focus of commentary. Comments 4.10 and 4.11 offer two variant perspectives 
on this discourse. Comments 4.10A-4.10B.2 were posted in response to an arti-
cle outlining Donald Trump’s claim that a Hillary Clinton win in 2016 would lead 
to the US becoming “another Venezuela” (Goins-Phillips, 2016d). They read:
Venezuela, so when is Michael Moore and Sean Penn going to fly down 
there and tell the world again it is the greatest place in the world? Its Gov-
ernment is ‘really’ for the people like all Governments should be striving 
for. When are they going to set up shop, after all it has the best Health 
Care system ever according to the LibTards. [sic]
Comment 4.10A 9 September, 2016




Comment 4.10B.1 10 September, 2016
Nobody ever said it was the best health care system. Wow, you people 
don't even try to cover up your lies anymore. [sic]
Comment 4.10B.2 10 September, 2016
User 4.10A asks, “Venezuela, so when is Michael Moore and Sean Penn going 
to fly down there and tell the world again it is the greatest place in the world?” 
The user reminds readers of putative claims by “LibTards” that Venezuela has 
the best healthcare system in the world. User 4.10B.1 responds with a quote 
from a Democracy Now interview with Michael Moore claiming Venezuela had 
the fastest and best care. User 4.10A’s comment clearly questions not just the 
role of government in provision of healthcare but also the role of Hollywood fig-
ures in publicly talking politics and expressing instrumental preferences. As can 
be seen in comment 4.10B.2, however, the argument is resisted in antagonistic 
terms, constructing a distinction between the speaker and addressee through 
reference to the dishonesty and lies of “you people.” This demonstrates the role 
of delegitimising language in characterisations of perceived opponents.18
Comment 4.11A demonstrates a more conspiratorial tone, with the suggestion 
that corporate welfare for Hollywood is a quid pro quo by California Democrats 
in return for political donations. Posted in response to a story detailing Holly-
wood actress Natalie Portman’s claim that Donald Trump’s election had ener-
gised people “in a new way” (Munsil, 2016), the comment reads:
Bear in mind that Hollywood receives $330 MILLION PER YEAR in corpo-
rate welfare thanks to California’s Democrat-controlled Legislature. In turn, 
Hollywood donors return a kindly portion of that taxpayer-funded windfall 
to Democrat candidates inside California and throughout the nation. This 
is what democratic socialism (a.k.a. crony capitalism) looks like. [sic]
Comment 4.11A 2 December, 2016
“corporate welfare”…..Tell that to the taxpayers of Indiana [sic]
Comment 4.11B.1 2 December, 2016
 It should be borne in mind that in this thesis I focus on user-generated discourse. I 18
cannot speak of the provenance of such outputs or of their relation to the intentionality 
of speakers.
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Applying for California actors guild welfare, requires getting casting call 
on your knees. ”C’mon! How bad you want it!” (Forcibly Grabs back of 
her head). [sic]
Comment 4.11B.2 2 December, 2016
In the previous section, I offered examples of positive characterisations of con-
servative economic productivity, e.g., Trump supporters have jobs. The flip side 
is that political opponents – Democrats, liberals, progressives – are here framed 
as an economic drain on conservative productivity. Here, I include examples of 
a pair of converse themes: government spending and progressives as con-
sumers of welfare. All three examples offered here are drawn from a report titled 
“Here’s how much the Obama family has spent on vacations over the last eight 
years” (Goins-Phillips, 2016c):
BO and MO act like welfare entitled leeches. I am sure Iran and the Saud-
is will be more than happy to pay for their future vacations..???? [sic]
Comment 4.12A 5 December, 2016
They’re just another black family in government housing anyway. Might 
as well play the stereotype to the hilt, ’eh? [sic]
Comment 4.12B 5 December, 2016
The examples presented in comments 4.12-4.14 all feature comments referring 
to Barack Obama or the Obamas variously as “welfare entitled leeches" (com-
ment 4.12A), “just another black family in government housing” (comment 
4.12B), “First Entitlement Family” (comment 4.13B), and “welfare rats in the 
ghettos” (comment 4.13B), with President Obama himself referred to as “noth-
ing more than a welfare thief” (comment 4.14). Here, making reference to “an-
other black family in government housing” performs an important representa-
tional function: it stabilises images of whiteness through opposition. On this 
matter, Kaufman (2002) highlights how the image of the “black thief” functions 
to stabilise the image of the good citizen, encoded as white. It is important to 
note here that open discussions of race were almost non-existent in the data. 
Comment 4.12B is one of the most prominent exceptions to this. Nevertheless, 
treatments of gun rights discourses and discourses on the moral status of wel-
fare, for example, point to the ways in which these matters function metonymi-
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cally to refer to white (and frequently male) identities. Whereas discourses of 
whiteness primarily function metonymically, here the racial dimensions of com-
mentaries on welfare are explicit. This theme will be expanded on in my analy-
sis of the next pair of comments.
Simultaneously establishing a commentary on welfare receipt and a critique of 
Democratic governance, comment 4.13B compares the number of “recreational 
outings” by the Obamas, referred to as the “First Entitlement Family,” to the “un-
reasonable” expectations of "welfare rats in the ghettos”:
A solvable Problem for any President in Office… Let Congress Stop this 
abuse of the Tax Payers Dollar… Regardless of who is our President…we 
as American Citizens should not be responsible for their Vacations! Never! 
[sic]
Comment 4.13A 6 December, 2016
By law, Presidents are required to pay the cost for themselves, their 
families and guest at all non-state events such as vacations, dinners 
and such. But the security and all the expenses involved are at our ex-
pense. The excess of recreational outings by the First Entitlement Fami-
ly is exactly what we see with the welfare rats in the ghettos and their 
expectations of someone else supporting their unreasonable demands. 
[sic]
Comment 4.13B 6 December, 2016
According to Teles (1996, p. 16) welfare politics in the US has been "exception-
ally dominated by issues of morality,” whilst the notion of personal responsibility 
is a core element of conservative perspectives on the moral dimensions of eco-
nomic activity, as introduced briefly in section 4.2, above. Discourses of person-
al responsibility play an important role in judgments regarding those experienc-
ing poverty (Henry, Reyna, & Weiner, 2004). Indeed, personal responsibility fig-
ures centrally in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Signed into law by President Bill Clinton, it led to a 
major reorientation of the American welfare state according to an ideologically 
conservative worldview (O'Connor, 2001). Indeed, Drakulich et al. (2020, p. 
375) highlight Clinton’s positioning as tougher on the “racialized dog whistle” 
issue of welfare fraud than even conservative Republicans.
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By drawing on themes touching on welfare and entitlement and relating them to 
economic productivity, users can draw on cultural narratives and stereotypes 
regarding the moral character of work, particularly the ways in which such moral 
characteristics are distributed along both partisan and racial lines. The deploy-
ment of such strict father metaphors, as discursive acts of articulation, serve to 
assert not only the morality of entrenched relations of domination but also their 
necessity. In the case of 4.15B, it is possible to appreciate the specifically 
racialised features of such boundary work. In the American context, welfare has 
long been stereotypically associated with African-Americans (G. C. Wright, 
1977). The characterisation of Obama as a “welfare thief” also speaks to such 
broader discourses of race and entitlement which, as Hochschild (2016) notes, 
animate the feelings of resentment felt by many white conservative Americans, 
who see themselves as waiting patiently on the American dream whilst others 
receive preferential treatment.
Neither these discourses nor sentiments are a recent development. Racialised 
rhetorics seeking to woo racially conservative white Democrats have been em-
ployed by Republicans for decades (Abramowitz & Webster, 2018). King & 
Smith (2014) identify even more explicitly the character of the opposition that is 
mobilised here with respect to colour blind approaches. They write:
Conservative public intellectuals have associated race-conscious policies 
meant to aid nonwhites with social disarray, welfare dependency, and drug 
addiction, sexual licentiousness, military weakness, and criminality, while 
linking color-blind policies with self-reliance, hard work, law-abidingness, 
sexual morality, national service, and personal merit. (King & Smith, 2014, 
p. 967)
In this sense, claims regarding Obama’s “expectations” of support mirror use of 
the “affirmative action candidate” trope, which saw conservative media figures 
use racial markers to stigmatise Obama during the 2008 US presidential elec-
tion cycle and, indeed, afterwards (Edge, 2009). However, as discussed in 
Chapter 1 (see section 1.1 pp. 11-17) arguments foregrounding the ideological 
role of colourblind approaches in buttressing white supremacy (Mueller, 2017) 
should be borne in mind here. The relationship these comments imply between 
fears regarding race as a factor in American politics and the racialised elements 
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of contemporary constructions of the American Dream will be discussed further 
in Chapter 7.
In characterising Barack Obama, “President of the United States of America, 
Commander in Chief, Leader of the Free world” as “nothing more than a welfare 
thief,” comment 4.14 goes further, drawing on revolutionary themes to raise the 
spectre of violence against the ruling elite:
President of the United States of America, Commander in Chief, Leader of 
the Free world…and still you are nothing more than a welfare thief. - We 
paid for your presidency, we paid for all those years of your lavish vaca-
tions…not by choice… they took it from us. We didn’t have a say in it. You 
just took it. ”Let them eat cake?” You need to learn the harsh reality of his-
tory, and so do the rest of you progressives. There comes a breaking 
point. [sic]
Comment 4.14 6 December, 2016
Whereas radical right-wing movements historically have been viewed as isolat-
ed from the American mainstream (Kaplan, 1995), the situation has changed 
notably in recent years, with the mainstreaming of radical and populist right-
wing sentiments (Mudde, 2017). Political violence has been used as an ideolog-
ical tool by right-wing wing movements in the US context, with motivators in-
cluding government overreach, economic grievances, and resistance towards 
greater social inclusion of minorities (Piazza, 2015).
The imagery of violent uprising resonates with other themes that characterise 
conservative discourse during the Obama era, particularly widespread claims 
about the need to "take America back” through whatever means necessary 
(Mudde, 2017) – a trope which resonates significantly with the “Culture Wars” 
narrative promulgated by conservative commentator and broadcaster Pat 
Buchanan in his 1992 address to the Republican National Convention in Hous-
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ton, Texas.  However, whereas the previous two examples framed the loss of 19
resources to those who hadn’t earned it as a problem with the Obamas, com-
ment 4.14 underlines the fact that the prospective correction is a harsh lesson 
to be learned also by all progressives. Indeed, the growing threat of violence 
from the extreme right was already recognised by the US Department of Home-
land Security in a report which examines the impact of the economic and politi-
cal climate on radicalisation and recruitment to right-wing extremism, published 
more than a decade ago (2009).
Keeping with the themes of government spending and welfare, comment 4.15 
sets out the judgment that having people out of work and on government sup-
ports is an apparent goal of Democrats, raising once again the notion that there 
is a productive segment of American society (i.e., conservatives) that is paying 
for a group of unproductive, freeloading others. Posted in response to Goins-
Phillips’ (2016d) article discussing Trump’s statements regarding the US becom-
ing "another Venezuela,” the comments read:
In truth, I believe that it will be much worse. I see whole segments of our 
society decide that they no longer have a need to earn their way. Why 
should they? The Democrats seem to want more and more people out of 
work and on the government doles, so what would happen if half of the 
population that is working were to suddenly walk off the job because they 
are tired of paying others not to work, and wanted to sit back and collect 
government funds and welfare that they have paid into for so many years. 
Within six months, the government will be broke and will be required to in-
crease taxes from people that no longer have any income to tax. This 
forces a continuation of tax increases to offset the continual drop of tax-
payers, until even the government can not afford to pay their own workers 
and must shut down and limit access to more government funds that rely 
on taxpayers that keep decreasing in numbers. The more the government 
spends, the more it needs to borrow until America is no longer the land of 
 The “Culture Wars" narrative postulated secular humanism as the motor for a per19 -
ceived erosion of the Christian bases of American nationhood (Berlet, 2012). In this 
view, social and cultural transformation were portrayed as the product of a leftist con-
spiracy. I here include a short excerpt from Buchanan’s speech: “There is a religious 
war going on in this country. It is a cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we shall 
be as the Cold War itself. For this war is for the soul of America. And in that struggle for 
the soul of America, Clinton and Clinton are on the other side, and George Bush is on 
our side … we must take back our cities, and take back our culture, and take back our 
country” [emphasis added] (Buchanan, 1992). Chapter 7 will feature further discussion 
of what is perceived to be at stake in the preservation of Christian conservative values 
and how this relates to specifically conservative constructions of American national 
identity.
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the free, but the land of the freeloaders, until it can no longer defend 
themselves from any act of war against it. But then, isn't that exactly what 
the Democrats require, peace at any cost as long as they still get their free 
crap. [sic]
Comment 4.15A 10 September, 2016
Either way it goes it will not be peacefull. You can count on Soro's $bil-
lions to keep fueling the flames. Hitlery is our Hugo Chavez. We can't 
let that happen. And her mob will not go quietly. Confirm your zeroes 
children. [sic]
Comment 4.15B 10 September, 2016
A cycle is imagined in which the half of the population that work to pay for the 
other half suddenly decide that they too want “to sit back and collect govern-
ment funds and welfare.” This cycle is seen to develop into a feedback loop of 
increasing taxation and borrowing, which will lead to an eventuality in which 
“America is no longer the land of the free, but the land of the freeloaders.” 
Echoing my earlier discussion of conspiracy narratives involving Democrats and 
illegal immigrants,  this is claimed to be “exactly what the Democrats require.” 20
To this claim, user 4.15B responds: “Either way it will not be peaceful. You can 
count on Soro’s $billions to keep fueling the flames” [sic]. Once again, alongside 
claims about government spending, the threat of violent upheaval appears in 
response. Such imagined futures as the one presented here are a theme that I 
will return to in greater detail in Chapter 7 (see section 7.4 pp. 241-252). No-
tably, this comment also introduces the notion that billionaire George Soros is 
bankrolling the protest upheaval. I will return to this matter in my analysis of 
comment 4.18, below.
Themes of protest and patriotism are also prominent in the data, particularly in 
responses to Carlos Garcia’s previously mentioned article discussing the 
Women’s March on Washington (2017). Comment 4.16, for example, suggests 
that protestors should redirect their efforts towards being “patriotic Americans” 
in order to allow America to “become great again.” The comment reads: 
 See analysis of comments 4.3A and 4.3B pp. 122-124; for further discussion, see 20
analysis of comment 7.10 pp. 241-244.
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If these folks would divert their effort into trying to be patriotic Americans 
rather than sorry trouble makers, our nation could start to become great 
again. All these protests do is drag the nation down and make us a mock-
ery among the rest of the world. I am embarrassed by and ashamed of 
them. Captain Jim Green, Veteran and Patriotic Constitutionalist [sic]
Comment 4.16 14 January, 2017
The legitimacy of not only the Women’s March on Washington but also protest 
as a tool of democratic participation are here called into question. It is thus as-
serted that protest is not patriotism, which takes some other unnamed form. As 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, political civic engagement assumes a variety of 
forms and takes shape under an array of social conditions. Importantly, howev-
er, it has been shown that beliefs about the legitimacy of protest activity are re-
lated to ideas about conflicting group objectives and thus at least partly rooted 
in judgments about shared ethnic and group identity (Bobo, 1988).
Continuing my focus on representations of protest and participation, comment 
4.17 features an example that is less bold in its criticism of the protest in ques-
tion: 
So let them protest peacefully. Cover it once and NO more. Quit covering 
the tantrums, protests, and bulling agenda we voted out over and over. 
Start covering what the American people voted were important to us Now. 
[sic]
Comment 4.17 14 January, 2017
In this comment, the legitimacy of peaceful protest appears to be accepted at 
least to some extent. However, user 4.17 goes on to exhort the media to “Cover 
it once and NO more.” Whilst the protestors may be entitled to their right, the 
comment asserts the media should not be covering it. Rather, they should be 
giving a platform instead to the positions expressed in the election. Whilst ac-
cepting that protest is a legitimate mode of engagement, this comment never-
theless situates the source of democratic legitimacy in electoral outcomes.
A primary means of questioning the legitimacy of the protest – in principle – and 
the protestors – as political agents – was to claim that both were being funded 
by billionaire financier George Soros. The notion that Soros is funding the pro-
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gressive political agenda was already seen above in comment 4.15B and is re-
peated here in comment 4.18:
George Soros is paying and 90% of these idiots are living in their parents 
basement. Those of us not going to support Mr. Trump need to be at work 
that day to support the protesters and the Illegals children. [sic]
Comment 4.18 14 January, 2017
Claims that Soros was bankrolling the movement and even directly funding pro-
testors became commonplace in the lead-up to the Women’s March, drawing on 
the popular conspiracy theory that Soros is behind a hidden plot to destabilise 
American government – i.e., the “Soros myth” (Kalmar, Stevens, & Worby, 
2018). Based on four nationally representative surveys, Oliver and Wood (2014) 
have shown this to be one of the most popular conspiratorial narratives in the 
US, although notably it has strong ideological (i.e., conservative) dimensions 
when compared to other popular conspiracy theories, such as chemtrails con-
spiracies  or conspiracies regarding the financial crisis.  Beck himself has 21 22
presented Soros as one of the most significant threats to America (Dreier & Za-
itchik, 2011). Commentary on the so-called “Soros myth” frequently highlights its 
anti-semitic elements (e.g.`, Kalmar et al., 2018), with common anti-semitic 
tropes including references to “globalists” (Levine Daniel, Fyall, & Benenson, 
2019) and claims of worldwide Jewish conspiracy (Krekó & Enyedi, 2018).
Whilst the Soros conspiracy has been classed as a right-wing or conservative 
conspiracy (Oliver & Wood, 2014), conspiratorial thinking historically has been 
pervasive in American public discourse and political thought (Hofstadter, 1964). 
Indeed, focusing on the prevalence of apocalyptic imagery in conspiratorial nar-
ratives, Barkun (2013) demonstrates the cultural dimensions of conspiracy in 
the US context. This links conspiracy narratives to another historically dominant 
 According to Cairns (2016, p. 71), chemtrails conspiracies “describe the belief that 21
the persistent contrails left by aeroplanes provide evidence that a secret programme of 
large‐scale weather and climate modification is ongoing, and is having devastating 
ecological and health consequences worldwide.”
 Financial crisis conspiracies posit that the 2008 financial crisis was “secretly orches22 -
trated by a small group of Wall Street bankers to extend the power of the Federal Re-
serve and further their control of the world’s economy” (Oliver & Wood, 2014, p. 956). 
In Oliver and Wood’s (2014) analysis of the prevalence of conspiratorial thinking in the 
US, the financial crisis conspiracy was the most widely endorsed conspiracy theory.
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mode of rhetoric that likewise imagines American apocalypse, the jeremiad 
(Bercovitch, 2012), which will be the focus of my analysis in Chapter 7. Interest-
ingly, the discourse of astroturf political mobilisation was prominent in respons-
es to Tea Party movement mobilisation when it was at the height of its public 
visibility (Courser, 2010). In left-wing and mainstream narratives, however, the 
Koch brothers were presented as the ones paying for the appearance of a polit-
ical movement (J. Boykoff & Laschever, 2011), alongside “the usual group of 
right-wing billionaires” (Krugman, 2009).23
Comment 4.19 makes the claim that protest is not so much illegitimate as it is a 
sign of immaturity:
When you mimic like parrots and spout the Leftist terminology (such as 
“fascist”) when such terms do not apply in the least, and intensely protest 
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE of this country as far as the results of the 
election, you expose to all just how out of touch you really are. Donald 
Trump is not even in office, and yet these lunatics are accusing the man of 
complete nonsense. Where were you when Obama and the DemoRATS 
were passing unConstitutional legislation and executive orders to bypass 
Congress? This is the same children who grew up getting their way in 
everything, or else they would have a temper tantrum; with no discipline 
from the parents. . 
Grow up, kiddies. [sic]
Comment 4.19 14 January, 2017
This comment raises a number of themes that were prominent in responses to 
the Women’s March article (Garcia, 2017), including the illegitimacy of protest 
and the immaturity of political opponents. Insofar as this comment ends with the 
exhortation “Grow up, kiddies,” it relates directly although inversely to examples 
of positive in-group evaluations presented in the previous section. Positive in-
group characterisations drew on claims about the economic productivity of 
Trump voters. Here, it can be seen how claims regarding the social role of per-
sonal responsibility, as discussed in comment 4.13, are not limited to economic 
factors. Rather, they are also mapped onto claims about political and civic en-
gagement, both in terms of partisan modes of political discourse (i.e., “spout the 
Leftist terminology”) and forms of political participation and governance.
 It should be noted that the role and impact of oligarch spending and corporate lobby23 -
ing in US politics is part of a broader public and scholarly debate (Warf, 2019).
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Still on the topic of protest, comment 4.20 features lengthy comments from two 
users. Both comments focus on the hypocrisy of protestors demonstrating 
against Trump’s “little mistake in making a stupid joke” – referring specifically to 
the now infamous recording of Trump’s conversation with the TV personality Bil-
ly Bush in which Trump discusses using his fame to grope women (Jacobs, 
Siddiqui, & Bixby, 2016) – and “Hillary’s enabling and standing behind her sex-
ually addicted and rapist husband” – referring to rape and sexual assault allega-
tions that have also been made against President Bill Clinton (D. Matthews, 
2017). The comments read:
Screaching their dismay at Trump’s little mistake in making a stupid joke 
just amazes me and makes me realize how blinded by reality these pro-
gressives are. They go into hysterics over a joke and turn a blind eye to 
Hillary’s enabling and standing behind her sexually addicted, rapist hus-
band. Further, Seymour Hersch’s book, The ”Dark Side of Camelot” re-
veals torrid sexual encounters with the Democratic icon, JFK who was 
also an extreme sex addict. These two men were the worst of the worst 
when it comes to preying on women daily. That’s conveniently glossed 
over while all hell breaks loose over a stupid, (never should have been 
said), joke. It”s not about the joke people, it’s about progressives losing. 
They’re whipping these lemmings into a frenzy and it could get dangerous! 
George Soros!!!!! [sic]
Comment 4.20A 15 January, 2017
I must agree, How can they hold Trump to Task for some Minor indis-
cretions, Yet they would much rather have a Woman who is clearly a 
Megalomaniacle Sociopath!. She HAS NO CONSCIENCE what so ever, 
in that she Enabled Billy Boy to carry on his sexual Escapades, on the 
Lolita Express and in the Oval Office. She obviously Looks upon the 
Nation as below her, she hate’s America and Americans She Clearly 
had NO platform going Forward for this Nation, she Had both the DOJ 
and FBI in her Back pocket, she clearly Broke the Law concerning Na-
tional Security Several Times and somehow she got away with it, Her 
Pay to Play Scenario, Broke the RICO Laws. Did not save the Four US 
Citizens in Benghazi, when all involved know they could have been ex-
tracted, and she actually believes she is innocent of any wrong 
doing….This woman is mentally very ill! Yet all these protesters and 
Bleeding heart liberals from Martha’s Vineyard, to the Hollywood Hills 
would see her in the White House as if she was the perfect C&C…this 
to me is madness! MSM selling out their Journalistic Ethics, and In-
tegrity, along with NOT pointing the Finger at the Real culprits Like 
George Soros, and his Cohorts, the NWO, and Yes even the Vatican, 
has led to this divisiveness and what is truly Terrifying is this has all 
been planned by the Globalist who stand to lose their Strangle hold on 
Washington if Trump should Drain the Swamp. I fear for the mans life 
	 	 140
as it is certain there is as target on his back…I pray to my lord God that 
he is NOT JFK’D… [sic]
Comment 4.20B 15 January, 2017
Whilst user 4.20A refers to this as “Trump’s little mistake” and a “stupid, (never 
should have been said), joke,” user 4.20B.1 refers to Trump’s “minor indiscre-
tions.” In both comments, Trump’s behaviour is discounted or otherwise min-
imised, particularly when compared with what is presented as the more egre-
gious harms of Democrats. 
In comment 4.20A, it is remarked that JFK and Bill Clinton – two Democrats – 
“were the worst of the worst when it comes to preying on women daily.” User 
4.20B’s comment, on the other hand, highlights the contradiction between at-
tacking Trump’s “minor indiscretions” and support for a “Woman who is clearly a 
Megalomaniacle [sic] Sociopath” with “NO CONSCIENCE what so ever.” User 
4.20B’s comment further outlines a litany of greater misdemeanours and threats 
that are conveniently ignored by progressives, ignoring the “Real culprits” [sic]. 
In this comment one can appreciate claims of a conspiracy of globalists, who 
“stand to lose their Strangle hold on Washington if Trump should Drain the 
Swamp.” This speaks to claims discussed earlier regarding the putative role 
played by George Soros in pushing a globalist agenda that threatens America 
and the American way of life, whilst also recycling Trump’s campaign slogan re-
ferring to ending Washington corruption.
In the final example of negative out-group characterisations, the user 4.21A 
admits, “Trump may not be perfect but he isn’t a Marxist/Socialist like the candi-
dates the Neo Democrat Party produces these days.” These comments were 
posted in response to Tré Goins-Phillips’ (2016b) article discussing Beck’s dis-
appointment in Ted Cruz:
Trump may not be perfect but he isn't a Marxist / Socialist like the candi-
dates the Neo Democrat Party produces these days [sic]
Comment 4.21A 24 September, 2016
Thank you Captain Obvious. Now get this message through to the nev-
ertrump idiots. [sic]
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Comment 4.21B.1 24 September, 2016
Screw the never trumpers! They are meaningless. Their numbers are a 
pittance and are not worth wasting breath over. Now on the other hand, 
the congressional never trumpers should be afwaid, vewy afwaid of 
what their constituents will do to them in the next cycle, if we last that 
long! [sic]
Comment 4.21B.2 24 September, 2016
The threat of socialism is a common theme, which seems to typify the central 
threat to the American way of life, liberty, and freedom. The historical roots of 
such constructions are complex. For example, fear of communist spies in the 
US State Department animated the McCarthyism of the 1950s, led by Republi-
can senator Joseph McCarthy (Fitzgerald, 2006). Such fears were deeply em-
bedded in conservative Cold War politics (Crouse, 2002). However, they did not 
end there. Indeed, Skoll and Korstanje (2013) relate these so-called “red 
scares” to a contemporary obsession with terorrism, arguing that ideas about 
both are fundamentally embedded in an American culture of fear that has been 
actively manufactured throughout the latter half of the 20th century, continuing 
to this day.
Comment 4.21A also serves as an example of the kinds of connections that are 
articulated between partisan affiliation, ideological perspectives, and moral 
characteristics in the sample. In this case, even if Trump is viewed with a de-
gree of ambiguity, he is nevertheless not like the candidate offerings of the De-
mocratic Party. The comment here sets out a classification as Marxist or Social-
ist as an extremely negative feature of Democratic, progressive, or liberal parti-
sanship and personhood.  This set of comments provides a key example of the 24
contested support for Trump during the 2016 US presidential election cycle. 
 Given my specific methodological approach, which relies on user-generated content, 24
it is not possible to decipher from my data how users conceptualise the relationship 
between these different forms of partisanship, i.e., how particular political ideologies or 
stances (e.g, progressivism) are seen to relate to partisan affiliation (e.g., Democrat). 
That is, my data do not reveal audience attitudes towards or understandings of the lim-
its and extent of “partisan sorting” (Huddy et al., 2015), discussed in Chapter 2 (see 
section 2.2.2 pp. 50-53). What is palpable is the manner in which such distinctions ap-
pear to be collapsed in the below-the-line commentary of users. Terms like “liberal” and 
“progressive” thus appear to be used interchangeably with labels like “Democrat.”
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Such contestations will be a central focus of my analysis in the following sec-
tion.
4.4 Contestatory characterisations
In chapter 2, I outlined some of the key features of the ongoing polarisation de-
bate in American political science. Here, I problematise the manner in which 
most prominent models of polarisation in the United States – whether elite (Fior-
ina & Abrams, 2008), mass (Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008), ideological 
(Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Fiorina & Levendusky, 2006), or affective 
(Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Levendusky, 2013a) – posit a bipolar vision of par-
tisan opposition that mirrors the make-up of the American two-party system. As 
discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.2 pp. 50-53), partisan sorting (Fiorina & 
Abrams, 2008) and ideological realignment (Saunders & Abramowitz, 2004) 
align policy positions, parties, and partisan identities in a variety of ways. In 
studies of partisanship in the US context, partisan identities are also largely ac-
corded to relatively neat categories of Republican and Democrat. According to 
Thomassen and Rosema (2009, p. 45), this is a sensible approach insofar as 
“history and the plurality electoral system have produced a stable two party sys-
tem.” 
However, prominent challenges to the existing political party order in the form of 
anti-establishment movements and populist discourses introduce some disrup-
tion to this model. Such disruption is here considered under the framework of 
“contestatory performance” (Fuoss, 1993), a concept which focuses on the polit-
ical dimensions of performance as something which makes things happen – 
something which has, in Austin’s (1962) terminology, “illocutionary force.” Per-
formance studies do not situate the power of performance merely in the formal 
features of utterances, focusing instead on the dynamic use of language and its 
role in the social construction of reality (R. Bauman & Briggs, 1990). Here, I fo-
cus on the role of contestatory performance in the articulation of antagonistic 
frontiers between in-group and out-group in the online political talk of com-
menters.
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Conflicting attitudes and orientations towards Donald Trump’s candidacy and 
presidency among Republican voters and conservatives are one example that 
points to the existence of significant contestation of partisan alignments in the 
contemporary US. Trump is a deeply ambiguous character, looked upon am-
bivalently by many, whilst enjoying the backing of a consistent “base” of sup-
porters (Stolee & Caton, 2018). Trump’s support among his base, it has been 
argued, derives from the manner in which he addresses public intolerance of 
uncertainty and ambivalence regarding social complexity (see Korostelina, 
2016`, Chapter 5). However, Donald Trump is not the only indicator of such con-
flicting sentiments, and a number of examples of such public contestation that 
problematise the relationship between the Republican Party and conservatism 
will be discussed here, particularly as this relates to ideas about the Tea Party 
movement and so-called RINOs, i.e., Republican In Name Only.
In the previous section, I presented a number of examples of name-calling be-
ing used as a means of denigrating political opponents. In those examples, op-
ponents were Democrats, progressives, and liberals. In comment 4.22, howev-
er, I present an example that shows the use of name-calling and insults to refer 
to a more complex array of characters. Drawn from Goins-Phillips’ (2016d) arti-
cle discussing Trump’s claims about the US becoming “another Venezuela,” 
mentioned above, the comments read:
Watch out for the Orange goon squad if you speak poorly of Don the 
Con... [sic]
Comment 4.22A
So I take it your voting for Hillary?... [sic]
Comment 4.22B
I am not voting for the Giant Douche or the Turd Sandwich [sic]
Comment 4.22C.1
Again, another trumpanzee who cannot keep his mind off of hillary! 
Did I say I was voting for Hillary, or even mention her? Nope. You did. 
You also proved my point! [sic]
Comment 4.22C.2
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Examples include “the Orange goon squad,” “Don the Con,” “trumpanzee,” and 
“Giant Douche or the Turd Sandwich.”  What is appreciable in this example is 25
the prominent claim that the failure to vote for Trump is a vote for Hillary Clinton: 
“So I take it your voting for Hillary?…” Such claims recur throughout the sample 
and were particularly common in the context of comments responding to an ar-
ticle discussing Glenn Beck voicing disappointment at Ted Cruz’s decision to 
support Donald Trump, posted to TheBlaze on 23 September 2016 (Goins-
Phillips, 2016b).
Tré Goins-Phillips’ (2016b) article discussing Beck’s disappointment in Ted Cruz 
resulted in a huge a response from site users and produced a large body of 
comments. Although the article was one of 30 that were included in my sample, 
it accounts for some 19% of all comments. Some of the comments were glib or 
outrageous interjections, others were clear examples of “trolling” (Hardaker, 
2010), but many were comparatively reflective and lengthy contributions which 
nevertheless frequently featured certain outrageous elements, such as insulting 
language, name calling, character assassination, and ideologically extremising 
language (Sobieraj & Berry, 2011). Comments 4.23-4.26 were all posted in re-
sponse to Goins-Phillips’ article.
Comment 4.23, for example, shows one such contribution reflecting on Cruz 
finding it “in his heart to forgive the awful thing that Trump said about him and 
his family,” after Donald Trump had insulted Cruz’s wife and publicly accused 
his father of assisting in the assassination of JFK:
There is a time and a place to forgive. I think, finally, Ted Cruz found it in 
his heart to forgive the awful things that Trump said about him and his 
family. Tearing people down is Trump’s way of winning, but now I hope – 
once he wins – that he will work closely with those in office who can help 
turn things around. If Trump surrounds himself with our Constitutionalists – 
Ted Cruz, Mike Lee, etc., we will have a fighting chance of maintaining our 
freedoms. If Hillary wins, we will all soon be wearing Mao suits. We know 
 The final entry in this list refers to the animated show South Park’s treatment of the 25
choice being presented to voters in the 2016 US presidential election. The episode 
highlights the “near-zero value of an individual vote, the intrinsic value individuals place 
on the act of voting itself, problems arising when voters must choose amongst undesir-
able candidates rather than issues, and the role of political campaigning” (Hoffer & 
Crowley, 2013).
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for a fact that she is a lover of the Alinsky doctrine, Soros puppet, and will 
suck up to anyone who funds her Clinton Foundation, and our health in-
surance will finally all go to a one-payer – crappy – system. Trump may 
spend up the debt, however, I fear Hillary will spend us far more into obliv-
ion. There is no way out but to vote for Trump. Ted did NOT sell out. He is 
trying to save this country by staying close to Trump and working with him. 
Glenn, I am sorry, too, but we need to pray that Hillary does not win, and 
then get in that voter box and vote for Mr. Trump. Ted will be around to 
fight another day, and I will still always thank God for people like Ted Cruz. 
[sic]
Comment 4.23 23 September, 2016
The user who posted this comment can be seen elsewhere in the data, e.g., 
comment 4.24B, discussing the possibility of Trump being guided by and learn-
ing from “ardent constitutionalists,” such as Ted Cruz and Mike Lee, presenting 
this as a means of ensuring “we will have a fighting chance of maintaining our 
freedoms.” Constitutionalists are thus charged with maintaining American free-
doms, and their greatest opportunity exists in working with Donald Trump in 
spite of his personal failings as a candidate. The alternative: “If Hillary wins, we 
will all soon be wearing Mao suits.” The role of the US Constitution in safe-
guarding the future of America and American nationhood will be a central topic 
in Chapter 7.
Comments 4.24A and 4.24B continue this theme of Trump being the “best of 
two evils,” with a particular focus on Cruz’s stated support for his candidacy:
Although I have been an ardent Cruz supporter from the beginning, a vote 
for Trump has and will never depend on a Cruz endorsement. Cruz vouch-
ing for Trump will not help Trump; it only diminishes Cruz because I al-
ready know everything I need to know about Trump and it isn’t good. All it 
means is an endorsement from Cruz no longer has value, something on 
which one can no longer rely. Ultimately if I do end up voting for the best of 
two evils, I will carry my vote to the booth in a brown paper-sack, never 
admitting to the dirty deed. Trumpumpkins believe that Trump can save 
the country from the abyss, but I believe that is simply wishful thinking. 
The country is proceeding headlong into another civil war, a civil war which 
no politician can prevent, not even Sen. Ted Cruz. And a win for Trump 
may delay or accelerate the inevitable. Anyone who tells you they know for 
certain which one of the two outcomes will occur is a liar or a fool. Reality 
check: patriots, be prepared to fight for your freedom. [sic]
Comment 4.24A 23 September, 2016
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However, why not have Ted Cruz work alongside Trump and perhaps 
be a mentor. I would rather have the likes of Ted Cruz being invited to 
the White House by The Donald, whereas Obama spent most of his 
time with Trumka, among other undesirables. Cruz is vouching for 
Trump for reasons only he and Trump know. Trump is a quick learner 
and why not have him learn from those that are ardent Constitutional-
ists. It truly is time to throw away the bitterness and let Ted work with 
Trump. Look at it this way – Trump needs to learn the intricacies of DC 
dialogue and how to deal with those on the inside for our sake. May Ted 
sway him from the RINOS, Amen [sic]
Comment 4.24B 23 September, 2016
User 4.24A, for example, highlights the fact that, in spite of being “an ardent 
Cruz supporter from the beginning, a vote for Trump was never dependent on a 
Cruz endorsement.” In fact, Cruz’s endorsement of Trump “only diminishes 
Cruz.” Voting for Trump is something that will be done grudgingly, and anyone 
who thinks that Trump will serve as the country’s saviour is misguided. That 
outcome takes the imagined form of “another civil war, a civil war which no 
politician can prevent.” The threat remains, and patriots must be prepared to 
“fight” for their freedom. 
User 4.24B looks more favourably on the circumstance: “Trump needs to learn 
the intricacies of DC dialogue and how to deal with those on the inside for our 
sake.” This claim foregrounds Trump’s positioning as an outsider to the political 
establishment, which had boosted Trump’s populist bona fides (Donovan & 
Bowler, 2018). However, even whilst expressing support for Trump, user 4.24B 
admits that he will require some guidance on operating in such close quarters to 
the Washington establishment, invoking protection for Trump in the form of a 
prayer: “May Ted sway him from the RINOs, Amen.”
Whilst ambivalence towards Trump features centrally in the contested articula-
tion of conservative identity within the sample, divergent attitudes towards the 
Republican Party are likewise important. The RINO – Republican In Name Only 
– is thus also a key figure in the contestation of the boundaries of conservatism, 
one which draws on an institutional critique of the Republican Party establish-
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ment and their congressional agenda.  The author of comment 4.24B invoked 26
a prayer to sway Trump from their influence. In comment 4.25, however, we see 
a more critical stance on what Cruz’s endorsement means: further empower-
ment for RINOs, Establishment Republicans, Alt-Right, Unprincipled evangeli-
cals, and Reince Priebus, the former chairman of the Republican National 
Committee who was later to become President Donald Trump’s first Chief of 
Staff: 
What the Cruz endorsement of trump means: RINOs further Empowered 
Establishment Republicans-Empowered Alt Right-Empowered Unprinci-
pled evangelicals-Empowered Reince Priebus-Empowered Liberty loving, 
constitutional conservative, grassroots that put Cruz on the map-just got 
jack-slapped across the face. When will we ever learn and become Never 
Republican and get a viable third party on the move? [sic]
Comment 4.25 23 September, 2016
What this means for the “Liberty loving, constitutional conservative grassroots 
that put Cruz on the map” is a jack-slap “across the face.” This comment sets 
out a fairly inclusive set of key intragroup oppositions that distinguishes be-
tween key elements of the 2016 Republican platform and a liberty loving, con-
stitutional grassroots. The comment asks, “When will we ever learn and become 
Never Republican and get a viable third party on the move?”
In these incantations of a third party battle against a disconnected Republican 
establishment and a set of Republican agents who fail to live up to the moral 
and ideological expectations of conservative voters, the shadow of the Tea Par-
ty movement looms large. The following comments are a key example of this:
I am a Constitutional Conservative and people like me (and Ted) have 
been defeated by populists, many of whom claimed to be Constitutional 
Conservatives. Ted has chosen to pick up and fight as much of the fight as 
he can with the half way crowd until the Constitutional Conservatives have 
greater success. I support Ted. He is still exactly who he said he was. 
Trump has been all things to many people and we don’t know who he 
would be as president because he is a liar. All that we know is that he will 
not be Hillary. I suspect that Trump will win by a wide margin and we will 
know that on election eve who will win. I don’t trust Trump. I like some of 
 It has been argued that engaging in primary challenges of RINOs was a primary 26
strategy of Tea Party movement candidates, with the aim of “overthrowing” establish-
ment elites in the Republican Party (Libby, 2015).
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the people around him, but is their judgement at its best this year? I am so 
glad that I did not run for county Republican committee this year. I would 
not be able to campaign for Trump. In a few weeks, the election will be 
over and we will have to focus on whatever crap Obama tries to advance 
before he leaves. After that, we may need to get the old TEA Party buses 
loaded again if wither candidate wins and can’t see the Constitution from 
the white house. After seeing the rise of Trump though, I have to assume 
that less people than ever even care about that liberty securing document 
when their preferred candidate becomes President. [sic]
Comment 4.26A 23 September, 2016
Tea Party endorsed Trump, so be happy. Or are you bummed out that 
Hildabeast won’t win? [sic]
Comment 4.26B 23 September, 2016
[user 4.27B] does indeed spew proper political speak, but the TEA 
Party is a large group of individuals who joined as a voice for specific 
principles and to oppose specific legislation like Obamacare. There 
were a few TEA Party organizations that rose up from it and if one or 
two of those organizations endorsed Trump from their little office of 
several people, they did not speak properly because Trump also has 
a government paid healthcare plan and wants to put the federal gov-
ernment into daycare, which are in complete opposition to the 10th 
amendment and the TEA Party. Any new government entitlement 
program is un constitutional and a tool for Progressives to populate, 
corrupt and use in propaganda against Republicans who later want 
to reign it in. As for your Hillary comment, it tells me that you can’t 
defend your candidate with any accountable, provable credibility, so 
you need to resort to the Alinsky diversion process.. [sic]
Comment 4.26C.1 24 September, 2016
David Duke endorsed deceiving don, too. What’s your point? [sic]
Comment 4.26C.2 24 September, 2016
In this exchange, for instance, user 4.26A presents as a “Constitutional Conser-
vative” [sic] who has been “defeated by populists, many of whom claimed to be 
Constitutional Conservatives.” As someone who doesn’t “trust Trump,” once the 
election is over user 4.26A remarks, “we may need to get the old TEA Party 
buses loaded again if wither [sic] candidate wins and can’t see the Constitution 
from the white house.” Whilst recognising a shift in the movements that define 
contemporary conservatism, a more authentic alternative is imagined.
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The US Constitution is here characterised as the source of all freedoms, insofar 
as it is referred to as “that liberty securing document.”  When another user 27
replies stating that the “Tea Party endorsed Trump, so be happy,” user 4.26A 
proceeds to outline in detail the complex character of the movement as some-
thing composed of “a large group of individuals who joined as a voice for specif-
ic principles and to oppose specific legislation like Obamacare.” From those ori-
gins, it is not possible for any “Tea Party” to speak for those who align with the 
movement, but it is seen as a possibility that a movement which had enjoyed 
substantial visibility and a considerable amount of influence in terms of shaping 
the agenda of Republican conservatism for a period of time (see Skocpol & 
Williamson, 2012) could reform and challenge the new status quo embodied by 
Trump.
Whilst the notion that Trump would invariably be a better choice for President 
than Hillary Clinton, even given his failings, formed part of an aggressive legiti-
mation of support for his candidacy, there are those who profess so-called 
“NeverTrump” leanings,  even if voting for Trump would mean keeping “Killery 28
out of the white house” (comment 4.27B). This position is noted in the final ex-
ample, posted in response to Schallhorn’s (2016) article discussing an argu-
ment made by Hillary Clinton in support of stricter background checks for gun 
owners. The comments read:
Trump agreed to “no fly, no buy”, which EVEN THE STINKIN’ ACLU OP-
POSES. But I guess it’s ok to deny people due process as long as it 
makes America great again. If we’re honest with ourselves, we should ac-
knowledge that this guy got his a$$ kicked last night. No...I am not a 
Hillary troll and I am not progressive. I am, however, a person who can ob-
jectively analyze a debate. [sic]
Comment 4.27A 27 September, 2016
 The relationship between conservatism and the US Constitution will be discussed in 27
greater detail in Chapter 6 (see section 6.2 pp. 184-194 and section 6.4 pp. 203-214) 
and throughout Chapter 7.
 NeverTrump is a movement of Republican, Democratic, and Independent voters 28
whose initial stated aim was preventing Donald Trump from acceding to the office of 
President of the United States of America. The movement entailed the #nevertrump 
hashtag which grew in prominence during the 2016 election cycle and which is current-
ly still active. See Johnson, McCray, & Ragusa (2018a) for a discussion of the Never-
Trump phenomenon.
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@[user 4.28A] – Don’t expect any Trump supporter to come out in his 
defense on this subject or your post. Having said that I totally agree with 
you. Voting for Trump to keep Killery out of the white house reminds me 
too much of something Churchill once said. “An appeaser is someone 
who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last”. Both of these two 
knuckleheads are going to destroy this county all that is left is for the 
American people to choose the path they want to be led down to get 
there. [sic]
Comment 4.78B 27 September, 2016
The tensions between those expressing full support for Trump, those express-
ing qualified support (i.e., better of two evils), and those who fundamentally re-
sisted his candidacy animate the data sample, particularly in the context of 
Beck’s reported attitude regarding Cruz’s shift in stance towards supporting 
Trump. Beck’s position as one of the most prominent conservative media fig-
ures to publicly stand against Trump’s candidacy and nomination cast him as a 
solitary figure in a media environment that was characterised by near unani-
mous support once Trump had secured the Republican Party nomination. Var-
ied responses to Beck’s position help to illuminate debate over the proper role 
of media in the political process, as well as commenters’ publicly negotiated un-
derstandings of their own role as both consumers and producers of media dis-
course in the context of a hybrid media system.
4.5 Conclusion: contesting the boundaries of conser-
vatism
In this chapter, I have focused on characterisations of US political parties, politi-
cians, and partisans as a means of demonstrating the performative co-construc-
tion of political opposition in the online political talk of commenters. In so doing, 
I set out examples under three key categories: negative out-group characterisa-
tions, positive in-group characterisations, and contestatory characterisations. In 
the first category, I showed three key in-group characterisations as economical-
ly productive, Christian, and conservative. In the second category, I outlined a 
further set of themes, which characterised the out-group as welfare consumers, 
immature, and participants in illegitimate protest and an astroturf movement. 
Under this category, I also explored a variety of examples of insults and name-
calling. Here, I drew attention to the specifically racial connotations of such ar-
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ticulations in which Christianity is coded as white, with both implicit and explicit 
characterisations of welfare as a non-white, non-conservative concern. Finally, 
in the third category, I focused on contestatory performance and set out exam-
ples of the dissensus surrounding what constitutes conservative identity that are 
typical of the data in my sample. In this case, important considerations were the 
figure of the RINO, memories of the Tea Party movement, and the role of Nev-
erTrumpers in contesting the boundaries of contemporary conservatism.
This initial analysis indicates that even in a deeply partisan media space, there 
is the persistence of dissenting voices, which demonstrate ongoing vibrant con-
testation over what it means to be a conservative in the context of contemporary 
social and political transformations, as well as the social tensions those 
changes engender. Within this domain of self/other distinctions, speakers are 
not only opposed as “conservative” Republican voters to Democrat, but also to 
other Republicans – e.g., RINOS and establishment Republicans – who fail to 
live up to the standards of conservatism that are contested – i.e., articulated – 
in the digital domains of internet-mediated discourse and elsewhere. This is an 
important finding in itself, particularly in the context of arguments positing delib-
erative enclaves as the direct response to the fragmentation that typifies the 
public spheres that are constituted through the use of online media (e.g.`, Sun-
stein, 2009). 
The third category of contestatory characterisations further indicates that it is 
insufficient to analyse affective polarisation in the contemporary US in terms of 
a simple binary opposition between two party identifications. My findings indi-
cate a dynamic, multipolar model of nested or recursive opposition may provide 
a more suitable approach to the phenomenon of affective polarisation, particu-
larly in the context of contemporary challenges to the constitution and function-
ing of established political parties (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013). I see this not 
just as a means of empirically challenging some prominent arguments about the 
prevalence of political homophily – and thus the role of social identity – in online 
participation in deliberative systems, but also as a tool for understanding the 
discursive articulation of complex forms of oppositional illegitimacy in the con-
text of digitally mediated partisanship in the contemporary US.
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In this chapter, I have provided an overview of how US parties, politicians, and 
partisans are characterised by users in ways that may reference potent 
metaphors of race and gender. As demonstrated, those characterisations are 
frequently marked by incivility, sharing many characteristics with outrage dis-
course as defined by Berry and Sobieraj (2013). Here, I have shown how cate-
gories of partisan opposition are articulated in antagonistic terms, demonstrat-
ing the dynamic and contested character of self/other distinctions in the below-
the-line commentary of users. In the following chapter, however, I will examine 
how those oppositions are mapped onto the contemporary media landscape by 
revealing how commenters use below-the-line commentary to voice their oppo-
sition to a perceived hostile media and, in the process, discursively contest the 
very definition of both oppositional media and American conservative identity 
online. 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Chapter 5: Antagonism and the media 
environment in the US
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the “antagonistic strategies” (Laclau, 1999) employed by 
commenters in their articulation of an oppositional definition of “liberal” and 
“mainstream” media in user-generated below-the-line commentary. In the previ-
ous chapter, I drew on the definition of outrage discourse set out by Berry and 
Sobieraj (2013) in their exploration of the rhetorical strategies of commercial 
partisan media that have become prominent in the US. In so doing, I used the 
notion of outrage as a way of talking about the role played by characterisations 
of social, political, and cultural difference in partisan news commentary online. I 
have argued that discursive strategies of “antagonistic othering” (Herschinger, 
2012) are central to digitally-mediated processes of affective polarisation. How-
ever, at a time of a growing integration of media and politics (Mazzoleni & 
Schulz, 1999) and a hybridisation of forms of media power and genres of politi-
cal communication (Chadwick, 2013), partisan antagonisms are expressed not 
only with reference to political parties, politicians, and partisans. Such notions of 
oppositionality are also performed in attitudes towards media outlets, figures, 
and content. In that sense, the kinds of “antagonistic frontiers" (Laclau, 2000) 
discussed in Chapter 4 can also be mapped onto publicly negotiated attitudes 
towards media and shared practices of media use. Reflecting on the relation 
between these phenomena and affective polarisation, in what follows, therefore, 
I will focus on how commenters define media as “oppositional” (Arceneaux et 
al., 2012) through the performance of antagonism.
First, I will draw on empirical examples to give an overview of how notions of 
“the media” are constructed in right-wing media discourse. Outrageous charac-
terisations of an untrustworthy mainstream media which is biased towards liber-
al ideologies and viewpoints will here be presented as attempts at a particular 
fixation of meaning that acquire political significance within a field of hegemonic 
struggle, as described in Chapter 2 (see section 2.4.1 pp. 75-81). Second, I will 
relate these figurative constructions of media to hostile media perceptions (Val-
lone et al., 1985) and oppositional media hostility (Arceneaux et al., 2012), re-
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lated concepts discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Here, I will outline some of the 
discursive mechanisms via which partisan antagonisms are mapped onto a me-
dia environment characterised at once by the proliferation of means of participa-
tion and a significant growth in the availability of partisan media resources, on-
line and elsewhere. In so doing, I will outline how commenters use the rhetorical 
figure of a “liberal media” (Major, 2012) that has become dominant in conserva-
tive thought to articulate partisan antagonisms. Finally, I will further demonstrate 
the dynamism of classifications of opposition in the context of user-generated 
below-the-line commentary, revealing how, in defining media as oppositional, 
commenters re-articulate outrageous models of personhood and agency for 
their own ends. As with my focus on the discursive construction of political dif-
ference in the previous chapter, the role of contestatory performance is here 
understood to figure centrally in attempts to classify both media and identity in 
partisan terms.
5.2 The figure of “the media” in American right-wing 
media discourse
Within right-wing media discourse, the notion emerges over the past several 
decades of “mainstream” as a pejorative reference, a slur suffused with an array 
of cultural judgments (Domke et al., 1999; Major, 2012). As I argued in Chapter 
1 (see section 1.2.2 pp. 26-31), partisan media figures articulate antagonistic 
frontiers between mainstream and right-leaning alternative media as a rhetorical 
strategy (Arceneaux et al., 2012), with Glenn Beck named as a major proponent 
of such antagonistic rhetoric (Jutel, 2013). In recent years, for example, a vari-
ety of prominent political and media figures on the right have drawn on 
metaphorical constructions of “the media” for rhetorical and strategic ends. Ex-
amples of this trend include: former Alaska Governor and 2008 Republican 
Vice-Presidential Candidate Sarah Palin’s use of the term “lame-stream media”; 
conservative talk-radio host Rush Limbaugh’s use of the term “drive-by media”; 
even President Donald Trump’s use of the term “fake news media” and, more 
recently, “lame-stream media” exemplifies this tendency. 
This crystallisation in the conservative vernacular of an oppositional notion of 
“the media” as “mainstream” or “liberal" is contemporaneous with the kind of 
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technological, economic, and political transformations that Berry and Sobieraj 
(2013) propose contributed to the emergence of the outrage industry. The 
mainstream is articulated as a figure of alterity against which to plot the frontiers 
of in-group and out-group. As discussed earlier, as an antagonistic strategy, this 
construction of a “liberal media” shares important features with populist charac-
terisations of mainstream media (Haller & Holt, 2019b). However, my data also 
demonstrate a persistent focus on the antagonistic othering of media and me-
dia-related practice(s) by commenters. Bearing in mind this background, in this 
section I will outline the construction of "the media” in the online political talk of 
commenters, noting some dominant discursive characteristics.
The first example in this chapter, comment 5.1A, features an important element, 
which is the characterisation of “the media” as an agent. The pair of comments 
presented here (5.1A and 5.1B) were posted in response to a story discussing 
Donald Trump’s choice of Exxon Mobil CEO Rex Tillerson as a potential nomi-
nee for the position of Secretary of State (Enloe, 2016a). The comments read:
Trump is using the Media in ways no one else thought possible! It’s mak-
ing the unhinged even angrier and showing their cards sooner than usual, 
while his staff is taking notes. M A G A ! [sic]
Comment 5.1A 11 December, 2016
He also is ”zeroing” in on a pick that is hugely in favor of common core 
and carbon taxes. I’m amazed at the people digging their heals to de-
fend these type of picks. [sic]
Comment 5.1B 11 December 2016
The notion of media agency does figure in communication research, especially 
around the development of political attitudes and sensibilities, e.g., the idea that 
media can serve as an agent of political socialisation (Chaffee & Yang, 1990; 
McLeod, Shah, Hess, & Lee, 2010; Moeller & de Vreese, 2013). Vidali further 
argues that Bolter and Grusin’s concept of remediation (1999) likewise entails a 
notion of an agentive media, insofar as “it tends to frame the issue as primarily 
about relations between media, as if media are actors independent of people, 
rather than about the interpretive work of social actors who use and produce 
media” (Vidali, 2010, p. 373). In the above case, “the Media” are portrayed as 
an agent that is susceptible to being strategically gamed by conservatives, with 
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this particular commenter presenting an image of Trump campaign staff strate-
gising around the affective states of audiences. In this case, it can be deduced 
that “the Media” refers to responses by mainstream media outlets to Trump’s 
use of Twitter and other media, thus highlighting an explicit understanding on 
the part of commenters of the “hybrid” (Chadwick, 2013) relation between newer 
and older media in contemporary political communication.
Furthermore, the idea that Trump’s use of “the Media” [sic] could make “the un-
hinged even angrier” calls to mind the concept of “owning the libs.”  This in29 -
flammatory tactic, designed to generate partisan outrage, has its roots in a 2015 
tweet by Proud Boys founder, Gavin McInnes,  in which he included a photo of 30
himself laying face-down in a dumpster in order to generate liberal outrage 
(Peyser, 2018). This quickly became a meme that grew increasingly prominent 
during the 2016 election cycle. To “own the libs” became an end in its own right. 
Whereas more recent research on the influence of media on political attitudes 
accommodates the fact that audiences actively integrate media content in prac-
tical ways that contribute to developing political positions (Buckingham, 1997), 
this figure of emotional reactivity creates an impression of liberal hypersensitivi-
ty tied to media use. 
Whilst the comment ends with an acronymic incantation of Trump’s campaign 
slogan, i.e., Make America Great Again, it should be highlighted here that not all 
users appeared to share in this positive appraisal of Trump’s tactics. In that re-
 The phrase “own the libs” draws on the digital vernacular term “own” to refer to the 29
domination and humiliation of “libs,” i.e., those on the political left (Peyser, 2018). It en-
tered mainstream political discourse in 2018 via a speech by then US Ambassador to 
the United Nations, Nikki Haley. Haley remarked at the time: “I know that it’s fun and 
that it can feel good. But step back and think about what you’re accomplishing when 
you do this — are you persuading anyone? Who are you persuading? Real leadership 
is about persuasion, it’s about movement, it’s bringing people around to your point of 
view. Not by shouting them down, but by showing them how it is in their best interest to 
see things the way you do” (Lora, 2018). As demonstrated by Haley’s remarks, even if 
some view owning the libs as an end in its own right, that outlook is not always shared 
by conservatives.
 McInnes was himself eventually scheduled to host a show titled Get Off My Lawn as 30
part of the later merger of TheBlaze’s television arm with Mark Levin-owned CRTV’s 
subscription video arm, which formed the new company Blaze Media. However, it was 
announced via Twitter less than a week after the merger took place that McInnes was 
no longer working for Blaze Media. The company tweeted, “Blaze Media no longer has 
a relationship with Gavin McInnes” (Bowden, 2018).
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gard, comment 5.1B highlights notable issues with Trump’s cabinet picks, par-
ticularly those in favour of “common core  and carbon taxes” – two policy 31
stances resisted by conservatives and others on the far right in the US (South-
ern Poverty Law Center, 2014).
Whilst comment 5.1A presents an introduction to the notion that the media can 
be considered as a singular intentional agent, this second example takes the 
case of the 2016 Wikileaks revelations to present the claim that the media are 
to be viewed as “untrustworthy.” Comment 5.2 was posted to a story focusing 
on former FBI Director James Comey’s decision to publicly announce his plans 
to review the Hillary Clinton email investigation 11 days prior to polling day in 
2016 (Goins-Phillips, 2016a). The comment reads:
The FBI didn’t say it was lying Hillary’s friend wieners emails! I’ve heard 
the media say so! But as we all know they are untrustworthy ! He said it 
was new information pretaining to another case! PHello , the media’s in-
side sources said so! I don’t think so! With all the information coming out 
about clinton’s aid by wiki leaked are may I say “pertaining” to Lying 
Hillary’s emails! Hello the media is in propaganda mode! Do you think 
maybe due to all of these truth being exposed by wiki leaks have anything 
to do with them opening a new case! Yes! The fact is these But don’t wor-
rie amerca wiki leak emails are so damaging to the FBI reputation there a 
rebellion going on within the FBI ! Look the media doesn’t want to give any 
credit to the wikileak emails! So our elites in the media will point the finger 
at anything except the wiki leak emails! The wiki leaks keep on coming 
and we have been told in the near future they will leak the truth about how 
corrupt our government is and Lying Hillary emails she destroyed will ex-
pose her and will be enough that even the FBI can’t cover for lying Hillary! 
Stay tune these elites running our country are radicals and will do and say 
any lie to protect there corrupt government ! It all about the elites getting 
power and money. Let there be no douth about it ! God bless America ! We 
are one! [sic]
Comment 5.2 29 October, 2016
With references to “our elites in the media” and “the elites running our country,” 
the comment draws on an explicitly populist trope that situates the people in an 
 Common Core State Standards “identify the literacy and math skills that children in 31
every public school should master at each grade level” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 
2014, p. 5). However, critics of the common core present it as a “plan to indoctrinate 
young children into ‘the homosexual lifestyle,’ a conspiracy to turn children into ‘green 
serfs’ who will serve a totalitarian ‘New World Order’” (Southern Poverty Law Center, 
2014, p. 5).
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antagonistic relation with “the power block” (Laclau, 2005). In this case, this is 
achieved by making claims about the actions of a radical and corrupt elite es-
tablishment, as well as positing the relation between this governing elite and the 
behaviour of the media, which is claimed to be “in propaganda mode.” In con-
trast with an untrustworthy media, comment 5.2 claims that Wikileaks will “leak 
the truth about how corrupt our government is.” In this view, Wikileaks are cast 
as the agents of truth, in opposition to the radical elites in the media, who “will 
do and say any lie to protect there corrupt government” [sic]. 
Throughout the sample, whilst characterised by critique of mainstream media, 
few references are made to media that can be trusted. One exception to this is 
the numerous references that refer to the conservative media figure Mark Levin 
(see section 1.2.2 pp. 26-31 and Chapter 6 for further discussion of Levin’s rel-
evance). Notably, even some references to other conservative media are nega-
tive, drawn into the struggle over how to define what contemporary American 
conservatism should actually look like as a feature of the media environment.
Notably, the comment also makes a claim to civic discourse through the use of 
religious language in the form of the blessing “God bless America” which, ac-
cording to Kaylor (2013, p. 93), represents America’s civil religion “more than 
any other phrase.” The comment likewise closes with the exclamation “We are 
one!” In the case of traditional newscasting, the use of the pronoun “we” plays 
an important role in personalising mediated participation frameworks and creat-
ing a generic sense of a listening/viewing audience (Scannell, 2000; Tolson, 
2006). However, in this example, the linguistic act of public construction – what 
Lee (2001) terms “performing the people” – draws on exclusionary forms of 
alignment that map out the antagonistic frontiers between in-group and out-
group. Here, trustworthy and reliable media are characterised as those that 
support a conservative agenda, thus excluding more mainstream outlets, fig-
ures, and content.
Whilst “the media" were presented in comment 5.2 as merely untrustworthy, the 
third and fourth examples highlight the failure of media to report on matters of 
importance. Comment 5.3 was posted in responses to an article focusing on 
claims made by Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu’s spokesman to 
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have “ironclad” evidence of Barack Obama’s involvement in the crafting of an 
“anti-Israel” United Nations resolution (Enloe, 2016b). The comment reads:
For many years the U.N. has been a cesspool where Arab nations repeat-
edly are ganging up on Israel. Upon his departing his post as U.N. Sec’y 
Gen., bin-moon admitted that there is great bias against Israel. U.N. con-
demned Israel of over 200 violations in last few years, while they con-
demned Syria only about 50 times. Outrageous in light of Syrian killings 
among themselves. Meanwhile, Israel has provided medical assistance to 
thousands of Syrians. Why isn’t that reported on mainstream news? [sic]
Comment 5.3 26 December, 2016
Focusing on the perceived bias of the UN against Israel, the third example 
questions the failure of “mainstream news” to report on Israel’s provision of 
“medical assistance to thousands of Syrians.” This comment thus highlights the 
idea that mainstream media are actively concealing the true nature of reality.
A more strident position is presented in comment 5.4, where the comment au-
thor points to the media’s active refusal to “report the truth.” The comment 
reads:
Sorry but I always picture the rioters and looters during another one of his 
legacy race riots…. Opportunistic! Oh yea, we gonna get ours while we’re 
in this presidency! Took total advantage! I don’t want to hear a word about 
Bush going to Crawford TX. That was a working White House, already 
staged, secure and CHEAP! This family are the jaunts around the globe! 
Michael and the girls, Aspen, Africa, Spain and on and on….. We forget all 
the trips, sending a jet to pick up the dog? The mother in law in tow for all? 
These people have left a stain on this office, it’s just too bad the media 
REFUSE to report the truth about this vile family and their contempt for 
America(S) May Manchele has one more skit trip to Aspen before it’s all 
over? Good ridenence! [sic]
Comment 5.4 6 December, 2016
This fourth comment was posted in response to a story outlining the cost of the 
Obama family’s vacations over the course of Barack Obama’s 8-year presiden-
cy (Goins-Phillips, 2016c). This commenter addresses the distinction between 
Barack Obama and his predecessor, George W Bush, both of whom were the 
object of partisan criticism for the amount of vacation time they accrued during 
their respective presidencies (Robertson, 2014), particularly regarding the costs 
incurred by the taxpayer. In this case, the claim is made that the two are in fact 
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incomparable, given that the Bush family ranch in Crawford, Texas was “a work-
ing White House, already staged, secure and CHEAP!” By contrast, the Obama 
family vacations are characterised as “jaunts around the globe” by “Michael and 
the girls.” This masculinisation of Michelle Obama’s name is repeated once 
again later in the comment when the comment author suggests “Manchele” 
might make one final “trip to Aspen before it’s all over.”  32
“These people,” it is asserted, “have left a stain on this office.” And yet “the me-
dia REFUSE to report the truth about this vile family and their contempt for 
America.” This deeply antagonistic depiction of Barack and Michelle Obama, as 
well as their family, highlights once more the role of outrageous characterisa-
tions of political difference in setting out key distinctions between conservatives 
and non-conservatives, i.e., characterisations that demonstrate features of out-
rage discourse as defined by Berry and Sobieraj (2011), already discussed in 
Chapters 1, 2, and 4. Here, however, the media are factored in as a central 
force in keeping the public uninformed through either their failure (comment 5.3) 
or refusal (comment 5.4) to report on matters of common concern.
The previous two examples focused on related contentions regarding an abdi-
cation of duty on the part of the media, as a social agent, to keep the public well 
informed. In comment 5.5, rather than being a matter of a lack of information, 
the claim is made that the mainstream media are instead “falsely painting a pic-
ture of Trump as a racist, crazy time bomb.” In that regard, this comment, post-
ed in response to an article discussing Hillary Clinton’s debate stage argument 
for stricter background checks on prospective gun owners (Schallhorn, 2016), 
portrays the media as purveyors and disseminators of disinformation. That is, 
intentional forms of misleading content (Farkas & Schou, 2018). The comment 
reads:
No he didn't have to convince voters that he was prepared, qualified and 
trustworthy. That's what Hillary had to do and she probably gave some 
 Alongside conspiracy narratives claiming that Barack Obama is gay (see section 4.3 32
pp. 126-143), right-wing media figures have also claimed that Michelle Obama is a 
“transexual.” Infowars host Alex Jones in particular has propounded this narrative, re-
ferring to Michelle Obama as “Michael” in a 2017 attack in which he claimed photo-
graphic evidence that she has a penis constituted “the final proof” that the former First 
Lady is “a man” (Farand, 2017).
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confidence to some wobbly Dem voters in that regard. He just had to show 
up and not look crazy like the Mainstream Media has painted him. By 
falsely painting a picture of Trump as a racist, crazy time bomb, the Main-
stream Media created the low expectation hurdle Trump had to cross, and 
he did that. He came off as an unpolished, somewhat arrogant, and very 
aggressive non-Washington insider. He came off as being capable of iden-
tifying problems and solving them. He came off as being just as disgusted 
with failed American foreign policies as the failed policies of generations of 
Dem politicians in our big cities - now little better than those in the third 
world. If you are a voter looking to drop a wrench in the "business-as-usu-
al" Washington gears, you probably found your candidate. If you are an 
independent who is tired of politics as usual and really see no difference 
between Democrats and most Republicans, you probably found your can-
didate. Me, I'm a NeverTrumper who is going to vote for Trump because 
Hillary, unlike Obama, does have a working knowledge of the levers of 
government and will be capable of doing even more damage to our coun-
try than Obama. At least theoretically, a Trump administration might be 
susceptible to its policies being influenced in the direction of smaller gov-
ernment and conservative principles. [sic]
Comment 5.5 27 September, 2016
In this case, the comment author asserts that by creating this false image of 
Donald Trump, the mainstream media are establishing a “low expectation hur-
dle,” which Trump is able to cross. Comment 5.5 thus posits that, whilst the 
mainstream media are engaging in a partisan and biased character assassina-
tion of Trump, they are in effect creating the very conditions under which he can 
succeed.
Alongside this characterisation of the mainstream media as a force for disinfor-
mation, however, this comment also features a number of further elements that 
relate it to a series of broader trends in right-wing media discourse that have 
already been discussed in this and earlier chapters. For instance, as with ex-
ample 5.2 above, this comment deploys a number of explicitly populist tropes. 
The image of a “voter looking to drop a wrench in the ‘business-as-usual’ Wash-
ington gears” in particular calls to mind the opposition between the people and 
those in power in Laclau’s (2005) account of populist rhetoric. It also raises the 
spectre of anti-establishment sentiment (Schedler, 1996), particularly among the 
Republican voter base. Similarly, the notion of “an independent who is tired of 
politics as usual,” likewise draws on populist antagonisms, but manages to do 
so in a way that sidesteps partisan identities. Finally, in the claim that Donald 
Trump had actually benefitted from his debate appearance, it is also revealed 
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that Hillary Clinton was being held to a different standard. Here, it is proposed 
that Clinton needed to convince voters that she was “prepared, qualified and 
trustworthy,” which this commenter suggests she may have achieved with her 
performance, whilst Trump “just had to show up and not look crazy like the 
Mainstream Media has painted him.” 
A further theme, then, is the presumption that Hillary Clinton is a danger to the 
United States. In this case, it is not because of her inexperience, but rather due 
to her admittedly extensive knowledge of the mechanics of government that 
Clinton is seen as a risk. Here, Clinton is compared to Obama, whose legitima-
cy was frequently questioned in 2008 by referring to him as the “affirmative ac-
tion candidate” (see section 4.3 pp. 126-143) and minimising his preparedness 
for office by derogating his experience as a community organiser (see`, for ex-
ample`, Malkin, 2008). Through her “working knowledge of the levers of gov-
ernment,” Clinton putatively will be able to inflict damage of which Obama was 
incapable. The related themes of Clinton as threat and the binary nature of the 
election will be raised in greater detail in Chapter 7 (see section 7.3 pp. 
233-241).
The sixth and final example in this section explicitly presents the idea of a “lib-
eral media.” Posted in response to a story describing a trip made by Barack 
Obama to Florida for reasons other than dealing with the aftermath of the Ft 
Lauderdale shooting of 8th January 2017, which had taken place one day prior 
(Urbanski, 2017), the comment reads:
Democrats: Why would we ever halt celebrations or the ass-kissing for our 
leader because of a few dead people? And, of course, the liberal media is 
covering up that this attack was yet another Muslim hate crime. [sic]
Comment 5.6 9 January, 2017
This comment constitutes an example of what Coleman (2004) terms person-
ation – that is, “a metapragmatic practice featuring the creation of [an] utterance 
(or other communicative action such as dance and musical style) explicitly or 
implicitly voiced as that of another” (Steve Coleman, 2004, p. 382). This use of 
transposition in the voicing of others’ speech is a stylistic approach that similarly 
characterises Rush Limbaugh’s on-air performances (Shoaps, 1999). In this ex-
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ample, the comment author addresses an issue highlighted in the story and, 
performatively occupying the voice of “Democrats,” asks: “Why would we ever 
halt celebrations or the ass-kissing for our leader because of a few dead peo-
ple?” The comment author further claims that the “liberal media” are engaged in 
a cover up of the fact that “this was yet another Muslim hate crime.” This com-
ment renders even more explicit than examples 5.3 and 5.4, above, the liberal 
bias that is claimed to be revealed in the media’s failure to accurately report the 
news. In this case, it is not merely a failure or refusal to report, but rather a lib-
eral media conspiracy to engage in a cover-up of the facts. Here, the Islamo-
phobic dimensions of the partisan attack are palpable.
In these examples, some specific trends are notable. For instance, “the media” 
are here portrayed as an untrustworthy social agent that either fails or refuses 
to truthfully report on matters of public importance, thereby creating a false pic-
ture of events or, worse, engaging in a liberal coverup. As with the examples in 
the previous chapter, however, characterisations focusing on partisan dimen-
sions tend to be rhetorically outrageous. That is, they are characterised by “el-
ements of malfeasant inaccuracy and intent to diminish” (Sobieraj et al., 2013, 
p. 408). Insofar as research has demonstrated a greater prevalence of outrage 
discourse and outlets on the political right than on the political left (Sobieraj et 
al., 2013), the prominent deployment of outrage discourse by audiences for 
right-wing media is not unexpected. However, a central issue is the manner in 
which user-generated content contributed by commenters appears to deploy 
outrageous characterisations in order to collapse both mainstream and liberal 
media within the tropic category of “the media.” 
Some media are measurably in opposition to right-wing attitudes and perspec-
tives and can be demonstrated to have a left-leaning, oppositional slant (Meraz, 
2011). Yet, user commentary indicates all non-conservative media mentioned in 
my sample are categorised under the trope of an untrustworthy and biased lib-
eral media, one which is fundamentally enmeshed in hegemonic power struc-
tures and establishment politics. This articulation problematises the very condi-
tions of possibility of an impartial media, as viewed from a conservative per-
spective. In that regard, based on an analysis of US press coverage from 1992 
to 2002, McChesney (2004, p. 110) argues, “references to the liberal bias of the 
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news media outnumber references to a conservative bias by a factor of more 
than seventeen to one.” In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will present 
this conservative critique of the “liberal media” in terms of hostile media percep-
tions (K. M. Schmitt, Gunther, & Liebhart, 2004) and oppositional media hostility 
(Arceneaux et al., 2012). However, in keeping with my qualitative approach, I 
will also draw on further empirical examples in order to suggest a more qualita-
tive framework for analysing claims of media bias and expressions of hostility 
towards oppositional media.
5.3 Performing antagonism through partisan news 
commentary
The examples outlined in the previous section serve as an introduction to the 
particular fixation of meaning that is the dominant definition of “the media” in 
American right-wing media discourse –– a partisan concept which collapses dis-
tinctions between mainstream and liberal outlets, figures, and content through 
discursive acts of antagonistic othering. In so doing, it also presents a first im-
pression of what Domke et al (1999, p. 36) refer to as “the rising public percep-
tion of a liberal news media.” Research suggests that this perception of liberal 
bias can be explained in part by the hostile media phenomenon (P. A. Beck, 
1991; Vallone et al., 1985), introduced in Chapter 1 and discussed in more de-
tail in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.3 pp. 53-60), which occurs “when opposing 
partisans perceive identical news coverage of a controversial issue as biased 
against their own side” (Feldman, 2012, p. 449). Insofar as my research focuses 
on discourse as opposed to attitudes, rather than focusing on perceptions of 
media hostility my discourse-centred analysis proceeds through an examination 
of how commenters, as active producers of media discourse, style media as 
hostile and oppositional through their user-generated commentary.
Taking up on the theme of how audiences talk about their perceptions of media 
bias, example 5.7 was posted in response to an article discussing Obama’s re-
sponse to Russian interference in the 2016 election (Morse, 2016). The com-
ment reads:
It’s okay for Soros, the MSM, Black Panthers to strong arm ,voters, send 
paid minions to disrupt opposition rallies, actively raise monies for their 
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campaigns from ME countires, and use dummy foundations to peddle the 
elections by quid quo schemes, but let ANYONE. Dare to publish the 
undisputed communications by the democraps oooooh now that’s beyond 
the pale…bwh [sic]
Comment 5.7 16 December, 2016
This comment raises a number of key themes discussed in Chapter 4, particu-
larly the role of George Soros in creating political unrest in the US, as well as 
the role of his “paid minions” in illegitimate protest and disruption of opposition 
rallies (see section 4.2 pp. 121-126). Alongside the political function of sup-
posed “dummy foundations”, e.g., The Clinton Foundation, these remarks serve 
as an overview of some of the insidious things Democrats putatively get up to, 
both in the public eye and behind closed doors. This commenter situates the 
mainstream media (“MSM") as a central force not just in the kind of perversion 
of democracy that frequently gets attributed to Soros and his putative followers 
but also as a central cog in the ongoing hypocrisy of claims regarding Russian 
interference in the 2016 election.
Commenter 5.8 draws on the fake news trope, equating fake news with “profes-
sional analysis”. This eighth example was posted in response to a story about 
the number of bus permits issued for the Women’s March on Washington, a 
protest which took place in Washington DC on the day following Trump’s inau-
guration (Garcia, 2017). The comment reads:
[User]: Let’s not allow “Fake News” to dominate, or as they prefer to call it 
now, “professional analysis” So let’s not put the cart in front of the horse. 
We do that by considering the REAL numbers and not the “doom and 
gloom” of media obfuscation. In effect, I predict the vast majority of bus 
riders will be Trump supporters! But just like the giant campaign crowds for 
Mr. Trump, the MSM will once again turn the camera’s away. They will 
show 150 protestors and block our view of the nearly 400,000 “Trump Pa-
triots!” Mark my words! Happy New Year!!! [sic]
Comment 5.8 14 January, 2017
Fake news had by then become a focal point of media critiques of conservative 
and right-wing political and media discourse. However, the term had also been 
co-opted by the same right-wing partisan media it was largely designed to de-
scribe. It was also prominently adopted by Donald Trump, during his time as a 
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candidate and, later, as President. This co-optation of the term by opposing po-
litical projects renders it, according to Farkas and Schou (2018, p. 300), a float-
ing signifier within a struggle between rival hegemonic projects to (re-)define the 
parameters of contemporary politics. The claim here being made is that the 
“doom and gloom of media obfuscation” will result in the circulation of false 
numbers, disguising the true size and makeup of those traveling to Washington 
by bus. A further link is made regarding the MSM deliberately downplaying the 
size of Trump’s “giant campaign crowds” which, it is suggested, were obscured 
by a deceptive mainstream media. This is an example of how users claim in-
sight into the underlying patterns that are disguised or otherwise obscured by 
media.
This comment further demonstrates a specific mode of “contestatory perfor-
mance” (Fuoss, 1993), exemplified in Chapter 4 (see section 4.4 pp. 143-151), 
which entails performance oriented towards the subversion of established rela-
tions of power. In the case of the phrase “Mark my words,” the user asserts both 
the authority and capacity not only to comment on media, but rather to decipher 
the hidden truths and meanings that are obscured by establishment institutions. 
On this basis, the user can contest more than the semantic content of news re-
ports. Rather, the user can also call into question and challenge the pragmatic 
structures of media power that define mediated participation, even in a hybrid 
media system. Such contestatory performances are essential to the discursive 
processes I seek to describe.
As with the second example, comment 5.9 comment features a prominent re-
working of a key talking point from the 2016 election cycle. This ninth example 
was posted in response to a story about MSNBC host Mika Brzezinski critiquing 
Hillary Clinton for blaming her loss on “fake news” (Jon Street, 2016a). The 
comment reads:
The Alt Left, which now controls the Democrat Party, were the originators 
of ’ fake news. ’ They started all of this which such journalistic gems as 
calling Obama a ’ biracial uniter ’ and christening their health con job as Ó 
Affordable ! ’ They created an earlier fake / con when they christened their 
economic bomb : the ’ Affordable ’ Housing Act ! Oh, the Alt Left is quite 
skilled at creating fantasy news ! We used to call these things lies ..back 
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when Christian morality was still in vogue with Democrats politicos and the 
MSM. [sic]
Comment 5.9 9 December, 2016
Comment 5.9 speaks of the “Alt Left which now controls the Democrat 
Party” [sic], mirroring mainstream media commentary on the role of the so-
called Alt-Right in reshaping the trajectory of Republican Party politics (Hawley, 
2017; Mudde, 2017).  According to this comment, it is the Alt Left who are in 33
fact the original purveyors of fake news, a strategy deployed in media prevarica-
tion around the coverage of Obama-era policies and politics. Here, mainstream 
media content is explicitly categorised as “fantasy.” However a question is also 
raised regarding the ways in which mainstream media discourse has trans-
formed, with a retroprojective (Lenclud, 1987) reference to a putative time 
“when Christian morality was still in vogue with Democrats politics and the 
MSM” [sic], something which is thus inferred to no longer be the case. The role 
of historical perspective in the articulation of conservative identity is a central 
theme in Chapter 7 (see section 7.2 pp. 219-233).
Whilst oppositional hostility towards mainstream media is broadly characteristic 
of the sample, it is also common to see more targeted attacks focusing on spe-
cific outlets that are judged to be biased against conservatives and the right. 
CNN, the focus of the comment seen in example 5.10, is a notable example. 
The tenth example was posted in response to a story dealing with Israeli Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s spokesman’s claim to have access to informa-
tion confirming Barack Obama’s involvement in crafting an anti-Israel resolution 
passed by the United Nations Security Council in December 2016 (Enloe, 
2016b). The comment reads:
This is an interview on CNN! The Clinton News Network and one of the 
biggest propaganda platforms of the Obama administration and the arro-
gant greedy Rothschild’s, Bilderberger group, Rockefeller’s, CFR and their 
military industrial complex. This is yet another ploy by these Fascist lying 
greedy thugs. Obama’s been kissing that Fascist murdering Netanyahu’s 
butt his entire administration. Just now a ploy to stir the cauldron of chaos 
 Whilst the term “Alt-Right” entered popular usage during and following the 2016 US 33
presidential election, the term “Alt-Left” is much more contested and is used in a pri-
marily pejorative sense by those on the right to refer to “Antifa” (i.e., anti-fascist) and 
other left-wing activists (Fuller, 2018).
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and unrest they’ve been doing since their candidate in HRC lost the elec-
tion. People need to wake up and execute every one of these greedy mur-
derous corrupt parasites. [sic]
Comment 5.10 30 December, 2016
Here, CNN is referred to as the “Clinton News Network” and is claimed to be 
“one of the biggest propaganda platforms of the Obama administration.” This 
claim is combined with conspiratorial assertions about the hidden collusion be-
tween CNN, the Obama administration, and prominent wealthy Americans. 
Conspiracy tropes are taken further, however, by the contention that Obama’s 
critique of Netanyahu is a ruse to disguise the fact that “Obama’s been kissing 
that Fascist murdering Netanyahu’s butt his entire administration.” The purpose 
here is simple: this is done in the interest of creating chaos and unrest. Once 
more, the comment asserts the power of the audience as critical interpreters of 
the evidence of their senses.
As in comment 5.8, above, comment 5.10 thus entails another important exam-
ple of a specific kind of contestatory performance that characterises the data in 
my sample. This comment also establishes the role of the audience in uncover-
ing the nefarious acts of a corrupt political establishment, with whom the “liberal 
media” are frequently seen to collaborate (Major, 2012). In this sense, the audi-
ence are tasked with sifting through the signs to reveal the hidden truth underly-
ing the claims of those in power. Importantly, this framework has been central to 
Beck’s particular mode of affective performance since his time at Fox News 
Channel – a framework in which his audience has long been invited to partici-
pate (Jutel, 2018). It is thus useful to note that the revelation of hidden truths 
shares important features with both the parrhesiastic rhetoric discussed in 
Chapter 1 (see section 1.2.2 pp. 26-31) and the jeremiad rhetoric discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
These performative acts of interpretation and contestation highlight the role of 
the audience in uncovering the machinations of the powers that be – in this 
case, revealing the Obama administration’s conspiratorial attempts to “stir the 
cauldron of chaos.” The comment ends by raising the spectre of violence 
against the assumed perpetrators of this conspiracy, a theme which weaves its 
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way through the sample in sometimes subtle and sometimes much more explicit 
ways (see, for example, section 4.3 pp. 126-142): “People need to wake up and 
execute every one of these greedy murderous corrupt parasites.”
Alongside CNN, discussed in the previous example, The Washington Post and 
MSNBC are likewise extensively portrayed as two stereotypically liberal and bi-
ased media outlets. They are discussed in the eleventh example, which was 
posted in response to a story which stated that Donald Trump and Hillary Clin-
ton were virtually tied in a poll conducted by CNN/ORC between September 1st 
and September 4th 2016 (Jon Street, 2016b). The comment reads:
Gee, the Washington Post! A bastion of conservative leanings, NOT! I be-
lieve my comment history will reflect I predicted this would come. When 
CNN and MSNBC show Trump either ahead or tied, as well as other liber-
al a outlets showing the same or not far behind I can guarantee the killary 
camp is in panic mode. Trump is digging into the demoncrats Black and 
Hispanic vote as well. Never a compete Trump fan doesn’t mean I can’t 
read the tealeaves. All you Soybots owe me an apology for all your ass 
thumbs. [sic]
Comment 5.11 6 September, 2016
This comment focuses primarily on how to interpret the fact that liberal media 
outlets are discussing polls that reflect positively on Donald Trump, showing him 
either ahead or tied with Hillary Clinton in the final months before the November 
6th election. This comment reveals some of the same ambivalence regarding 
Donald Trump that was notable in the previous chapter. Just because this 
commenter was never a complete fan of Donald Trump does not mean they 
“can’t read the tealeaves.” Alongside claims of access to hidden realities pre-
sented in comment 5.8 and 5.10, this notion of prognostication and prediction is 
something that features heavily in the data sample. It will form a central compo-
nent of my discussions in Chapter 7 (see section 7.4 pp. 241-252).
As with the comment 5.9, the twelfth example was posted to a story about 
MSNBC host Mika Brzezinski critiquing Hillary Clinton for blaming her loss on 
“fake news” (Jon Street, 2016a). Unlike the other examples offered in this sec-
tion, however, this comment was posted as a reply to a comment by another 
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user, although the initial comment is here omitted for brevity. Comment 5.12 
reads:
Amen [user]. You hit every button. All I can add is that what Hillary did was 
worse than the media who spread the fake news. News outlets like 
MSNBC were guilty of both advocating for Hillary while representing them-
selves as journalists (that’s fraudulent and deserving of contempt), but 
they were only the messenger. Hillary’s actions were more nefarious – 
each fake story she fabricated was intended to work directly to her advan-
tage, either selfaggrandizement or for purposes of CYA. The media huck-
sters deserve to be ignored – and that seems to be more and more their 
fate every day. For the pay-to-play Clinton Foundation and lying to Con-
gress, if not the email breaches of national security, Hillary deserves a fair 
trial. [sic]
Comment 5.12 10 December, 2016
The comment raises a number of issues that have been discussed above, par-
ticularly the correspondence between the actions of media organisations, on the 
one hand, and political figures and institutions on the other. However, it also ex-
plicitly draws attention to the ideological constitution of journalistic practice as a 
domain typified by objectivity and distance, which has featured centrally in 
analyses of American journalism, particularly in the 20th century (Kperogi, 2013; 
Schudson, 2001). On this matter, the notion that a news outlet would advocate 
for a political candidate is described as “fraudulent and deserving of contempt.” 
At the same time, the comment does not mention the partisan character of the 
space within which this comment is made. This is a point of interest that raises 
the question of what kind of content gets styled by commenters as neutral or 
congruent. As I shall demonstrate in the following section, the definition of con-
gruence is deeply contested in the sample.
In all, it is possible to appreciate a number of broad themes in the above exam-
ples, themes which indicate both audience perceptions of media bias by main-
stream outlets and audience hostility towards those same outlets which are per-
ceived to be biased against conservatives. First, alongside references to the 
mainstream media or “MSM,” there is a metacommentary regarding media or-
ganisations that are classed as liberal – a metacommentary that is present 
across the data sample. However, notably less is said here about which media 
are to be viewed as reliable. Second, following on from examples presented in 
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the previous section, there is the idea that the media are engaged in clear acts 
of obfuscation that need to be revealed by the audience. Third, such acts of 
concealment, once uncovered, are argued to be motivated by powerful partisan 
alignments between media organisations and political elites. These alignments 
manifest not merely in blatant acts of suppression, but rather in far-reaching 
conspiracy against the conservative opposition, challenging the very idea that 
the liberal media might be capable of engaging in objective journalistic practice. 
Each of these key themes contributes to the construction of a publicly negotiat-
ed definition of oppositional media in which notions of identity and alterity are 
important factors. 
5.4 Contesting the boundaries of conservative media 
and identity
Following Jackson and Sherriff (2013), I earlier proposed that a qualitative ap-
proach can help to reveal some of the complexity and nuance of real-world in-
tergroup relations. In so doing, I proposed a focus on the performance of an-
tagonism as a way of thinking about the dynamic articulation of distinctions be-
tween self and other. Here, I will focus on the definition of oppositional media as 
another such form of rhetorical performance. Whilst media provide resources for 
politically significant behaviours (Chadwick et al., 2018b), audiences are free to 
work with those resources in ways that may confound the intentions of institu-
tional media. In this section, I will discuss how commenters articulate the 
boundaries between likeminded and oppositional media via the appropriation 
and redeployment of the archetypes of agency and identity that are characteris-
tic of right-wing outrage discourse.
Comment 5.13 is exemplary insofar as it draws together a number of discourses 
–– i.e., economic, populist, religious –– that are prevalent throughout the sam-
ple. It was posted in response to a story highlighting Glenn Beck’s disappoint-
ment in Cruz’s decision to support Donald Trump (Goins-Phillips, 2016b). The 
comment reads:
Glenn is in financial straits and he’s bought and paid for by the establish-
ment, Look at who remains of the never Trumpers, The Bushes, Nancy 
Graham, Romney, McCain, Dole, Boehner, and the whole NE power corri-
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dor of R Senators, and yet some of the good folks on this site can’t see 
farther than their adoration for Beck that he has has put them on the side 
of their own enemies. Even Mark Levin had a crisis of conscience and had 
to say the Hillary, the preferred candidate of the R and D establishment, 
needed to be stopped, and now he would vote Trump. You will know them 
by their fruits, the fruits of the never Trumpers is poison, eat of it at your 
own risk. [sic]
Comment 5.13 26 September, 2016
In the first instance, attention is drawn to the precarious financial status of 
Beck’s media empire, e.g., “Glenn is in financial straits.” This is a recurring 
theme. Here, however, the author proposes that these financial issues indicate 
that Beck is “bought and paid for by the establishment.” The “adoration” of some 
of Beck’s audience blinds them to the fact that “he has put them on the side of 
their own enemies.” In that regard, Beck is contrasted with Mark Levin, another 
prominent conservative media figure.  Levin, who appears as foil for Beck 34
throughout the sample, had also taken a notable anti-Trump stance, only to lat-
er reassess that position. In this case, the comment author remarks that Levin 
had a change of conscience regarding Trump when faced with the prospect of a 
Hillary Clinton presidency. 
Clinton is portrayed here as “the preferred candidate of the R and D establish-
ment.” This comment further exemplifies the populist antagonism, noted earlier, 
which characterises the sample. Here, the establishment is seen as both Re-
publican and Democrat, calling to mind the figure of the RINO, or Republican In 
Name Only, who have been the focus of conservative uprisings by the Tea Party 
movement and libertarians, as well as a panoply of other groups and individuals 
on the right (Hawley, 2016; Mudde, 2017). As discussed in Chapter 4 (see sec-
tion 4.4 pp. 143-151), RINO is a term used to describe a Republican who strays 
too far from conservative principles. Beck is here placed within this grouping, in 
comparison to Mark Levin, who merely had a “crisis of conscience.” Lastly, the 
comment closes by drawing on biblical imagery through citation of the bible 
verse Matthew 7:16: “You will know them by their fruits.” For those who identify 
with the Never Trump viewpoint, their fruit is “poison.” The stakes of the choice 
 Beck and Levin would later merge their respective media endeavours, TheBlaze and 34
CRTV, to create Blaze Media in December 2018 (Concha, 2018). See Chapter 1 (sec-
tion 1.2.2 pp. 26-31) for further discussion of the context within which this occurred.
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facing voters are here presented in biblical terms. This is a choice with which 
the media commentators to whom voters align through media selectivity must 
likewise wrestle.
Posted in response to the same story as comment 5.13, which discussed Glenn 
Beck’s response to Ted Cruz’s support for Trump (Goins-Phillips, 2016b), com-
ment 5.14 also focuses on the putative impact of financial factors on Beck’s po-
litical allegiances, which are to be appreciated by the audience through his par-
tisan performances. The comment reads:
glenda has milked the conservative cow and now that that cow is running 
dry glenda’s started flirting/milking the liberal cow. For glenda its all about 
the benjamins! [sic]
Comment 5.14 24 September, 2016
Bearing in mind Beck’s formerly prominent role in anti-establishment conserva-
tive politics, this comment suggests that Beck has “milked the conservative 
cow” and so is reorienting towards “flirting/milking the liberal cow.” Notably, the 
comment feminises Beck’s first name –– Glenda instead of Glenn –– calling to 
mind the masculinisation of Michelle Obama’s name in example 5.4, above. For 
“glenda,” the commenter concludes, “its all about the benjamins.”  This high35 -
lights once more the idea that Beck is beholden to financial interests, indicating 
an inauthentic or staged engagement with conservative politics and principles. 
In that regard, both comment 5.13 and 5.14 point to a critique of the financial 
motivations of individuals, including the implications of such motivations in 
terms of authentic conservatism. This critique appears elsewhere in the data, as 
it does in my analysis. This brief point also prefigures my discussion in Chapter 
6, where I analyse how users describe the political and economic significance of 
their media choice, particularly in terms of the effects it is imagined that choice 
will have on both Beck’s media operations and his status as a conservative 
commentator. 
 In this case, “benjamins” is a slang reference to the US one hundred dollar bill, which 35
features the image of American Founding Father Benjamin Franklin. The phrase “It’s all 
about the Benjamins” is thus synonymous with the phrase “It’s all about the money."
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As with the previous example, the theme of inauthentic conservative posturing 
appears prominently in comment 5.15. This comment was posted in response 
to the same story discussing the results of a CNN/ORC poll mentioned in ex-
ample 5.11, which showed Trump and Clinton in tied position (Jon Street, 
2016b). The comment reads:
The Blaze is a Progressive website CEO’d by the former president and 
CEO of The Huffington Post that’s why. Glenn Beck is a progressive Leftist 
despite all of his fraudulent lies about the Constitution and being a Con-
servative. 2008 Glenn Beck against John McCain 2012 Glenn Beck goes 
on a Jihad to keep people at home and not voting and success Obama re-
elected. 2016 Glenn Beck is outright campaigning for Hillary Corrupt Clin-
ton. The man is NOT a Conservative never has been and never will be. 
[sic]
Comment 5.15 6 September, 2016
In this case, however, both TheBlaze and Glenn Beck are the target of antago-
nistic characterisation. In the first instance, attention is drawn to TheBlaze’s 
corporate structure with the claim that TheBlaze is a “Progressive website 
CEO’d by the former president and CEO of The Huffington Post.” Alongside 
TheBlaze, Beck is likewise portrayed as a “progressive Leftist despite all of his 
fraudulent lies about the Constitution and being a Conservative.” Here, Beck is 
portrayed as guilty of wrongdoings that are seen to characterise more “liberal” 
media.
As with other examples presented here, this critique is rooted in Beck’s anti-
Trump position. Critical audience commentary characterises this stance not 
merely as a vote for Clinton, but rather as “outright campaigning for Hillary Cor-
rupt Clinton.” Regarding Beck’s conservative bona fides, then, the comment au-
thor is quite specific that Beck has never been a conservative and “never will 
be.” Unlike the previous commenter, therefore, the author of this comment as-
serts that Beck has never been a conservative, suggesting instead that Beck’s 
talk of the constitution and his conservative identification was rather a case of 
Beck inhabiting a conservative persona rather than being an actual conserva-
tive. This is one explanation proferred for Beck’s anti-Trump stance. Another is 
discussed in my analysis of comment 5.16, below. Nevertheless, as discussed 
in the previous chapter (see section 4.4 pp. 143-151), expectations regarding 
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what qualifies a person as a conservative, including ideas about the electoral 
candidates they should support, are a matter of disagreement and contestation.
Likewise commenting on Beck’s divergence from conservative standards, the 
comment in example 5.16 focuses on the wayward path of TheBlaze under 
Beck’s ownership. Posted in response to an article discussing late night host 
Jimmy Fallon’s interview with then-candidate Donald Trump (Goins-Phillips, 
2016e), the comment reads:
Lame, good link and good post! Perhaps one of the Trump children, or 
even Ailes, should purchase it from Beck and company. Then, put it back 
on a conservative even keel. Wouldn’t that be ironic. Hope Glenn turns it 
around, but think his anti-Trump psychosis needs to end. Now! Whereas, 
we know full well Hitlery is totally evil, it’s time to say give Trump a chance. 
Beck needs to have humility and confess he may be wrong. Then, if 
Trump turns out as bad as he says, then he can have bragging rights to 
scream he was right about him. However, I think Glenn is wrong on Trump, 
and it’s for a number of reasons. Is he perfect? Nope! Interestingly, it cer-
tainly seems this is what is being demanded. Rather self defeating in my 
estimation. Trump is the only viable candidate. Bottom line is #never-
hitlery; so, I am gladly voting Trump. Sorry, Glenn, you need to repent [sic]
Comment 5.16 16 September, 2016
In order to “put it back on a conservative even keel,” the comment suggests, 
TheBlaze should be purchased by one of Trump’s children or even Roger 
Ailes.  Once again, Beck’s anti-Trump stance – here termed “his anti-tTrump 36
psychosis” [sic] – is identified as a root cause of the perceived transformation of 
Beck and TheBlaze, as well as audience attitudes towards both. Likewise, this 
comment draws attention to what is at stake if Beck maintains his anti-Trump 
position. Two folk theories are thus apparent in the data that seek to explain the 
transformation of Beck and TheBlaze: one arguing that Beck was in fact never a 
conservative, but rather merely posed as one; and another which sees current 
conditions as a reaction to Trump – an example of what would come to be 
known as “Trump derangement syndrome,” usually attributed to those on the 
left (Hargreaves, 2018).
 Now deceased, but who at the time the comment was posted had recently resigned 36
as Chairman and CEO of Fox News Channel (amongst other Fox subsidiaries) follow-
ing a series of high-profile allegations of sexual harassment by female staff members.
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This comment notably features an example of the different standard to which 
Trump and Clinton were being held, a topic raised earlier in my analysis of 
comment 5.5 (pp. 160-162). In this case, whereas Trump deserves a chance, 
“we know full well Hitlery is totally evil” [sic]. This view of Hillary Clinton is given 
further stress towards the end of the comment: “Bottom line is #neverhitlery; so 
I am gladly voting Trump.” This latter provides a key perspective on support for 
Trump: given that Hillary Clinton poses a grave threat to the United States, 
Trump becomes the only viable alternative. Support for Trump thus can be seen 
not so much to consist of a positive identification with Trump as a candidate, but 
rather a vehement and frequently vitriolic rejection of his opponent, Hillary Clin-
ton. I will return to this theme in Chapter 7. Religious discourse is again palpa-
ble when it is suggested that Beck must both “confess” his errors and “repent.”
Like a number of the preceding comments, the penultimate and final examples 
were both posted in response to a story discussing Beck’s reaction to Ted Cruz 
publicly expressing his support for Donald Trump’s candidacy (Goins-Phillips, 
2016b). The comments reads:
Have to agree with a poster above, Beck is now deemed despicable. I rate 
him now even lower than Jimmy Swaggart or Jim Bakker and Tammy Fay. 
It was easy to see coming-when Glenn started sporting the tailored suits 
you knew he succumbed. For practical purposes he’s on Hillary’s payroll 
but don’t forget the payola scandal with Mark Levin et. al. We chide the 
senators and congressmen for not opposing POTUS but Beck is effective-
ly working for the left now. His empire is collapsing now, that’s what you 
get when you sell your soul. [sic]
Comment 5.17 25 September, 2016
Of course Beck is disappointed. He dedicated his whole show to defeating 
Trump, and said some downright horrible things about Trump. I am a Cruz 
fan as Beck is. I am not a Trump fan but he is our ONLY hope. If we can 
elect Trump and hold his feet to the fire, we have a chance of moving this 
country back to where it needs to be. Hillary as POTUS would be the end 
I’m afraid. At least with Trump we have a chance. I quit listening to Beck 
because his Gandhi phase quickly turned into out-right HATE of Trump. It 
got old and so negative I couldn’t listen anymore. How can anyone claim 
so much to hear from God and yet vilify his fellow man so much? Does 
Beck really trust in God, when he goes off the deep end when his political 
candidate loses? I think Beck trusts in gold and his political candidates 
more than he trusts in God. It’s really sad, because I used to be a HUGE 
Beck supporter. I still visit this site often and comment sometimes, but I will 
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probably never listen to Beck again, let alone watch the Blaze channel that 
I have access to. [sic]
Comment 5.18 23 September, 2016
Comment 5.17 features a number of thematic elements already encountered 
above. For instance, the notion that Beck is “on Hillary’s payroll” or that he is 
“effectively working for the left now.” Related to claims seen earlier that financial 
incentives govern Beck’s and TheBlaze’s editorial decision-making and political 
position, the idea of “payola" is introduced, which is defined as “undisclosed 
payments (or other inducements) which are given to bring about the inclusion 
material in broadcast programs” (Coase, 1979, p. 269). This comment asserts 
that “Beck is now deemed despicable,” with the comment author stating, “I rate 
him now even lower than Jimmy Swaggart or Jim Bakker and Tammy 
Fay” [sic].  37
The collapse of Beck’s media empire, of which TheBlaze was one component, 
was a matter of open debate in the data sample. It was also frequently an ob-
ject of derision. The collapse of his empire is raised again here, with the expla-
nation: “that’s what you get when you see your soul.” This comment thus serves 
as a further example of how critique of Beck centres on his financial motiva-
tions. However, by claiming a hidden meaning to Beck’s tailored suits, it also 
serves as an indicator of the role assumed by users as readers of signs and 
portents that reveal a deeper reality that is not only hidden beneath the content 
of media but which is also inscribed on media figures.
This final example, comment 5.18, speaks in frank terms about the sizeable 
shift that has taken place in the author’s alignment with Beck and his message. 
As with the other examples in this section, the comment draws attention to 
Beck’s anti-Trump position, although this commenter identifies Beck’s “Gandhi 
phase” as the origin of Beck’s eventual “out-right HATE of Trump.” Again, the 
 Jimmy Swaggart is an American pentecostal televangelist, who was defrocked by 37
Assemblies of God, a Pentecostal Christian denomination in the US. Jim Bakker is 
American televangelist, convicted felon, and former Assemblies of God minister. Tam-
my Faye Messner (formerly Bakker) was co-host of televangelist program The PTL 
Club with former husband, Jim Bakker. Bakker’s indictment and conviction brought no-
toriety for Messner.
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stakes of electing Hillary Clinton are made clear: “Hillary as POTUS would be 
the end.” The apocalyptic imaginaries which animate the attested electoral 
stances of users will be a focus of discussion in Chapter 7.
Whilst these are common themes, which have already been discussed at 
length, I suggest this final example is particularly notable for its elision of termi-
nology from the fields of media, politics, and sport to discuss followers of both 
media figures and politicians, e.g., “I am a Cruz fan as Beck is” and “I used to 
be a HUGE Beck supporter.” It is not simply a question of listening to Beck’s ra-
dio show or watching TheBlaze. Rather, one is a supporter of a media figure, as 
one might support a team or athlete. Likewise, one is a fan of a politician, as 
one might be a fan of a musician or celebrity. This transformation in forms of 
engagement with politics has been put forth as an explanatory factor for affec-
tive attachments to political parties (Sandvoss, 2013). Here, the importance of 
“parasocial” (D. C. Giles, 2002) factors is palpable, a matter that will be ex-
plored further in Chapter 6.
Insofar as the comment makes explicit reference to the impact that Beck’s polit-
ical stance has had on the commenter’s viewing habits, one can appreciate the 
way in which media use here is attributed political dimensions, thereby fore-
grounding media choice as a mode of political action. As TheBlaze increasingly 
is presented as oppositional media, this blending of consumer and political dis-
courses in user-generated narratives around engagement with TheBlaze be-
comes a matter of growing relevance. This is an issue I will explore further in 
the following chapter.
On review, a number of key themes are notable. First, Glenn Beck and The-
Blaze are under financial pressure, which is having an impact on editorial policy 
and decision-making. Underlying this is the assumption that Beck exercises edi-
torial decisions that shape the institutional content of TheBlaze. Second, Glenn 
Beck is an accessory to the establishment and is motivated by money, whether 
due to the aforementioned financial pressures or for other reasons. Third, 
Beck’s prominent anti-Trump stance is reflected more broadly in TheBlaze con-
tent, and this is having an impact on audience engagement at a time when 
Trump’s status in the Republican party became evermore established and dom-
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inant. Here political perspectives are discussed in terms of consumer behaviour 
such that, in the context of an increasingly partisan media environment, pat-
terns of media use acquire political significance. This will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 6. Finally, Beck’s anti-Trump stance has important po-
litical implications in terms of the possibility of electing Hillary Clinton. What is at 
stake is not merely a single election but the fate of the entire nation. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. 
The data in this section show that, just as conservative identity is open to con-
testation and negotiation in user-generated media discourse, as discussed in 
Chapter 4, so too are the audience capable of debate and disagreement over 
the very distinction between oppositional and congruent media. In particular, 
commenters have the capacity to appropriate the rhetorical frameworks of out-
rage discourse and redirect them at media they view as insufficiently conserva-
tive. In the final examples presented here, for example, Beck and his media 
empire are re-articulated as the target of oppositional media hostility. Whilst 
Arceneaux et al (2012) have postulated that media figures support ideological 
positions that are attractive to their target audience, a gap emerges in the con-
text of a divisive and contested primary, like the one that took place during 
2016. Appropriating and redeploying the rhetorical frameworks of outrage is one 
means via which commenters can seek to assert their own role within the 
hegemonic struggle to define contemporary American conservatism. In the fol-
lowing chapter, I will discuss this transformation of audience attitudes in greater 
detail, relating the shifting views of commenters about Beck and TheBlaze to 
their explicitly expressed understandings regarding their own media use.
5.5 Conclusion: performing audience opposition to 
“hostile" media
In this chapter, I have sought to further my argument that affective polarisation 
usefully can be viewed as a discursive product and manifestation of antagonism 
(Laclau, 2005; Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Mouffe, 2005). Insofar as antagonism 
provides a framework for thinking about the ontology of oppositional identities, I 
see it as an important analytical tool for articulating a qualitative account of af-
fective polarisation. As discussed in the previous chapter, a focus on participa-
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tion in “real-world” interactions can help to draw out some of the dynamic and 
contingent elements of identity/alterity distinctions. In this chapter, I have 
demonstrated that the same holds true for characterisations of media outlets, 
figures, and content. In so doing, I have focused on three central problematics. 
First, I outlined how a notion of “the media” is articulated through a focus on the 
discursive collapse of various categories of media by commenters and right-
wing media figures. Focusing specifically on the elision of mainstream and lib-
eral media, I argued that by collapsing the categories of oppositional and neu-
tral media under such figures as “the media” and “liberal media,” perceptions of 
media bias apply in broad terms. The discursive construction of “the media” was 
also demonstrated to rely on populist themes deriding a corrupt establishment – 
what Laclau (2005) terms “the power block” – thereby catalysing an anti-politi-
cal-establishment movement (Schedler, 1996) within the Republican party and 
its voter base. 
Second, this collapse of categories was explained with reference to the concept 
of hostile media perceptions, in which all media apart from congruent media are 
viewed by strong partisans as hostile. By focusing on specific claims of media 
bias in user-generated commentary, I argued that a qualitative approach draw-
ing on the concept of antagonism can help to illuminate the dynamic character 
of oppositional media hostility. In that regard, through my discussion of the 
manner in which commenters present themselves as qualified interpreters of 
media obfuscations, I here demonstrated the central role of contestatory per-
formance in articulating a definition of oppositional media.
Third, I argued that the boundaries of what constitutes counterattitudinal and 
likeminded media are contingent and discursively constituted figurations. As 
such, these categories are open to public negotiation in the online political talk 
of commenters. In a hybrid and high-choice media environment, a variety of ac-
tors vie for dominion in defining the boundaries of contemporary American con-
servatism. This includes media figures and media users alike. Thus, whilst au-
dience approaches to defining media as oppositional may share generic char-
acteristics with the content of outrage-based political opinion media, insofar as 
they similarly draw on outrageous characterisations of difference, it is also pos-
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sible for them to be articulated in contradictory ways. Thus, whilst Glenn Beck 
and TheBlaze may articulate an antagonistic frontier between conservative me-
dia and the so-called “liberal media” or mainstream media, they are themselves 
the focus of outrage voiced by users. In this way, ostensibly congruent media 
can be classified under the terms of opposition for the political and participatory 
ends of commenters.
In Chapter 2, I referred to Bird’s (1998) contention that audiences should be 
viewed as active participants in producing markets for media content. Here, my 
analysis has revealed how commenters participate not only in building a market. 
Rather, their participation in partisan media also contributes formatively to con-
testing the boundaries of American conservatism. However, as has been 
shown, the ways in which commenters engage with antagonistic models of 
identity and associated partisan media bias, as well as the tropes on which 
those models rest, are complex and nuanced. 
Whilst media selectivity may induce fears regarding the effects of political ho-
mophily in a digital media environment, as discussed in Chapter 2, those fears 
should be set against actual empirical explorations of how audiences use media 
as “resources” (Chadwick et al., 2018b). This is a topic to which I will turn in the 
next chapter, as I examine how commenters attribute political and economic 
significance to their choice of media. 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Chapter 6: Audience commentary on media 
choice
6.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on how commenters imbue media choice with political and 
economic significance in user-generated below-the-line commentary. In the pre-
vious two chapters, I discussed some of the ways in which commenters use the 
public performance of antagonism to discursively contest the boundaries of 
American conservatism in a high-choice media environment that is charac-
terised by the wide availability of partisan content (Prior, 2007). In so doing, I 
showed how the antagonistic characterisations of political parties, politicians, 
and partisans I outlined in Chapter 4 are also expressed in attitudes towards 
media outlets, figures, and content. In Chapter 5, I further established that 
commenters actively participate in the disputed redefinition of TheBlaze and 
Glenn Beck as oppositional. My analysis demonstrated the role of affective fac-
tors in expressions of perceived media bias, particularly the centrality of identity 
to the contested definition of oppositional media. Employing the concept of polit-
ical consumerism (de Zúñiga, Copeland, & Bimber, 2013b; Stolle et al., 2005), 
outlined in greater detail in Chapter 2, I here further this analysis by looking in 
greater depth at how commenters use below-the-line commentary to discursive-
ly construct their media use as a mode of political-civic engagement through 
commercialised partisan media.
First, I will offer an overview of how commenters’ relation with Glenn Beck and 
TheBlaze is seen to undergo a significant transformation, particularly in the con-
text of Beck’s failure to support Donald Trump’s candidacy in the 2016 US pres-
idential election. Here, I will highlight the manner in which participatory media 
facilitate the public expression of attitudes towards – and judgments about – 
media in user-generated below-the-line commentary. Second, I will demonstrate 
how Beck’s contentious stance regarding Trump serves as a potent resource for 
user commentary on the decision to engage with or disengage from both Glenn 
Beck and TheBlaze. Finally, I will outline some of the imagined political and 
economic outcomes users attribute to their media choice. Here, I will relate mo-
tivated tuning out of users to other prominent actions targeting rightwing media 
	 	 183
figures and outlets. In so doing, I will frame the political significance of selective 
exposure to – and participation in – partisan media in terms of the buycott/boy-
cott distinction (Baek, 2010; M. Friedman, 1996; Neilson, 2010). Driven by the 
data, this chapter refers to the related concepts of political consumerism and 
political prosumption as a framework for understanding how media users pub-
licly discuss their choice of media. However, by focusing on the partisan produc-
tion of user-generated content, it also considers how audience produsers 
(Bruns, 2009) constitute the meaning of their actions in computer-mediated dis-
course.
6.2 The changing relation between TheBlaze and its 
audience
As has already been established, the empirical focus of this thesis is the below-
the-line comment field at TheBlaze.com, where “below-the-line” is industry ter-
minology for “comment and debate spaces opened up underneath news articles 
and blogs” (Graham & Wright, 2015, p. 319). As discussed in Chapter 1 (see 
section 1.2.1 pp. 18-26), Graham and Wright (2015) posit that this framing of 
comment fields can be seen to demarcate a clear distinction between user-
generated content and the formal outputs of journalists and other professional 
staff.  Nevertheless, media serve as resources upon which audiences can 38
draw in the production of user-generated content (Chadwick et al., 2018b). In-
deed, as argued earlier, the above-the-line outputs of professionals can serve 
as motors for uncivil responses by audiences (Coe et al., 2014).
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 (see sections 1.2.1 pp. 18-26, 2.3.2 pp. 
68-71, and 2.3.3 pp. 71-75), an increasing level of attention is being paid to the 
democratic role and social impacts of participatory media, including the potential 
for below-the-line comment fields to serve as a space for deliberation 
(Dahlberg, 2011) and other modes of political-civic engagement, such as politi-
cal consumerism (Gotlieb & Cheema, 2017). However, at the same time as be-
 Whilst Beck has sought to characterise TheBlaze as a journalistic enterprise (see 38
section 1.2.2 pp. 27-32), this distinction between users and professionals is somewhat 
problematised in this case by its status as a cross-platform media enterprise that relies 
in important ways on audience labour, as well as the labour of conservative political 
movements and activists (see Jutel, 2018).
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low-the-line comments fields increasingly constitute an important venue for in-
ternet-mediated political discussion they also provide a public mechanism for 
users to openly discuss their response(s) to the content of both above-the-line 
and below-the-line media. In this section, I will discuss the use of the comment 
field as a means for users to offer a critique of media by focusing on the trans-
formation in the relation between TheBlaze and its audience.
Examples offered in the previous chapter primarily referred to Beck in the third 
person. However, a significant portion of the sample shows users frequently 
addressing Beck in the second person, implying a two-way conversation. All the 
examples presented in this section demonstrate this mode of address. In that 
regard, it is worth bearing in mind the structure of TheBlaze as a multi-platform 
media outlet, which I outlined in greater detail in Chapter 1. Glenn Beck plays a 
prominent role in his eponymous The Glenn Beck Program, which at the time of 
data collection was broadcast daily via TheBlazeTV and as a radio broadcast. 
Beck also frequently links to news and opinion items from TheBlaze.com via his 
own website GlennBeck.com. However, Beck is seldom listed as an author of 
articles on TheBlaze. In fact, none of the items in my sample are listed as au-
thored by Beck.  The examples presented in this section, and this chapter, 39
should be construed in the context of this framework. 
I begin my discussion of how users depict their changing relation with Beck and 
TheBlaze with a comment posted to an article discussing James Comey’s deci-
sion to publicly announce the reopening of the Clinton email investigation in Oc-
tober 2016 (Goins-Phillips, 2016a). The comment reads:
Glenn Beck you're a disgrace! I listened to your radio show today and it 
was more of a Hillary Clinton campaign infomercial than even CNN & 
MSNBC combined. Everything in the first 1 1/2 hours was Hillary Clinton 
campaign talking points. So now according to Beck the 'TeaParty' are a 
bunch of racists, Ted Cruz is a racist, alt right this and alt right that and if 
you don't agree with Beck's clearly LEFTIST talking points that he re-
ceived directly from the HRC campaign then you're a right wing racist. 
Glenn Beck you're NOT a Conservative, you're a LIAR, a phony, a fraud , 
a fake and a charlatan. You're everything that is wrong with the media in 
this country. You're a committed Democrat Leftist and an uber Progres-
sive. It amazes me that anyone that may have been a Conservative or a 
 See source classification sheet in the Appendix (p. 277).39
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right winger in their thinking prior to meeting Glenn Beck can possibly still 
be listening to this dangerous brainwashing snake oil salesman. You ought 
to be ashamed of yourself Glenn Beck fighting for and supporting such a 
corrupt crook in Hillary Clinton that has sold 20% of our strategic uranium 
stockpiles to Vladimir Putin's Russia of all people. Go ahead ands down 
vote me all you want but one day you will see I was 100% correct. [sic]
Comment 6.1 29 October, 2016
This comment once again highlights a number of themes that were already 
raised in the previous chapter – primarily the notion that Beck and TheBlaze are 
operating on behalf of Hillary Clinton. In this case, the author asserts that Beck 
is serving the ends of Clinton’s campaign to a greater extent than traditionally 
left-leaning outlets or those characterised as “liberal” within right-wing discours-
es, classing Beck’s radio show as “more of a Hillary Clinton campaign infomer-
cial than even CNN & MSNBC combined.” As in the previous chapter, collusion 
between the “liberal media” and Clinton’s campaign is portrayed as an estab-
lished fact.
Whilst this comment explicitly and effusively sets out an antagonistic frontier be-
tween conservatism and its opponents, it also openly criticises Beck for the way 
in which his commentary supposedly performs a similar antagonistic function. In 
the case of Beck, however, it is asserted that his position is critical of the right, 
noting Beck’s “clearly LEFTIST talking points.” In this way, the comment author 
sets out a deeply critical appraisal not only of Beck’s electoral stance, but also 
the political character of his role as a prominent media figure. At the same time, 
however, the antagonistic dimensions of the comment author’s own contribution 
are neither highlighted nor discussed. This comment is notable for its hyperbole, 
a key dimension of outrage discourse as defined by Berry & Sobieraj (2013). 
In the previous chapter, examples were presented to demonstrate how Beck 
and TheBlaze are being re-cast by commenters as oppositional media. This 
trend is further evidenced here. In the case of comment 6.1, Beck is not merely 
claimed to be a “LIAR, a phony, a fraud, a fake and a charlatan,” but also 
“everything that is wrong with he media in this country,” as well as “a committed 
Democrat Leftist and an uber Progressive.” Beck’s role in promoting Clinton’s 
candidacy is stated firmly with the declaration that Beck “ought to be ashamed” 
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for “fighting for and supporting” Hillary Clinton’s candidacy. Clinton is here 
classed as a “corrupt crook,” with the explanation being that she has “sold 20% 
of our strategic uranium stockpiles to Vladimir Putin's Russia of all people.”40
The user ends the comment with a shift away from Beck to address the audi-
ence directly. Foreseeing a negative response to their highly critical comment, 
they write: “Go ahead ands down vote me all you want but one day you will see 
I was 100% correct” [sic]. This shift in “footing” (Goffman, 1981) is illuminating. 
Research has shown that a notion of the audience and its makeup is salient in 
the minds of users when they are online (Dvir-Gvirsman, 2016). In this case, 
that awareness is encoded in computer-mediated discourse, highlighting the 
fact that the comment is indeed directed towards the audience as active (yet 
largely imagined) participants in the exchange. What is notable in this case, 
however, is that the comment author indicates their assumption that the audi-
ence will be against them, thus indicating an expectation of a misalignment be-
tween audience and user. Whilst for the most part the comment is scripted as 
though directed at Beck himself, this final sentence indicates a salient concep-
tualisation of the “participation framework” (Goffman, 1981) of the exchange on 
the part of participants. Furthermore, the theme of prognostication indicated in 
this final sentence is an important feature of the sample that will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter 7.
As with all the remaining examples in this section, comment 6.2 was posted in 
response to a September 2016 article discussing Glenn Beck’s reaction to Ted 
Cruz stating his public support for Donald Trump’s candidacy (Goins-Phillips, 
2016b). The comment reads:
Yes, Glenn, by all means "Go to the Mountains for a while." Shame on you 
for being so HARDNOSED AND UNFORGIVING. I am extremely disap-
pointed in you and your LIES. You have once again proven you are not for 
LOVE AND FORGIVNESS. YOU ARE NOT CHRISTIAN, Jesus instructed 
 This refers to a widely circulated claim that Hillary Clinton was involved in a conspir40 -
acy to sell “roughly 20 percent of America’s uranium supply to Russia in exchange for 
$145 million in donations to the Clinton Foundation” (Putterman, 2018). Whilst Politi-
Fact have labeled this claim “mostly false” (Putterman, 2018), the conspiracy was 
propagated extensively by right-wing media (Dagnes, 2019). This reference highlights 
the manner in which media discourse beyond the current discourse context can serve 
as a resource for audiences.
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YOU to forgive 70 x 7. Are you above Jesus? Uhmmmmmmmmmm YES 
in your mind. Proverbs 14:12, Glenn read and and soak it in. "There is a 
way which seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of 
death." Did you notice where it says "a" man? You are that man. Shame 
on you. Be careful on that mountain, so you don’t slip. You are SICKEN-
ING!!! [sic]
Comment 6.2 24 September, 2016
Research has demonstrated a number of key factors that influence modes of 
participation in below-the-line commentary among readers of online news 
(Tsagkias, Weerkamp, & De Rijke, 2009), but there are also demonstrated 
forms of interplay between content produced by professional journalists and 
user-generated reader comments (Weber, 2013). In particular, when a topic is 
already on the news agenda, readers are likely to have developed an opinion 
(Weber, 2013) and are therefore more likely to be motivated to respond (Di-
akopoulos & Naaman, 2011). Comment 6.2 serves as a key example of this 
trend. However, topicality of news content is important not only in terms of gen-
erating responses but also in terms of influencing the kind of content that ap-
pears in below-the-line commentary (Diakopoulos & Naaman, 2011). 
In that regard, whilst the previous example referred to widely circulated claims 
about Hillary Clinton’s supposed corruption, comment 6.2 more explicitly draws 
on the content of the article to which it is responding. The statement “Yes, 
Glenn, by all means ‘Go to the Mountains for a while’” refers specifically to the 
content of the above-the-line content to which the comment is responding and 
which itself cites a 23 September, 2016 Facebook post by Glenn Beck immedi-
ately following Ted Cruz’s public statement in which Beck states: “Profoundly 
sad day for me. Disappointment does not begin to describe. Maybe it is time to 
go to the mountains for a while” (see G. Beck, 2016). In this way, it is possible 
to appreciate how readers can draw explicitly on news content as a resource for 
their own participation.
The comment is also notable for its deployment of religious themes, with the 
user drawing explicitly on religious discourse and resources. Most notably, the 
comment author refers to the Bible, citing Proverbs 14:12: “There is a way 
which seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death.” It 
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is asserted that Beck is the referent of this verse, implying that Beck’s stance is 
damnable. Whilst in example 6.1 the central point being made was that Beck is 
not a conservative, here the more specific claim is rather that Beck’s talk about 
politics indicates that he is not in fact a Christian. The articulation of American 
conservatism as fundamentally Christian, which I outlined in Chapter 4, is here 
noteworthy. In both cases, however, Beck is admonished for the shame that he 
should feel as a result of his anti-Trump positioning.
Whereas the two previous examples situate the problem with Beck’s position in 
terms of the 2016 election cycle, example 6.3 proposes a more long-term trend 
in Beck’s orientation towards the political establishment in presidential cam-
paigns. The comment reads: 
Glenn - your chickens have come home to roost! For 2 presidential runs 
you mocked constitutional candidate Ron Paul and supported establish-
ment candidates - John McCain and then Mitt Romney! You also had a 
brief affair with Sweater Vest candidate - Rick whats-his name .... sheesh 41
- you really pick the dumbest people! I feel bad for you but this is a bed 
you made! [sic]
Comment 6.3 23 September, 2016
A distinction is here drawn between a “constitutional candidate” and “establish-
ment candidates.” In this case, Ron Paul is characterised as a constitutional 
candidate who was purportedly “mocked" by Beck for “2 presidential runs.” On 
the other hand, the comment author asserts that Beck “supported establishment 
candidates” John McCain and Mitt Romney, who were the Republican candi-
dates during the two presidential campaigns immediately prior to 2016, as well 
as Rick Santorum, who was an unsuccessful candidate for the Republican nom-
ination on more than one occasion. Drawing on this opposition between consti-
tutionalists and the establishment,  the comment highlights Beck’s propensity 42
to stump for the wrong candidate: “sheesh - you really pick the dumbest 
 This comment refers to former Republican Senator and presidential hopeful Rick 41
Santorum. Santorum became widely known for wearing sleeveless sweaters, with 
Rick’s sweater vest at one point going “viral,” with dedicated parody accounts on Twit-
ter and Tumblr (Gross, 2012).
 See Chapters 4 and 5 for further discussion of how the opposition between conser42 -
vatism and the political establishment is represented.
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people!” The centrality of the US Constitution to the contested definition of 
American conservatism will be a primary focus of my analysis in Chapter 7.
Whilst example 6.3 draws attention to a broader timeframe for Beck’s misjudg-
ments, comment 6.4 situates the user’s contemporary shift in attitude towards 
Beck in the context of a set of milestones in Beck’s career since leaving Fox 
News Channel in 2011. The comment reads:
Glenn From the day you left fox I subscribed to the Blaze and when the 
channel came on Dish I also supported you through that also But you have 
lost me now I turn it on and all I hear is Trump bashing from you Stu and 
Pat I don’t like Trump or love Trump but it is all I have It is a binary election 
only 2 choices now and I am definitely not voting for Hillary Trump is not 
even close to Cruz which is also whom I voted for but my God you have 
really lost it At least he has a couple of good things anti abortion and im-
migration right she has nothing right I remember when your show was 
about God and not about bashing Trump was about the Constitution the 
people Looks like Mark Levin is my new Glenn Beck he at least is rational 
about the situation You have lost me [sic]
Comment 6.4 23 September, 2016
Here, again, there is a noted ambivalence regarding Donald Trump’s candidacy: 
“I don’t like Trump or love Trump but it is all I have.” However, the characterisa-
tion of the election as “binary” is important. The comment author asserts, there 
are “only 2 choices now and I am definitely not voting for Hillary,” even if “Trump 
is not even close to Cruz.” This notion of a binary election calls to mind the an-
tagonisms that have been the focus of this and preceding chapters. It will con-
stitute a central focus of Chapter 7 (see section 7.3 pp. 233-241). Similarly, the 
assertion “I remember when your show was about God and not about bashing 
Trump was about the Constitution the people” foregrounds some of the key fea-
tures of Beck’s productions that attracted the user: God, the Constitution, and 
the people. This comment once again highlights the relation between Christiani-
ty and conservatism. However, with its focus on “the people,” it also features 
important populist elements.
One of the more significant factors to consider here is the claim that Beck’s 
“Trump bashing” is having an impact on the user’s engagement, such that 
Beck’s anti-Trump stance, as a media figure speaking through the cross-plat-
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form constellation of media that is TheBlaze, is foregrounded not only as a key 
factor in a transformation of the user’s perception of Beck and his colleagues 
and co-hosts (i.e., “you Stu and Pat” [sic]), but also in a stipulated shift in their 
stated rituals of media use: “Looks like Mark Levin is my new Glenn Beck.” It is 
noteworthy that the user characterises Mark Levin as “rational about the situa-
tion,” given Levin’s conspicuous switch from being a one-time prominent Never-
Trump voice to a reluctant supporter once Trump had secured the Republican 
nomination.  In the context of the comment author’s explicitly articulated loyalty 43
as a supporter and a subscriber (i.e., consumer/prosumer but also, crucially, 
customer who has paid for these services), this statement regarding a change 
in media choice acquires greater weight. The comparison of Beck to Mark Levin 
will receive greater attention in the following section. 
The comment in example 6.5 also highlights Beck’s relation with Pat Gray and 
Stu Burguiere  who, at the time, served as co-hosts of The Glenn Beck Pro44 -
gram. The comment reads:
This is so Funny - your mind control of Pat and Stu has been abruptly in-
terrupted by Ted Cruz's endorsement. Glenn what are you going to report 
to the Hillary camp now? Lots of replies on this story - Glenn give it up. 
[sic]
Comment 6.5 23 September, 2016
Here, it is suggested that Beck’s continued resistance to Trump’s candidacy in 
the context of Ted Cruz’s endorsement of Trump has “abruptly interrupted” 
Beck’s “mind control of Pat and Stu.” The use of the term “mind control” here is 
 Levin’s statement of support for Trump’s candidacy on September 6, 2016 also de43 -
ployed the figure of a binary election. He stated: "I think this is a binary election – at 
least for the country – that either Trump or Clinton will be president of the United 
States. I happen to think despite the CNN poll and so forth there is a lot of work to do 
to make up ground, particularly in battleground states. But Hillary is so awful I just don't 
know. I'm not in the prediction business so it doesn't matter. So I'm going to vote for 
Donald Trump” (I. Schwarz, 2016). More recently, both Beck and Levin have been 
more effusive in their support for Trump. However, the dynamics of that development 
are beyond the scope of this discussion and this thesis.
 Pat Gray and Stu Burguiere were Beck’s co-hosts on The Glenn Beck Program. 44
Gray served as co-host from 2009 until 2017. Burguiere continues to serve as execu-
tive producer, head writer, and occasional co-host of The Glenn Beck Program. Both 
Gray and Burguiere were also formerly joint co-hosts of The Pat & Stu Show on The-
BlazeTV, which was cancelled in January 2017.
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telling, insofar as it indicates some understanding on the part of the user that 
Beck is actively shaping not only his own performance, but those of his col-
leagues. That is also the kind of influence that was the focus of a number of ex-
amples in the previous chapter when discussing audience understandings of 
Beck’s impact on the editorial policies and decision-making practices that shape 
the various forms of content produced and circulated by TheBlaze.
The first example in this section demonstrated a shift in alignment from Beck to 
the audience, indicating a set of speaker assumptions regarding the participa-
tion frameworks of below-the-line commentary. Even when explicitly addressed 
to Beck, comments can thus be read as implicitly oriented towards the audi-
ence. In this example, the comment author also highlights the role of the audi-
ence. However, in this case, the focus is not on the audience as an explicit ob-
ject of address but rather as active produsers of commentary themselves, e.g., 
“Lots of replies on this story.” Bearing in mind that this single comment thread 
constitutes more than 20 percent of the sample, this comment stipulates what 
that level of response signifies, i.e., Beck needs to change course regarding his 
anti-Trump viewpoint: “Glenn give it up.”
This section’s final comment is another important example of a user highlighting 
a transformation in their perception of Beck by drawing attention to their history 
as a follower of his productions. The comment reads:
 
Glenn Beck let me explain to you why people like me who followed you 
and trusted yhou for years now despise you: 1). You claim to be standing 
alone against Trump "to supposedly save the country". You do not stand 
alone and are not trying to save anything but Hillary Clinton’s campaign. 
You stand with the Republican establishment, the Democrat party estab-
lishment, the media MSM establishment, Ben Sasse, Jeff Flake & Mittens 
Romney (the poorest excuse for a human being ever invented). You stand 
with 99.9% of Leftist Hollywood NYT, HuffPost, ABC, NBC, CBS, NPR, 
Washington Post, MSNBC, and the worst of them all CNN and the list 
goes on and on and on and on. And you want to know what all of those 
groups and people you stand with have in common? We the voters de-
spise them, we despise them all, we despise their LIES, we despise their 
political correctness scam, we despise their Leftist "Progressive" policies & 
ideology we despise them And you stand with ALL of them and then some. 
So figure it out yourself once you wiped the sticky Cheetos off of your 
face. [sic]
Comment 6.6 23 September, 2016
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This comment makes clear that it is not merely a case of shifting alignments but 
rather one of broken trust between Beck and his audience.  Whilst Beck may 45
present himself as “standing alone against Trump ‘to supposedly save the coun-
try,’” the user refutes this claim, arguing “You do not stand alone and are not try-
ing to save anything but Hillary Clinton’s campaign” – a statement which echoes 
an antagonistic characterisation of Beck that is prevalent throughout the sample 
and which was outlined in greater detail in the previous chapter in my discus-
sion of the role of commenters in defining the boundaries of likeminded and 
counterattitudinal media.
Rather than standing alone, the user claims, Beck is instead aligned with an ar-
ray of “establishment” individuals, groups, and organisations. The comment 
characterises these individuals, groups, and organisations in strident terms, 
rhetorically asking, “And you want to know what all of those groups and people 
you stand with have in common?” Here, the comment author provides an affect-
laden depiction of their commonalities, as well as audience sentiment: “We the 
voters despise them, we despise them all, we despise their LIES, we despise 
their political correctness scam, we despise their Leftist "Progressive" policies & 
ideology.” 
One of the more notable features of the comment is the element “We the 
voters.” The expectations this statement demonstrates regarding the constitu-
tion of the audience differs starkly from the example provided in comment 6.1, 
where the user asserted themselves an outlier and not of a mind with the audi-
ence that were expected to engage with the comment. In the context of the 
opening sentence of comment 6.6, which claims to align the user with a pur-
portedly disaffected audience, “We the voters” has the effect of aligning that au-
dience with the voting citizenry. This rhetorical act situates the audience’s media 
choice in terms of democratic participation, thereby underlining its political sig-
nificance. The content of the story as well as the messaging of Beck’s broader 
productions thus serve as resources for the comment author’s attribution of 
meaning to their behaviour as media users. 
 A counterpoint will be presented in the following section, with an analysis of some 45
comments expressing support for Beck’s position.
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In closing, the comment provides a further example of media being used as a 
resource, with the user writing, “So figure it out yourself once you wiped the 
sticky Cheetos off of your face.” This refers to a segment of the 29 April 2016 
episode of The Glenn Beck Program during which Beck and his co-hosts coated 
their faces in crushed Cheetos in order to mock Donald Trump’s skin tone. This 
comment thus presents its author as a skilled and knowledgeable acolyte of 
Beck’s outputs, thus lending weight to their critique.
To underline the relevance of these data in the context of the current argument, 
one of the main indications is the manner in which Beck’s contentious stance 
regarding Trump’s candidacy serves as a potent resource for below-the-line 
contributions posted by commenters. However, these comments are not limited 
to a focus on the democratic role of Beck’s position – and, by extension, the 
democratic role of TheBlaze. Rather, they also serve as a resource for argu-
ments around the implications of Beck’s stance in terms of declared transforma-
tions in commenters’ media practices, i.e., their choice to engage with or disen-
gage from both Beck and TheBlaze. These changing media practices are fre-
quently linked directly to Glenn Beck/TheBlaze's perceived shift towards a 
counterattitudinal stance in the context of the 2016 election – a shift which is 
presented as fundamental to the contested redefinition of Glenn Beck and The-
Blaze as oppositional media. The impact on users’ media practices will be the 
focus of my analysis in the following section.
6.3 Tuning in and out of hybrid media
As noted above, media selectivity is a salient feature of commentary within my 
data set, with a preponderance of material explicitly focusing on the choice of 
users both to tune in and to tune out of various kinds of media. Media choice is 
presented in explicitly partisan terms. Whilst the literature on selective exposure 
that was discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 currently provides the domi-
nant framework for analysing the political implications of media selectivity, the-
matic analysis of user-generated commentary demonstrates that commenters 
also attribute economic significance to their media use. The concept of political 
consumerism thus also offers a means of examining how users talk about their 
	 	 194
choice choice to engage with specific media outlets, figures, and content. Fur-
thermore, in a hybrid media environment, this is something that can be explicitly 
encoded in user-generated commentary. In this section, I focus on the ways in 
which users draw on media as a resource in discussing the significance of their 
own media use, demonstrating the relevance of the concepts of political con-
sumerism and political prosumption in the context of my dataset.46
The first two comments presented as examples in this section serve as a coun-
terpoint to the predominantly negative appraisals of Beck and TheBlaze that 
have thus far been presented and discussed. The first example follows on from 
the examples offered in the previous section by addressing Beck in the second 
person. The comment reads:
Love you Glenn; love you all like brothers (yes, you too, Jeffy). And Cruz/
Carson, to me, would’ve been the perfect ticket, but it wasn’t to be. It’s pol-
itics, and I will vote for the Republican nominee. I respect the will of the 
people, who went out in droves to vote for Trump. I respect that; I trust it. 
Period. I am also a man of principle, but I have a hard time squaring your 
decision not to support Trump with reality. But I’ll keep listening to you, as 
I’ve done for years; as I said, like brothers. [sic]
Comment 6.7 23 September, 2016
As with example 6.1, however, the post simultaneously targets Beck and the 
broader audience in an explicit, albeit highly gendered, manner: "love you all 
like brothers.” Whilst the user is not entirely happy about Trump’s selection 
(“Cruz/Carson, to me, would’ve been the perfect ticket, but it wasn’t to be”), their 
expressed electoral stance is nevertheless shaped by the strength of their at-
tachment to the Republican ticket: “It’s politics, and I will vote for the Republican 
nominee.” Many commenters express this perspective, framing a Clinton win as 
unconscionable and demanding any necessary tactic in order to stop her. I will 
discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 7. However, whilst voicing support for 
the Republican nominee because “it’s politics,” many commenters are none-
theless extremely critical of the Republican establishment, speaking to an ap-
 This current discussion focuses on how users articulate the meaning of media 46
choice. See section 2.3.3 pp. 71-75 for a critique of political consumerism as a mode of 
participation.
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parent rupture between conservatism and Republican elites that has already 
been highlighted elsewhere in this thesis (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
In the case of Ted Cruz, the relation with the Republican establishment appears 
somewhat fraught, given his status as a notable anti-establishment conservative 
and a key figure in the Tea Party movement, who was elected to the US Senate 
in the 2012 elections thanks in part to the work of Tea Party activists.  The con47 -
flict between support for an established “anti-establishment” candidate and a 
newly entrenched establishment stance (i.e., support for Trump) is downplayed. 
The statement “It’s politics” highlights the need to come to a decision, once 
more raising the theme of a binary election, although implicitly.  In this case, 48
that decision is to revert to the Republican offering. Here, an opposition is set 
out between principle and reality-based reason. Whilst the user identifies as 
“also a man of principle,” the implication is that more important considerations 
are in play than mere principle, and this requires alignment with the Republican 
agenda. Beck’s failure to follow this logic leaves the user confounded: “I have a 
hard time squaring your decision not to support Trump with reality.” 
Nevertheless, in spite of this stated disagreement in terms of Beck’s continued 
anti-Trump stance, the user’s expressed choice to tune in is not affected: “I’ll 
keep listening to you, as I’ve done for years.” In terms of the boycott/buycott dis-
tinction, this stated support for Beck can be seen as a form of buycott, i.e., 
“supporting businesses that exhibit desirable behaviour” (Neilson, 2010, p. 
214), in spite of the user’s stated ambivalence regarding Beck’s logic in refusing 
to support Trump. Indeed, a central argument in this chapter is that the practice 
of selective exposure to likeminded commercial media can be construed in 
 Cruz has been widely referred to as a “Tea-Party favourite” (Koppel, 2012).47
 By way of comparison, previous Republican candidates for the Presidency are men48 -
tioned in the data, although no such comments indicate how a user viewed the candi-
date at the time or how they voted. For example, John McCain is quoted in an article 
from my data set which outlined Donald Trump’s choice of Rex Tillerson for the role of 
Secretary of State (Enloe, 2016a). This quote serves as a prompt for an array of re-
sponses from users, many of them echoing Donald Trump’s own attack on McCain, in 
which he claimed he was "not a war hero,” as he had been captured (Schreckinger, 
2015). One commenter speaks in deeply antagonistic terms about McCain, arguing 
that his failure to "vanquish a mere Senator who had no executive leadership experi-
ence whatsoever” in the 2008 election was due to his fear of being labelled a racist for 
criticising then-candidate “Barack The Hussein” Obama.
	 	 196
terms of this key distinction in the literature on political consumerism. As noted 
above, this is a conceptual choice that is motivated by the data.
In that regard, the author of comment 6.8 questions why a user who expresses 
a negative view of Beck would engage with his material through an array of 
media practices across platforms and modalities. This comment highlights the 
“transmediality” (Bateman, 2017) of Beck’s operation as well as the engage-
ment of his audience. The comment reads:
If you hate Glenn Beck so much, why do you spend the time on his site, 
listening to his show, reading his posts, etc? Why? Go post happy 
thoughts on Breitbart or Hannity's site. Be happy there instead of angry 
here. But I have a feeling you'll continue to troll away, cause that's what 
you do. Weak. [sic]
Comment 6.8 25 September, 2016
The opening sentence highlights, in the first instance, the kinds of media and 
information repertoires (Ferguson & Perse, 2000; Reagan, 1996; Yuan, 2011) 
that obtain in the cross-platform behaviours that are characteristic of the con-
temporary media environment. An alternative media choice is offered, one 
which elaborates a partial classification of the right-wing media ecology within 
which TheBlaze is seen to operate: “Go post happy thoughts on Breitbart or 
Hannity's site.”  By admonishing another user to be “happy there instead of 49
angry here,” the comment author seeks to patrol the affective character of user-
generated discourse on the site. In effect, this comment serves to question why 
a user would choose to engage in selective exposure to what Knobloch-West-
erwick (2015, p. 973) terms “attitude-discrepant messages.” Importantly, whilst 
there is little mention in the data of positive, congruent media, this comment ex-
plicitly focuses on other right-wing media in negative terms.
 At the time comment 6.8 was posted to TheBlaze.com, Breitbart News was notably 49
aligned with the Trump campaign, with co-founder Steve Bannon being named Chief 
Executive Officer of Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign in August 2016. Bannon 
would later join the Trump administration as Trump’s Chief Strategist, making Bannon a 
Senior Advisor to the President. Likewise, the Fox News Channel and conservative talk 
radio personality Sean Hannity was a noted supporter of Trump, both during the elec-
tion and throughout Trump’s eventual presidency.
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Nevertheless, the user doubts this admonishment will have any impact, sug-
gesting the user being addressed will “continue to troll away, cause that's what 
you do. Weak.” This statement delegitimates the target’s contributions to the 
comment thread. Furthermore, by referring to speech as “trolling” (Hardaker, 
2010), the comment author highlights the problematic nature of negative or un-
civil contributions.  This comment thus articulates a set of judgments not only 50
around forms of participation, but also their proper place on the site as well as 
within the broader landscape of American conservative media. In so doing, it 
publicly sets out claims not only about who should and should not be tuning in, 
but also who should and should not be participating in the production of user-
generated content.
Whilst comments 6.7 and 6.8 served as an illustration of the ongoing support 
that Beck enjoyed among some audience segments, comment 6.9 once more 
demonstrates an antagonistic reading of Beck’s electoral stance and media 
content. As with many earlier examples, Beck is characterised in outrageous 
terms using insulting language, with the user describing him as “not a good hu-
man” and “a shill for the Globalists.” The comment reads:
Seriously you give Beck the benefit of the doubt. Beck is not a good hu-
man and he's a shill for the Globalists... If you listen closely over the past 
several years his big issue is tolerance and promoting a so called brother-
hood of mankind which some refer to as Babylonian Multiculturalism. Beck 
is a degenerate. Listen to his prideful rant today in which he takes the 
Lord's name in Vain.. Just sickening to watch. [sic]
Comment 6.9 26 September, 2016
In the previous section, my analysis focused on the temporality of commenters’ 
engagement with Beck. Here, again, a timeframe is introduced in order to evi-
dence a transformation in Beck’s content and stance that is at the root of the 
user’s shifting perception of Beck. Whilst Beck was widely known for his right-
wing leanings (Jutel, 2018), this comment draws attention to a shift away from 
traditionally conservative issues that, it is claimed, has been taking shape over 
 See section 1.2.1 pp 18-26 for a discussion of trolling and other forms of online inci50 -
vility.
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a number of years. In particular, the author of comment 6.9 focuses on the mul-
ticultural character of Beck’s messaging as a key legitimation of this claim.
The rejection of multiculturalism is a prominent feature of right-wing populist 
discourse (Han, 2015; Rydgren, 2005). Presumably as a result of his purported 
support of multiculturalism, Beck is characterised as a “degenerate,” once again 
using insulting language to refer to Beck in outrageous terms. Similarly, Beck’s 
deviation from Christian ideals of comportment underline this characterisation, 
including “his prideful rant” and taking “the Lord's name in Vain.” This latter is 
forcefully described as “sickening to watch.” 
Here, engagement with Beck’s content and the issues to which it pertains are 
set out in terms that explicitly reference media as a practice, e.g., “If you listen 
closely,” “Listen to his prideful rant,” “Just sickening to watch.” In this way, the 
comment integrates a number of discourses in its articulation of a reading not 
only of Beck’s content, but also of commenters’ engagement and participation 
as produsers and, more importantly, Christian conservatives.
Whilst, as noted earlier, there is little explicit reference made to media deemed 
acceptable, a number of comments assert the availability of agreeable content. 
In that regard, the conservative commentator Mark Levin was raised as a topic 
of discussion in Chapter 5 as well as the previous section of the current chapter. 
In examples 6.10 and 6.11, Levin is once again presented as a valid alternative 
to listening to Glenn Beck or subscribing to TheBlaze. The comments read:
I used to love hearing Glenn Beck for years but I feel he has become a 
useful idiot ! Listen to Mark Levin! It is where its at people .. [sic]
Comment 6.10 23 September, 2016
Yes, I subscribe to Levin TV. Mark Levin really does a great job of covering 
the important issues of the day. I prefer him to Trump pompom promoters 
Rush and Hannity, and Trump basher Glenn. I still subscribe to the Blaze, 
but usually find only about 1/3 of Glenn’s shows interesting anymore. [sic]
Comment 6.11 23 September, 2016
Firstly, in example 6.10 a timeline of engagement is presented that situates the 
comment author’s choice to listen to Beck: “I used to love hearing Glenn Beck 
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for years.” This reflects comments made by a number of other users in the 
sample and clearly indicates a significant shift in audience perceptions of Beck, 
perceptions which have transformed over time and, in others, much more 
abruptly. As already noted, presenting oneself as an acolyte or subscriber lends 
a degree of authority to one’s claims regarding Beck’s perceived transformation. 
For the author of comment 6.10, Beck has now changed: “I feel he has become 
a useful idiot !”
Whilst many of the comments presented as evidence in this chapter and the 
preceding chapter identify Beck as an intentional supporter of the Clinton cam-
paign, the use of the term “useful idiot” here indicates a less purposive action.  51
Rather than continue to tune into Beck’s content, the comment author instead 
directs the audience to choose Mark Levin: “Listen to Mark Levin! It is where its 
at people” [sic]. The author of comment 6.11 also indicates their preference for 
Levin: “Yes, I subscribe to Levin TV.” A simple explanation is offered: Levin ef-
fectively covers “the important issues of the day.” In the context of this state-
ment of support for Levin, identifying Beck as a “Trump basher” serves to high-
light a key dimension of effective coverage for the user: congruence. 
It is important to note that the vitriol and criticism directed towards Beck and 
TheBlaze are not always matched by an equal but opposite level of support for 
Trump. As has been seen in many of the foregoing examples, both in this chap-
ter and elsewhere, support for Trump is qualified by a number of important pro-
visos and caveats. The most important of these appears to be the overriding 
need to oppose Hillary Clinton above all other considerations, including long es-
tablished principles. The same is true of user 6.11’s measured support for 
Levin, which once again sets out a classification of the right-wing media ecology 
within which media figures and their associated outlets are seen to operate. 
Speaking of Levin, the user writes, “I prefer him to Trump pompom promoters 
Rush and Hannity, and Trump basher Glenn.” Whilst finding a listenable alterna-
 According to Landes, the origin of the term derives from Lenin. Lenin, he reports, 51
“allegedly referred to Western intellectuals who so supported the Communist experi-
ment that they disguised its horrors from the West, as ‘useful idiots’” (Landes, 2013, p. 
621). 
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tive to Beck hasn’t yet resulted in the user unsubscribing from TheBlaze, the 
user nevertheless asserts they find Beck’s content increasingly uninteresting.
The timeframe for Beck’s perceived transformation has already featured in my 
analysis. Comment 6.12 once again presents a timeline for the user's evolving 
perception of Beck and the resulting change in media habits that ensued. The 
comment reads:
I used to like Glenn Beck, but I had to tune him out about three years ago 
when he became preachy and a shock jock. Every show was being adver-
tised as extremely important to be recorded by you. Then the peddling of 
gold, which was supposed to be $2000 by two years ago and by now 
you’d be a multi- millionaire, then MLK became his hero when I remember 
MLK and he was just a rabble-rouser. That he didn’t surprise me for his 
lack of support for the nominee, it’s obvious. I had already turned him off 
by that time. Even the Blaze today is getting sensationalistic. Soon I will 
stop coming here, also. It’s a pity because his message was good, but he 
has made all the money he needs and now is becoming a minimalist. 
Glenn realizes that if Hillary wins, he will still have a program. The best 
thing that happens to these people in order to bitch and moan about the 
guy in the WH. Oh well, really I miss the old Glenn. [sic]
Comment 6.12 23 September, 2016
This user locates Beck’s transformation three years prior to the date on which 
the comment was posted in September 2016. Interestingly, the user highlights a 
number of notable features of Beck’s productions that involved Beck becoming 
“preachy and a shock jock,” which in turn led to a shift in their attitude towards 
him. In addition, Beck’s advertising practices are highlighted. Attention here is 
drawn to “the peddling of gold” as indicative of Beck’s content.
Comment 6.12 differs somewhat from other examples insofar as it sets out a 
clear distinction between Beck and TheBlaze. Thus, whilst the author situates 
Beck’s transformation into a “shock jock” three years previously, it is remarked 
that TheBlaze “today is getting sensationalistic.” It is claimed that this will have 
an impact on the user’s media choice in the near future: “Soon I will stop com-
ing here, also.” As has been seen in many of the preceding examples, clandes-
tine motives are once more attributed to Beck and his electoral stance – mo-
tives to which only insightful listeners and viewers are privy. Whilst Beck’s 
“message was good,” something has changed. There is a calculation attributed 
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to Beck, insofar as “his lack of support for the nominee” – i.e., Trump – is “obvi-
ous”: “Glenn realizes that if Hillary wins, he will still have a program,” thus ex-
plaining his supposed tacit endorsement of Clinton in terms that foreground 
Beck’s role as a commercial media figure. As noted earlier, financial motives are 
an explicit point of critique used to explain Beck’s divergence from a shared par-
tisan outlook.
The user concludes: “Oh well, I really miss the old Glenn.” This highlights the 
strength of the user’s affective engagement with Beck. Thus, whilst users may 
indeed be tuning into Beck’s shows as well as TheBlaze in order to encounter 
specific kinds of desired content, there is also a question of the various kinds of 
emotional attachment they are developing with media outlets, figures, and con-
tent. Whilst audience relations with media figures have been theorised under 
the rubric of parasocial relations and interaction (D. C. Giles, 2002; Horton & 
Wohl, 1956), the participatory affordances of below-the-line commentary pro-
vide a mechanism via which users are given the impression of active engage-
ment with the objects of those affections. 
The transformation in the relation between Glenn Beck/TheBlaze and their au-
dience is shaded acutely by this parasociality. In that regard, and as has been 
demonstrated, users display a conceptualisation of the complex participation 
frameworks that are implicated in the use of media, whether implicitly or explicit-
ly. But the transformation in the relation between Glenn Beck/TheBlaze and 
their audience is also bound up in an array of user judgments regarding not only 
the kinds of content one can expect from conservative media but also an array 
of expectations regarding the forms of subjectivity that are deemed appropriate 
for conservative media figures. 
It is worth noting that in spite of the varied insistence by users of their choice to 
“boycott” Glenn Beck for his perceived counterattitudinal stance, they are never-
theless continuing to actively post on TheBlaze, a fact which has distinct politi-
cal economic implications in terms of users’ “digital prosumption labour” (Fuchs, 
2013b). How commenters portray the intended and imagined impacts of their 
media choice will be the focus of the following section.
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6.4 Partisan media choice and the collapse of Beck’s 
media “empire”
Whereas this chapter argues that selective exposure can be conceptualised as 
a form of buycott, especially in the case of subscription media, boycotts also 
have a well established relevance in the study of right-wing partisan media. A 
number of prominent advertiser boycotts in recent years have had some level of 
impact on the programming and staff makeup of right-wing and conservative 
partisan media outlets. For example, Glenn Beck was himself the subject of a 
major advertising boycott during his time at Fox News Channel, following com-
ments he made as a guest on the show Fox & Friends in which he referred to 
President Barack Obama as a racist with “a deep-seated hatred for white peo-
ple or the white culture” (Calderone, 2009). Similarly, Rush Limbaugh was the 
target of an effective advertising boycott in response to statements he made 
about Georgetown University law student Sandra Fluke’s public advocacy seek-
ing healthcare coverage for contraception in which he referred to Fluke as a 
“slut” (Wheeler, 2012). These are just two examples, with an array of more re-
cent boycotts targeting a variety of Fox News Channel staff as well as other 
prominent right-wing media figures serving as further examples of this trend.
The difference in this case is the manner in which commenters, many of whom 
profess a long-standing affective and commercial engagement with Beck and 
TheBlaze, choose to punish them for both their perceived anti-Trump stance (a 
position that is characterised as counterattitudinal in a significant proportion of 
comments in my data sample) and divergence from conservative principles. 
Nevertheless, the portrayal of an anti-Trump perspective as oppositional, whilst 
dominant, is also deeply contested. Thus, whilst the majority of the examples in 
this section focus on the imagined impacts of the decision to disengage from 
Glenn Beck and TheBlaze, they also include a number of responses from users 
who disagree with the tactic.
In the first example, there is once more a collapsing of the distinction between 
between Glenn Beck and TheBlaze, a factor that has been a common feature of 
the sample. The comment reads:
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Glenn is sacrificing whole business He is not being rational at all He has 
lost it and I have been a big supporter of him until now it is the Trump 
bashing network and I for one am sick of it Trump is not my cup of tea but 
better than the communist alternative [sic]
Comment 6.13 23 September, 2016
As a further response to Beck’s reaction to Ted Cruz’s support of Donald Trump, 
this comment once again engages with the contentious issue of oppositionality. 
As with many of the previous examples, the user expresses a major shift in their 
perception of Beck – from a position of support to one of aversion that is specif-
ically rooted in TheBlaze’s perceived critique of Trump. In this case, the project-
ed outcome of resistance to Trump is the loss of Beck’s business. TheBlaze is 
here referred to as “the Trump bashing network,” drawing a clear set of relations 
between an array of factors that bridge political and economic domains through 
a commentary on media practice. The opposition between the partisan view-
points of commenters and Glenn Beck/TheBlaze are set in relief. 
At the same time, the implications of this oppositionality are framed in terms not 
only of economic collapse but also of electoral outcomes. Glenn Beck is seen to 
be sacrificing his business, but his lack of support for Trump also raises the 
spectre of electoral success for “the communist alternative.” This notion of 
communist alternative highlights the sense of the polarised choice being pre-
sented to voters. However, it articulates the distinction in a specific manner that 
draws on “red scare” rhetoric discussed in Chapter 4 (see section 4.3 pp. 
126-143).52
The next set of examples forms a triad composed around an initial comment 
and two subsequent responses. Each of the comments was posted on Sep-
tember 6, 2016 in response to a story discussing a poll conducted by CNN/ORC 
between September 1 and September 4, 2016 showing Donald Trump and 
Hillary Clinton to be virtually tied in the lead-up to the election (Jon Street, 
2016b). The comments read: 
 Attacks of this manner are referred to as “red-baiting,” described as a “McCarthyite 52
tactic of disqualifying someone’s ideas by the allegation that he or she was a Commu-
nist of sympathetic to Communism” (Beverley, 2004, p. x).
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Read the Milo article. http://www.breitbart.com/milo/2016/09/06/glenn-
beck-socialjustice-warrior/ I was a member here since it was GBTV. The 
collapse of the Blaze is sad but not unexpected given the "Never-Trump" 
meme. To most thinking people this means either directly or indirectly sup-
port for Hillary. You can't have it both ways. [sic] 
Comment 6.14A 6 September, 2016
Glenn shutdown American Dream Labs over the weekend (I'd post a 
link from the Daily Beast but the Blaze will delete my post) his "empire" 
is collapsing all around him. [sic] 
Comment 6.14B.1 6 September, 2016
[User 6.14b]…your statement implies that anyone who shuts down a 
business is a failure. Does that include Trump bankrupting businesses 
and shutting down his own university? [sic]
Comment 6.14B.2 6 September, 2016
The initial comment (6.14A) opens by directing readers towards an article au-
thored by Milo Yiannopoulos,  who at that time was a senior editor at Breitbart 53
News. In this article it is claimed that Beck is a “social justice warrior.” This pejo-
rative term, prevalent in online right-wing discourse, has a particular association 
with the so-called “Alt-Right” (Massanari & Chess, 2018). It denotes “a person 
who generally enforces an overly aggressive and incendiary style of discussion 
while promoting socially progressive views including civil rights, multiculturalism, 
feminism and identity politics” (Schofield & Davidson, 2017, p. 56) and entails 
both gendered and racial dimensions (Brock, 2015). Usage of the term – and 
the associated initialism SJW – spiked after the so-called GamerGate  ha54 -
rassment campaign targeting a number of women working in the video game 
industry in August 2014. The term has fundamentally antagonistic connotations 
in its popular usage, insofar as “#Gamergate supporters often used ‘SJW’ as a 
term to describe the ‘opposition' that they faced” (Massanari & Chess, 2018, p. 
527). In this regard, the use of the term to refer to Glenn Beck is a further indi-
 Milo Yiannopoulos would later resign from Breitbart in February 2017 within 24 hours 53
of losing a speaking slot at a major conservative conference and having a book deal 
canceled over what a New York Times article described as “glib remarks about pe-
dophilia by Roman Catholic priests and his endorsement of sexual relations with boys 
as young as 13” (Peters, 2017).
 The events of GamerGate are analysed in greater detail by Massanari (2015) in 54
terms of their relation to online antifeminist activism and what she terms “toxic techno-
cultures.”
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cation of the antagonistic character of public attitudes towards him. However, its 
use in this specific instance must be understood not only in the context of the 
opposing positions of Breitbart News and TheBlaze regarding Donald Trump, 
but also in Yiannopoulos’ personal status as a so-called “right-wing provocateur” 
(A. Phillips, 2019, p. 158).
The reference to the Breitbart News article precedes the user confirming their 
membership of TheBlaze, tracing their membership back to the time of the in-
ception of GBTV.  As in comment 6.6, above, this allows the speaker to assert 55
a certain degree of authority as a commentator. The user speaks of the “col-
lapse” of TheBlaze, which it is remarked is “sad but not unexpected given the 
‘Never-Trump’ meme.” As in previous examples, the user interprets Beck’s anti-
Trump stance in binary terms. Whilst many of the comments containing this fea-
ture portray Beck’s stance as intentional, the author of 6.14A is less forceful, 
characterising it as either direct or indirect support for Clinton. However, they 
nevertheless assert: “You can’t have it both ways.” Here, the putative collapse 
of TheBlaze is explicitly linked to the company’s stance regarding Trump.
The first response to this comment, presented in 6.14B.1, takes up on the 
theme of collapse by drawing attention to the fact that Beck had shuttered his 
film and television venture, American Dream Labs (ADL) on September 5, 2016. 
ADL was a division of TheBlaze's parent company, Mercury Radio Arts, which 
was built around a partnership with American filmmaker, screenwriter, and 
painter Ben McPherson. This was a move which Beck termed a “‘good’ divorce” 
in a statement posted to his website on September 2, 2016.  Nevertheless, an 56
 GBTV was Beck’s web-TV venture, which was launched on September 12, 2011 fol55 -
lowing Beck’s departure from Fox News Channel in spring 2011. One year later, The-
Blaze was formed by Mercury Radio Arts on June 28, 2012 from the merger of GBTV 
with TheBlaze.com (the news and opinion website which had been launched by Mer-
cury Radio Arts on August 26, 2010) and Markdown.com (an online marketplace 
launched by Mercury Radio Arts in May 2011). This had the effect of creating a “single 
multi-platform media company” (Weprin, 2012). 
 In his statement announcing the separation of TheBlaze and American Dream Labs, 56
Beck stated: “ADL wanted to be in Los Angeles where it could be more than “Glenn 
Beck’s side project.”
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article in The Daily Beast dated September 5, 2016 described the decision as 
“Glenn Beck’s financially troubled media empire” taking another hit.57
This September 5 article from The Daily Beast is explicitly drawn on as a re-
source by the author of comment 6.14B.1, particularly through the use of the 
term “empire” in scare quotes, which may imply not only a direct reference to 
the use of the term in the quoted piece but also pejoratively to its dubitable use 
in reference to Beck’s operations. Here, the comment author offers an explicit 
metacommentary on their decision not to provide a link to The Daily Beast, 
highlighting their supposition that this would result in the post being deleted by 
moderators at TheBlaze. As with the first comment in the triad, this user also 
sees Beck’s so-called empire in a state of collapse.
It is important to note once more, however, that Beck’s stance regarding Trump 
was deeply contentious. Thus, whilst it prompted a huge response from com-
menters, not all of this was negative. As such, the meaning of Beck and The-
Blaze maintaining such a position is openly contested in the data sample. 
Comments 6.7 and 6.8, presented in the previous section, demonstrate that 
some level of support still existed for Beck and TheBlaze among commenters 
during the timeframe represented in the data sample. Comment 6.14B.2 further 
demonstrates the manner in which the implications of Beck’s stance are openly 
contested in below-the-line commentary, with the user addressing the author of 
comment 6.14B.1 directly and asking if their judgments around failing business-
es apply equally to Donald Trump.
The above exchange demonstrates succinctly the existence of competing voic-
es on the significance of Beck’s electoral stance. This kind of disagreement is 
 The full opening paragraph reads: “Glenn Beck’s financially troubled multimedia em57 -
pire took another hit over Labor Day Weekend as Beck announced that Mercury Radio 
Arts, his privately held umbrella company, has abruptly stopped producing scripted film 
and television projects under his once-cherished subsidiary American Dream 
Labs” (Grove, 2016b). Notably, the opening sentence links to another piece by the 
same author dated April 28, 2016 that reports on an estimated 40 layoffs taking place 
at various office locations, which it is claimed took place “in order to satisfy the re-
quirements of a multimillion-dollar bank loan taken out recently to keep Beck’s rev-
enue-challenged enterprise running” (Grove, 2016a).
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further demonstrated in the pair of comments provided in example 6.15A (origi-
nal comment) and 6.15B (reply). The comments read:
Beck: "Profoundely sad day for me." Nooooooo---not even close. What re-
ally happened was that the top of Glenn’s head exploded and a half ton of 
confetti shot out. Then he rolled around on the floor thrashing about, 
throwing a tantrum.... "Whaaaaaaaaaa! Whaaaaaaa!" --like a petulant five 
year old child who’s just had his Play-Station taken away from him. Glenn-
-get ready to close down The Blase soon. It’s going into the toilet, along 
with you. Also... soon your radio audience will be a pathetic shell of what it 
once was. Can’t wait! Goodie! Goodie! It will look like the Hindenburg--I 
wish I could have a camera standing by to see the look on your face. Ad-
vice: in your next lifetime--try getting on the correct side of the issues. 
Thus spake [User 6.15A]. [sic]
Comment 6.15A 23 September, 2016
SO [User 6.15A], you're a fascist communist? You want The Blaze shut 
down? Freedom of the press denied? Your narrative is the only one al-
lowed? You're a book burner? You want free speech and opposition 
points silenced? Beck IS on the right side of the issues. The Liberty 
side. The constitution side. The Accountable government side. He's en-
titled to his opinion and free speech. They are his right and property. 
Advice; In your next lifetime, if by miracle God deems you worthy of a 
second chance or deems that we need to be punished with your rein-
troduction, learn this; The Blaze is spelled with a Z. 
Comment 6.15B 24 September, 2016
The first of the two comments, 6.15A, draws explicitly on the content of the 
news report to which it is responding (i.e.`, Goins-Phillips, 2016b) by citing 
Beck’s statement that Ted Cruz’s expression of support for Trump as the Re-
publican candidate represents a “profoundly sad day” for him. However, the 
comment rejects this by offering an alternate reading of Beck’s reaction that 
characterises Beck as a “petulant five year old child who’s just had his Play-Sta-
tion taken away from him” [sic]. Beck’s reaction is immediately related to eco-
nomic factors, with the user asserting – putatively addressing Beck – that The-
Blaze is “going into the toilet, along with you.” The viability of TheBlaze is here 
linked directly to the size of Beck’s radio audience, which it is claimed will soon 
be “a pathetic shell of what it once was.” In this case, not only is the relation be-
tween Beck’s anti-Trump stance and the failure of his business implied; Beck’s 
performance is also characterised as childish and melodramatic. In closing the 
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comment, all of this is tied to Beck’s apparent failure to get “on the correct side 
of the issues,” linking Beck’s supposedly erroneous political viewpoints to the 
series of economic impacts on his media enterprise. 
The manner in which the user addresses Beck directly appears important. In the 
literature on parasociality, the concept of empathetic interaction refers to behav-
ioural/affective response on the part of the audience, e.g., verbally addressing a 
media figure (D. C. Giles, 2002, p. 282). This is something that is facilitated to a 
certain extent by hybrid media. Insofar as this comment is addressed towards 
Beck in the second person, it is notable for its incivility. The user seemingly de-
lights at the apparent collapse of TheBlaze as well as Beck’s listenership, liken-
ing these to the Hindenburg disaster.  58
However, the response in comment 6.15B explicitly contests user 6.15A’s inter-
pretation through an antagonistic reading of their response. This comment takes 
the preceding statements regarding the collapse of Beck’s media endeavours 
and reframes them as deeply anti-conservative through the opposition set out 
between user 6.15A and Beck. Beck, it is here claimed, is on the side of liberty, 
the Constitution, and accountable government. By contrast, the author of com-
ment 6.15B posits that user 6.15A’s reaction implies they are a “fascist commu-
nist” who supports the silencing of free speech and opposition, the denial of 
freedom of the press, and the burning of books. This comment once again ex-
emplifies the tactic of red-baiting. However, it also demonstrates the way in 
which “communism,” as an epithet, is articulated with other forms of political phi-
losophy and practice – in this case, fascism.
In examples 6.15A and 6.15B, an explicit expression of the partisan antago-
nisms described in Chapter 4 is palpable. However, in this case, these antago-
nisms are not only mapped onto the media environment, as shown in Chapter 
5. Rather, they are also portrayed in terms that integrate discourses of political 
and economic legitimacy, insofar as the focus here is placed not just on the sta-
tus of both participating users and Glenn Beck as conservatives but also on the 
 The Hindenburg disaster of 1937 is notable for its use as a reference point, insofar 58
as it serves as a cultural touchstone for the voicing of catastrophe (Torres, 2012) and a 
powerful visual metaphor of shock and destruction (Baird, 2007).
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way in which the qualities of conservatism are bound up fundamentally in the 
political economy of (partisan) media. Thus, whilst user 6.15A sees Beck’s per-
spective as validating the collapse of his business, user 6.15B proposes the 
challenge that, in fact, Beck’s stance exemplifies conservative ideals.
In the previous chapter, I presented a number of examples which used claims 
about Beck’s financial dependence and partnerships in order to articulate a def-
inition of Glenn Beck and TheBlaze as oppositional media. In many cases, users 
made claims about the clandestine and illicit character of Beck’s financial moti-
vations, particularly his imagined dealings with the Clinton campaign. The 
comment in example 6.16 similarly draws on these themes. The comment 
reads:
My guess is Mr. Beck had to go to “other sources of funding” to keep his 
operation afloat . . . . consequently, he may just be another “owned” per-
sonality. He’s had to lay off dozens of employees and the reason for this is 
quite simple . . . . fewer folks watch and listen to him, so his Advertisers 
are dropping him, or cutting back on their spending with his organization. 
This is what happens in a Free Enterprise System . . . something quite 
foreign to Socialists and a majority of obamba and “the rodham’s” Lem-
ming. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/02/03/why-glenn-beck-s-
media-empireis-burning-down.html [sic]
Comment 6.16 23 September, 2016
Here, the user proposes that Beck’s reliance on alternative sources of funding, 
assumed to be necessary in order to maintain his media operation, implies that 
he “may just be another ‘owned’ personality.” The comment outlines an explicit 
reading of the economic structures and relations implied in practices of media 
production. A direct relation is thus set out not only between Beck’s declining 
audience figures and a reduction in advertising revenue; the comment also re-
lates this reduction to the fact that Beck had at that time been reported to have 
laid off “dozens of employees.” The logic of this series of events is spoken of in 
reductive terms as simply “what happens in a Free Enterprise System.”  59
Through the characterisation of Beck as an “owned personality,” this comment 
thus portrays the difficulties facing Glenn Beck and TheBlaze at once as a mat-
 Free enterprise figures centrally as an ideological commitment of fiscal conservatism 59
and libertarianism (Collomb, 2014). It has been cast in opposition to both Communism 
and state capitalism as something which is impeded by so-called “big 
government” (Loayza, 2003).
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ter of partisan inauthenticity and a matter to be resolved by the dynamics and 
logics of the market. Once again, a user is seen to directly reference The Daily 
Beast as a resource.60
In the previous sections, a number of examples were presented which explicitly 
addressed the audience as both participants in a mediated exchange and, more 
specifically, produsers of media discourse. Likewise, it was shown that com-
ment authors maintain a sense of the kinds of users who are engaging with 
their content. This provided support to Dvir-Gvirsman’s (2016) claim that a con-
cept of the audience is salient in the minds of media users. For Dvir-Gvirsman, 
shared identity is a key factor in media selection practices, one which she ar-
gues explains “media-audience homophily” or “one’s preference for partisan 
media websites catering to a homogeneous, likeminded consumership” (2016, 
p. 1072). However, my analysis demonstrates a vision of the audience that is 
both divided and contested. In the following examples, I will examine this fur-
ther. 
The comment in example 6.17, posted in response to a story discussing Donald 
Trump’s claim that the US would become “another Venezuela” if Hillary Clinton 
was elected President (Goins-Phillips, 2016d), serves as a further example of 
this mode of metacommentary on the composition of the audience. Posted in 
response to an earlier user comment, the comment reads:
[user], no, though reason, and it's working out pretty well judging by the 
collapse of GB's market share and empire (300 laid off, share down 50%) 
and the increasing relative number of Trump supporters who come here to 
take a dump in the NeverTrump saboteur punchbowl, without whom GB's 
share would be down 90%. I don’t expect to reach dunces, committed 
shills or the sock puppets and meatheads who voted you up 18 times, but 
I’m not writing for you. That would not be rational. [sic]
Comment 6.17 12 September, 2016
Here, it is possible to appreciate two dominant themes. In the first instance, the 
comment author references the collapse of Beck’s empire in response to his 
anti-Trump stance, which is seen to be evidenced by a claimed 50% decrease 
 Notably, as with the examples of The Daily Beast references presented earlier, the 60
cited article was authored by the journalist Llyod Grove.
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in share value, as well as the supposed layoff of 300 staff. In the second in-
stance, a distinction is articulated in terms of the makeup of the audience. The 
user suggests that the composition of TheBlaze’s readership consists largely of 
a growing relative number of Trump supporters who are visiting the site to – fol-
lowing Hardaker’s (2010) definition – “troll” NeverTrumpers. Without these 
users, it is claimed, the decrease in Beck’s share value would be even more 
pronounced. However, the user here explicitly outlines to whom their analysis is 
not addressed: those “dunces, committed shills or the sock puppets and meat-
heads” who indicated their agreement with the earlier statement by upvote. 
In this example, there is thus evidence presented not only for an explicit aware-
ness of the emergence of major divisions in audience alignments that are intrin-
sically linked to a contested electoral stance. The comment also provides sup-
port for the argument that the audience conceptualise the implications of those 
shifts in audience composition not only with regard to electoral outcomes but 
also in terms of the economic status of Glenn Beck and TheBlaze.
Whilst example 6.17 demonstrates a reading of the composition of the audience 
that implies an understanding of their hidden motives, the final example claims 
special insight into Beck’s intentions. Posted in response to a story focusing on 
comedian Jimmy Fallon tousling Donald Trump’s hair (Goins-Phillips, 2016e), 
the comments read:
Ironic that Glenn Beck Wrecked his media empire trashing Trump Politico: 
Glenn Beck’s ‘Bad Bet on Cruz’ a Crushing Blow to His Media Empire 
http://www.breitbart.com/2016-presidentialrace/2016/09/15/politico-glenn-
becks-bad-bet-cruz-crushing-blow-media-empire/ 
Comment 6.18A 16 September, 2016
I've got to go read that. I've caught 3-4 minutes of Glenn on radio sev-
eral times in the past week or so. Every time, he's been working on re-
habbing his image, to the listeners... Or, still trying to justify his actions, 
to himself. And, maybe trying to find a way to re-re-reinvent himself. 
Kinda sad. [sic]
Comment 6.18B 16 September, 2016
Comment 6.18A features a succinct statement noting the irony of an anti-Trump 
position having negative economic repercussions and a link to a Breitbart News 
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article discussing the connection between Beck’s support for Ted Cruz and its 
impact on his “media empire.”  61
The theme of Beck’s clandestine motives is common in the sample and has 
been discussed already in this chapter and elsewhere in this thesis. In the case 
of comment 6.18B, Beck’s understanding of his listenership is foregrounded as 
a driving force in a shift in Beck’s messaging the comment author claims to 
have perceived through sporadic engagement with Beck’s radio show over a 
period of roughly one week. In this regard, whilst “trashing Trump” is once again 
presented as an explanation and legitimation for the “wrecking” of Beck’s “em-
pire,” it is also here suggested that Beck is not only aware of the impact of his 
anti-Trump stance but is potentially actively working to recalibrate his messag-
ing to address and potentially remedy his perceived oppositionality.
By focusing on the relation between so-called “Trump bashing” and the collapse 
of Beck’s media operations, users foreground the intended and imagined out-
comes of their choice of whether to tune in or out. As seen in the preceding set 
of examples in this section, commenters maintain an explicit awareness of how 
their media choice assumes political and economic significance, demonstrating 
the relevance of the concept of political consumerism to my discussion of user-
generated commentary. However, as seen in the examples presented in this 
section, audience attitudes towards Glenn Beck and TheBlaze demonstrate the 
importance of judgments about identity in the context of perspectives on divisive 
politics. This includes publicly articulated ideas regarding the impact of partisan 
content on the composition of the audience.
6.5 Conclusion: from buycott to boycott
In this chapter, I have argued that commenters use below-the-line commentary 
to attribute political and economic significance to their choice of whether or not 
to engage, as simultaneous consumers and producers of media discourse, with 
 Notably, the linked article (Breitbart News, 2016) reproduces another article from 61
Politico authored by Kenneth Vogel and Hadas Gold (2016). The Breitbart News ver-
sion changes the title from “Glenn Beck's bad bet on Ted Cruz” to “Politico: Glenn 
Beck’s ‘Bad Bet on Cruz’ a Crushing Blow to His Media Empire,” stressing the econom-
ic dimensions of Beck’s support for Cruz.
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Glenn Beck and TheBlaze. Building on the empirical analyses of previous chap-
ters, the public contestation of oppositional identities was here foregrounded as 
a prominent factor in shaping not only practices of media choice but also public 
understandings of the impacts of selecting to engage with particular forms of 
media. In my analysis, I focused on three central problematics. 
First, I outlined how commenters discuss a transformation in their relation to 
Glenn Beck and TheBlaze. I framed this transformation in terms of a perceived 
shift from a proattitudinal to a counterattitudinal stance that largely appears to 
animate the response of commenters. In so doing, I identified the varied time-
line put forth for Beck’s redefinition as oppositional media, although Beck’s high-
ly contentious anti-Trump stance during the 2016 US presidential election here 
was seen as a key moment. It was established that it is not enough for Beck 
and TheBlaze to be judged to be on the “right side” of the issues; they must also 
fulfil a variety of expectations around being seen to be authentically conserva-
tive. In that regard, it was shown that users express an awareness of the partic-
ipation frameworks of below-the-line commentary that manifests in shifting 
alignments with participants, both real and imagined, as well as social judg-
ments about the composition of the audience. In many cases, comments were 
seen to be characterised by incivility.
Second, I discussed the salience of media choice as a topic of user-generated 
discussion in below-the-line commentary at TheBlaze.com. Insofar as users 
demonstrate an explicit focus on the political and economic impacts of their ac-
tions, here I argued that political consumerism serves as a viable framework for 
conceptualising how commenters represent their own media-related practices 
as well those of other users. I thus discussed media choice in terms of the buy-
cott/boycott distinction, drawn from the literature on political consumerism. The 
data indicate that the contested definition of Glenn Beck and TheBlaze as op-
positional media is integrated into the discursive articulation of conservative 
identities through explicit metacommentary by commenters on media selectivity. 
In that regard, whilst user contributions exemplify the kind of “privatised con-
sumer orientation” that is critiqued by deliberative theorists (for discussion`, see 
I. M. Young, 1997), it also highlights the central role of identity in shaping pat-
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terns of media use that simultaneously are seen to assume political and eco-
nomic significance.
Third, I examined how users attribute political and economic meaning to the in-
tended and imagined outcomes of their media use, relating practices of media 
disengagement to other boycotts targeted at right-wing media figures and out-
lets. My data show a distinct focus on how user behaviour, shaped in response 
to perceived oppositional bias on the part of Glenn Beck and TheBlaze, is con-
strued in terms of its impact on the economic viability of Glenn Beck’s media 
operations. This was shown to take place in the context of a broader public fo-
cus on the collapse of Beck’s so-called “media empire.” The qualities of conser-
vatism were shown to be viewed frequently in political and economic terms, with 
issues related to partisan inauthenticity and political misjudgment presented as 
resolvable through market mechanisms. Once again, I noted the central role of 
imaginaries of audience composition in expressions of alignment with media 
outlets, figures, and content.
Some users draw on outrageous characterisations of political difference in order 
to situate their relation to Beck in terms of the antagonism between “authentic” 
American conservatism and its multiple opponents, real or imagined. In that 
sense, as argued in the preceding chapter, user-generated contributions by 
commenters share a number of generic characteristics with outrage discourse, 
as defined by Berry and Sobieraj (2013). Given the particular methodological 
approach applied here, the question of intent remains open in the case of user 
generated content, but this element of intentionality – of deliberate attempts to 
provoke reactions – is central to Berry and Sobieraj’s definition. In the previous 
chapter, I showed how models of personhood circulated in outrage media can 
also be deployed by their audiences. In this chapter, too, my analysis has fo-
cused on how media can be seen to serve as resources for ways of seeing and 
speaking about politics online. This is not a case of passive reception but rather 
one of active contestation, opposition, and discursively articulated antagonisms 
that are mapped onto the social world with reference to both ideological and af-
fective factors. 
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My data offer a clear indication of the manner in which acts of media use are 
construed by commenters in terms that align both political impacts and econom-
ic outcomes. Content generated by users can thus be seen as a form of “politi-
cal prosumption” (Hershkovitz, 2012) in which commenters actively engage in 
modes of media production. In that regard, I am reminded of Silverstone’s 
(2002) assertion that audiences, if they are to be viewed as active, must also be 
seen as morally culpable. Likewise, I call to mind Dahlberg’s (2010, p. 349) ex-
hortation that “rather than cybersubjects understood as duped by a spectacle, 
we need to explore how to deal with users who very much know what they are 
operating within,” thus highlighting the role of audiences in perpetrating and 
propagating hegemonic agendas.
In this chapter, I have focused on the intended and imagined outcomes of me-
dia practice primarily in terms of Beck’s media operations. In the next chapter, I 
will focus instead on how commenters situate their own actions and those of 
politicians and media figures in terms of an idealised political past and imagined 
political future. 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Chapter 7: Imagining America’s past, present, 
and future
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how commenters characterise political action and identi-
fication by drawing on antagonistic visions of an idealised political past and 
imagined political future. In so doing, it pays particular attention to the role of 
imaginaries of American apocalypse in the online political talk of commenters. In 
the preceding chapters, I have sought to develop a qualitative account of how 
commenters contest the boundaries of American conservatism in below-the-line 
commentary. For instance, Chapter 4 examined antagonistic portrayals of parti-
sanship at the level of political parties, politicians, and partisans. Chapter 5, on 
the other hand, demonstrated how these antagonistic representations are also 
mapped onto the US media environment, whilst Chapter 6 elaborated on this 
argument by showing how antagonistic constructions of partisanship feature in 
public discussion of the political and economic implications of media choice. 
However, commenters also use below-the-line commentary to assert broader 
claims about the significance of partisan antagonism by making reference to the 
specifically conservative (i.e., white conservative) foundations of American soci-
ety, culture, and identity – employing “temporal narratives” (Brophy, 2016) that 
frequently cite the origins of American political institutions and their contempo-
rary evolution, whilst also prophesying their ultimate destiny. In what follows, I 
analyse the discursive role of such narratives of social and political transforma-
tion in the online political talk of commenters, including how they rhetorically 
serve to both remake and reinforce the complex “antagonistic frontiers” (Laclau, 
2000) on which they are predicated.
First, I will address an explicit focus by commenters on the historical role of the 
Constitution of the United States in shaping American social and political life. 
Here, I will pay particular attention to the manner in which users impute inten-
tions to a variety of political actors and historical figures, particularly the Found-
ing Fathers of the United States – seen as both framers of the Constitution and 
progenitors of American civil society. Second, I will examine how commenters 
debate contemporary political concerns, particularly the putative threat posed 
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by a Hillary Clinton presidency and the impact it is imagined such an outcome 
would have on the composition of the Supreme Court of the United States. In so 
doing, I will pay specific attention to constructions of the “binary” nature of the 
2016 US presidential election. This is a topic that briefly was raised in preceding 
chapters. Here, I will examine how the notion of a binary election – a heavily 
data-driven theme – is situated relative to broader claims regarding what is at 
stake in the ballot. Finally, I will relate these discussions of the past and the 
present to an array of comments that speak in manifestly prophetic terms about 
the future of the United States of America, foregrounding apocalyptic images of 
decay and destruction of American society, culture, and identity. In so doing, I 
will examine a set of millenarian and eschatological tropes prevalent in the user-
generated content contributed by commenters, with a particular focus on the 
ways in which apocalyptic imagery and vatic pronouncements are together de-
ployed as rhetorical strategies in the performance of political antagonism 
through online partisan media. 
By focusing on the themes of national birth and death that I identify in my data, 
this chapter relates the online political talk of commenters to a historically signif-
icant mode of rhetoric rooted in contrasting images of greatness and degrada-
tion – namely, the jeremiad tradition introduced in Chapter 2. The jeremiad has 
been theorised as central to the articulation of American national identity 
(Bercovitch, 2012). However, it is a form of discourse and a style of speech that 
is usually attributed to political and religious leaders, as opposed to the political 
talk of everyday speakers. Insofar as jeremiads “build their visions of the future 
on understandings of the past” (Murphy, 2009, p. 169), I argue that jeremiad 
rhetoric serves as a potent framework for conceptualising the function of tempo-
ral narratives in the performance of conservatism. I do so by focusing on the 
discursive role of prophecy and prognostication in the online political talk of 
commenters. However, extending the argument I have set out in previous chap-
ters, I also show how these rhetorical structures and strategies are related in 
practice to the deeply antagonistic portrayals of personhood and agency that 
commenters use to contest the boundaries of American conservative identity 
online.
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7.2 Past – America as divine providence
As outlined in Chapter 2, the jeremiad is a rhetorical form that has played a 
perennial role in assertions of American identity from the time of Puritan New 
England (P. Miller, 1953). Murphy (2009) argues jeremiad rhetoric deploys vi-
sions of moral decline as a rhetorical device by looking to the past. In so doing, 
it draws on a conservative imaginary of America’s origins which is rooted in a 
number of key claims about the nation’s founding documents as well as the 
aims of its Founders. My data indicate this mode of rhetoric figures heavily in 
commenters’ discussion of the implications of political action and identification, 
including a pervasive focus by commenters on the US Constitution and its role 
in shaping American society, culture, and identity. This section focuses on how 
such historical visions are situated relative to an array of partisan antagonisms 
that are articulated by commenters. 
My discussion begins with a comment posted to Goins-Phillips’ (2016b) report 
on Beck’s reaction to Ted Cruz’s sport for Trump. The comment reads:
Sir or madam, let me explain something to you. You are the problem, not 
Glenn. You say you followed him; and, if you did you know that he has 
been right at every turn. Now because he won't fall into lock step with the 
man whose followers say that we will be "bowing" to the Donald, you turn 
on him and decide that he has changed sides. He has changed nothing. 
You have, if you were ever a listener of Mr. Beck. Glenn stands as the 
Founders did with reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence. You 
have bought into the line of a "snake oil" salesman who refuses to release 
his tax records, a man who brags about being a serial adulterer, a man 
who has never done anything that he feels like he must ask forgiveness 
for...there was only one man on earth that was without sin and it isn't Don-
ald Trump, a man who has proven that if you don't agree with him he will 
destroy you, a man who is a bully and a liar and has ABSOLUTELY no 
idea about policy nor has he ever said that he believes in the Constitution 
of the United States being the "Law of the Land". A man who only a year 
ago stated that Hillary Clinton had been a "great" Secretary of State and 
would make a great POTUS. I find it remarkable that you could possibly 
support this charlatan who has been a lifelong Democrat and is not a con-
servative, let alone a Constitutional Conservative. So keep your name call-
ing to yourself because you are the one who has become a leftest and are 
following anger and not God. [sic]
Comment 7.1 23 September, 2016
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This comment sets out a clear contrast between Glenn Beck and Donald 
Trump. It suggests that if one were a follower of Beck, one would know that he 
“stands” with the Founding Fathers in terms of his support for the “Protection of 
Divine Providence.” This providential notion of an America set apart by some 
divine plan has important historical origins in the Puritan roots of American na-
tionhood (Bercovitch, 2012), but it also figures centrally in the jeremiad rhetoric 
of more recent heroes of American conservatism, such as Ronald Reagan (Jo-
hannesen, 1986).  Comment 7.1 thus articulates an important alignment be62 -
tween Glenn Beck and the Founding Fathers. Furthermore, by linking Beck and 
the Founding Fathers to the claim that America is the outcome of God’s grace, it 
also establishes the Christian character of American society, culture, and identi-
ty.63
Whilst Donald Trump received wide support from evangelical conservatives in 
2016 (Whitehead, Perry, & Baker, 2018), comment 7.1 presents a negative view 
of Trump. Here, Trump is classed as a “snake oil salesman,” a “serial adulterer,” 
a “lifelong Democrat,” and a “charlatan.” He is set in opposition not only to 
Glenn Beck and the Founding Fathers, but also to Christ. Whilst a number of 
examples in the previous chapter proposed that Beck’s resistance to a Donald 
Trump candidacy and presidency indicated he was anything from a tacit sup-
 As noted by Cynthia A Young (2019, p. 86) in her analysis of the right-wing appropri62 -
ation of civil rights rhetoric, Beck explicitly invoked divine providence during his 
“Restoring Honor” rally, which took place at the Lincoln Memorial on 28 August, 2010 – 
the forty-seventh anniversary of Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech. In 
his address Beck stated: “My challenge to you today is to make a choice. Does Ameri-
ca go forward and the American experience expands or does the experiment fail with 
us? Make the choice. And then if you answer as I do, look to the top of the Washington 
Memorial – the Washington Monument, praise be to God. My favorite line in the Decla-
ration of Independence is ‘With firm reliance on divine providence we mutually pledge 
to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.’ Let that phrase be our 
guide.”
 This articulation is related to the public deployment of rhetorics of “Judeo-Christian 63
values,” which have been widely used to differentiate America from foes both real and 
imagined since the 1950s (Haynes, 2017). The notion of a unified Judeo-Christian tra-
dition originated earlier, in the late 1800s (Hartmann, Zhang, & Wischstadt, 2005). 
Judeo-Christianity, Haynes (2017) posits, implies “rejection both of secular values and 
those of different faiths, including Islam.” In this sense, it is a term that is “defined by 
exclusion” (Haynes, 2017, p. 69). Most recently, its usage by President Donald Trump 
and his allies articulates a concept of Judeo-Christianity that unifies it with a benign 
form of capitalism (Haynes, 2017, p. 70). See p. 224 (this chapter) for further discus-
sion of Judeo-Christian values.
	 	 220
porter of Hillary Clinton to being on the payroll of her campaign, comment 7.1 
highlights a number of claims about Donald Trump’s own earlier support for 
Clinton – not only in her role as Secretary of State, but also in statements he is 
claimed to have made that she would make a “great" President of the United 
States. This is presented as a sign of Trump’s unprincipled character and thus 
his standing relative to the Founding Fathers. A number of other negative char-
acteristics are foregrounded, including the claim that Trump is a “bully" and a 
“liar” who has “ABSOLUTELY no idea about policy,” adding further stress to the 
critique.
Notably, the comment draws attention to the claim that Trump has never ex-
pressed a belief that the Constitution of the United States represents the “Law 
of the Land.” Likewise, the comment stipulates a distinction between being a 
“conservative” and a “Constitutional Conservative” [sic]. By highlighting both 
Trump’s failings of character and his failure to verbalise his belief in the trans-
formative power of the Constitution, the comment thus sets out not only a num-
ber of important characteristics of constitutional conservatism ; it also stipu64 -
lates some of its performative features. In particular, insofar as it establishes 
some form of verbal test, this comment formulates a model of constitutional 
conservatism that rests on a key relation between action and utterance, consti-
tuting a “metapragmatic” (Lucy, 1993) theory of conservative action and identifi-
cation.  In this view, a constitutional conservative becomes identifiable through 65
explicit discursive alignments that signal support for the Constitution. 
In the context of this differential modelling of American conservatism and its re-
lation to both the Constitution and its authors, continuing support for Trump is 
seen by the commenter as “remarkable.” In that regard, this failure of judgment 
on the part of the user to whom this comment is explicitly addressed is taken as 
an indication that they have “become a leftest and are following anger and not 
God” [sic]. Here, “leftist” can thus be seen to collapse a variety of contrasts and 
 For an overview of what is meant by the phrase “constitutional conservatism,” see 64
footnote 15 p. 126 (Chapter 4).
 Here, metapragmatic discourse is understood to be that special mode of reflexive 65
discourse, either implicit or explicit, that seeks to comment on and contextualise the 
appropriate use of language (see Lucy, 1993, p. 17).
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distinctions into one antagonistic opposition between conservatives and leftists, 
one which is articulated with reference to a particular kind of historical analysis 
that situates the origins of the United States and its Founding Documents, as 
well as the actions of its Founders, in Christian mythical time. Nevertheless, by 
articulating a further opposition between conservatives and constitutional con-
servatives, comment 7.1 also highlights the role of factions in contestation over 
the boundaries of a notionally “pure" conservatism that is dedicated to maxi-
mum consistency – i.e., “orthodoxy” or the maintenance of a “stable set of prac-
tices or beliefs” (Brophy, 2016, p. 123) – through time. This is a point to which I 
will return in the following section.
A number of the above themes also appear in comment 7.2A, below. This 
comment forms part of a set of three comments, which consists of an initial 
comment and two replies. The comments were posted in response to a story 
focusing on a statement by Kellyanne Conway, who had served as Donald 
Trump’s campaign manager, in which she implied that President Barack Obama 
“didn’t love the country enough to stop his feud over Russia’s alleged election 
interference” (Garcia, 2016).  The comments read:66
I see nothing wrong with what Conway has stated. There are many who 
believe that President Obama ”dislikes” America (to many this is a harsh 
way of putting it so you can replace with a word that makes you feel bet-
ter). There are many examples. Examples by President Obama himself. 
Wasn’t their his initcial speech about ”fundamental transforming The Unit-
ed States of America”? Well, why would you ”fundamentally” want to 
change something if you liked it. Another reason was his first term apology 
tour. Now, why would you go around the world and apologize for the exis-
tence of your country if you liked it? Also, when ever there has been a ter-
rorist attack in America, the President’s first inclination is to apologize to 
muslims and warn American citizens not to attack muslims. He lectures 
the people of America as if we are a bunch of idiots. At every step of he 
and his administration have done whatever they could during his tenure as 
President to chip away and at moments have cut out big chunks of this na-
 Donald Trump named Kellyanne Conway his campaign manager on 17 August, 2016 66
(Altman & Miller, 2016). She had joined his campaign as a senior adviser weeks be-
forehand. Prior to joining the Trump campaign, however, Conway had worked with 
Keep the Promise 1, a super political action committee (SuperPAC) created to support 
Trump’s main primary opponent, Ted Cruz (Altman & Miller, 2016). She would later 
serve as Counselor to the President upon Trump’s inauguration on 20 January, 2017. 
Later again, Conway would serve as Senior Counselor to the President from 9 Feb-
ruary, 2018 following the departure of Steve Bannon from that role. At the time of writ-
ing, Conway still serves in this role.
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tions Foundation. He is supposed to be a Constitutional scholar. Well, to 
me he has not acted as such. This nations Founding was on the Creator 
and Natural Law. You may not believe it or agree and that is fine. But, if 
you have read your history, and the words of the Founders themselves, 
there is no doubt. Yet, he has done all he can to do away with America’s 
traditions, and the like. So, I agree These are just a few. There are more, 
but I believed these are on the top of the list and you get the idea. [sic]
Comment 7.2A 16 December, 2016
So we, forget Obama, should just ignore Russia’s meddling on our elec-
tion and colluding and helping one of the candidates? Trump was well 
aware of the hacking. (Remember his ”I hope they find those 30,000 
emails)You losers and Kelly can spin all you like, But those are the facts 
and BOTH the CIA and the FBI are now coming to that conclusion. 
Does the phrase: ”GROW UP” mean anything to you kiddies? [sic]
Comment 7.2B.1 16 December, 2016
great comment! sadly, your well thought out ideas contain too much log-
ic for the irrational liberal mind to comprehend. all they can wrap their 
brains around are dishonest ideas that can be easily chanted angrily in 
one of their hateful protests. [sic]
Comment 7.2B.2 16 December, 2016
The first of the above comments, 7.2A, opens by expressing agreement with 
Conway, with the comment author asserting that they see nothing wrong with 
her statement. It is posited that many people feel the same way and that their 
feelings are supported by numerous examples. First and foremost is Obama’s 
stated intention to fundamentally transform the United States of America.  The 67
user asserts that Obama and his administration made good on this aim by vari-
ously “chipping away” at – and at times cutting out “big chunks” of – the nation’s 
“Foundation” over the course of his Presidency. 
The user here qualifies what is meant by the “nations Foundation” [sic]: by high-
lighting Obama’s status as a Constitutional scholar, the role of the Constitution 
is set in relief. Likewise, the comment asserts that America was founded on “the 
Creator and Natural Law,” which entails a strong reading of the intentions of the 
 The user labels this as one of President Obama’s initial speeches. In fact, Obama 67
made the comments in a speech made in Columbia, Missouri on 30 October 2008, 
which was five days prior to the 2008 US Presidential Election. On that occasion, 
Obama declared: “We are five days away from fundamentally transforming the United 
States of America” (V. D. Hanson, 2013).
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Founding Fathers and their aims in terms of giving form to American civil soci-
ety. It is asserted that one may infer the Founding Fathers’ intentions not only 
from the text of the Constitution, which entextualises the will of the Founders as 
well as the will of the people; one may also look at other expressions of their 
aims and intent, including their own words. The comment asserts that these 
words leave one in no doubt as to the Founding Fathers’ objectives in terms of 
asserting the divine basis of the American nation.
However, whilst oriented towards a past that is situated simultaneously in both 
historical and mythical time, this particular conservative religious reading of 
American civil society’s organising structures also generates a political project 
for conservative Christians, who are summoned to “re-create a national culture 
that matches natural law” (Kintz, 1998, p. 7). In this activist articulation of con-
servatism, natural law is conflated with the biblical law of the Ten Command-
ments and its encoding of specifically “Judeo-Christian cultural values” (Kintz, 
1998, p. 7). In Kintz’s view, this conservative Christian mobilisation aims to re-
turn US culture to “its true identity as God’s unique experiment in human history, 
with its divinely inspired Constitution” (1998, p. 7). In that sense, the Constitu-
tion can be seen not only as a textual embodiment of the intentions of the 
Founding Fathers and the citizenry for whom they spoke. Rather, it acquires its 
significance to conservative Christians insofar as it is also viewed as a direct 
manifestation of God’s will on earth. As such, American conservatism is articu-
lated specifically as an orientation towards preserving God’s will throughout 
time – i.e., a form of orthodoxy, according to the definition employed by Brophy 
(2016), introduced above.
 
Comments 7.2B.1 and 7.2B.2 were both posted in direct response to 7.2A. The 
former expresses clear disagreement with the propositions set out in Conway’s 
reported statement, which intimated an anti-American motivation in Obama’s 
focus on Russian interference in the 2016 election. This first of the two re-
sponses claims access to “the facts” regarding the reality of Russian interfer-
ence, as confirmed by both the FBI and CIA, proposing that the hacking was 
something Trump was “well aware of.” Comment 7.2B.1 thus demonstrates a 
form of contestatory performance that was noted in Chapter 5, i.e., presenting 
oneself as privy to the hidden truth underlying dominant political and media nar-
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ratives. In so doing, whilst addressing “You losers and Kelly” [sic], it also draws 
on themes of childishness through the use of insulting language: "Does the 
phrase: ”GROW UP” mean anything to you kiddies?” Comment 7.2B.1 thus 
calls into question the capacity of the author’s opponents to engage in public 
discourse at an adult level. However, it draws on manifestly conspiratorial 
themes whilst doing so.
By contrast, comment 7.2B.2 indicates support for the initial comment whilst 
also using insulting language that refers to the rational capacities of liberals. In 
commending the initial comment, 7.2B.2 sets out an antagonistic characterisa-
tion of the liberal mind as “irrational” and incapable of comprehending the logic 
of the well thought out ideas and arguments presented in user commentary. In 
so doing, however, it presents a metacommentary on the poetics of protest dis-
course and the language of political activism, remarking not only on the deft-
ness with which an utterance can be recycled and recirculated in the context of 
protest and dissent, but also on the inherently “dishonest” character of liberal 
political talk. This comment thus serves as a further instantiation of claims re-
garding the corruption and deviousness of political opponents discussed in 
Chapter 5.
Comment 7.2B.2 thus can be seen to articulate an antagonistic frontier between 
liberals and conservatives through a metapragmatic focus on practices of politi-
cal communication. That is, it offers a highly partisan commentary on how politi-
cal talk is to be judged. In that regard, it is important to note that this latter of the 
two responses sets forth the user’s support for the analysis presented in the ini-
tial comment, including its postulations regarding the Founding Fathers’ inten-
tions and the role of divine providence in shaping the emergence of American 
nationhood. This comment thus points to the relevance of jeremiad rhetoric to 
my analysis.
Amongst scholars of jeremiad rhetoric, providence serves a focal point in the 
emergence of an American identity (Murphy, 2009, p. 11). In a related manner, it 
also figures centrally in Taylor’s (2002) analysis of the development of modern 
social imaginaries. Insofar as they entail visions of the moral order of society, 
social imaginaries can be viewed as crystallisations of hegemonic discourse. 
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Taylor argues that with the development of modern social imaginaries, the no-
tion of providence is reframed in distinctly economic terms (C. Taylor, 2002, p. 
102). The concept of providence as it pertains to American origin myths is thus 
deeply inflected by notions of both material productivity and mutual interdepen-
dency, which insinuate a commentary on “economic venture within a larger spir-
itual narrative” (Bercovitch, 2012, p. xiii). If the move towards a more economic 
notion of providence is fundamental to the emergence of modern social imagi-
naries, in the US that transformation can be seen to be at least in part facilitated 
by jeremiad rhetoric, which is animated by the opposition it articulates between 
profanation and (re-)sanctification. 
Comment 7.1, above, employs a set of key contrasts to articulate a series of 
oppositions and alignments between Glenn Beck, Donald Trump, the Founding 
Fathers, and Jesus Christ. Comment 7.2A, on the other hand, sets out an array 
of contrasts between Obama and the Founding Fathers in order to support a set 
of claims about their imagined intentions – in this case set out as fact. Following 
on from these examples, comment 7.3 demonstrates both the use of contrast as 
a rhetorical device and prominent claims about the aims and intentions of Amer-
ica’s Founders. 
Posted on 27 September, 2016 in response to a story detailing statements 
made by Hillary Clinton indicating her support for stricter background checks for 
gun-owners (Schallhorn, 2016), comment 7.3 reads:
The founders of this nation, being fresh out of a revolutionary war and life 
under an oppressive regime, guaranteed the right to keep and bear arms 
with the intent that every citizen be a part of a standing militia to protect us 
from oppression by the federal government of the United States of Ameri-
ca. The Constitution created a series of checks and balances to limit the 
federal government's ability to oppress American citizens. The right to 
keep and bear arms is the final check on the power of politicians. That is 
exactly why liberal politicians are trying to take away guns. They don't care 
about murder victims, they want to be able to reign supreme and to usurp 
all of the people's power without fear of retribution. 500 million guns in the 
hands of Americans will even make Hillary think twice about screwing over 
America. [sic]
Comment 7.3 27 September, 2016
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As in both prior examples, comment 7.3 articulates an antagonism between the 
Founding Fathers and contemporary political figures – in this case “liberal politi-
cians.” As was demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6 regarding audience perspec-
tives on media content, the comment also asserts special insight on the part of 
the comment author by advancing an interpretation of the aims and intentions of 
the Founding Fathers that links the Second Amendment to the traditional 
checks and balances of the US government – i.e., separation of powers, etc. 
Here, it is declared that the objective of these acts was to “protect us from op-
pression by the Federal Government of the United States of America” [empha-
sis added], thus articulating an antagonistic relation between government and 
citizenry. However, by presenting the claim that liberal politicians "don't care 
about murder victims,” the comment also re-articulates an array of ideas regard-
ing partisan attitudes towards political and moral questions of law and order, 
whilst simultaneously reproducing “good guy with a gun" narratives that are 
linked to hegemonic notions of masculinity in the context of American gun cul-
ture (A. Stroud, 2012). In this view, it is not the presence of guns that is a threat, 
but rather their absence. This comment presents attitudes towards law and or-
der in populist terms that portray liberals not only as oppressors but also as 
morally culpable in their perceived disregard for the physical safety of the Amer-
ican citizenry. 
There are important racial undertones to such claims. “As recently as the 2008 
election,” Drakulich et al. (2020, p. 375) write, “a strong connection remained 
between implicit racial antipathy and support for law-and-order rhetoric and 
policies.” Law and order discourse can be seen in this sense to map structural 
issues onto street crime. Murakawa (2012) addressees this issue with reference 
to Stuart Scheingold’s (1984, p. 68) notion of the “myth of crime and punish-
ment,” which viewed the politics of law and order as the “projection of personal 
insecurities into the policy arena.’’ She argues, “insecurities about seemingly 
intractable structural problems are condensed onto street crime, where harsh 
punishment to the individual lawbreaker provides a much-needed illusion of 
control” (Murakawa, 2012, p. 1010). This further relates to the rhetorical strate-
gies of racialising danger and couching threat in partisan terms discussed by 
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Abramowitz and Webster (2018), raised in Chapter 4 (see discussion of com-
ments 4.13A and 4.13B pp. 132-134).
Insofar as the intended function of the Second Amendment remains a matter of 
public and historical debate, beliefs about gun ownership and its regulation can 
be seen to have a partisan character. Gun rights advocates assert that gun 
rights are natural rights, supported by the Constitution, and subject to an 
agreement with government, which may renege on that agreement (Lunceford, 
2015, p. 335).  In this context, comment 7.3 stipulates the Founding Fathers’ 68
intent that “every citizen be a part of a standing militia,” with the aim of limiting 
the federal government’s ability to oppress citizens. On this point, Lunceford 
(2015, p. 335) highlights the widespread belief that the Second Amendment af-
firms and guarantees the right to rebel against government tyranny, which he 
characterises as a myth that figures centrally not only in right-wing gun rights 
discourse, as promoted by the National Rifle Association (NRA), but also in 
children’s stories, such as My Parents Open Carry (Jeffs, Nephew, & Bergman, 
2011, p. 10). 
By contrast, comment 7.3 infers that liberal politicians can be judged in terms of 
their purported intention to “take away guns,” the aim of which is to “reign 
supreme and to usurp all of the people’s power without fear of retribution.” This 
assertion is accompanied by a powerful image of "500 million guns in the hands 
of Americans” serving as a check on Hillary’s intention to “screw over America.” 
This statement infers that political disagreements are resolvable through guns, 
which are further seen to guarantee a citizen’s capacity to resist oppression. 
This comment thus closes with an allusion to “Second Amendment remedies,” a 
rhetorical strategy which draws on the proposition that “any American with a gun 
can take up arms against his or her government” (Lunceford, 2011, p. 37). 
Comment 7.3 demonstrates a view of the relation between past, present, and 
future that is deeply rooted in a specifically conservative reading of the Constitu-
tion and the objectives of America’s Founders, particularly on the issue of gun 
 It should be noted that a “states’ rights” interpretation views the Second Amendment 68
as granting rights to states, as opposed to individuals (Reynolds & Kates, 1994). The 
meaning is thus contested.
	 	 228
rights. Yet, it should be noted that gun rights have not been universally enjoyed, 
even in the context of the Second Amendment. Throughout the history of the 
United States, various groups have been denied access to owning firearms, 
frequently on the basis of race (Winkler, 2011, p. 116). This argument is under-
lined by Burbick (2006, p. 23), who further recognises a gendered dimension of 
this limited access to gun ownership:
By making the gun debate rest on individual rights alone, we have torn the 
debate from the historical struggle of minorities and women to gain the 
protection of the government. 
Burbick (2006) here highlights how gun rights discourse historically downplays 
the cultural importance of the disarming of African-Americans to many white 
Americans. Contemporary re-tellings of American origin myths should be under-
stood not only in the context of such competing claims but also in terms of the 
constructions of whiteness on which those claims to rights rest.
In that regard, according to Friedman (1992), both history and discourse about 
its production are positional phenomena. That is history, as a discursive con-
struct, is at once socially constituted and constitutive of the spaces within which 
identity is articulated. As can be seen in comment 7.3, the particularly conserva-
tive construction of an idealised political past built around the aims of the 
Founding Fathers serves to occlude a variety of historical transformations in the 
application of Constitutional protections. Indeed, this also speaks to broader 
processes of cultural forgetting in which myths of the Founding of America 
erase nuances regarding not only the religious attitudes of the Founding Fa-
thers,  but also the fact that gun laws have always been applied in an uneven 69
manner (L. L. Miller, 2010).
Moving on from questions of gun rights, comments 7.4A and 7.4B also demon-
strate a particular vision of the Constitution and the intention of the Founding 
Fathers. The pair of comments were posted in response to a story about the 
cost to the taxpayer of Barack Obama and his family’s vacation time throughout 
his Presidency (Goins-Phillips, 2016c). They read:
 See Harris and Kidd (2011) for a historical overview of the individual religious atti69 -
tudes of the Founding Fathers.
	 	 229
This is simply unconscionable. Federal overreach and misappropriation of 
monies, the federal debt… The Founding Fathers meant for most of the 
power to reside in the states. However they knew a day would come when 
the federal government would become too powerful. Therefore they wrote 
Article V of the Constitution to allow We the People to petition the state 
legislatures to call for a Convention of States to propose amendments to 
rein in the federal government and return power to the states. Learn more 
and sign the petition at http://www.conventionofstates.com [sic]
Comment 7.4A 8 December, 2016
Don’t be foolish enough to allow yourselves to be tricked into opening 
up the Constitution to changes. It won’t stop at Federal Overreach folks! 
This WILL set a precedence for changing the Constitution! [sic]
Comment 7.4B 28 December, 2016
As with comment 7.3, above, comment 7.4A portrays the Constitution as a 
check on the power of the federal government. Furthermore, the comment simi-
larly claims insight into the subjective states of the Founding Fathers. In this 
case, however, the focus is on how the framers of the Constitution intended 
“most of the power to reside in the states.” A further tension is foregrounded 
here: the opposition between states’ rights and the power of the federal gov-
ernment. 
States’ rights have been a key tenet of American conservatism throughout its 
history (Chemerinsky, 2005), but they also figure centrally as a trope in more 
recent political discourse. Amongst the Tea Party movement, for example, ar-
guments privileging states’ rights have been shown to be rooted primarily in 
fears about overreach by the federal government as well as its failure to repre-
sent the people, amongst other factors (Courser, 2012). In that regard, there are 
significant similarities between the populist claims made by Tea Partiers and 
those made by Donald Trump throughout his 2016 campaign (Rohlinger & Bun-
nage, 2017). In much the same way, Glenn Beck is likewise seen to have 
helped to create some of the rhetorical conditions for Donald Trump’s rise to 
power (C. A. Young, 2019, p. 109). In both cases, states’ rights have continued 
to constitute a core feature of assertions regarding the Constitutionally-assured 
limits of governmental authority. 
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If comment 7.4A looks to the past to create a sense of the political present, it 
does so by asserting an image of the Founding Fathers’ supposed vision of 
their own political future – the certain arrival of a day when “the federal govern-
ment would become too powerful.” This fear of an inevitable infringement of the 
rights of the states is proposed as the motivating factor for the authoring of Arti-
cle V of the Constitution. Comment 7.4A thus argues Article V permits “We the 
People” to call a Convention of States in the interest of proposing Constitutional 
amendments. The aim of such action is explicitly outlined: “to rein in the federal 
government and return power to the states.”  A tension is here palpable be70 -
tween the suggestion that an amendment is necessary to safeguard the states 
from government overreach and the need for the original text of the Constitution 
to be preserved in perpetuity.
The relation between Christian theology and understandings of the Constitu-
tional basis of American government and civil society must here be remarked. 
The maintenance of orthodoxy, which characterises conservative Protestantism, 
relies on the anticipation of future threats (Brophy, 2016). Building on the analy-
sis presented in foregoing chapters and the empirical data of the current chap-
ter, that threat is seen to be articulated in antagonistic terms that map along 
partisan lines. In its articulation of American nationhood as fundamentally Chris-
tian and divine, conservatism operates on a specific temporal projection of the 
past into present and onto the future, sharing key elements of “temporal narra-
tive” (Brophy, 2016) with jeremiad rhetoric. At the same time, the past of Christ-
ian conservatism is not timeless but is rather discursively rooted in the moment 
of the Founding, which transposes the mythical time of the Bible to the historical 
time – i.e., "literal chronological history” – of American civil society (Smith, 1971, 
p. 138).
Recalling public contention over the origins of the Second Amendment, the ob-
jectives of Article V are also a matter of debate and disagreement. Whereas 
comment 7.4A proposes Article V’s role in ensuring that states and “We the 
people” can act against oppression by the federal government, scholars of 
 Notably, Article V of the Constitution of the United States entails two methods for 70
proposing amendments. Whilst a Convention of States is one mechanism, the Consti-
tution also affords the same power to the US Congress (Rogers, 2007).
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Constitutional law also highlight its relation to the framers’ simple recognition of 
the imperfection of their work (see for example Levinson, 1995). The public con-
testation of the meaning of Article V thus also assumes a partisan character, as 
with disagreement regarding the aims and extent of the Second Amendment.
In this case, the user’s explicit support for a Convention of States was ex-
pressed numerous times throughout the comment thread, with multiple com-
ments posted calling for this course of action, each time linking to the same on-
line “convention of states” petition. As comment 7.4B demonstrates, however, 
this position was not necessarily supported by other users, with the author of 
this reply warning against opening the Constitution to changes. This response 
thus entails not only a particular orientation towards the past, but also indicates 
a specific image of the future, as evidenced in fears expressed about what 
“WILL” happen if one sets a precedent for permitting Constitutional amend-
ments. By presenting their vision of a future in which precedent opens the Con-
stitution to further review, and highlighting the perceived threat this would entail, 
this comment draws attention to the fact that the question of Constitutional 
amendment remains fraught amongst those who demonstrate the kind of per-
formative alignment with Constitutional principles that was seen as diagnostic of 
constitutional conservatism in example 7.1, above.
Examples in this section have demonstrated the rhetorical role of contrasts be-
tween key political actors, both historical and contemporary. At the root of these 
oppositions is the contested imaginary of a society founded on divine provi-
dence, a notion that is powerfully inflected with both economic and religious el-
ements. The Constitution is understood in this context as an expression of 
God’s will towards a materially productive bounty, as much as it is seen to en-
textualise both the intentions of the Founding Fathers and the will of the people. 
At the same time, discussion of the Founding Fathers encodes a particular con-
struction of the Founders’ intentions that views them as actively seeking to 
thwart the federal government. Against this background, one can begin to an-
alyse how commenters construct the choices available to conservatives in the 
political present.
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7.3 Present – 2016 as a “binary” election
It has been established that party identification has a direct bearing on how vot-
ers understand the nature of the political choices that are available to them.  71
Party identification is likewise implicated in processes of partisan polarisation, 
both ideological and affective. The American two-party system thus has impor-
tant theoretical and methodological implications for this research. At the same 
time, it is clear that Trump, widely recognised as “not a politician” (John Street, 
2018), entered the Republican primaries as a party outsider (Cohen, Karol, 
Noel, & Zaller, 2016). In so doing, he benefitted from and actively sought to res-
onate with a wave of anti-establishment sentiment (Schrock et al., 2018). In that 
regard, claims about the binary nature of the 2016 US presidential election and 
the polarisation of choice it represents have been a prominent theme through-
out this thesis, one which was raised specifically in my analysis of comments 
6.4, 6.7, and 6.14A in the previous chapter. Here, I will further develop this 
analysis by examining user-generated commentary on the role of the US 
Supreme Court in protecting the legacy of the United States’ Founding Docu-
ments and forestalling the perceived threat posed by non-conservative politics.
To begin, comment 7.5 was posted in response to a previously-cited story re-
porting on Trump’s Venezuela claims (Goins-Phillips, 2016d). The comment 
reads:
Thanks [user] for the insulting tone. Maybe you should take those crayons 
and color in your coloring book. You are wrong as all you third party peo-
ple are. And, I agree with Sean Hannity. You guys own everything Hillary 
does if she becomes president. All her supreme court nominees, and 
higher taxes, and America's decline. You guys own it. Don’t damn insult 
me. Your guy didn’t win; so, you act like freaking little children and whine 
and cry. Sick of it. [sic]
Comment 7.5 10 September, 2016
Like the first example presented at the start of this chapter, comment 7.5 is ex-
plicitly addressed to another user. In this case, however, the addressed user is 
classed amongst a broader group of “third party” voters to whom the comment 
 See, for example, my discussion of Thomassen and Rosema (2009) in Chapter 2 71
(see section 2.2.2 pp. 50-53).
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is also addressed, as indicated by the rebuke “You are wrong as all you third 
party people are.” Whilst speaking to the aftermath of the contentious Republi-
can primary process, this comment clearly establishes the binary nature of the 
Presidential election. In that sense, the admonishment “Your guy didn’t win” 
refers to Ted Cruz, Trump’s erstwhile rival for the Republican nomination, who 
was, as seen in the previous chapter, the primary candidate for whom Glenn 
Beck had expressed explicit support. The choice is thus either Hillary Clinton or 
Donald Trump. 
Underlining the ramifications of a Clinton win, comment 7.5 postulates a set of 
specific outcomes, including “her supreme court nominees, higher taxes, and 
America’s decline.” These will be the fault of those who vote for a third party 
candidate, with the comment stressing, “You guys own it” – not “us”, not “we the 
people.” Considering these potential outcomes, discursively constructed as cer-
tainties, this comment highlights the perceived childishness of resistance to 
Trump, e..g, “act like freaking children,” “take those crayons and collar in your 
colouring book” [sic]. As noted above, this occurs in the aftermath of the Repub-
lican primary process.
In the literature on political polarisation in the US, primary elections have been 
proposed as an important indicator of the ideological movement of both the Re-
publican and Democratic parties (Boatright, 2017, p. 4). In that regard, anti-es-
tablishment forces can have a powerful impact on party agendas. In the case of 
the Republican Party, this had already been demonstrated by the substantial 
effect of Tea Party movement support on Republican primary contests during 
the 2010 congressional midterm elections (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, & 
Pope, 2011, p. 304). This vulnerability to "extreme factions" was further illustrat-
ed with the creation of the House Freedom Caucus in 2015, which formalised 
an effective voting bloc within the House of Representatives, further pushing 
Republican policy to the right through the entrenchment of a conservative 
agenda (A. J. Clarke, n.d., p. 21). Horwitz (2013, p. 2) even goes so far as to 
claim that the “‘anti-establishment’ right wing now defines American conser-
vatism.” Nevertheless, the 2016 primaries and the NeverTrump movement they 
inspired demonstrate that important cleavages still exist. 
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With reference to such factionalism, comment 7.5 articulates a set of nested in-
tra- and extra-party oppositions that have direct relevance to the discursive 
construction of conservatism. Republican voters are exhorted to unify and move 
past the factional rivalries that are seen to constitute a real and present danger 
to the American way of life. This calls to mind other instances of demands to 
disregard long-established principles encountered in the data (see, for example, 
comment 6.7 pp. 195-197).  Such exhortations could be viewed as conflicting 72
with demands to preserve orthodox conservative practices and beliefs from the 
past into the future.
Another domain where the conservation of past into the present and future is 
considered vital is the selection of judges for the Supreme Court. In that regard, 
the argument presented in comment 7.5, above, stipulates that disagreement 
must be stopped and conservatives must get in line, considering the implica-
tions of voter behaviour on the Court’s composition. In the following set of 
comments, it is similarly suggested that whilst the 2016 US presidential election 
may be binary in nature, one issue predominates: the Supreme Court. The 
comments read:
I'm a one issue voter: The Supreme Court. Trump will appoint for sure 1, if 
not two in his first term. It's a no brainer for me who to I'm voting for. [sic]
Comment 7.6A 23 September, 2016
yup, and hillary will appoint anti-Constitutional judges, thats 100% cer-
tain. [sic]
Comment 7.6B.1 23 September, 2016
Thank God in heaven, you are one of the few who get it. Unfortunately 
there Will be 3 maybe 4 New Ginsburgs on the court within The first 4 
years if she wins...They will rule 6-3 for 35 years. [sic]
Comment 7.6B.2 23 September, 2016
 The intra-group conflict of which these debates are symptomatic are indicative of a 72
factionalism that would also have an impact on how Donald Trump would govern after 
his election, insofar as “a president’s relation to factions within his party ... shapes his 
policy priorities, strategies, and governing tactics” (DiSalvo, 2012, p. 114). This speaks 
to the lamination, i.e., layering, of oppositions that are deployed in the formulation of 
conservative subject positions, as discussed in Chapter 4.
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yup, and under a hillary appointed SCOTUS, the liberal states will 
start complete gun bans for ALL their citizens. As its unonstitutional 
to ignore the second amendment, it will get taken to the supreme 
court, where hillary's judges will allow it. once a few states have done 
gun bans (and had their bans allowed under hillary's SCOTUS) 
hillary will take gun bans nationwide. and just like that, hillary will de-
feat the second amendment for good (and the rest of our freedoms 
will soon follow). the USA will be nothing more than a european-style 
socialist democracy ruled by the elite class in only a few years if 
hillary wins. [sic]
Comment 7.6C 24 September, 2016
Generally speaking, it is understood to be the case that the appointment of a 
new Supreme Court justice can “move constitutional doctrine and judicial policy-
making in new directions” (Baugh, Smith, Hensley, & Johnson, 1994, p. 2). In 
that regard, it is not entirely surprising that the capacity of an individual judge to 
affect the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution figures centrally in state-
ments made by commenters pertaining to their fears about what a future 
Supreme Court might look like – in this case the idea that Clinton will appoint “3 
maybe 4 New Ginsburgs on the court” during her first term.  This is particularly 73
so when one considers the potentially generational character of a Supreme 
Court justice’s term. The relationship between voter behaviour and the composi-
tion of the Supreme Court articulated by commenters underlines the perceived 
long-term impact of the choice to be made by voters during the 2016 Presiden-
tial election. In that regard, comment 7.6B.2 envisages the court ruling “6-3 for 
35 years.”
To provide some context to anxiety about transformations in the composition of 
the Supreme Court, it might be useful to refer to an example from recent history, 
when conservative fears about “activist,” i.e., empathetic (Hess & Sobre-Den-
ton, 2014, p. 11), judges characterised the confirmation hearings of Justice 
 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was appointed to the Court by President Bill Clinton. 73
She assumed office on 10 August, 1993 as the first Supreme Court Justice appointed 
by a Democratic President since the nomination of Justice Thurgood Marshall by Pres-
ident Lyndon Johnson in 1967 (Baugh et al., 1994, p. 3). Over the course of her time 
on the Court, Justice Ginsburg has demonstrated a distinctly liberal voting pattern 
(Daneshvar & Smith, 2017). However, at the time of her appointment, Ginsburg por-
trayed herself as a moderate. This position was supported by her performance as an 
appellate judge (Baugh et al., 1994, p. 7). Justice Ginsburg died on 18 September, 
2020 and was succeeded on the Court by President Trump's nominee, Justice Amy 
Coney Barrett.
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Sonya Sotomayor. Justice Sotomayor was appointed to the Court by President 
Barack Obama in 2009 at a time of pervasive, if somewhat premature, claims 
that America had entered a post-racial era (Dawson & Bobo, 2009; Halewood, 
2009). During the confirmation process, Justice Sotomayor was famously en-
joined by Republican senators to “set aside” her gender and ethnicity in order to 
ensure her impartiality (Hess & Sobre-Denton, 2014, p. 11). Likewise, press 
coverage of Justice Sotomayor has been shown to have negatively focused on 
race and gender, whilst her intellectual abilities and experience were down-
played (Towner & Clawson, 2016). The Sotomayor hearings thus set in relief 
public perceptions linking white masculinity with neutrality and, consequently, 
impartiality and objectivity (Hess & Sobre-Denton, 2014). 
These notions of neutrality can be understood in terms of what critical white-
ness literature terms the invisibility of whiteness (Dyer, 2005). There are funda-
mental power dynamics that animate this process of erasure of whiteness as a 
marked category. As argued by Dyer (1988, p. 44) “white power secures its 
dominance by seeming not to be anything in particular.” “The claim to power,” 
he later proposed, “is the claim to speak for the commonality of 
humanity” (Dyer, 2005, p. 10) – that is, hegemony, in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
(2001) terms. Nevertheless, the invisibility of whiteness is an ineluctably a racial 
position (Dyer, 2005, p. 11), albeit one which seeks to define itself as coexten-
sive with and indeed characteristic of the human condition. The hegemonic di-
mensions of such struggles to define the content of neutrality (i.e., partisan, 
racial) are revealed in powerful ways when viewed in the context of contestation 
over “control” of the US Supreme Court.
Comment 7.6C is more specific again, speaking in terms of specific legislative 
outcomes. The comment predicts an outright ban on guns, driven initially by the 
liberal states, but bolstered by a Supreme Court shaped by Clinton appointees. 
It is thus claimed that the election of Hillary Clinton would signify the defeat of 
the Second Amendment, which is portrayed as a bulwark against other forms of 
government oppression – i.e., as a means of protecting “the rest of our free-
doms.” The imagined ramifications are stark: the USA will quickly become a “eu-
ropean-style socialist democracy ruled by the elite class” [sic]. Comment 7.6C 
thus gives an indication of the kinds of imaginaries of ideal politics that are be-
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ing articulated by commenters, defined negatively against the (imagined) model 
of European-style socialism. 
Comment 7.7 demonstrates a similar anxiety over the fate of the Supreme 
Court. As with comment 7.5, above, this comment was also composed both as 
a direct response to a user who wrote critically of Donald Trump and as a more 
general address to others. Posted in response to Goins-Phillips’ (2016d) article 
reporting Trump’s claim that the US would become “another Venezuela,” the 
comment reads:
[User], and all others. People are projecting what Trump may do. "Your 
Fear"...That's just it. We know without a doubt if Hillary wins there goes 
SCOTUS as the article says. There is no turning back. Please people re-
think this. This election is about ONE THING ONLY. SCOTUS. We can find 
someone after Trump. But not if Hillary wins because that is GAME, SET, 
And MATCH! [sic]
Comment 7.7 10 September, 2016
Whilst the comment fails to offer unqualified support for Trump’s candidacy, it 
does propose a key distinction between Trump and Clinton: when people talk 
about what Trump will do as President, they are projecting based on fear, 
whereas people can speak “without a doubt” about what Hillary Clinton will 
achieve. That is, her election will lead to the remaking of the Supreme Court 
and, by extension, the Constitution. It is furthermore asserted that whilst any 
damage done by Trump could be rectified once he leaves office, Clinton’s im-
pact would be enduring. Once again, whilst there is a binary choice to be made, 
it is claimed the election is about “ONE THING ONLY”: the Supreme Court. In 
making this argument, the comment draws on the notion that Clinton’s election 
would be a catastrophic turning point for America, one which must be avoided 
at all costs.
Of course, the 2016 US presidential election didn’t lead to a Clinton presidency. 
Donald Trump was elected on 9 November, 2016 and was inaugurated on 20 
January, 2017. The following day, TheBlaze staff writer Sarah Lee (2017) wrote 
of “two Americas” meeting in Washington, moving the discussion from the no-
tion of a binary election to a pair of antagonistic factions that needed uniting 
post-inauguration. The final examples in this section were posted in response to 
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Lee's article. They consist of a pair of comments (i.e., a comment anresponse) 
followed by a separate individual comment. They read:
I find the title TWO Americas very disturbing. There are not two Americas. 
Blaze you need to get your S..t together! [sic]
Comment 7.8A 21 January, 2017
There is the real America and the fake Americans who are going to get 
their ass kicked over and over again. I think these liberal losers have 
awoken a sleeping tiger. [sic]
Comment 7.8B 22 January, 2017
”But he’ll have to do some uniting of the two Americas” – I have reserva-
tions about the statement ”Two America’s”. There is only one America. The 
civil America which holds the Constitution as its law of the land. That ”oth-
er America” isn’t America at all. Its some deep dark perversion of socialism 
and anarchism or something. I’m not quite sure what to call it, but I do 
know it isn’t ”American”. [sic]
Comment 7.9 21 January, 2017
In the first instance, comment 7.8A reacts negatively to the story, focusing di-
rectly not on the claim per se but on the manner in which it is produced as a 
media output. The comment thus begins with a commentary on the title of the 
story, which is found to be “very disturbing,” rather than the claim itself. On the 
matter of the claim, the user simply expresses that there are not two Americas, 
before admonishing TheBlaze regarding its editorial and journalistic standards 
with the declaration: “Blaze you need to get you S..t together!” [sic]. Comment 
7.8B responds somewhat less resolutely, engaging to a greater extent with the 
actual notion that there might be two Americas. Nevertheless, there is some 
pushback. Rather than two Americas, the comment proposes, there is a “real 
America” and “fake Americans.” This distinction is attributed distinctly partisan 
dimensions through the link it establishes between “fake Americans” and “liberal 
losers” who, it is claimed, have “awoken a sleeping tiger” through their opposi-
tion to Donald Trump’s candidacy and, later, presidency. In this case, the elec-
tion of President Trump is portrayed as an indicator of some sort of significant 
recalibration in American political life, marking the end of the Obama era and 
eight years of Democratic control of the Executive branch of government.
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Whilst also expressing unease regarding the claim that there are two Americas, 
comment 7.9 is nevertheless forceful in its interpretation of how Lee’s notion of 
two Americas might be read. The distinction is thus clarified to obtain between 
the “civil America,” built around a set of beliefs regarding the fundamental role 
of the Constitution, and some “other America” that “isn't America at all.” In this 
comment, it is possible to appreciate a mapping of key antagonisms onto a 
reading of the social and political implications of democratic processes – in this 
case the election of President Donald Trump. Socialists and anarchists who op-
pose President Trump – i.e., Clinton voters, by the logic of a binary election – 
are here cast as Other. This is a discursive act that articulates a particular vision 
of an authentic America, one which explicitly reproduces the antagonistic fron-
tiers that have been the focus of my analysis throughout this thesis. In that re-
gard, it is important to note the manner in which this comment portrays Ameri-
can politics not as a struggle between legitimate alternatives but as motivated 
solely by the preservation of the Constitution, once again highlighting the role of 
orthodox temporal narratives in the performance of conservative identity in my 
dataset. 
The temporal narratives of American conservatism resonate deeply with rhetori-
cal structures of the jeremiad. For Murphy (2009), jeremiad rhetoric has the ca-
pacity to reshape American politics. However, at the heart of the jeremiad is a 
set of judgments, rooted in in the past, about “what counts as authentically 
American” (Murphy, 2009, p. 169). Whilst deploying a jeremiad framework, the 
above examples present a vision of American past, present, and future that ex-
cludes a plurality of political ideologies, in the process representing conser-
vatism as the legitimate worldview. By implication, opposing viewpoints are 
deemed to be illegitimate. This indicates the perception of a "relation of antago-
nism” (Mouffe, 1998, p. 16), one which is established with regard to political op-
ponents, both real and imagined.
The Supreme Court of the United States plays a fundamental role in the inter-
pretation of the US Constitution, but it also figures centrally in contestation over 
“a more acceptable constitutional future” (Levinson, 1999, p. 211). It is in this 
context that the examples in this section focus heavily on the strategic value of 
the US Supreme Court. In these examples, one can appreciate the manner in 
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which current political conditions and concerns, here predominantly presented 
in terms of a binary election, are conceived not only with reference to the Amer-
ican past but also an imagined future. This discursive orientation towards the 
future will be the focus of the following section.
7.4 Future – apocalyptic rhetorics of decay and degra-
dation
Thus far in this chapter, I have focused on how readings of the past draw on 
temporal narratives that see it as fundamental to the political present. However, 
I have also introduced the notion that projections into the future similarly play a 
role in presenting what is at stake in preserving the American way of life. This 
orientation towards futurity will be the focus of this section. I begin this discus-
sion by noting the online political talk of commenters is characterised in part by 
frequently dramatic claims about the impending destruction of America and the 
American way of life. For Dunmire, “the future is an important site of political, 
ideological, and material contest” (2019, p. 2), one which constitutes an impor-
tant element of American national identity. However, research also demon-
strates that the way in which people imagine the future animates social practice 
in the present (Tavory & Eliasoph, 2013).
According to Ritter (1980, p. 169), exhortations to “view the present in terms of 
myths of the American past and American future” are characteristic of jeremiad 
rhetoric. Although the jeremiad is a form of rhetoric associated with American 
religious and political leaders, this chapter seeks to examine how elements of 
jeremiad rhetoric pervade the online political talk of commenters. The rhetorical 
deployment of antagonistic imaginaries of national apocalypse and repentance 
will therefore be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
Comment 7.10 was posted in response to Goins-Phillips’ (2016b) article dis-
cussing Glenn Beck’s reaction to Ted Cruz’s public statement of support for 
Trump’s candidacy. Responses to this article feature prominently in my empiri-
cal analysis and constituted a significant proportion of my data. The comment 
reads:
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Glenn it is called Settling, coming to terms with a choice that involves the 
lesser of two evils, one very great evil Globalist Witch vs. a vindictive 
megalomaniac oligarch type who could give a wit about the US Constitu-
tion. In the end if the oligarch wins, the US will likely survive with or without 
its Constitution intact. If the Globalist Witch wins, the US will be An-
schlussed into global government within four years. If the oligarch wins, 
the US will resist the worldwide pressure to establish global government. 
So I choose the oligarch/ Caudillo orange haired guy. Is this the end of 
America as a Republic? Time will tell. So head for the lake or the moun-
tains on November 9th after voting for the vindictive megalomaniac oli-
garch. Pray that America's Manchurian lame duck President does not have 
him killed during the transition. [sic]
Comment 7.10 24 September, 2016
Comment 7.10 represents another example of the propensity for users to ad-
dress themselves directly to Glenn Beck. As with many of the previous exam-
ples I have presented, this comment is also formulated as an admonishment 
that Beck must make a difficult but unavoidable choice – in this case between a 
“vindictive megalomaniac oligarch” (i.e., Trump) and a “very great evil Globalist 
Witch” (i.e., Clinton). Insofar as it has already been established that invocations 
of Beck as a participant also serve to simultaneously target the broader audi-
ence (see analysis of comment 6.1 pp. 185-187), this can also be viewed as a 
rebuke to Beck’s supporters and followers, insisting that they, too, must make a 
similar choice.
Such reprovals can be understood in the context of publicly contested claims 
regarding the binary nature of the 2016 election and the demands such a per-
ceived polarisation of choice places on the voter, a matter that was explored in 
the previous section. In this case, the user elaborates on the binary choice be-
tween Trump and Clinton by stipulating a set of propositions regarding what will 
happen as a result of each candidate’s possible election. As was demonstrated 
in a number of earlier examples, the outcomes of the election are once again 
depicted in somewhat uneven terms: the effects of a Trump presidency are in 
the realm of possibility, whilst the effects of a Clinton presidency are in the 
realm of certainty. Insofar as the user proposes a choice that “involves the less-
er of two evils,” it is claimed to be unclear whether America will continue as a 
Republic, whatever the outcome of the election. 
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On one hand, electing Trump is seen to indicate the likely survival of the US, 
“with or without its Constitution intact.” On the other hand, it is asserted that 
electing Clinton will result in the US being “Anschlussed into global government 
within four years.” Within the context of claims being made in this comment re-
garding the kind of threat posed to the US by a Clinton presidency, use of the 
term “Anschlussed” appears important. The term Anschluss, from German, 
most notably refers to the annexation of Austria by Germany in 1938. Its use 
thus evokes a historically-loaded image of forced integration and wartime ex-
pansion of political entities and movements.  However, given its martial refer74 -
ent, the term also has connotations of violent resistance and conflict. 
This comment is notable for the manner in which it presents the US as having 
been subjected to the forces of globalisation, rather than being one of their key 
architects and beneficiaries. Here, “global government” is articulated as a vis-
ceral threat to the US Constitution, one which draws on an image of “shadowy 
groups” engaging in a socialistic plot (Potok, 2003, p. 59).  This particular im75 -
age resonates in significant respects with the Soros myth introduced in Chapter 
4, although it should be noted that outside of conspiratorial narratives, George 
Soros is recognised as a powerful proponent of global capitalism (George E. 
Marcus & Powell, 2003). 
The political economic implications of the reference to “global government” are 
thus palpable. In that regard, Kintz (1998) notes that whilst the United States 
played a key role in propagating a “postwar liberal international order” (Stokes, 
2018, p. 133) by exporting North American-style neoliberal market democracy, 
this process of expansion has had devastating consequences on American 
workers. Following Chomsky, Kintz (1998, p. 5) suggests that political economic 
analysis demands that one recognises the fundamental distinction between the 
 Despite longstanding resistance throughout the 1930s, it is important to note there 74
was a shift in Austrian public opinion towards Nazi support, including support for the 
Anschluss in 1938 (R. Schwarz, 1982).
 According to Potok (2003, p. 59), the emergence of fears regarding the creation of a 75
“socialistic global government” is contemporaneous with the formation of United Na-
tions in 1948, although President George W Bush labeled this notional global govern-
ment the "New World Order” – a phrase which quickly gained currency among the ex-
treme right.
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general population and the “principal architects of policy” (a term Chomsky him-
self borrowed from the work of Adam Smith). This distinction is explicitly centred 
in Donald Trump’s rhetoric of economic nationalism, with its focus on American 
industry (Stokes, 2018). It is thus not surprising to find an intended Trump voter, 
however hesitant, assert that only through the election of Donald Trump as 
President can the forces seeking to “establish global government” effectively be 
resisted.76
However, if the threat to the Constitution manifest in the spectre of global gov-
ernment can be seen to entail economic elements, there is nonetheless more at 
play in fears about the transnational distribution of power than purely economic 
forms of anxiety. For example, the shift towards protectionism, which was 
primed by the Trump campaign, has been shown to be mediated by other de-
mographic factors, including “race, diversity, education, and age” (Noland, 2020, 
p. 33). Indeed, Mutz (2018) has argued that such factors are associated with 
anxieties over perceived threats to group status amongst white voters, indicat-
ing that attitudes towards globalisation may also have racial dimensions.
On the matter of racial conflict, by articulating the concept of a “new Supreme 
Court that allows mass illegal amnesty,” comment 7.11 raises several themes 
that I have already outlined earlier in this chapter. It also speaks to some of the 
same issues of status threat discussed immediately above. The comment 
reads:
He ain't wrong on this one, how are you going to beat the Dems once the 
new Supreme Court allows mass illegal amnesty? You think they're ever 
going to vote conservative when all the programs will be set up to make 
sure they know to "vote for the party comrade, we keep you employed and 
fed." And if you think congress is actually going to stand up to her, they've 
had 6 years to stand u to Obama, we've gotten Gay Marriage, Oba-
macare, and how many other fundamental transformations under that 
strategy. We lose here, the United States of America won't be coming 
back. [sic]
Comment 7.11 11 September, 2016
 This articulation of conservative positioning can be seen as distinct from ear76 -
lier attempts to deflect public anger away from “job exporters and rich tax 
dodgers” and to direct it instead at “at ‘welfare cheats’, women, gays, blacks 
and immigrants” in the form of the Iraq War (Hochschild, 2003, p. 181).
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Whilst in the previous section, my analysis focused on how the Supreme Court 
figured in constructions of a binary election, here the future implications are 
more explicitly outlined in terms that relate a prophesied fate to recent political 
history. A contrast is here established between the Supreme Court as it current-
ly exists and an imagined version of the Court that would be the outcome of a 
Clinton victory in 2016. The comment offers examples of key changes that 
came about under Obama’s leadership as evidence of what could be expected 
from a Clinton presidency, including marriage equality  and the Affordable Care 77
Act.  These changes are tied discursively to Obama’s policy agenda through 78
the use of the term “fundamental transformation,” discussed in the previous sec-
tion (see analysis of comment 7.2A pp. 222-226). 
First and foremost, however, the comment articulates a vitally important con-
spiratorial link between the Democratic Party and so-called illegal immigration 
through the claim that a Supreme Court shaped by Clinton appointees would 
permit a “mass legal amnesty.” This imagined outcome is attributed to cynical 
electoral calculus on the part of the Democrats that would remake American 
demographics in order to ensure the Democratic Party cannot be beaten at the 
polls. 
 This comment attributes the provision of marriage equality in the US to an Obama-77
era policy agenda. More specifically, marriage equality was ultimately achieved through 
constitutional litigation (Eskridge, 2013). This was made possible through the Obama 
administration’s decision not to defend the Defence of Marriage Act (DOMA) in two 
pending DOMA cases, due to their judgment that it represented a violation of the prin-
ciple of equal protection established in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution (Johnsen, 2012, p. 599). DOMA had been passed by the US Congress “in re-
sponse to concerns that Hawaii and other states might recognise same‐sex 
marriage” (J. S. Jackson, 2016, p. 1). It was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on 
21 September, 1996 and was eventually struck down in response to a 2013 ruling by 
the US Supreme Court.
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), colloquially known as “Oba78 -
macare,” was passed by the US Congress in March 2010. Obamacare has been an 
ongoing target of Republican political manoeuvring and a perennial focus of conserva-
tive rhetoric ever since. For example, during the 2016 presidential election campaign, 
Trump declared his intention to “repeal and replace” the ACA (McCarthy, 2016). Never-
theless, at the time of writing, attempts by the Republican Party to either repeal or de-
fund Obama’s signature health reform law have been largely unsuccessful.
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Fears regarding the impact of immigration on the demographic makeup of 
American society, discussed in Chapter 4, were a prominent motor of shifting 
public attitudes throughout the twentieth century, with such anxieties predomi-
nantly manifesting in the form of anger directed towards illegal immigrants (Gal-
ston, 2017, p. 26). Such fears continue to characterise American conservatism 
today (Gries, 2016). For instance, Williamson and Skocpol (2011) argue that 
concern about immigration was central to Tea Party ideology (if the movement 
could be said to have had a unifying ideology), provoking distinctly emotional 
reactions from their survey respondents. In the Trump era, furthermore, atti-
tudes towards immigration have been linked to both racist nativism and white 
supremacy (Huber, 2016).
Insofar as the comment ends with the definitive claim that if this election is lost, 
the “United States of America won’t be coming back,” it appears that such anxi-
eties are still prevalent today. As in comment 7.7, above, losing the election is 
thus portrayed as an irreversible turning point for America. Given the comment’s 
focus on mass illegal amnesty as a key tactic of Democrats, this imagined 
transformation appears to be shaded by distinctly nativist undertones. Here, the 
relation between America and whiteness is rendered implicitly through reference 
to “illegal amnesty", with the related role of Democrats in disrupting the coher-
ence of American nationhood presented explicitly.
Comments also draw on religious themes in articulating an image of a projected 
future. Comment 7.12 is a key example of this.  The comment reads:79
....although widely trashed on theBlaze site for switching from my primary 
candidate to a Trump supporter and attempting to show the hypocrisy of 
Glenn (Alinsky on parade), I have never wavered in my foundational love 
and concern for Glenn...I pray that he may right his ship, learn from his 
mistakes, review the lessons taught and grow... I AM a "2" Corinthians 
Christian and "Constitutional" Conservatives will need ALL the Christians 
that they can muster in the future to save America, her sovereignty and 
 The invocation of the parasocial relation between Glenn Beck and his audience in 79
below-the-line commentary is one of the central themes in my analysis. That theme is 
once again prominent in comment 7.11. Whereas comment 7.10, for example, demon-
strated a more specific form of empathetic interaction, i.e., second-person address, 
comment 7.12 speaks about Beck in the third person, rather than addressing him di-
rectly.
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preserve her founding documents to save Humanity during the perilous 
near future that we face... [sic]
Comment 7.12 16 September, 2016
One of the more notable features of this comment is the manner in which it ex-
plicitly identifies the author as a “‘2’ Corinthians Christian,” thus invoking the 
Second Letter of St Paul to the Corinthians.  This is a form of talk that is asso80 -
ciated specifically with Evangelical Christianity (Martí, 2018). The comment 
therefore features a number of specific assertions of identity that establish no-
table connections between Christian subject positions, support for Donald 
Trump, and critical “concern” for those who continue to resist his candidacy. 
Given the particular racial faultiness that typify African American Christianity and 
White Evangelicalism (Nikides, 2013), such distinctions can also be viewed in 
racial terms. 
Whilst identifying as a “‘2’ Corinthians Christian,” the author of comment 7.12 
also asserts that Christians will be necessary allies of constitutional conserva-
tives.  Here, it is claimed that Christians and conservatives must work together 81
to deal with a perceived threat to America’s “sovereignty" and “her founding 
documents.  Those Founding Documents are here attributed an almost divine 82
power as a fundamental mechanism for saving humanity in the context of an 
 Whilst a central theme in the Second Letter of St Paul to the Corinthians is that of 80
“crisis,” it also focuses heavily on the notion of “new creation” that is brought about by 
the will of God. The idea of “new creation” is described by Hafemann as “a prophecy of 
redemption in which a ‘light will shine’ upon those dwelling in darkness” (1998, p. 249). 
Thus, to identify as a “‘2’ Corinthians Christian,” whilst signalling Evangelical Christiani-
ty, appears to be closely linked to the practice of prognostication, particularly as this 
relates to imaginaries of corruption and salvation.
 This is not a novel proposition. The Christian Right has for several decades been 81
indispensable to the Republican Party’s electoral strategy and has played a fundamen-
tal role in strengthening a conservative political movement in the US (Diamond, 1995, 
p. 6). Wilcox (2016, p. 107) argues that since its inception as a political force, long es-
tablished “truths” regarding the nature of the Christian Right, widely accepted by politi-
cal scientists, have been turned on their head—including the notion that the Christian 
Right are political “purists.” This is no longer seen to be the case. For example, white 
evangelical support for Trump, during the 2016 election and beyond, has puzzled many 
social scientists (Martí, 2018, p. 1).
 The Founding Documents of the United States of America include the US Constitu82 -
tion, the Bill of Rights (which entails the first ten amendments to the US Constitution), 
the Declaration of Independence, and the Federalist Papers (Congress.gov, n.d.).
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undefined “perilous near future.” Unlike other examples I have presented, the 
nature and extent of that threat is not specified in this case. Nevertheless, the 
threat is portrayed as existential, menacing the very survival of America. The 
comment thus adds not only to public contestations over the relation between 
institutional media and user-generated content, on the one hand, and political 
action, on the other; it also asserts their more elemental role vis-à-vis the dis-
cursive production of imaginaries of American apocalypse. 
In the eschatological images of decay and degradation that are emphasised in 
numerous prophetic readings of the outcomes of a Clinton presidency, it is pos-
sible to appreciate prominent elements of jeremiad rhetoric. In that regard, 
Aamodt (2002, p. 3) argues: “Because the apocalypse is so closely tied to the 
concept of the Last Judgment, it is related to jeremiad rhetoric, with its tendency 
to call for repentance and to predict dire consequences if the warning is ig-
nored.” Here, repentance can be achieved through political strategy – by em-
bracing Trump and renouncing Clinton, including those who stand for her and 
the threat they represent. This is presented as the duty of conservatives and 
Christians alike. Such visions of collapse serve to re-articulate antagonistic fron-
tiers through the deployment of jeremiad rhetoric, which discursively aligns 
imaginaries of past, present, and future. 
However, as argued by Mutz (2018), support for Trump in 2016 was also tied in 
important ways to status anxiety that had both racial and gender dimensions. 
The specifically white imaginaries of American apocalypse put forward in my 
sample are shaded in powerful ways by this hegemonic struggle over social po-
sitioning. This white status anxiety contrasts in important ways with the images 
of futurity, transformation, and Black empowerment that characterised the jere-
miad rhetoric of figures such as James Baldwin (Dean, 2016).
Like comment 7.10, above, the final example in this chapter was posted to Tré 
Goins-Phillips’ (2016b) article discussing Glenn Beck’s reaction to Ted Cruz’s 
shifting Trump stance. In particular, the comment seizes on Glenn Beck’s claim, 
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drawn from the Facebook post that featured centrally in Goins-Phillips’ report, 
that “America is an idea, not a country” (G. Beck, 2016).  The comment reads:83
America is an idea, not a country. - This shows the fundamental flaw in 
Beck (and many others) thinking. It is one thing to support an idea, it is 
another to protect a nation built on that idea. Beck would cede the nation 
to those bent on its destruction in order to protect the 'idea'. The problem 
is that failing to protect the nation will see the 'idea' destroyed along with it. 
As those like Clinton and her Globalist ilk gain greater power, you will see 
the 'idea' destroyed or relegated to the dustbin of History. It is no longer 
taught in schools and never mentioned in media. That is by design. Beck 
and those like him preach the idea but fail at every turn to do what is 
needed to protect it and the nation it gave birth to. When the jackboots are 
permitted free reign and history is re-written to appease the socialists 
there is no longer an 'idea', only an agenda. You either fight to preserve 
the nation and thus the idea that spawned it or you surrender and forget 
the idea ever existed. Beck and company would rather surrender and for-
get than fight. They would rather gather at the trough while claiming ever 
higher 'principles' while the nation burns than do what is needed to save it. 
They would sacrifice the nation for their own 'principles' and in doing so 
destroy the very 'idea' they say they wish to protect. They are both selfish 
and clueless, but above all they are cowards. Run to the mountains Beck, 
running is all you know. [sic]
Comment 7.13 24 September, 2016
Focusing on the “fundamental flaw” in Beck’s and others’ contention that Ameri-
ca is an idea, this comment establishes a tension between that idea and the 
practical conditions in which it exists. Here, it is asserted that the idea of Ameri-
ca gave birth to a nation. In that regard, it is something which preceded the 
founding. Bercovitch situates the development of this idea in the “supernatural 
legitimacy” the Puritans accorded to “the Protestant work ethic in the New 
World” (2012, p. xiv). Jeremiad rhetoric played an important role in legitimating 
a new imaginary of society. “It became the office of the jeremiad,” he argues, “to 
ritualise that configuration of spiritual and worldly ends into an identity for an 
emergent modern country” (Bercovitch, 2012, p. xiv). At the root of this national 
 In his Facebook post, Beck also invoked the Founding Fathers. Like numerous ex83 -
amples presented in this chapter, Beck used his post to proclaim a special understand-
ing of what the Founding Fathers meant when they spoke. I here present a small snip-
pet of the post to give a greater sense of the context: “America is an idea, not a coun-
try. When we discuss the destruction of our country, that is vastly different than the de-
struction of an idea. I fear the idea is already lost, due to the panic of losing ones com-
fort and country. There are many things that I believe that I will never say, but I shall 
never say the things I do not believe. Come what may. The founders meant it much dif-
ferently when they said: join or die” (G. Beck, 2016).
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identity was a particular capitalist way of life that became encoded as the Amer-
ican Dream – where “‘dream,’ as prophecy, held a material promise (‘golden 
opportunity’), and where ‘America,’ as this nation, represented the last best 
hope of mankind” [emphasis in original] (Bercovitch, 2012, p. xiv). 
However, this formulation can also be seen to have specifically racial dimen-
sions. The curious coalescing of spiritualism and capitalism that animates the 
American Dream relates primarily to white forms of Protestantism (Bercovitch, 
2012, p. 200). Critical scholars of race have drawn attention to the role of the 
American Dream in perpetuating the invisible power of whiteness (e.g., Shome, 
2000). This process is thus also related in powerful ways to colour blind ap-
proaches to racial inequality, insofar as the American Dream has been present-
ed as the first attempt at producing structures of colour blindness (Tran & Pa-
terson, 2015). Indeed, James Baldwin famously argued that the “American 
Dream is at the expense of the American negro” in a 1965 debate with William 
F. Buckley Jr. (Buccola, 2019).
The theme of promise and eventuation that is embedded in the notion of the 
American Dream also figures centrally in conceptualisations of American excep-
tionalism. In that regard, McCrisken (2003, p. 8) proposes that America is ex-
ceptional “not for what it is, but what it could be.” The antagonistic reading of the 
contemporary political environment presented in comment 7.13, and which was 
likewise prominent elsewhere in my data, presents an image of that promise 
under threat. Comment 7.13 establishes a vision of a battle between those who 
would “fight to preserve the nation and thus the idea that spawned it” and those 
who would “surrender and forget the idea ever existed.” At risk in this apocalyp-
tic battle is not just America and the American way of life, but rather the very fu-
ture of humanity. If the notion of the American Dream, as a founding myth of 
American nationhood, can be seen to encode whiteness, then that threat to the 
idea from which America emerged can likewise be viewed in implicitly racialised 
terms.
These are the stakes of political participation in the partisan landscape articu-
lated by commenters: victory or apocalypse. Which is to say, from the perspec-
tive of a notionally pure conservatism oriented towards the preservation of 
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modes of agency and subjectivity entextualised in the US Constitution, to lose 
the “American idea” literally would be to witness the death of the American na-
tion and so see its end in time. Insofar as American nationhood is presented as 
a worldly incarnation of the word of God in historical time, the prophesied loss of 
the Constitution is thus presented as as much an apocalypse as the end of time 
in Christian eschatology. These are the stakes of the opposition between con-
servatives and their opponents performed in user-generated below-the-line 
commentary.
This comment sees Beck featuring centrally in this imagined conflict. At the 
same time, the comment centres on the perceived inauthenticity of political 
claims being made by certain partisan media figures and their followers. In that 
regard, there is some confusion in terms of the motivations attributed to Beck. 
At points, it is hinted that Beck’s stance comes from a principled, albeit mis-
guided, engagement with an idea. Later it is suggested that “Beck and compa-
ny” merely claim principles whilst “gathering at the trough,” i.e., personally bene-
fitting, monetarily or otherwise from a performative political posture. This can be 
contrasted with Trump’s perceived authenticity as parrhesiastes (Foucault, 
2001), i.e., truth-teller speaking truth to power, a mantle earlier claimed by 
Glenn Beck himself.84
The invocation of a time when “jackboots are permitted free reign and history is 
re-written to appease the socialists” [sic] presents a striking and notably 
dystopian vision of America’s imagined future, one which draws on a key antag-
onistic figure in the form of socialism. In the context of a narrative founded on 
existential conflict between those who would protect America and those who 
would destroy it, the discussion of appeasement alludes to surrender – acced-
ing to the demands of an enemy. Likewise, use of the word jackboot similarly 
entails military allusions, drawing on a powerful metaphor for fascist oppression 
 As discussed in Chapter 1 (see section 1.2.2 pp. 26-31), Glenn Beck’s outputs have 84
long portrayed him as the bearer of untold and hidden truths. When GBTV was 
launched in 2011, Beck’s production company, Mercury Radio Arts filed a trademark for 
its tagline: "The Truth Lives Here” (Weprin, 2011).
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and authoritarian rule.  This comment thus articulates left-wing fascism as a 85
genuine threat.
This expressed attitude towards authoritarianism is somewhat challenging. Ac-
cording to MacWilliams (2016, p. 718), authoritarianism was one of only two 
factors that predict support for Trump among likely Republican voters during the 
2016 US presidential election, with the other being “fear of personal threat from 
terrorism.” Similarly, adherence to Christian nationalist ideology has also been 
shown to be “a robust predictor of voting for Trump,” one which is “related to, 
but not synonymous with, reducible to, or mere reflection of economic anxieties, 
sexism, racism, Islamaphobia, or xenophobia per se” (Whitehead et al., 2018, 
pp. 147-148). There is thus an important tension palpable between the imagery 
featured in the user’s comment (i.e., Trump as a corrective for authoritarianism) 
and the broader political context within which that comment was articulated (i.e., 
support for Trump predicted by authoritarianism). The comment nevertheless 
encodes a vision of the kind of America that is idealised by the user. This is 
achieved largely by connotation, through a focus on a perceived moment of na-
tional crisis and the consequences the user imagines this crisis will have for the 
future of American society, culture, and identity.
As noted above, a central dimension of jeremiad rhetoric is its focus on the ten-
sion between profanation and (re-)sanctification, destruction and rebirth. In 
drawing on a jeremiad framework that exults past greatness whilst exhorting 
against cataclysm borne from electoral choices, it is possible to appreciate how 
commenters attribute responsibility for the coming collapse according to parti-
san judgments. In that regard, my analysis demonstrates how apocalyptic im-
agery and vatic pronouncements are together deployed as rhetorical strategies 
in the performance of political antagonism through a variety of temporal narra-
tives. Imaginaries of American apocalypse can thus be seen to reproduce and 
reassert the antagonistic frontiers that are the focus of this thesis.
 This trope has been employed in intra-group conflict on the right. For example, Potok 85
(2003, p. 48) recounts the case of a National Rifle Association (NRA) fundraising letter 
circulated in the immediate aftermath of the Oklahoma City Bombing which claimed 
that “jack-booted government thugs” had the permission of the government to “harass, 
intimidate, even murder law-abiding citizens,” prompting former President George H W 
Bush to resign from the organisation in a letter dated 3 May, 1995 (Raymond, 1997).
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7.5 Conclusion: the shape of things to come
In this chapter, I have argued that commenters discursively construct political 
action and identification by drawing on visions of an idealised political past and 
imagined political future. In so doing, the online political talk of commenters 
draws on a framework of jeremiad rhetoric that has been dominant in the dis-
cursive articulation of American nationhood since the era of New England Puri-
tanism. This rhetorical tradition affords a primary import to the role of prophecy 
in asserting American identity. However, its deployment by users articulates 
temporal narratives that typify an approach to the performance of conservatism 
in my data. My analysis centred on three principal topics, modelled on the way 
in which user comments draw out relations between past, present, and future.
First, I explored how commenters discuss the political past. My data demon-
strate a key focus on the Founding Fathers and the US Constitution, as well as 
other Founding Documents. I demonstrated how users impute a variety of inten-
tions to America’s Founders, including their aims for the Second Amendment 
and Article V of the US Constitution. Whilst the nature of these intentions are 
open to ongoing public debate, my analysis also showed how they can be 
mapped onto user-generated commentary on contemporary politics. This com-
mentary further entails a metacommentary on the meaning of political language 
and the intentions underlying the performance of politics through talk. This 
metacommentary is used to legitimate particular conservative interpretations of 
the US Constitution as a foundation of American society, culture, and identity. 
However, my analysis also reveals how American political history can be situat-
ed in Christian mythical time, by stipulating the US Constitution (and thereby 
American nationhood) as a product of divine providence. Insofar as God’s will is 
thus framed as a focal point in the emergence of American nationhood, it simul-
taneously draws on and animates a particular vision of moral order of society, 
i.e., social imaginary. This moral order is here seen to rest on an array of dis-
cursively constructed oppositions, articulated with reference to antagonistic ar-
ticulations of political agency outlined throughout this thesis.
Second, I examined how commenters discuss the political present, with a par-
ticular focus on how users draw on images of the political past whilst orienting 
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towards the political future. I once again raised the theme of the binary nature of 
the 2016 US presidential election, which briefly had been raised in previous 
chapters. In the context of perceived polarisation of choice in the American two-
party system, users spoke in explicit terms about the existential threat to Ameri-
ca posed by Hillary Clinton’s candidacy. This is perceived as a threat so great 
that voting for third party candidates on principle is precluded. The fact that the 
online discussions in my sample took place in the immediate aftermath of a con-
tentious primary highlights a variety of intra- and extra-party oppositions that 
complicate my analysis. In the context of the Republican Party, specifically, anti-
establishment politics are seen to gain a strong foothold whilst users contest the 
meaning of what it means it be a conservative, including how that manifests at a 
discursive level. Although there was resistance to the notion that the 2016 elec-
tion revealed a schism between two Americas, users nevertheless debated 
what counts as authentically American. In this debate, conservatism was repre-
sented as the legitimate worldview. This is a position which was further mapped 
onto commentary on the fundamental role of the US Supreme Court in shaping 
an American future, thus recognising its role as a site of political struggle.
Third, I analysed how commenters discuss the political future. Whilst a notion of 
future threat was already apparent, the orientation towards futurity is even more 
pronounced in the examples presented here, featuring more thoroughly devel-
oped antagonistic imaginaries of national collapse. Taking into account such 
explicit acts of prognostication, prophecy here was presented as an important 
element of American and, specifically, conservative self-definition. In this per-
spective, the future is viewed as an important locus of conflict in an ongoing 
struggle to assert competing models of American nationhood – or, more pre-
cisely, the will of politicians to preserve into the future the nation as it exists 
now. A variety of imagined outcomes of a Clinton presidency were presented, 
including mass illegal immigration and expansion of gun control efforts enabled 
by Democrats. These outcomes were explicitly portrayed as invariably leading 
to the destruction of America. Threat was here construed in distinctly partisan 
terms. I posited that a narrative of existential conflict between those who would 
protect America and those who would destroy it serves to re-articulate an an-
tagonistic frontier between conservatives and non-conservatives. However, I 
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also argued that commenters’ understanding of that threat may entail racial di-
mensions that are rooted in perceptions of group membership.
Imaginaries of decay and degradation are central to the tradition of jeremiad 
rhetoric that for centuries has played a formative role in asserting American na-
tionhood. Such rhetorical structures here have been shown to feature promi-
nently in the online political talk of commenters. Insofar as they are deployed in 
the context of deeply partisan interpretations of political action and identifica-
tion, imaginaries of American apocalypse serve to reproduce the antagonisms 
between conservatives and non-conservatives which are the focus of this the-
sis. 
Drawing on antagonism as a conceptual tool, my analysis in foregoing chapters 
has built towards the contention that commenters are active participants in the 
hegemonic project of defining American conservatism. In that regard, partisan 
attributions of responsibility for an imagined American apocalypse can likewise 
be seen to have a hegemonic character, insofar as they are mapped onto imag-
inaries of an ideal moral order that is specifically conservative in nature. This 
chapter has sought to illuminate what form it is imagined that apocalypse would 
take, i.e., the end of the “American idea” as the erasure of God’s will on earth.
Based on these principles, partisan media figures to whom commenters profess 
longstanding parasocial attachments can be seen to play an important mitigat-
ing role in the context of a perceived – or, at least, performed – threat to the 
very existence of American nationhood. As my analysis demonstrates, however, 
they can likewise be seen to exacerbate that threat, based on shifting audience 
attitudes regarding media congruence. Whilst commenters assume some de-
gree of discursive authority in the context of a hybrid media environment, they 
nonetheless recognise the enduring power of partisan media figures to shape 
political strategies and media agendas, whilst creating meaningful relationships 
with their audiences. 
In the previous chapter, my focus was on how commenters conceptualise the 
political and economic significance of their media choice. Here, the focus is 
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broadened to encompass reflections on how voter choice and media practice 
might come together to impact the entire system of American political institu-
tions, including the linguistic and discursive frameworks on which they are 
founded. The online political talk of commenters can thus be seen to articulate a 
set of perceived links between media practice, political-civic engagement, and 
the very future of America.
My thesis aims to offer a qualitative account of affective polarisation through an 
empirical focus on the discursive construction of partisan antagonism on one 
side of the polarised political culture in the US. This chapter contributes to that 
goal by providing an analysis of the various ways in which the online political 
talk of commenters perform antagonistic imaginaries of an ideal American future 
founded on a specifically conservative moral order. These imaginaries articulate 
at the intersection of an array of oppositions that attribute powerful significance 
to factors including economy, race, and gender. They reveal whiteness to be in 
many cases an implicit but deeply rooted framework for the performance of 
apocalyptic images of decay and degradation as well as imaginaries or Ameri-
can origin and destiny.
However, my analysis also reveals how acts of imagining an American future 
are achieved through historically significant forms of rhetoric that have the ca-
pacity to drive transformations in American society, culture, and identity. These 
are also forms of discourse that seek to define what counts as authentically 
American. They thus entail conspicuous evaluations of idealised social person-
ae voiced by commenters. My data indicate that such judgments about valued 
forms of personhood remain a matter of public contestation, as do the imagined 
futures in the interests of whose performance they are exploited. 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Chapter 8: Conclusion – contesting the 
boundaries of American conservatism online
8.1 Introduction 
My aim in this thesis was to present a qualitative account of what affective po-
larisation looks like at the level of online user-generated discourse. My empirical 
focus was on how users of the American right-wing news and opinion website 
TheBlaze.com articulated partisan oppositions in a below-the-line comment field 
in the lead-up to and immediate aftermath of the 2016 US presidential election. 
I developed my approach with regard to three conditions that have specific the-
oretical, methodological, and empirical relevance in terms of my research objec-
tives. 
First, a noted rise in so-called negative partisanship (Abramowitz & Webster, 
2016), in which some partisans dislike the other party more than they like the 
one with which they identify, was linked to the phenomenon of affective polari-
sation. Distinguished from ideological polarisation, affective polarisation was de-
fined as negative affect towards opposing partisans, i.e., attitudes towards the 
opposition (Levendusky, 2013a). Heretofore, it has largely been studied from a 
quantitative perspective using a social identity approach (Iyengar et al., 2019). 
Nevertheless, drawing on Jackson and Sherriff (2013), it was asserted that a 
qualitative approach to social identity could help to reveal the dynamic process-
es through which categories of opposition are constituted in the context of real-
world intergroup relations. 
Second, the election of Donald Trump as US President in 2016 has prompted a 
new interest in the articulation and qualitative content of American conservative 
identity (K. Hanson et al., 2019; Kreiss et al., 2017), a focus which has drawn 
attention to relevance of factors such as race, class, and gender. This shift has 
underlined not only my own interest in right-wing political movements; it has 
also provided new impetus for studying political communication from a qualita-
tive perspective. Such a drive also aligns with my aim of producing a qualitative 
account of how affective polarisation manifests in the online political talk of 
users of an American right-wing partisan media website.
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Third, the articulation of partisan identities in online user-generated commentary 
takes place under conditions of media hybridity (Chadwick, 2013), which is 
marked to a certain extent by a struggle over access to and control of represen-
tational – i.e., discursive – resources on the parts of media elites, political elites, 
and publics. Thus, whilst partisan media users have the capacity to participate 
as “produsers” (Bruns, 2006) in the articulation of partisan oppositions in below-
the-line comment fields, the hybridisation of relations of power that typify older 
and newer media points to important limits on the kinds of meanings that can be 
articulated by users, whether via institutional practices of moderation and con-
tent management or other structural mechanisms.
In order to address my overarching objectives, I specified four research ques-
tions that map largely onto the breakdown of my empirical chapters. I asked: 
How do commenters articulate partisan oppositions in their online political talk? 
How do commenters articulate partisan oppositions in their characterisation(s) 
of media? How do commenters situate their media choice discursively in terms 
of the political and economic significance of partisan media? And how do com-
menters relate their partisan media use to broader historical processes of so-
cial, cultural, and political transformation? 
To address these questions, I employed an articulation approach grounded in 
the work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (Laclau, 1999, 2005; Laclau & 
Mouffe, 2001; Mouffe, 1996), which views articulation as the ongoing struggle to 
“fix” meaning – including the meaning of society and identity – in ways that ex-
clude other meanings (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002). I integrated this theoretical 
framework with a constructionist thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) of 
online political talk in user-generated “below-the-line” commentary (Graham & 
Wright, 2015), basing my analysis on a corpus of 5,288 user-generated com-
ments posted to TheBlaze.com during the period 20 July 2016 to 21 January 
2017.
Reflecting on the propositions and conclusions of foregoing chapters, this final 
chapter serves as a conclusion to my thesis. First, with reference to my stated 
objectives and research questions, I review the main findings and implications 
of my empirical analysis. Second, I set out four of the key contributions this the-
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sis makes in addressing the broader literature on partisan media and political 
identity in the US. In so doing, I offer a reflection on the significance of these 
findings in terms of developing a qualitative account of affective polarisation. 
Here, I also discuss some of the broader implications of my research, including 
some of the key achievements of my thesis as a contribution to an ongoing de-
bate around deeply contentious politics. Third, I outline some of the main limita-
tions of my approach and detail some possible future directions in which to take 
my research, focusing specifically on how my research could be strengthened 
by integrating an ethnographic perspective on networked meaning-making 
through computer-mediated discourse.
 
8.2 Towards a qualitative account of affective polarisa-
tion
In this section, I review the findings of my empirical analysis. I begin with Chap-
ter 4, which addressed the question of how commenters articulate partisan op-
positions in their online political talk. Here, I demonstrated how the boundaries 
of American conservatism were contested through the public performance of 
antagonism. The prevalence of negative characterisations of political difference 
was noted. The concept of negative partisanship helps to account for the no-
table lack of positive identity content. The content of conservative identity was 
shown to be articulated with reference to partisan opposition – through a focus 
on characterising opponents in negative terms rather than a positive focus on 
what makes a conservative “conservative.” However, articulations of opposition 
were also deeply contested and were thus typified by a variety of voices: some 
spoke of Trump in explicitly positive terms; some deemed him merely accept-
able in the face of the threat posed by Hillary Clinton; yet other so-called Nev-
erTrump responses viewed him in starkly negative terms, in much the same 
way as negative attitudes towards Clinton.
Based on the presented examples, I argued that a more qualitative theory of 
identity is required in order to adequately conceptualise and understand the 
discursive practices that underlie processes of affective polarisation. This 
speaks both to conceptualisations of polarisation in political science as well as 
understandings of the implications for deliberation of increasing audience frag-
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mentation in the contemporary media environment. Whilst a social identity ap-
proach allows for the existence of internal conflict within groups, it doesn’t offer 
an account of the ways in which such conflicts manifest through discursive prac-
tices of various kinds. Likewise, a social identity approach doesn’t provide a 
discursively-grounded means of explaining some of its more pertinent predic-
tions in the context of intensifying partisan identity, e.g., the vilification of internal 
dissenters (Huddy et al., 2015, p. 15). 
My analysis shows that whilst implicit and explicit reference to forms of person-
hood are a central feature of user-generated commentary at TheBlaze.com, it is 
predominantly through an explicit and routinely derogatory focus on defining the 
characteristics of political alterity – that is, direct characterisations of difference 
– that nuanced categories of self and other emerge in the online political talk 
that constitutes my data. The characterisations that typify my data are perva-
sively negative, often uncivil, and frequently outrageous in nature, mirroring 
other research findings which show a growing incidence of uncivil (Hmielowski 
et al., 2014) and outrageous (J. M. Berry & Sobieraj, 2013) political discourse in 
the contemporary media environment that maps along the lines of partisan 
identification. The denigration and derogation of out-groups is one means of 
achieving positive social identity, which is a defining feature of the social identity 
approach (C. Jackson & Sherriff, 2013). However, contrary to arguments posit-
ing the growth of deliberative enclaves of likeminded others in an age of online 
media (Sunstein, 2001), my data nevertheless outline a space not of consensus 
but rather of “contestation” (Dahlberg, 2007) regarding the proper alignment be-
tween ideology and identity, even in the context of highly partisan participation.
Chapter 5 demonstrated how categories of partisan opposition are mapped 
onto the media landscape by analysing how media figures, outlets, and content 
are discussed in ways that reproduce the partisan antagonisms discussed in 
Chapter 4. Antagonistic depictions of media were related to hostile media per-
ceptions and oppositional media hostility (Arceneaux et al., 2012; Matheson & 
Dursun, 2001; Vallone et al., 1985). Perceptions of media hostility can have im-
portant implications, particularly insofar as hostile media perceptions have the 
capacity to negatively impact attitudes towards mainstream media institutions 
as well as trust in democracy (Tsfati & Cohen, 2005). Oppositional media hostili-
	 	 260
ty, then, can be discerned in attitudes towards outlets, figures, and content 
(Arceneaux et al., 2012). However, media choice tempers the development and 
entrenchment of oppositional media hostility by providing an opportunity to 
“blunt media distrust and other hostile perceptions” by providing an opportunity 
to change the channel (Arceneaux et al., 2012, p. 179). Whilst the small selec-
tion of contributions presented in Chapter 5 demonstrated many of the themes 
already outlined in Chapter 4, they can also be seen under the rubric of a broad 
swathe of participatory practices that are characteristic of contemporary models 
of political communication and engagement. And yet, whilst media may provide 
archetypes of agency with which audiences engage, the audience are free to 
work with those “resources” (Chadwick et al., 2018b) in ways that may confound 
the intentions of institutional media.
Chapter 6 examined how characterisations of political difference are performed 
with reference to the political and economic significance of hybrid partisan me-
dia. My analysis revealed how media choice is portrayed as something that has 
both political and economic significance. In this chapter, I outlined how the 
sometimes-contradictory acts of “antagonistic othering” (Herschinger, 2012) that 
characterise the audience’s online political talk are deployed in discussions of 
media and media-related practice. I argued that these discussions can be con-
strued at once as forms of political-civic engagement and consumer behaviour. 
Thus, whilst the choice to engage with likeminded media can be conceptualised 
in terms of selective exposure, it can also be conceptualised as a mode of polit-
ical consumption (Atkinson, 2015) or political prosumption (Hershkovitz, 2012), 
introduced in Chapter 2 as alternative modes of political participation and ex-
pression.
The implicit and explicit understanding of the participation frameworks of below-
the-line commentary demonstrated in users’ contributions appears important – 
specifically changes in footing involving shifts in alignment from Glenn Beck to 
the audience. Thus, addressing Beck directly, particularly in contestatory 
modes, can be seen to have significant performative dimensions in which com-
menters express not only their reaction to Glenn Beck and TheBlaze’s per-
ceived transformation from proattitudinal to counterattitudinal media; they also 
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perform alignments with idealised models of personhood through competing 
assertions of identity. 
In that regard, the move from buycott to boycott indicated in user-generated 
commentary illuminates an array of shifting judgments about appropriate ways 
of being conservative. Thus, the contested characterisation of Beck/TheBlaze 
as a failing business (in a free market context) is bound up in the articulation 
and re-articulation of the boundaries of conservative identity – demonstrating 
both implicitly and explicitly the forms of talk and comportment that are deemed 
appropriate for conservative persons, whilst also outlining appropriate view-
points on issues of political importance to conservative voters. Nevertheless, 
although antagonistic, these claims about the oppositional status of Glenn Beck 
and TheBlaze are the site of forceful public contestation. In the context of argu-
ments relating cyberbalkanization to polarisation (Sunstein, 2009), the fact that 
my data reveal how such factors are contested provides a useful case study 
into the actual dynamics of these processes in below-the-line commentary on a 
partisan news website.
In Chapter 7, I demonstrated how the use of partisan media is rhetorically relat-
ed to broader historical processes of social, cultural, and political transformation 
via antagonistic imaginaries of American past, present, and future. Through a 
focus on the integration of “temporal narratives” (Brophy, 2016) into the contri-
butions of commenters, I set out how various discourses and discursive ele-
ments are drawn together – i.e., articulated – in contestatory assertions of iden-
tity. As a central dimension of jeremiad rhetoric (Bercovitch, 2012), imaginaries 
of decay and degradation were drawn on by commenters in order to articulate 
antagonisms between conservatives and their perceived opponents. However, 
as in foregoing chapters, the nature and extent of that opposition was seen to 
be a matter of public contestation. Audience commentary privileged images of 
the destruction of America and its Constitution, with commenters positioning 
Beck, his media operations, and his audience relative to these narratives of de-
cline. However, commenters were also seen as active participants in the hege-
monic project of defining American conservatism.
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Through a focus on the production and performance of temporal narratives, my 
analysis in this final empirical chapter was attuned to describing the kinds of fu-
ture imagined by American conservatives as well as the array of rhetorical re-
sources they draw on in giving voice to outrage online. I demonstrated how 
commenters perform a vision of American apocalypse in which the end of the 
“American idea” acquired its particular significance from its portrayal as the era-
sure of God’s will on earth. Partisan media were shown to be positioned central-
ly in audience commentary on the mechanisms of such eschatological out-
comes. Whereas in Chapter 6, my focus was on how commenters relate the po-
litical and economic significance of partisan media, in Chapter 7 my focus was 
placed more squarely on how judgments about valued forms of personhood are 
bound up in performed fears regarding the ultimate destiny of not only the entire 
system of American political institutions, but also American nationhood.
The above framework points to the benefits that might accrue from conceptual-
ising the critical perspective of users in terms that are distinct from some of the 
more progressive normative stances of critical theory, in which deliberation is 
set forth as a benchmark against which the value of political discourse should 
be measured. By assuming a qualitative empirical focus on right-wing partisan 
media, it becomes possible to ask what kinds of politics actually are being en-
visaged and enacted in the digital spaces of online partisan media, rather than 
judging content for its relative closeness or distance from deliberative ideals. 
Thus, my focus instead was directed towards forms of discourse that are ani-
mated by variant – i.e., “conservative” – imaginaries of an ideal social world per-
formed through digital participation.
8.3 Contributions and achievements
This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge in four key respects. First, whilst 
affective polarisation has been conceptualised from a primarily quantitative per-
spective through the lens of a social identity approach, the qualitative content of 
identity is also important (K. Hanson et al., 2019). Social identity theory has 
been shown to be a reliable tool for mapping patterns of group conflict (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). As a theory articulated in the context of primarily quantitative 
paradigms, it is well-suited to measuring identity characteristics according to 
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predefined scales, e.g., strong partisan, weak partisan, etc. Yet, a more qualita-
tive model is required in order to theorise the communicative practices by which 
group boundaries come to be defined in the first place (Huddy, 2001; C. Jack-
son & Sherriff, 2013). Although the social identity approach, particularly self-
categorisation theory, provides a set of analytical tools for analysing intragroup 
tensions, the post-positivist methodological articulation and deployment of the 
approach limits its utility in the description of such “messy” real-world dynamics 
(C. Jackson & Sherriff, 2013). This gap is addressed through a qualitative 
analysis of real-world contexts within which group identities are rendered partic-
ularly salient. 
My analysis reveals how, as a mode of discursive practice, these characterisa-
tions allow participants to produce complex, nested, and shifting orders of parti-
san opposition, allowing speakers to express alignments of various kinds with 
an array of either socially sanctioned or proscribed forms of personhood. I con-
tend that these discursive practices have broad implications in terms of norma-
tive claims that frame the public sphere as a space constituted through rational 
deliberation. But they are also pertinent to models of political polarisation that 
rely on operationally pre-defined classifications in order to map patterns of iden-
tity/difference rather than categories of opposition emergent in discourse.
Second, and relatedly, my thesis examines how audiences respond to per-
ceived shifts in alignment with media outlets, figures, and content. I have ar-
gued that a qualitative approach can help to illuminate the dynamic nature of 
hostile media perceptions whilst at the same time providing an empirical 
grounding for further explorations of audience understandings of media. I con-
tend that a rigorous account of hostile media perceptions and their role in pro-
cesses of affective polarisation would benefit from including such qualitative in-
sights as to their dynamism and changing nature. 
As with affective polarisation, a social identity approach has also been applied 
to the study of hostile media phenomena. The study of hostile media percep-
tions has thus taken place largely within a post-positivist, experimental effects 
paradigm, also frequently drawing on social identity theory as an explanatory 
mechanism (Matheson & Dursun, 2001). My data point to ways in which exper-
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imental approaches that place media outlets, figures, and content in predefined 
categories of liberal, conservative, etc. can be enhanced through a focus on 
user-generated discourse. 
A focus on below-the-line commentary, actively contributed by the audience, 
demonstrates that those categories are, in actuality, publicly contested in online 
political talk. In this way, categories of likeminded and oppositional media are 
seen to be discursively articulated by the audience in sometimes outrageous 
and contrary manners. Through such acts of opposition, antagonisms are per-
formed – that is, they are called into being through discourse (R. Bauman & 
Briggs, 1990) – in which select media are rendered “other.” The dynamic nature 
of definitions of hostile media underlines the value of a qualitative analysis that 
can reveal their contested character. At the same time, a qualitative focus on 
these phenomena demonstrates the variety of tactics available to audiences in 
their response to pro- and counterattitudinal content. This challenges pervasive 
narratives regarding the relationship between political homophily and partisan 
selective exposure, whilst situating the categorisation of partisan and main-
stream media in terms of broader political struggles.
Third, applying an articulation approach, Berry and Sobieraj’s (2013) concept of 
the outrage industry can be seen to view outrage as a business strategy that 
rests on the performance of partisan antagonisms. My research reveals that 
both media and audience have the capacity to define the parameters and tar-
gets of those antagonisms. The question remains as to whether or not audience 
comments can be seen as authentic representations of political attitudes or if 
they are more usefully to be viewed as “merely” grounded in the performance of 
outrage as a genre of political discourse. A definition of outrage discourse that 
takes into account both user-generated content and audience motivations 
would go some way to addressing this concern. In that regard, I return once 
more to Bird’s (1998, p. 33) warning against seeing audiences as overly passive 
recipients of whatever journalists put in front of them. Instead, she argued, we 
should see audiences as engaging not just in terms of consuming content but in 
actively shaping the media environment through their choice of media. In a pe-
riod characterised by hybrid forms of media engagement (Chadwick, 2013), this 
claim is even more relevant. At the same time, the relation between elite and 
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public discourse in a hybrid media environment must be properly accounted for, 
as Chadwick (2019) argues.
Fourth, the site I have chosen serves as a case study that reveals extreme 
competition within the right-wing partisan media market. In a general sense, one 
of the contributions my thesis makes as a limited case study is in providing a 
detailed snapshot of one aspect of the American right-wing media ecosystem at 
a particular historical moment. It therefore contributes to a body of research that 
seeks to understand the particular dynamics of this media environment and its 
broader impact (e.g.`, Benkler et al., 2018). By focusing on TheBlaze, however, 
my thesis speaks to some of the pressing challenges faced by partisan media 
figures and outlets as they navigate the shifting and sometimes antagonistic 
alignments of partisan media audiences. My case study thus reveals some of 
the ongoing trials of right-wing partisan media at a time when Breitbart was in its 
ascendancy, at the same time as it provides a qualitative account of what peo-
ple are doing with media. 
More broadly speaking, however, this thesis makes a more targeted contribution 
that is at once intellectual and political in nature. As discussed in section 3.4.2 
(see pp. 114-116), one of the key motivations for this research was my desire to 
produce an account that is rigorous, theoretically rich and, above all, fair. For 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), the critical analysis of discourse is a political 
practice that entails taking a principled stance on the production of public spa-
ces within which dialogue across difference can take place. This is a contention 
that I bear in mind as I engage with my own approach to the discursive articula-
tions of the American right. More than two decades ago, Lakoff (1995, p. 177) 
wrote that “[c]onservatives regularly chide liberals for not understanding them.” 
This particular censure was directed broadly to liberals at large, but it is possible 
to appreciate here how such a statement applies to the relationship between 
practices of academic discourse production and issues of cultural marginalisa-
tion discussed by Hochschild (2016). 
In this sense, there is a distinct relationship here to the institutional dynamics of 
academia. As argued by Gusterson (2017, p. 211):
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Those of us who teach in universities must grapple with the fact, empha-
sized in Katherine Cramer’s (2016) study of the Wisconsin Tea Party, that 
our institutions—which we often see as the vanguard of a liberal pluralistic 
21st-century culture—are seen by those outside the gates as alien citadels 
of class superiority and elitist prejudice toward those who work with their 
hands.
Such potential acts of exclusion serve to underline the need, as highlighted by 
Gusterson (2017) to study nationalist populism, given the fundamental connec-
tion he identifies between the rise of nationalist populism and the cultural and 
economic outcomes of neoliberalism, which have deeply affected in profoundly 
negative ways those who supported Trump in 2016 — and, it should at this 
point be noted, again in 2020. If there is something to be critiqued in these ide-
ologies and identities, then it should be done from a standpoint of being empiri-
cally and theoretically informed, motivated by a desire to critique from a position 
of understanding as opposed to judgment. What I have recounted in this thesis 
is in this view a story that surely must be told, whether or not we want to tell it 
and especially, now more than ever, whether or not we want to hear it. Indeed, 
with this in mind, I view my approach here as a moral and ethical responsibility 
in the context of the global spread of reactionary and exclusionary politics.
In a further sense, then, I argue one of the central achievements of this thesis is 
how it demonstrates an approach that can be applied beyond the specific case 
study chosen here. Reiljan (2020) has made an important intervention in this 
regard, drawing attention to the fact that affective polarisation is common be-
yond the US political system, even in multiparty European contexts. The articu-
lation approach I have demonstrated here represents a powerful tool in this re-
gard, insofar as it seeks fundamentally to provide a mechanism for examining 
and illuminating the dynamism of categories of opposition that underlie pro-
cesses of affective polarisation and to reveal their discursive and, more specifi-
cally, contingent character. Because it focuses on the discursive production of 
difference, rather than purely on predefined analytical categories, this approach 
can work just as well, I argue, in the context of entrenching populist discourses 
in Poland, the UK, and elsewhere. 
However, I do not seek to claim this approach should serve as a replacement 
for more quantitative treatments of affective polarisation and negative partisan-
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ship. Rather, I seek to broaden the theoretical and empirical toolkits available to 
those who seek to explore the processes by which sameness and difference get 
produced by media elites, political elites, and publics. In so doing, this thesis is 
designed as a contribution to a conversation that seeks remedies to the social 
issues linked to deepening polarisation, based on a rigorous exploration of the 
phenomena in question.
8.4 Limitations and future research
The analyses presented in this thesis entail a number of limitations that point to 
productive paths for future research. Some limitations were necessitated by 
fundamental resource restrictions, whilst others were the outcome of theoretical 
and methodological choices made in the interests of ensuring the coherence of 
my arguments. 
For instance, my analysis focuses on a single website during a limited time-
frame following a contentious Republican Party primary (Yates, 2019) and in the 
lead-up to and immediate aftermath of an election that was notably polarised 
(Blair, 2017). As a result, I do not seek to make any claims regarding the gener-
alisability of my analysis. This is particularly true when one considers the fact 
that TheBlaze.com is but one component in a multi-platform media operation, 
which is now owned and controlled by Blaze Media following the merger of 
TheBlaze and CRTV in 2018. As argued in Chapter 3, drawing on Graham and 
Wright (2015), limiting one’s focus to an individual case study is a means of en-
suring that a researcher is able to undertake a rich analysis that explores a spe-
cific set of research questions. My decision to focus on an individual website, 
whilst methodologically justified and to a certain extent demanded by other 
practical factors (see section 3.3.3 pp. 108-110), means that digital platforms 
are insufficiently accounted for in this thesis. This is a key limitation in the con-
text of a growing recognition of their increasing power as ecosystems that play 
a significant role in shaping social life at various scales (Van Dijck, Poell, & De 
Waal, 2018). 
In that regard, the specific role of Facebook as a mechanism for the participa-
tion of TheBlaze’s users has been strengthened by the removal of TheBlaze.-
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com's below-the-line comment field. In addition, TheBlaze and its current parent 
company Blaze Media should be viewed as but one node within a networked 
right-wing media ecosystem (Benkler et al., 2018). Whilst small-scale qualitative 
case studies are useful when it comes to providing nuanced analysis of this 
media landscape (Faris et al., 2017), more broad-ranging comparative data 
would contribute to a more holistic analysis of the place of right-wing media 
within a hybrid media system. A focus on the networking of publics via platforms 
(e.g.`, Langlois, Elmer, McKelvey, & Devereaux, 2009) may also introduce a 
greater diversity of voices, considering the extensive transmedia affordances of 
digital platforms. Such voices might also offer a view on the networking of racist 
and specifically white supremacist discourses (e.g.`, Back, 2002b). However, 
considerations of media hybridity indicate that these voices may not necessarily 
be those of users, with explorations of platform media demonstrating not only 
the moderation of content by digital platforms but also its selection and curation 
(Gillespie, 2018).
An expanded research agenda oriented towards the role of digital platforms 
would benefit from the inclusion of more quantitatively oriented data and analy-
sis, e.g., network analysis and hyperlink analysis (see`, for example`, Kaiser, 
Rauchfleisch, & Bourassa, 2019), that can illuminate the kinds of networks of 
meaning that digital platforms can either enable or impair. This would have the 
added benefit of allowing me to develop the coding skills necessary to apply 
methods set aside during the course of my PhD research. However, a focus on 
the role of platforms must also pay heed to the implications of “big data” not 
only in terms of emerging practices of political campaigning (Conway, Kenski, & 
Wang, 2015), but also as regards new techniques of political communication 
research (Gil de Zúñiga & Diehl, 2015). Indeed, an expanded research agenda 
should likewise provide an account of the presence of non-human voices on 
digital platforms (e.g.`, Bessi & Ferrara, 2016), one factor that has led to a 
heightened sense that some of the underlying assumptions of communication 
scholarship are in need of fundamental complication (Hedrick et al., 2018).
In that regard, limitations linked to my empirical focus on user-generated com-
ments mean that I have concentrated in this thesis on discursive performance 
rather than the attitudes of audiences. In the context of an emerging recognition 
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of the potential “ambivalence” of online engagement (W. Phillips & Milner, 
2018), as well as accounts of so-called “dark participation” in online user com-
mentary (Frischlich et al., 2019), there are undoubtedly numerous issues with 
attempts to represent earnest or “authentic” (Evans, 2010) expressions of self 
online. Whilst I have established that the detailed analysis of user-generated 
discourse is a useful objective in its own right, I nevertheless argue that my re-
search would also benefit from employing a broader array of qualitative meth-
ods, such as interviews and participant-observation, that would allow me to en-
gage in a more substantive way with commenting users of partisan media about 
the meanings they personally attribute to their online political talk, as well as 
with non-commenting users regarding their decision(s) not to participate as 
“produsers” (Bruns, 2006) of user-generated commentary online. Such methods 
would contribute to developing a more detailed picture of how media discourse 
is animated and reanimated by audiences through practices of commentary and 
citation, i.e., how media discourse is socially circulated (Vidali, 1996), as well as 
the implications of these practices in terms of the articulation of group bound-
aries. 
In Chapter 1, I looked to the case made by Karpf et al. (2015) for a more quali-
tative approach to political communication research and noted this as a central 
motivation for my own work. In spite of some notable exceptions (e.g.`, Nielsen, 
2012), ethnography thus far has not been used extensively as a methodological 
framework in the study of political communication from a qualitative perspective. 
Nevertheless, two notable works make the case for just such an approach, i.e., 
Vidali and Peterson (2012) and Luhtakallio and Eliasoph (2014). I contend that 
my research would benefit significantly from a more thoroughly ethnographic re-
articulation, one which could offer important insights into the kinds of relations 
that obtain between the digitally-enabled articulation of polarised political identi-
ties and other expressions of identity/alterity, online and offline. 
Effective online ethnography, in particular, can be attuned to both "the mobility 
of discourse across media platforms” (Georgakopoulou, 2017, p. 3) and the 
“multisited” (George E Marcus, 1995) character of networked meaning-making. 
Ethnography, including online ethnography, thus represents an important 
methodological tool for the study of the production of meaning through comput-
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er-mediated discourse in a networked right-wing media ecosystem. An ethno-
graphic framework would also provide a set of qualitative tools for investigating 
the ways in which alignments between race, gender, ideology, and partisan 
identity (see Abramowitz, 2018; Kreiss et al., 2017) are articulated and re-articu-
lated by media and political elites as well as publics. Such an analysis would 
contribute more thoroughly to an understanding of articulation as socially situat-
ed meaning production. 
Nevertheless, as noted in the previous section, one of the main contributions 
my thesis makes as a limited case study is in providing a detailed snapshot of 
one aspect of the American right-wing ecosystem at a particular historical junc-
ture. In that regard, it remains to be seen how political oppositions were articu-
lated by right-wing partisan media users during the 2020 US presidential elec-
tion. As I wrote this concluding chapter early in 2020, several months prior to 
the election, a number of key shifts were notable that set that moment in con-
trast with the period represented in my data; namely, the absence of a con-
tentious primary within the Republican Party; President Donald Trump's highly 
polarised approval ratings, with roughly 90 percent approval among Republi-
cans compared to roughly 10 percent approval among Democrats (Gallup, 
n.d.) ; Glenn Beck’s vociferous support of Trump, donning a MAGA hat in May 86
2018 (Leach, 2018); the merger of TheBlaze with Mark Levin's CRTV to form 
Blaze Media, also in 2018; and the removal of TheBlaze.com's below-the-line 
comment feature in favour of comments made via TheBlaze’s Facebook page, 
mentioned above. 
The contrast between conditions in 2020 and conditions in 2016 raises a num-
ber of important questions. For instance, what does the online political talk of 
TheBlaze’s users look like now? Are the contributions of users marked to a simi-
lar extent by expressions of outrage as they were in 2016? What is the signifi-
cance of TheBlaze and Blaze Media in the American right-wing media ecosys-
tem today? How is conservatism being articulated in other partisan media spa-
 Whilst Gallup polling reveals Trump’s job approval rating among Republicans and 86
Democrats to be highly polarised, his approval among Independents is more in line 
with his general approval rating. For the period 2-15 January 2020, Trump’s job ap-
proval rating was 44%. According to the same data, Trump’s maximum job approval 
rating to date was 46%, whilst his lowest approval rating to date was 35%.
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ces that are perhaps more relevant to conservative politics in 2020? And how 
does the online political talk of users relate to other forms of user-generated 
content, as well as to the discourses of various political and media elites in a 
hybrid media system? A further topic of interest that is implied in my focus on 
right-wing media is the extent to which my analysis could be broadened to in-
clude the articulation of partisan identities across the political spectrum. The 
relevance of my current analysis to such a question is a matter that remains to 
be explored.
Finally, it has been noted that the growing popularity of social media after the 
late-2000s has led to a sidelining of the role of elite cues in analyses of audi-
ence engagement with media (Chadwick, 2019). Although my analysis does 
seek to recognise the role of elite cues through the integration of a media-as-
resources perspective (see Chadwick et al., 2018b), this thesis lacks a compre-
hensive focus on the ways in which audiences creatively recontextualise re-
sources from their broader media diets. There is thus significant scope for a 
more thorough examination of how user-generated content is situated relative 
to elite outputs. By theorising the formative role of structure and constraint, I 
have nevertheless sought to reflect on the limitations that exist in terms of the 
kinds of meanings that can be articulated by users. The tensions between user 
agency and elite persuasion is an important element of this dynamic. 
For Chadwick (2019, p. 11), an important task for future research is to “identify 
the elite origins of affectively charged misinformation and the conditions under 
which it spreads online.” My research could in this sense give greater consider-
ation to the hybrid affective and information ecologies within which users articu-
late the boundaries of political identity and alterity. As my findings indicate, 
however, there exists the enduring question of how partisan media users, espe-
cially self-identifying conservatives, engage with elite cues from multiple 
sources when they see themselves as empowered diviners of truth in the face 
of perceived duplicity and hostility, particularly in the context of antagonistic 
rhetorics that portray media not only as untrustworthy but also as “enemies of 
the people” (M. McKee & Stuckler, 2017). Building on the analyses presented in 
this thesis, an expanded research agenda would be wise to pay significant heed 
to such critical acts of positioning amongst politically motivated audiences.
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8.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the main conclusions presented 
in my thesis, an account of some of the key contributions of my doctoral re-
search, and a reflection on some possibilities for future study. The main points 
are summarised briefly here.
In terms of responding to my research questions, my empirical analysis demon-
strated, first, how the boundaries of American conservatism were articulated in 
my dataset through the public performance of antagonism, revealing how group 
boundaries were contested through a specific focus on negative characterisa-
tions of political difference. Second, I showed how these categories of partisan 
opposition were also mapped onto the media landscape. Media figures, outlets, 
and content were discussed in my data set in ways that reproduced antagonis-
tic depictions of political opponents. Third, insofar as characterisations of politi-
cal difference were performed with reference to the political economy of hybrid 
partisan media, media choice was shown to be viewed as something that has 
both political and economic significance. And finally, fourth, the use of partisan 
media was rhetorically related to broader historical processes of social, cultural, 
and political transformation through antagonistic imaginaries of American past, 
present, and future. In this sense, performative visions of an imagined American 
apocalypse provide justifications for negative affect towards opposing partisans, 
whilst revealing the discursive logics underlying the contested performance of 
partisan antagonisms that characterise my sample.
My thesis makes four key contributions to the existing literature. First, by taking 
a qualitative approach to what affective polarisation looks like in a real-world 
context, my research contributes to an examination of the articulation and con-
tent of American conservative identity. Second, and relatedly, through a focus 
on the dynamic nature of categories of identity and alterity, my thesis examines 
how audiences respond to perceived shifts in alignment with media outlets, fig-
ures, and content. This discussion of the dynamic and contested nature of defi-
nitions of hostile media underlines the value of a qualitative analysis. Third, 
whilst Berry and Sobieraj’s concept of the outrage industry views outrage dis-
course as a business strategy, the various ways in which audiences deploy out-
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rage in user-generated below-the-line commentary demonstrates not only that 
both media and audience have the capacity to define the boundaries of in-group 
and out-group, but also that those articulations may themselves be in conflict. 
Fourth, even as a limited case study, my focus on TheBlaze.com provides a de-
tailed snapshot of one aspect of the American right-wing media ecosystem at a 
particular historical moment. In so doing, my research reveals not only a field of 
ongoing competition and potential financial peril, but also an explicit awareness 
on the part of commenters of their relation to the political economy of partisan 
media.
Finally, in terms of limitations and directions for future research, I noted a num-
ber of key constraints that can be addressed by broadening my research agen-
da. Including a greater focus on platforms could help to highlight further ten-
sions between media and users that are characteristic of hybrid media. Continu-
ing to write against the presumption of authenticity, future research would also 
be more attuned to the presence of non-human voices and forms of dark partic-
ipation. Likewise, greater attention to the relationship between the discourses of 
elites and publics could help to reveal points of engagement and of resistance. 
In a more immediate sense, however, a pressing opportunity exists to examine 
how conservative identity is being contested in the context of the 2020 US pres-
idential election. The inclusion of new data would help to take my research in a 
more comparative direction. Methodologically, whilst orienting to the benefits of 
mixed methods approaches, an interest in the embeddedness of partisan media 
in online and offline experience indicates the value of grounding my research in 
an ethnographic framework.
Arguments regarding the implications of partisan selective exposure have dom-
inated analyses of the relationship between media and affective polarisation. 
Whilst the role of partisan media audiences in the articulation of partisan identi-
ties was here my central focus, my analysis shows how other frameworks that 
foreground media as a practice can help to highlight how media users actually 
use and characterise media. Political consumerism was presented as a means 
of conceptualising how audiences attribute meaning to their media choice, 
whilst counter-arguing and source-denigration were introduced as ways of de-
scribing how partisan media users respond to disagreeable content. More 
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broadly, my thesis has shown how users integrate affective responses to media 
and politics into antagonistic articulations of partisan identity and alterity in user-
generated below-the-line commentary.
By presenting a qualitative account of what affective polarisation looks like at 
the level of online user-generated discourse, I have sought to demonstrate the 
value of an approach to affective polarisation that provides a sense of how 
deeply contested categories of partisan opposition can be. In order to progress 
this research agenda, it will be necessary to explore further the diverse relations 
obtaining between users and institutional media as well as to problematise this 
dialectic in the context of a hybrid media system. Such research must remain 
open to the possibility that the kinds of futures imagined by internet users are 
not solely animated by the progressive visions that have characterised much 
existing work on the liberatory potentials of digital politics.
Whilst this thesis has focused on one facet of polarised political culture in the 
US, I recognise the broader global reach and implications of processes of affec-
tive polarisation, particularly in the context of evolving modes of and frameworks 
for digital participation. Indeed, in this thesis I have sought to develop an analyt-
ical framework that can be applied more broadly, in the US and elsewhere. Ex-
amining these broader contexts can help to reveal not only how affective polari-
sation is tied to the socially situated articulation of partisan oppositions but also 
how such discursive practices of meaning-making are nested within and ani-
mated by transnational infrastructures that enable new forms of antagonism. My 
hope is that my research will contribute to a greater understanding of the ways 
in which those infrastructures are animated by frequently competing voices of 
outrage. 
In the context of ongoing partisan and racial tensions in the US, developing a 
rigorous understanding of these phenomena is, I argue, an important step to-
wards developing empirically-grounded responses to the diverse and shifting 
challenges posed by processes of affective polarisation. Developing a rigorous 
sense of how the boundaries of contemporary American conservatism — specif-
ically white conservatism — are contested through discursive acts of antago-
nism is an important part of this process. However, beyond the US context, this 
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thesis should be viewed as a contribution to a much broader but no less press-
ing discussion around how to remedy through deepening understanding the so-
cial issues that are simultaneously motors for and the outcome of the discursive 
production of opposition and exclusion. 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Appendix
Source classification metadata is provided for each item included in the sample:
Title: Title of item as it appears on TheBlaze.com
Reporter: Listed author of item
Publication Date: Listed in the format DD Month YYYY
URL: Web address of item
Comment Count: Number of user-generated comments
Set Description: Describes which of 3 case sets the item belongs to, #1-10
Period: Searches conducted in 7 monthly periods Jul 2016–Jan 2017
Source: Set of search results in which item appeared
Rank ID: Ranking for item based on search engine outputs
Rand ID: Attributed in Excel and used as a means of randomising sample
1 Title Rick Perry: Khizr Kahn 'Shouldn't Get a 
Free Ride' on Trump Criticism Because 




Reporter Tré Goins-Phillips Period August
Publication 
Date








141 Rand ID 0.0068
2 Title Trump, Clinton Virtually Tied in New Poll Set 
Description 
Clinton 10
Reporter Jon Street Period September
Publication 
Date







155 Rand ID 0.028
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3 Title Trump: The U.S. Will Become 'Another 




Reporter Tré Goins-Phillips Period September
Publication 
Date








313 Rand ID 0.0121





Reporter Tré Goins-Phillips Period September
Publication 
Date







189 Rand ID 0.0071
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4 Title Bill Clinton: Hillary Has Experienced De-





Reporter Tré Goins-Phillips Period September
Publication 
Date








130 Rand ID 0.0076
6 Title Glenn Beck voices disappointment in 




Reporter Tré Goins-Phillips Period September
Publication 
Date








1031 Rand ID 0.0065
7 Title Clinton argues for stricter background 





Reporter Kaitlyn Schallhorn Period September
Publication 
Date








158 Rand ID 0.0017
8 Title WikiLeaks email: Clinton campaign chief 





Reporter Kate Scanlon Period October
Publication 
Date








13 Rand ID 0.0124
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9 Title FBI Director James Comey explains why 




Reporter Tré Goins-Phillips Period October
Publication 
Date








307 Rand ID 0.0227
10 Title Gary Johnson asks CNN host if FBI re-





Reporter Jon Street Period October
Publication 
Date








70 Rand ID 0.0234
11 Title RNC Chairman Reince Priebus: If Donald 





Reporter Chris Enloe Period November
Publication 
Date








75 Rand ID 0.0191
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12 Title Slate writer: Trump's victory is proof posi-




Reporter Tré Goins-Phillips Period November
Publication 
Date







89 Rand ID 0.0058
13 Title Vladimir Putin moves missiles closer to 
Europe, while Donald Trump and Gen. 




Reporter Sarah Lee Period November
Publication 
Date






C o m m e n t 
Count
67 Rand ID 0.0009
14 Title Yes we cran': Obama unleashes slew of 




Reporter Leigh Munsil Period November
Publication 
Date








55 Rand ID 0.0247
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15 Title Actress Natalie Portman: People are 'en-




Reporter Leigh Munsil Period December
Publication 
Date








58 Rand ID 0.002
16 Title Here's how much the Obama family has 





Reporter Tré Goins-Phillips Period December
Publication 
Date








307 Rand ID 0.0287
17 Title Liberal TV host criticizes Hillary Clinton 




Reporter Jon Street Period December
Publication 
Date








87 Rand ID 0.002
	 	 282





Reporter Brandon Morse Period December
Publication 
Date







326 Rand ID 0.0085





Reporter Chris Enloe Period December
Publication 
Date








117 Rand ID 0.003
20 Title Kellyanne Conway implies Obama doesn't 




Reporter Carlos Garcia Period December
Publication 
Date







83 Rand ID 0.0211
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21 Title President Obama uses Trump's favorite 





Reporter Sara Gonzales Period December
Publication 
Date








151 Rand ID 0.0131
22 Title Obama roasts Russia in press confer-




Reporter Leigh Munsil Period December
Publication 
Date







78 Rand ID 0.0015
23 Title Federal judge orders unsealing of search 




Reporter Chris Enloe Period December
Publication 
Date








40 Rand ID 0.027
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24 Title Netanyahu spokesman: We have 'ironclad' 





Reporter Chris Enloe Period December
Publication 
Date








426 Rand ID 0.0336
25 Title New Judicial Watch documents: Obama 





Reporter Leigh Munsil Period December
Publication 
Date








221 Rand ID 0.0207
26 Title Day after deadly Ft. Lauderdale mass 





Reporter Dave Urbanski Period January
Publication 
Date








109 Rand ID 0.0123
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27 Title Meryl Streep finds Trump sickening, but 




Reporter bishopdave Period January
Publication 
Date







9 Rand ID 0.0056
28 Title Millions migrated to states with right-to-





Reporter Brandon Morse Period January
Publication 
Date








63 Rand ID 0.0098
29 Title There are three times as many bus per-





Reporter Carlos Garcia Period January
Publication 
Date








326 Rand ID 0
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30 Title When two Americas met in Washington, 




Reporter Sarah Lee Period January
Publication 
Date








94 Rand ID 0.0039
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